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ABSTRACT 
In 1899, Atlantans saw their city streets as multi-purpose open spaces, freely available to all 
persons and transit modes. By 1929, that understanding had changed. Streets became automobile 
conduits to rapidly and efficiently move motor vehicles around town. Other modes of 
transportation had disappeared or been marginalized. New government regulations tightly 
controlled or banished other street users and uses. Vast amounts of municipal space became the 
domain of automobiles, losing the democratic values which public roads formerly represented. 
This study will demonstrate that during the 1920s, Atlanta’s powerful elites brought about this 
transformation of society’s comprehension of the meaning and function of a city street. Seeing 
the automobile as the essential tool for city expansion, this pro-growth coalition directly 
intervened in state and municipal government to enact laws favoring motor vehicles. They 
sought and won the allocation of public funds to build the physical infrastructure and legislative 
superstructure to facilitate the presence of cars on city streets. The print media marketed the 
changed definition of street space, and promoted the automobile as a status symbol and a way to 
escape the always-contentious, multi-racial streetcars. Realtors and investors urged better roads 
for automobile access to their burgeoning suburban developments. While the transformative 
process took root and sprouted between 1900 and 1919, the twenties witnessed the bulk of the 
efforts of the growth alliance to remake Atlanta’s city streets. No longer a luxury vehicle for the 
very rich, by 1920, the car had emerged as a necessity for all but the poorest citizens. Utilizing 
modern marketing methods and innovative business strategies, automakers helped emplace a 
national culture of consumption. Advertisements urged Atlantans to go into debt to purchase the 
latest models, while the local government struggled to cope with traffic gridlock and outrageous 
numbers of auto-related fatalities. Blaming streetcars for the congestion, business and civic 
leaders also increasingly faulted pedestrians and children for their own injuries and deaths—they 
should not have strayed onto streets which no longer belonged to everyone. By 1929, Atlanta’s 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The early twentieth century was an era of associations, organizations, institutes, societies, 
clubs of every kind; and Atlanta was a city of joiners. This paper will most often give the full 
name, though for readability, abbreviations will sometimes be used. 
AAA  American Automobile Association 
AAAA  Atlanta Automobile Accessory Association, eventually merged with AADA 
AACW Associated Advertising Clubs of the World 
AADA  Atlanta Automobile Dealers’ Association, local chapter of NADA 
AAEA  Atlanta Automotive Equipment Association, eventually merged with AADA 
AAMC Atlanta Ad Men’s Club (women were welcome members) 
AAOSG Association of Automobile Owners of the State of Georgia 
ACTB  Atlanta Convention and Tourist Bureau, earlier the Atlanta Convention Bureau 
AEC  American Engineering Council 
AERA  American Electric Railway Association 
AFT  Atlanta Federation of Trades, conglomerate labor organization 
AGMA Atlanta Garage Managers’ Association 
AIA  American Institute of Architects; also FAIA indicating a Fellow of the institute 
AJBA  Atlanta Jitney Bus Association 
ALAM Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers 
AMC  Atlanta Motor Club 
AMCMA American Motor Car Manufacturers’ Association 
APD  Atlanta Police Department 
ARMA Atlanta Retail Merchants Association 
ASC  Atlanta Safety Council, local chapter of NSC 
ASCE  American Society of Civil Engineers 
AtlAA  Atlanta Automobile Association, local chapter of AAA 
AUC  Atlanta University Center 
AUL  Atlanta Urban League 
BOMA Building Owners and Managers Association 
BPR  Bureau of Public Roads 
CBD  Central Business District, aka, downtown 
CSA  Citizens’ Safety Association, forerunner to the Atlanta Safety Council 
CIC  Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
COC  Chamber of Commerce; also JCOC, Junior Chamber of Commerce 
CSA  Citizens’ Safety Association 
FMC  Ford Motor Company 
GADA  Georgia Automotive Dealers’ Association 
GM  General Motors Corporation 
GMA  Georgia Manufacturers’ Association 
GMAC General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
GPSC  Georgia Public Service Commission 
GSAA  Georgia State Automobile Association 
xiv 
HEB  Highway Education Board 
LAW  League of American Wheelmen (women not welcome) 
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
NAAM National Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
NACOC National Automobile Chamber of Commerce 
NADA  National Automobile Dealers’ Association 
NACW National Association for Colored Women 
NAREB National Association of Real Estate Boards, the whites-only organization formed  
  in 1908 as the National Association of Real Estate Exchanges, but changed the  
  name in 1916; became the National Association of Realtors in 1972. 
NAREB National Association of Real Estate Brokers, the African American organization  
  formed in 1947 as Blacks were excluded from the white real estate groups. 
NBC  National Broadcasting Company 
NNBL  National Negro Business League 
NSC  National Safety Council 
NUL  National Urban League; the Atlanta chapter was the Atlanta Urban League (AUL) 
NU  Neighborhood Union 
OOHA  Out of home advertising; usually refers to billboards 
OOHAAA Out of Home Advertising Association of America 
SAE  Society of Automotive Engineers. It began as the Society of Automobile   
  Engineers in 1905, but in 1916, added in the American Society of Aeronautic  
  Engineers, the  Society of Tractor Engineers, as well as representatives from the  
  power boating industry, and changed the name to reflect its broadened scope. 
SMF  Southern Motorists’ Federation 
WGST  WGM were the call letters for Atlanta’s second radio station, licensed to the  
  Atlanta Constitution, which soon donated it to the Georgia School of Technology  
  [now Georgia Institute of Technology]. The school immediately got a new license  
for educational broadcasting, with the call letters WGST. 
WSB  Call letters of Atlanta’s first radio station, licensed to the Atlanta Journal. What  
  they stand for is somewhat esoteric; “W” was an early regional designator for 
naval radio signal entities, and “B” indicated the second entry in its class. The 
popular “Welcome South, Brother” explanation is a colorful local invention. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In 1899, the citizens of Atlanta, Georgia experienced their city streets as multi-purpose 
spaces open to the free exercise of various transportation modes, social functions, and 
commercial activities. By 1929, that understanding had changed: streets now served as 
automobile conduits with the major purpose of rapidly and efficiently moving motor vehicles 
around the metropolitan area. The heavier, faster, free-ranging machines had marginalized or 
eliminated horses, mules, bicycles, and even pedestrians. New municipal ordinances banished or 
tightly circumscribed all non-automotive street users and uses. Motorized traffic took over vast 
amounts of once-shared, free-to-all public space, running roughshod over the democratic values 
which city roadways formerly represented. 
How did this happen? How did the car “win” the road? Academics have offered 
numerous explanations, and certainly multiple factors made possible and assisted the 
automobile’s rise to dominate the nation’s streets during the early twentieth century. A highly 
popular conception insists that Americans simply loved their cars. This narrative maintains that 
the preeminence of the car over all other forms of ground transportation occurred in a free, 
capitalist marketplace. Citizens voted with their dollars, right feet planted firmly on accelerator 
pedals. The automobile was the people’s choice, a triumph of democracy. Devotees of this view 
consider any suggestion to the contrary unpatriotic, even un-American. 
This study suggests an alternate explanation. It will demonstrate that, between 1920 and 
1929, a group of powerful, elite Atlantans transformed the meaning and function of their city’s 
streets. This coterie of influential whites, mostly men, comprised what Harvey Molotch terms a 
growth-machine coalition: a group of business leaders who viewed urban property as a market 
commodity capable of providing great wealth and power. These individuals had the most to gain 
2 
or lose in urban land-use decisions, and the automobile supplied the essential transportation 
component for successful property development. As such, cars needed accommodation in the 
forms of good roads and traffic laws to enable the mobility required for municipal spread.1 
For the coalition, increased automobility and city expansion intertwined as co-
dependents; one could not occur without the other. A new “motor age geography” had become 
necessary. Consequently, group members worked to ensure that local government enacted 
policies and distributed resources favorable to both. Their initial efforts took place in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century, but they got serious in the 1920s. During those ten years, 
they re-made the common understanding of a road’s purpose—conveying automobiles. In so 
doing, they reconstructed city streets, installing the physical infrastructure and legislative 
superstructure requisite for cars to function unobstructed by poor pavement and unhindered by 
slower, more vulnerable street users.2 
On the list of explanations for how the car won the road, the growth-machine thesis with 
its coalition of powerful influencers ranks as one variant within the “elite-imposition” school. 
Adherents generally maintain that businessmen, professionals, the automobile industry, and city 
planners deliberately promoted the motor vehicle. Some see dirty-dealing conspiracies; others 
find less nefarious hookups between pro-car forces. Peter Norton, in his groundbreaking book, 
Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, dismisses the elite-
imposition theory as inadequate because none of its versions explain why elites fought so hard to 
privilege the automobile.3  
 
1 Harvey Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” American 
Journal of Sociology 82, no. 2 (1976): 309-14. 
2 For an overview of the nationwide construction of the new geography in the 1920s, see Christopher W. 
Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 125-39. 
3 Peter D. Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2008), 9-10, 13-14. 
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This study supplies that missing “why.” The growth-machine thesis offers a cogent, 
rational, and believable explanation of the motivating factors of the placed-based urban elite 
alliance and their view of city expansion as a way to greater personal wealth. One of the 
important contributions of this narrative to the existing literature is that it fills the lacuna 
identified by Norton in elite-imposition theory. This study concentrates on the changing physical 
configuration of city streets and evolving legislation of street uses and users, largely directed by 
the pro-growth coalition to privilege the automobile.  
Through long experience, the association of influential decision-makers and policy-
setters understood the transportation as an essential component of development. Between 1899 
and 1929, these power elites gradually embraced the automobile as the latest, most promising 
transit mode. Themselves wealthy men and owners of multiple cars, they early saw the potential 
of the new-fangled horseless carriage, and adopted it as the modern cog in their vision of the 
urban growth machine. In order to increase the utility of the automobile to achieve their 
expansionist goals, in the 1920s they re-made Atlanta’s streets and laws to facilitate motor 
vehicle travel. At the same time, the coalition promoted car use, deploying the latest marketing 
strategies and advertising techniques to convince city dwellers that they too needed to possess 
one of these marvelous inventions. Before the stock market crashed, the group had succeeded in 
both endeavors: nearly half of local households owned a car, and city streets existed primarily to 
move them.  
 A hundred years later, Atlanta still strives to build its way out of its notorious traffic 
gridlock while the greater metropolitan area continues to grow, extending in 2020 to include 29 
counties with a population approaching six million. But the pattern began a hundred years ago 
with a group of local place entrepreneurs who held the power to direct financing, plans, and 
4 
policies. They enacted their vision of urban growth via automobile, enthusiastically endorsed 
motor vehicle use, and set into place the legal and physical structures necessary to establish 
motordom’s autocracy, under which we all exist today. In Atlanta, the car did not “win” the road; 
instead, the pro-growth coalition literally paved the way as they surrendered city streets to the 
automobile. 
1.1 Molotch’s Growth Machine Thesis 
A closer look at Molotch’s growth machine thesis helps explain Atlanta’s own 
association of powerful elites and how they operated. His empirical theory rests on the 
assumption that land is a market commodity and therefore is of great importance to “place 
entrepreneurs”—those individuals and entities interested and invested in property. Owning, 
developing, and selling land can generate significant wealth.  
However, the process requires constant activity to maintain or swell the revenue stream. 
A variety of strategies can be employed to keep the money flowing, such as acquiring 
undeveloped territory outside the city, or replacing small, outdated intown structures with larger, 
modern buildings capable of generating higher rents. Another popular technique, raising property 
values can be achieved either by increasing accessibility so that different sections of town 
become more attractive to investors, or by legislating exclusivity for wealthy residents in select 
neighborhoods.  
The growth imperative forms the political and economic essence of virtually any 
municipality, and drives decisions about property, services, and finances. The city effectively 
serves as a machine to stimulate wealth and generate economic growth, an “areal expression” of 
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the business affairs and concerns of the place-based elites. As urban borders swell, so do their 
personal fortunes.4 
According to Molotch, the desire for expansion motivates those with property interests to 
unite and form a coalition. The clearest indicators of their success are the continuous extension 
of city boundaries and rising population counts. To achieve both, the group works to influence 
local, and when possible, state and national governments, seeking favorable legislation. 
Decisions about land use, transportation, tax rates, labor relations, law enforcement, public 
utilities—each has the power to affect the business climate, attracting or repelling new industries, 
enhancing or curtailing growth. Should the real estate market fill completely, expanding 
development encroaches into surrounding communities. Ensuring that municipal policies will 
promote growth is a key function of the association, and often group members have government 
positions. But in or out of office, the place entrepreneurs hold considerable power at the local 
level.5  
A pro-growth coalition usually consists of three types of individuals or organizations. 
The majority are property owners, business proprietors, and local investors—people with land or 
land-based interests who depend on city government to enable their everyday commercial 
activities. Financiers, lawyers, realtors, and syndicators make up another subset; they provide 
various forms of assistance or services to those in the first group. Also active in the association 
are those who may not have direct place-based concerns, but whose financial fortunes depend on 
city growth.6 
 
4 Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” 309-10.  
5 Ibid., 310, 312-13, 317-18. 
6 Ibid., 314. 
6 
Coalition members work not only through government, but also make strenuous efforts to 
promote the metropolis. They are the city boosters who generate community spirit, what Molotch 
calls the “we feeling,” which can greatly influence local politics. But boosterism can also reach 
beyond the city limits and spread the word about urban amenities and a commerce-friendly 
reputation throughout the region or even nationally. Often a function of the local Chamber of 
Commerce, it encompasses an array of activities aimed at a variety of audiences, including 
expositions, parades, public school curricula, professional sports teams, essay-writing contests, 
conventions, and advertisements in business and travel publications. All contribute to unite 
citizens, foster “civic jingoism,” and promote the pro-development agenda.7   
 Essential to the growth-machine efforts are the local media, especially, in the early 
twentieth century, the newspapers. An ever-expanding metropolitan region benefits their revenue 
streams with increased subscriptions from a growing population and a wider area of affect for 
their many advertisements. A paper’s financial status depends on the size of its customer base; 
not only will it sell more lines of advertising, but it can charge higher rates per line. The 
transition of print media from being subscription-dependent to relying primarily on advertising 
for the bulk of their revenues had occurred by 1900, but increased exponentially during the 
1920s (see Table 16 in Chapter 7).  
The newspaper is an active member of the pro-growth coalition on its own behalf. But it 
also acts as the group’s major mouthpiece, championing all the boosterish activities to unify the 
citizenry, burnish the city’s reputation, and promote the growth agenda. It generally does not 
care which direction urban expansion takes (a newspaper can be delivered to any doorstep), and 
therefore acts as a fair and disinterested observer, or at least maintains that perception. Although 
 
7 Ibid., 314-15. 
7 
viewed as the voice of the community, in reality the newspaper does more than merely describe 
public events and activities. By its coverage, editorials, political slant, racial and religious biases, 
and even the advertising it accepts, it can also shape or direct public opinion. The media then is a 
valued and necessary member of the growth group, endorsing specific municipal policies to 
expand the local economy and attract wealth into the region.8 
Scholars of the growth-machine thesis have described it as an urban phenomenon limited 
almost exclusively to the United States. That regional tendency could arguably be tied to Sam 
Bass Warner’s American value system of “privatism,” providing a foundation for the successful 
operation of U.S.-based growth-machine coalitions. Warner defines privatism as the insistence 
that the purpose of life is primarily to engage in a personal struggle for wealth, that “the 
individual should see his first loyalty as his immediate family, and that a community should be a 
union of such money-making, accumulating families.” He asserts that widespread adoption of 
such attitudes has impacted the physical forms of American urban areas, whose “lots, houses, 
factories, and streets have been the outcome of a real estate market of profit-seeking builders, 
land speculators, and large investors.” While not essential to an understanding of the city as a 
growth machine, Warner’s economic framing of American individualism supports the place 
entrepreneurs’ focus on space commodification as essential to growth, and on its subsequent 
effects on urban structure.9  
Any study of the genesis of America’s automobile age must consider Norton’s Fighting 
Traffic. He argues that before city streets could be reconfigured to privilege automobiles, the 
 
8 Molotch, “The City as Growth Machine,” 315-16; Andrew E. G. Jonas, and David Wilson, eds., The 
Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1999), 3. 
9 Sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 3-4; Rick Beard, “From Suburb to Defended Neighborhood: Change in Atlanta's 
Inman Park and Ansley Park, 1890-1980” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1981), 377-78. 
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streets themselves had to be reconstituted as places where society agreed that cars belonged. He 
studies this social reconstruction through the lens of the various groups fighting over who had 
the right to the public roadways. The pro-automobile interests, collectively referred to as 
motordom, ultimately prevailed. This study contends instead that the reconstitution of society’s 
street views happened while the physical reconfiguration took place. At least in Atlanta, no strict 
temporal divide between the two occurred. However, his delineations of the combatants and 
winner fit the narrative presented here.10  
Norton convincingly describes how motordom effectively utilized rhetoric borrowed 
from the American ideals of individual liberty and free markets to persuade the country that 
motorists had a right to street space. But beyond highly-resonant oratory, the pro-car alliance had 
additional weapons in the form of national associations with local chapters in every city; a pro-
business Republican political climate; substantial wealth to promote their agenda; and the 
sympathy of increasing numbers of motorists. The disparate and disorganized combatants 
(streetcar companies, parents of young children, police, independent traffic engineers not 
employed by the auto industry) lost, and by 1930, motordom had redefined urban streets. Again, 
similar actors and activities appear within the growth coalition narrative presented here.11 
This dissertation strives to put a face on the forces of motordom as it evolved in the early 
twentieth century. It falls into the elite-imposition category of explanations of how the car won 
the road, which Norton faults for not explaining why elites strove for automotive dominance. He 
never analyzes the motivations of the pro-car constituents, beyond undefined allusions to 
expanding capitalism. In contrast, the growth-machine theory offers a reasonable explanation of 
 
10 Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 1-6. 
11 Ibid., 17. This writer strongly disagrees with Norton’s “sympathy of motorists” characterization. They 
did not merely support motordom; they were one of its essential components. 
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precisely why the urban elite alliance promoted the car. The group sought financial gains from 
city expansion, which required the mobility and accessibility provided by the automobile. Norton 
takes a broad, generalized view, focusing on the goals and strategies of the entities comprising 
U.S. motordom. This study is more granular, scrutinizing the identities and actions of the local 
individuals and organizations leading the fight for the redefinition of one city’s streets.12  
1.2 Studies of Atlanta’s Decision-Makers  
That Atlanta has long possessed a group of well-to-do decision-makers who controlled 
local policies and directed city growth can be found in the writings of an array of scholars. 
Several studies specifically about the city assert that a group or association of groups have 
dominated urban politics and influenced the plans and ordinances enacted by elected officials. 
Floyd Hunter’s 1953 Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers led the way, 
documenting Atlanta’s leaders and the system of power relations operative in the early 1950s. 
Businessmen, financiers, government officials, professionals, the newspapers, and others with 
civic interests made up his consortium, although a much smaller insider subset at the heart of the 
group held veto power. These men set the municipal agenda, making use of “propaganda media” 
to establish and maintain policies beneficial to their concerns. Hunter’s was truly a path-breaking 
study, dismaying social scientists, especially those of the pluralist persuasion, and arguably 
inaugurating the field of power structure research. His empirical study of Atlanta’s power base 
preceded Molotch by more than twenty years but fits well in the growth-coalition theory of local 
power.13   
 
12 Ibid., 9, 13-14.; Norton focuses on the goals of the conglomeration of entities comprising motordom. 
13 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1953), 11-13, 208; Clarence N. Stone, “Preemptive Power: Floyd Hunter's ‘Community 
Power Structure’ Reconsidered,” American Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (February 1988): 87; G. William 
Domhoff, “C. Wright Mills, Floyd Hunter, and 50 Years of Power Structure Research,” Michigan Sociological 
Review 21 (Fall 2007): 11.  
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Later came Regime Politics, in which political scientist Clarence Stone investigated how 
Atlanta’s urban government collaborated with business interests to shape the city’s policy 
agenda. While his regime theory differs from the growth machine thesis in approach, it 
fundamentally describes the identical government-private sector dynamic. Stone agrees with 
Hunter that, in Atlanta at least, the growth elites dominated. His chosen period of study (1946-
88) enables him to address in detail the African American leadership’s incorporation into and 
eventual control of the governing coalition. The present study also looks at the decision-makers 
of the Black community, who comprised a pro-growth alliance operating parallel to the ruling 
white coalition during a time when Jim Crow reigned supreme. For the most part ignored, Blacks 
on occasion held a singular power at the ballot box, which they would strategically employ to 
influence the municipal program to their advantage in the 1920s.14 
Scholars across a variety of disciplines continue to utilize growth machine theory in their 
studies of numerous U.S. cities, including Atlanta. For the most part, however, they have 
investigated more recent history, and for a time, many believed that urban growth machines 
existed only after the second World War. Writing two decades after his initial thesis, Molotch 
acknowledged that his idea could also apply to pre-Fordist periods. The core growth-machine 
concept holds, though the details change over time. Coalitions continue to make use of the 
available technologies, marketing techniques, fiscal instruments, and trending industries.15 
 
14 Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1989). 
15 Robert Edward Cochran, “Governmentality: The New Urbanism and the Creative Class within Atlanta, 
Georgia” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012); Akira Drake, “The Politics of Atlanta's 
Public Housing: Race, Planning, and Inclusions, 1936-1975” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2014); Harvey 
Molotch, “Growth Machine Links: Up, Down, and Across,” in The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives 
Two Decades Later, ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York, 1999), 249.  
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This study joins the stream of more recent scholarship documenting earlier growth-
coalition manifestations.16 It demonstrates how, between 1920 and 1929, Atlanta’s place 
entrepreneurs championed the new automotive technology, promoted motor vehicle use, and 
invited car manufacturing and related industries to locate in the area. The group employed 
innovative as well as traditional financing schemes, and went even further, deploying legislative 
tools to reconfigure the city streets to establish automobile dominance. 
Outside of the growth machine school, others have studied Atlanta’s power elites during 
the general time frame of this study. Lyon writes about building trends in Atlanta from 
Reconstruction to 1930, and asserts that pressure from local elites steered development in the 
central business district during the early twentieth century. Lands discusses the civic and 
business elites operating between 1880 and 1950, and how this “white, propertied power” 
divided the city by race and class, privileging exclusive park-neighborhoods. Amsterdam, who 
also focuses on the 1920s, describes how the “well-off bankers, manufacturers, merchants, and 
high-end lawyers who made up the city’s white commercial and industrial elite” comprised  “a 
group deeply committed to attracting new businesses to the city.” They sought to “further the 
goals of urban reform and urban boosterism to prepare citizens for work and democracy while 
helping to lure new firms to their hometowns.” Each of these different authors focus on disparate 
municipal elements and policies, but all chronicle the same set of influential Atlantans that 
comprise the pro-growth coalition of this dissertation.17 
 
16 Domhoff maintains that between 1890 and 1920, growth coalitions not only existed, but developed a 
sophisticated system; G. William Domhoff, “The Shortcomings of Rival Urban Theories,” University of California, 
http://whorulesamerica.net/. 
17 Elizabeth Anne Mack Lyon, “Business Buildings in Atlanta: A Study in Urban Growth and Form” (Ph.D. 
diss., Emory University, 1971), 384-86, 464-65; LeeAnn Lands, The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing 
Landscapes in Atlanta, 1880-1950 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 2, 19-26; Daniel Amsterdam, 
Roaring Metropolis: Businessmen's Campaign for a Civic Welfare State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2016), 1-2, 5, 15, 39. Lands and Lyon write exclusively about Atlanta, while Amsterdam’s is a comparative 
study of Atlanta, Detroit, and Philadelphia. 
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Doyle’s comparative study of New South cities between 1860 and 1910 pushes back 
specifically against the growth-machine theory. His complaint focuses on what he calls its 
mechanistic view of urbanization, which portrays cities “simply as large, impersonal growth 
machines that respond reflexively to opportunities for economic expansion and to the dictates of 
geographic advantage.” Such a view does not allow for human agency in the city-building 
process, and also omits government’s essential role. Some cities like Atlanta flourished while 
others like Charleston languished. He attributes the difference to the men acting (or not) within 
their specific settings and capitalizing (or not) on locational advantages and amenities.18 
A close reading of Molotch, however, reveals that powerful urban individuals and their 
organizations comprise the essential actors. They, in conjunction with government at multiple 
levels, utilize their city as a mechanism for expanding money-making capabilities. Setting aside 
an argument over the machine metaphor, this writer agrees completely with Doyle’s description 
of the men who created the New South paradigm, and maintains that it perfectly encapsulates a 
group of prominent growth leaders.  
At the head of each local enterprise were the leading businessmen, who may be 
likened to the major stockholders and board of directors. Not only did their 
individual businesses hinge on the success of their cities, their investment in local 
real estate rose or fell with their city’s fortunes. They enlisted the aid of local and 
state governments, whose leaders often came from their own ranks, and engaged 
newspaper editors as propagandists, but the main energy and much of the capital 
that fueled the city-building process flowed from the business elite.19 
 
Beyond Doyle, yet another study of southern urban areas effectively documented an 
Atlanta expansionist alliance a year before Molotch published his growth machine thesis. For 
five cities in the 1920s, Blaine Brownell catalogs the “urban ethos”— a defining conception of 
 
18 Don Harrison Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-
1910 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 17. Doyle perhaps refers to some social scientific, 
economic, or geographic renditions of growth-machine theory, or assigns greater weight to the machine metaphor. 
19 Ibid. 
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the city encompassing the desirability and necessity of both urban growth and social order. His 
“commercial-civic elite” realized those two mutually reinforcing goals by focusing attention 
primarily on the downtown business district, and utilizing print sources to promote their projects. 
For Brownell, Atlanta exemplified the new metropolitan South as its elite men, acting through 
the local Chamber of Commerce, dominated urban affairs in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.20  
Brownell’s narrative of the city’s leadership describes a typical pro-growth coalition: the 
close relationship between prominent businessmen and government officials, their concern with 
media and presentation, their occasional disagreements but general unanimity on the direction of 
municipal policies. He also takes care to underscore the fundamental inequities of such an 
alliance and its inherent biases favoring both commerce and whiteness. While the decision-
makers at times had to factor in labor interests, they had no concern whatsoever for the Black 
citizens, and only did the minimum to maintain law and order and to enforce the existing racial 
status quo. The findings of this dissertation comport closely with his analysis of Atlanta’s 
leaders, their concerns, methods of operation, prejudices, and exclusivities. Brownell effectively 
describes a growth-machine association before Molotch named the phenomenon.21 
Finally, Preston’s Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-
1935 greatly informed this study. Asserting that the car played a leading role in producing the 
modern South, Preston focuses on Atlanta between 1900 and 1930, with occasional comparisons 
to other U.S. cities. During that period, radical changes occurred in the city’s size, financial 
 
20 Blaine A. Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1975), 44-53. Mixon utilizes Brownell’s term, “commercial-civic elite,” and also cites Hunter’s books on 
Atlanta’s policymakers in his study of the 1906 race riot; Gregory Mixon, The Atlanta Riot: Race, Class, and 
Violence in a New South City (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2004), 1-4, 132, and throughout. 
21 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, xvi, xix, 53-60. 
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structures, and physical characteristics, aided by the automobile which provided not only 
convenient transportation but also a wealth-producing industry. By 1930, the car had become the 
prevailing means of urban transportation.22 
Preston and this dissertation investigate the same city, people, topic, and nearly the same 
time period. Both arrive at the identical conclusion, that “Atlanta was transformed from a city 
built to serve the railroad to a metropolis adjusted to accommodate the automobile,” begging the 
question, why this study? A major difference is this paper’s utilization of the growth-machine 
thesis to explain when, how, and why a coterie of influential white men adopted the automobile 
as a tool for municipal expansion. Citing Paul Gaston, Preston does maintain that boosterish 
spokesmen did deploy the car to bring prosperity and recognition to the South. However, his 
primary focus is on the fiscal advantages of having auto dealerships and assembly plants in town, 
not how cars increased accessibility to developing properties. While generally acknowledging 
the fiscal motivations of prominent individuals and city officials, he does not reference the 
existence of the informally organized body of policy-makers. Neither does he investigate, as this 
study does, precisely how that group’s influence changed the local laws and city streets.23 
Preston’s is more a top-down look at the effects of automobility on Atlanta and its pivotal 
role in transforming the city into a progressive metropolis. This bottom-up study specifically 
explores how the pro-growth elites created new systems—both physical and legislative—to 
privilege cars as their primary tool for municipal expansion. Their efforts resulted in a 
 
22 Howard L. Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1979), xiv-xvii, 16. 
23 Paul M. Gaston, The New South Creed:  A Study in Southern Mythmaking (New York: Knopf, 1970), 68;  
as quoted in Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 16, 144. Preston 
does not reference Hunter or Molotch; his emphasis is not on the pro-growth coalition, its members, its motives, its 
mechanics. 
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reconfiguration of the streets specifically for automobile mobility, accompanied by a radically 
different understanding of what and who constituted acceptable street uses and users. 
1.3 Methodology and Organization  
This study was sparked by a desire to discover the origins of Atlanta’s auto-centric ethos 
with its sadly inadequate mass transit system. By understanding how the city arrived at this 
transportation imbroglio, perhaps those of us who live here could find a way out of it. From the 
very beginning, and long before encountering either Molotch or Hunter, this writer decided that 
an investigation of the people empowered to create car-dominant roadways would comprise a 
critical part of the study.  
Consequently, a database of over 200 white leaders (including four women) was 
compiled and eventually narrowed to 114 persons who had an impact on Atlanta’s city streets in 
the early twentieth century. Another database identifies 21 African American leaders (including 
one woman). Certainly the city had many more Black leaders and prominent business owners 
than those selected here. During the Jim Crow era, however, very few had the power to bring any 
alteration to the city streets, and those who did had only indirect influence. The bulk of the 
physical and legislative changes to Atlanta’s roadways occurred in the chambers of the all-white 
city council at the behest of the white business leadership. Throughout this dissertation, non-
specific mentions of such entities as the pro-growth coalition, power elites, and city officials 
refer to the whites who held significant authority over their fellow African American citizens.24  
As even brief sketches of 135 lives would make tedious reading, the general approach of 
this study will be to discuss the most important individuals as they enter the narrative within the 
 
24 Hunter, in his study of Atlanta’s leaders over just a few years in the early 1950s, had an initial database 
of 175, from which he selected 40 top-tier white elites to investigate in depth, and 34 Black leaders to determine 
what power they held and how they interacted with the white leadership; Hunter, Community Power Structure: A 
Study of Decision Makers, 10-11, 116-17, 175. 
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context of their transportation-related activities. Chapter 2 examines both of Atlanta’s 
associations of place entrepreneurs, their members, their relationships, and the power 
differentials within as well as between the two racially-segregated groups. It will demonstrate 
how closely the city’s elites mirror textbook examples of pro-growth coalitions in composition 
and function, and in their strategies for persuading government officials and fellow citizens to 
embrace policies advantageous to the groups’ interests. 
Seeing the car as the essential transit cog, the growth forces directly intervened with 
government bodies to write, enact, and enforce pro-automobile laws and limiting other street 
uses. Before most urban families even owned a car, coalition members initiated the allocation of 
public funds to construct a massive two-tiered system to facilitate motor vehicle movement. One 
tier consisted of the physical overhaul of city streets by grading, paving, and re-sizing roads and 
sidewalks. It also included building car-carrying viaducts above the city’s original life line, the 
railroad network running through the heart of downtown.  
The second tier comprised legislation to create a blanketing “web of regulation,”25 
defining and enforcing who could use city streets, and how and when and where. The expansion 
advocates’ ultimate goal remained constant throughout: growing Atlanta for economic gain. 
They succeeded admirably: the city by 1929 had expanded in area, population, and reputation as 
the financial nucleus, central distribution point, and automotive center of the southeastern United 
States.  
Atlanta entered the Automobile Age on in 1899, when a motor car first drove on city 
streets, causing much wonder and excitement. Over the next twenty years, policymakers slowly 
 
25 Dr. Barbara Young Welke, J.D., conjured the wonderfully evocative phrase, “the web of regulation” in 
her perceptive study, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 377.  
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came to approve and tentatively advance motor vehicle use. But the substantial work occurred 
during the decade of the twenties, culminating in December 1929’s publication of the city’s first 
comprehensive traffic survey. That document enshrined motor vehicle supremacy for the Greater 
Atlanta metropolitan area. Atlanta adopted automobility gradually over thirty years, with the 
decades characterized by the familiar trope of crawl, walk, run. The ten-year periods are loosely 
defined as follows:  
  1900-09   Co-existence—shared streets 
  1910-19   Conflict—contested streets 
  1920-29   Consolidation—exclusive streets 
  
Neither the dates nor their descriptions are hard-and-fast delimiters, but do outline the 
general trajectory of the changing understandings of the city’s streets. The first two decades saw 
the tentative beginnings of Atlanta’s automobility, but the most striking alterations took effect 
and motordom achieved supremacy during the Roaring Twenties. Chapter 3 introduces that 
tumultuous decade of the consolidation of urban streets as nearly exclusive car conduits. 
Four chapters describe the 1920s, the decade when the elite businessmen and 
professionals implemented the majority of the infrastructural changes to Atlanta’s streets in 
pursuit of their goal of car-enabled urban expansion. Chapter 4 discusses the creation of the first 
official planning commission, and chronicles in detail how it, the growth alliance, and the city 
government united to pass bond issues for the construction of the three major viaducts. Chapter 5 
documents the city’s traffic problems and solutions: gridlock, fatalities, pedestrian control, 
children in the streets, the creation of a traffic regulation system, and removing or limiting once 
acceptable uses of the public roadways—including the streetcars.  
Chapter 6 examines segregated Atlanta, the 1922 zoning ordinance and its claim to 
protect property values by racially-dividing residential areas. It considers Black Atlanta, semi-
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segregated streetcars, and the race-based policing of city streets. Chapter 7 recounts two 
entrepreneurial tales: selling the city and selling cars. It first traces how the growth coalition used 
modern marketing techniques to establish Atlanta as the nation’s southern business headquarters. 
It then describes the rescue of the flailing auto industry by saturation advertising and innovative 
business strategies. Chapter 8 wraps up the decade with a detailed look at the city’s 1929 traffic 
survey, which ensured the streetcar’s demise and deliberately kicked the twin cans of Atlanta’s 
on-street parking and one-way streets dilemmas down the gridlocked roads, still unresolved 
today. More importantly, the study established automobile domination and the cemented the 
understanding of city streets primarily as channels for cars and trucks.26  
Chapter 9 presents some conclusions of the study. It examines the great liability of the 
growth-machine coalition: its massive inequities which left the majority of Atlanta’s citizens 
voiceless in the policy-making process. Motivated by narrow self-interests, the power elites had 
little understanding of or concern for many of the important issues confronting all of the African 
Americans and most of the rest of Atlanta’s citizens. Their policy of city expansion via 
automobile took years, cost millions of taxpayer dollars, and required copious amounts of 
legislation to restructure and regulate the streets. To undo any of it, or make meaningful changes 
to reduce its harmful effects will require similar investments of time, money, and political will.    
The major goal of this dissertation is to detail why and how the “shared roads” of 1899 
changed, primarily between 1920 and 1929, into virtual car conduits. It studies the alliance of top 
influencers in one city, Atlanta, Georgia, adopting the local view of the place where a growth-
machine coalition operates. This street-level (in every way) perspective best elucidates the 
 
26 Stephen Deere, “AJC Continuing Coverage: Parking Tickets,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 
28, 2020; Bill Torpy, “Two Ways of Looking at Changing One-Way Baker Street,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
June 3, 2019; Emil Moffatt, “Atlanta Mayor Puts Brakes on Baker Street Two-Way Conversion,” 90.1 FM WABE  
(July 11, 2019). 
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relationships between individuals and groups, actions and spaces. Doyle and Barrett both 
advocate the close study of specific urban settings and the individual business leaders operating 
within them; only through such detailed scrutiny can early twentieth-century transportation 
policy be understood.27 
Youthful Atlanta did not possess much of the cultural baggage of some older southern 
cities. From its unconventional railroad beginnings, it was an upstart, a brash commercial town 
where business, and a reputation for busyness, reigned supreme. The 1864 conflagration forced 
locals to rebuild much of downtown, further enhancing the sense of newness and vitality. The 
rapidity of its literal reconstruction during and beyond the Reconstruction years gave civic 
boosters ample opportunities to boast of Atlanta’s progressive and industrious attitudes and its 
eager embrace of modernity.28 
Yet the city was not entirely atypical. Similarly-motivated and enthusiastic businessmen 
led their cities into the New South, embracing different industries, residents, forms of 
government, and cultural mores well into the twentieth century. What happened in Atlanta—the 
ceding of the streets to the automobile—happened everywhere else in the nation. But in 
addressing U.S. urban transportation issues of the early twentieth century, Barrett summarizes it 
best: “Common problems and common factors . . . all helped shape transportation policy in every 
city, but policy itself remained embedded in local history.” The individuals mattered; different 
actors in a particular time and place may have as much impact on city building and transportation 
 
27 Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910, xiv; Paul 
Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit: The Formation of Public Policy in Chicago, 1900-1930 (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1983), 5. 
28 City of Atlanta Board of Education, Atlanta: A City of the Modern South (New York: Smith & Durrell, 
1942), 6-7; Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910, 136-58. 
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decisions than the external forces operating more generally. Atlanta then serves as illustrative 
though not archetypal.29 
This dissertation utilizes the Atlanta Constitution, the city’s only daily morning paper, as 
its most essential primary source, in no small part due to its availability in a full-text searchable 
format. The dual descriptive/prescriptive nature of any paper makes it suspect as a reliable 
document, but as Ryan observes, the newspaper “may be as close as historians can get to the 
voice of the public” simply because so many diverse entities reported their activities to it. As the 
city’s paper of record, and therefore critical to this study, the Constitution published official 
accounts of municipal actions, and printed verbatim texts of newly-enacted legislation, debates, 
and mayoral speeches. Its standard fare of articles, op-eds, automobile advertising, and detailed 
obituaries of prominent personages proved very helpful. Perhaps most importantly, the owners 
and publishers of the three local dailies were valued members of the pro-growth coalition, 
sharing the group’s expansionist goals, but also functioning as essential spokesmen to promote 
its policies and positions.30 
This dissertation investigates one domain, the city streets, focusing specifically on those 
located within the “central business district” (CBD), or “downtown.” The two terms are used 
interchangeably here, something Americans began to do in the early twentieth century. During 
 
29 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 11-34; Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: 
Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910, xiv-xvi; Casey P. Cater, Regenerating Dixie: Electric Energy 
and the Modern South (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2019), 5; Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit: 
The Formation of Public Policy in Chicago, 1900-1930, 5; Joel A. Tarr, and Josef Konvitz, “Patterns in the 
Development of the Urban Infrastructure,” in American Urbanism: A Historiographical Review, ed. Howard Gillette 
and Zane Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987), 196. 
30 Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American City During the Nineteenth 
Century (Oakland: University of California Press, 1997), 13. The Atlanta Journal was the premiere daily evening 
paper, while the Atlanta Georgian, also a daily, was a much smaller afternoon paper. The two Black-owned weekly 
papers, the Atlanta Independent and the Atlanta Daily World, supplied fresh information and perspectives 
undocumented in the white papers. 
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that time period, Five Points, where five major thoroughfares converged, constituted the center 
of the CBD. 
As a town that grew up around rail lines, Atlanta has no midpoint commons area, no 
central park or plaza. The heart of the city, its earliest center point, was an intersection of 
roads—a fitting symbol for a transportation-focused entity with railroads, interstates, and one of 
the world’s busiest airports. This space once called “the center of town life” has served as a 
navigational landmark, a community assembly area, an essential water source, the primary 
transportation locus, a tourist destination, and the dividing point between city quadrants where 
street numbers began at 1. It was once the busiest intersection in the city.31  
Downtown has always laid claim to some distinctive territory—not only in municipal 
layout and functionality, but also within the imaginations of local citizens. It constituted the 
center of the transportation network as well as the major commercial area, but also dwelt as a 
“civic symbol” in the urban zeitgeist, the site of intersections and interactions. It performed as 
the city’s impromptu stage, a place of theatricalities and spectacles, a venue for communications 
of all types, open to everyone. This uniquely North American term first came into sporadic use in 
the late eighteenth century. Newspaper readers in 1890s Atlanta encountered occasional 
mentions of “downtown,” but usage increased more than forty-fold during the 1920s. The focal 
decade in this study matches this evolving understanding of the urban center and its streets at the 
time when America first became a nation of city dwellers.32 
 
31 Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2001), 183-85. Both terms in this dissertation refer to the same area of Atlanta centered at Five Points. The map in 
Figure 1 shows the central business district boundaries, outlined as follows: just west of Spring Street to the west, 
just south of Forrest Avenue [Ralph McGill and Ivan Allen boulevards] to the north; just west of Piedmont Avenue 
to the east; and just south of Mitchell Street to the south. 
32 Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 4-7. Oxford English Dictionary; “downtown, adv., adj., and n.,” OED Online, 
December 2020, Oxford University Press, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/57300?redirectedFrom=downtown. 
“Downtown” was referenced only 106 times in the 1890s, but 4,259 in the 1920s. In contrast, “central business 
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Downtown, a compact and walkable area, served as a natural gathering place. As the 
nexus of the transportation network of railroads, streetcars, and automobiles, it was the most 
congested area of the city in the early twentieth century. Naturally, it hosted the greatest number 
of pedestrians, not only during the three workday “rush hours,” but also for the noteworthy civic 
occasions. Every parade passed through the intersection where reviewing stands for visiting 
dignitaries stood. Atlantans in 1848 cast the town’s first ballots inside a grocery store at Five 
Points. By the early 1900s, tens of thousands congregated in front of the same location to watch 
election results projected by stereopticon onto the side of the nine-story Silvey Building just 
across Peachtree Street.33 
Businesses advertised their downtown addresses proudly, noting how close they stood to 
Five Points. The location was ideal; a trolley to anywhere in the city could be caught at the 
intersection. Shoppers and workers alike rode in daily, even on the weekends to attend services 
at the many religious assemblies situated nearby. After the arrival of the automobile, the two 
outer lanes of many downtown streets stayed continuously full of cars parking curbside for free, 
as shown in the1929 map of the CBD, which indicates the number of legal curbside parking 
spaces in each block (Figure 1 below). New automobile hotels throughout the “congested area,” 
 
district” is found only once before 1900, with 15 references in the 1910s and 32 references in the 1920s. Statistics on 
both usages were compiled from the Atlanta Constitution from 1868-1984. 
33 The Five Points intersection originated as a crossroads for important travel routes for indigenous peoples, 
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Street on a land lot boundary—the site of today’s Edgewood Avenue. The first election took place on January 29, 
1848, with voters casting ballots at Thomas Kile’s grocery store at the northwest corner of Peachtree and Marietta 
streets, site of the William-Oliver building today; Franklin M. Garrett and Harold H. Martin, Atlanta and Environs: 
A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 3 vols. (New York: Lewis Historical, 1954), 1:263. For a description of one of 
the election night celebrations, see “Election-Mad Atlanta Enjoyed a Gay Night,” Atlanta Constitution, June 5, 
1908. The custom of gathering to view election results had disappeared by the 1920s, as people increasingly turned 
on their radios to catch the early returns, and cars choked the area with the growth of a lighted, night-time 
entertainment district. 
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officially defined by the city in 1924, provided covered parking and garage services to paying 
customers. 
The commercial 
success of downtown 
drove real estate prices 
sky high, forcing many 
small business owners 
by the late 1920s to 
relocate to the suburbs. 
Burgess discussed the 
importance of mobility 
to municipal growth, 
maintaining that land 
values served as very 
accurate indices of 
mobility. Writing in 
1925, he asserted that 
the highest land values 
in the city occurred at 
the point of greatest 
mobility. In Atlanta, that point was Five Points, the heart of the city.34 
 
34 Ernest W. Burgess, “The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project,” in The Urban 
Sociology Reader, ed. Jan Lin, and Christophere Mele (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 97. Reference to Five 
Points as the heart of Atlanta from “Journal-Herald Tour Will Begin,” Atlanta Constitution, June 6, 1910. 
Figure 1. Map of Atlanta’s Central Business District; 1929 Traffic 
Survey, pg. 38.  
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Although the transportation network brought a unifying focus to downtown life, the 
throngs jostling on the public streets and sidewalks often found more conflict and division than 
harmony. Every streetcar had its own contested interior where the races mixed, touched, 
bumped, and sometimes fought in the crowded space. The often-celebrated democracy of 
downtown proved more democratic for some than others. Black Atlantans dared not linger long 
on street corners, as police made quick arrests for the nuisance infractions of idling and loitering, 
disorderly conduct, and the very useful, purposefully ill-defined charge of “suspicion.” The city 
center hosted labor strikes and experienced the nadir of the city’s overt racist actions. During the 
1906 race riot, streetcars played a deadly role, delivering unsuspecting homeward-bound 
working African Americans into the hands of the white mob raging at Five Points.35  
Another reason for this study to focus on Atlanta’s downtown is that politics and business 
resided primarily in the CBD. Major government buildings had downtown addresses, including 
the state capitol, city hall, main post office, the federal reserve bank, and all the courts. The 
prime retail, service, financial, hospitality, and entertainment facilities clustered in downtown; 
land-devouring entities like warehouses, factories, and sports fields of necessity located farther 
out where property cost less. Fogelson notes that the study of downtown is a study of power and 
those who wielded it. Logically, the pro-growth coalition focused most of its attention there, 
usually at the expense of other sectors of the city.36  
Innovations and technological advances first appeared in downtowns; Atlanta was no 
exception. Installment of essential services (water, sewer, gas, electricity, telegraph and 
 
35 Jon C. Teaford, The Twentieth-Century American City: Problem, Promise, and Reality, 3rd ed. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 8; Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the 
American City During the Nineteenth Century, 42, 53. 
36 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, xvi; Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-
1950, 7. 
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telephone lines) occurred earliest in the city center. Gas-lit streetlamps shone first in the CBD, 
replaced in 1910 by dazzling electric lights, giving the district a new nickname, the “White 
Way.”  
The roadways of the central business district also witnessed a series of “firsts” involving 
city regulations of street surfacing, usage, and traffic. These included such novelties as solid-
surface paving, curbs and gutters, speed limits, traffic cops, illegal jaywalkers, stop signs, traffic 
towers, signal lights, loading zones, “non-parking” areas, one-way streets, and gridlock. The 
city’s earliest instance of vehicles banned entirely from a roadway occurred on Peachtree Street, 
on which heavily-loaded wagons and trucks could not travel as they tore up the asphalt road 
surface.  
Finally, the heart of downtown was the location where the first automobile appeared on 
city streets. That momentous occasion took place on October 14, 1899, just outside the Kimball 
House, the finest hotel in town. A steam-powered Locomobile, fresh off the train, stood parked 
at the corner of Decatur and Peachtree streets, just steps from the middle of Five Points. 
Atlanta’s automobile age had begun. 
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2 ATLANTA’S PRO-GROWTH COALITIONS  
Beginning in the late 1970s, Professor Clifford M. Kuhn (1952-2015) and colleagues 
conducted a series of interviews with Atlantans about their lives and experiences in the city 
between the years 1914 and 1948. Two of the interviewees were retired businessmen who 
recounted their remembrances about the 1920s Forward Atlanta campaign, and gave a 
remarkable account of the men they called “real leaders of Atlanta.” A small, select group of 
prominent, close-knit, civic-minded white businessmen, they “wielded tremendous influence 
over municipal affairs.” They created Atlanta Spirit and promoted city growth. The Chamber of 
Commerce, elected officials, and this group of commercial and financial leaders caucused 
together to get things done in the city. Whatever they got behind or chose to sponsor, the rest of 
the city went right along with them. One of the interviewees said, “They were the leaders of the 
city, and they might meet at the various clubs, or maybe at somebody’s house. I know they used 
to meet a lot—I’ve been present at the Capital City Club, Driving Club. They used to have 
meetings at those places.” These “real leaders” constituted the inner circle of Atlanta’s pro-
growth coalition.37 
Many cities across the South have long possessed a coterie of wealthy white men 
enormously influential in civic business, society, and governance. By the latter nineteenth 
century, the merchants, financiers, industrialists, developers, and newspaper men in many urban 
centers had supplanted the former slave-owners of the old order. In Atlanta especially, this elite 
group emerged as the driven and determined urban architects of Henry Grady’s New South. 
 
37 The interviews were broadcast in a 50-part radio series on WRFG; tapes of the interviews are at the 
Atlanta History Center; the transcriptions were gathered into the book listed here. Clifford M. Kuhn et al., Living 
Atlanta: An Oral History of the City, 1914-1948 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 89. One of the two 
interviewees was Nathaniel Baxter Maddox (1901-93), a son of Robert Foster Maddox (1870-1965), mayor of 
Atlanta from 1909-11, and one of the “real leaders” described above. As a son of one of the elite, he would naturally 
have known about his father’s meetings at their home and at the most exclusive clubs in Atlanta. 
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They toiled together, embracing modern methods and technologies, constantly seeking 
progress—by which they meant growth. They wanted their town to lead, not just their state, but 
the entire southeastern United States. No city embodied the boldness, enterprise, and dynamism 
of the new order more, and none had more vocal or enthusiastic boosters than Atlanta. 
The city grew tremendously both in area and population in the early twentieth century, 
and by 1929, Atlanta had emerged as the commercial, financial, and transportation headquarters 
of the region. The pro-expansion alliance had succeeded. To understand how, one must consider 
the group’s members: who they were; where they lived, worked, and socialized; what 
commonalities drew them together; what circumstances divided them. Equally important to 
determine are what strategies they employed to persuade lawmakers and fellow citizens alike 
that the interests of the alliance were those of everyone else. As a group, they possessed the same 
attitude reflected in the popular mis-quote of General Motors president, Charles E. Wilson, who 
in 1953 did not famously say, “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.” The 
powerful elites felt that what was good for them was in fact good for Atlanta, and did not hesitate 
to say so.38 
This sense of entitled superiority led the leaders to neglect the concerns of many, if not 
most of their fellow citizens. Entire sectors of the city, especially the neighborhoods of the 
working classes and African Americans, had sub-standard everything: housing, streets, water, 
sanitation, schools, heating, lighting, transportation access. Unless such deficiencies began to 
seriously impact Atlanta’s reputation, or until the policymakers needed their votes, these 
 
38 John Kay, “The Concept of the Corporation,” Business History 61, no. 7 (January 15, 2019): 1131; 
Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, 36. What Charles Erwin Wilson (1890-1961) actually said at his 
Secretary of Defense Senate confirmation hearing in 1953 was, “I thought that what was good for America was good 
for General Motors, and vice versa.” But as Kay notes, it did not really matter, as the popular distorted version 
exemplified the central role which large corporations had come to play in modern economic life. In the same way, 
either statement (accurate or not) exemplifies the attitude of the pro-growth coalition toward their fiscal goals vis-à-
vis what might benefit the rest of Atlanta.    
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constituencies received little attention from business or civic authorities. The vast majority of 
city dwellers had little or no voice in municipal decisions. This glaringly undemocratic, 
oligarchic inequity is the great fault of the typical growth-machine alliance; Atlanta’s was no 
exception.39 
This chapter explores the men and women of the two, racially-segregated pro-growth 
coalitions. Throughout this paper, references to the elite decision-makers, policy setters, growth 
alliance, and other such terms designate the white leaders, without any racial descriptor. During 
the Jim Crow era of extreme segregation, the reality was that the African American leaders in 
Atlanta had little to no influence on municipal policies of any kind. When they did, they had 
much greater concerns that expanding automobility; their communities faced fundamental 
survival issues like lynchings, lack of healthcare, unlivable wages. Given the disparate sizes and 
spheres of influence of the two different leadership groups, and the fact that they seldom 
interacted in any meaningful way, they are discussed separately below. 
2.1 The White Pro-Growth Coalition  
Atlanta’s pro-growth coalition did not suddenly appear full-fledged in 1899. Official 
business groups had formed early in the city, but disbanded during the Civil War. Merchants 
revived the Atlanta Board of Trade in 1866, but soon replaced it with a new organization more 
responsive to the city’s growth, the Chamber of Commerce (COC). A group of top businessmen 
were the ones behind the formation of that highly-influential body, dedicated to “enlarging and 
extending the commercial influence and growth of the city.”40 
 
39 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 145. 
40 For histories of the Mercantile Association, the two Atlanta Boards of Trade, and the creation of the 
Chamber of Commerce, see Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 1:472-
73, 712, 866-67. For documentation of the Chamber of Commerce in the early twentieth century, see Walter G. 
Cooper, Official History of Fulton County (Atlanta: Walter W. Brown, 1934), 339-43. 
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As informal associations, growth alliances keep no official records, but the establishment 
of the COC may signal the beginnings of the coalition in Atlanta. Certainly well before the turn 
of the century, the city’s elite business leaders had joined together in a variety of business, 
professional, and social organizations, using their influence to lower tax rates and railroad freight 
charges, provide greater accessibility to downtown, and enthusiastically promote the city.  
Over the time period of this study, the composition of this group naturally changed. Some 
born before or during the Civil War would gain great wealth and prominence late in the 
nineteenth century, especially Asa Griggs Candler, Sr. (1851-1929) of Coca-Cola fame, Joel S. 
Hurt, Jr. (1850-1926) whose electric streetcars enabled his Inman Park development, and Henry 
Morrell Atkinson (1862-1939), the forceful head of the streetcar and electric company that 
eventually became Georgia Power. All three would still possess enormous influence well into the 
twentieth century, though two would be dead before the endpoint of this dissertation, and the 
third would die within ten years. As these leaders aged and diminished in activity, younger men 
stepped up to take their places. Some, such as Robert Winship Woodruff (1889-1985), president 
of an automobile company as well as Coca-Cola, would go on to even greater fame beyond 1929. 
Although losses in the coalition occurred, the vacuums filled quickly so the group maintained its 
influence and authority. “The king is dead, long live the king!”-approach ensured continuity.  
Although the term “elite” is used to refer to the coalition members in terms of their impact 
on the city streets, not all of them achieved that level of status socially. Some father-to-son 
legacy members inherited their advantages; others worked hard to achieve varying degrees of 
rank and riches. Not everyone in the database was widely known—then or now. Names like 
Candler, Hurt, and Woodruff live on in Atlanta on buildings, streets, parks, schools, and civic 
institutions. The name Atkinson, despite Henry’s forty-year reign as a social, economic, and 
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business powerhouse, survives only on an electric power plant and the road leading to it. Other 
prominent or rising civic leaders do not appear in the database at all, e.g., future mayor and 
airport expansionist William Berry Hartsfield (1890-1971), as their spheres of influence did not 
extend to transportation and street infrastructure during the early decades of the twentieth 
century.  
The database, like the coalition itself, contains multiple tiers of individuals. An 1889 
newspaper article provides a detailed view of civic fortunes, listing names, worth in dollars, and 
the business entities of influential Atlantans. The reporter chiefly celebrates the industrious 
nature of everyone who generated so much from the postbellum municipal ashes, and 
underscores some defining characteristics of the commercial elite: busy, hard-working, thrifty, 
public-spirited, with a great love of the city and high hopes for its greatness. Similar descriptors 
apply to those in the growth-coalition of this study, along with similar gradations in wealth. 
Some of the same last names appear in both lists. Atlanta 
early acquired a reputation for busyness and business 
long before the industry and productivity of the 1920s—
the key decade of this study.41  
Table 1 (at right) lists the chief occupations of the 
111 white growth-coalition earners; three of the four 
women in the database held no paying positions. The top 
six in order included business owners, newspaper men 
(owners, editors, reporters, production workers); 
attorneys, bankers, real estate entrepreneurs of various kinds (realtors, developers, building and 
 
41 “With Our Millionairs [sic],” Atlanta Constitution, April 7, 1889; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and 
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Table 1. Primary Occupations of 
White Growth-Coalition Members 
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loan officers, construction company owners), and manufacturers/industrialists. Most held 
positions as presidents of companies, founders and proprietors of large enterprises, prestigious 
professionals, or board chairpersons. A number would never reach such exalted levels, yet still 
wielded some influence which those higher-up found useful. The list contains the city’s most 
important enterprises, and the majority of the men in the database were documented members of 
the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (women could not join until 1921). As Hunter notes, “The 
pattern of business dominance of civic affairs in Regional City [Atlanta] is a fact. No other 
institution is as dominant in community life as the economic institution.”42  
Many of the men also had significant secondary careers (see Table 2 below). When they 
had succeeded in their primary field, they sought or 
were sought out for other business options, often in real 
estate, transit-related entities, and banking. Both the 
primary and secondary occupations of Atlanta’s elite 
represent all of the entities defined in the growth-
machine thesis.  
Finally, a number of the group also held 
elected positions (see Table 3 at right). Typical for a 
pro-growth coalition, few of the members ran for 
public office and the majority of those served on the 
Atlanta city council. The list contains duplicates, as 
most of those who achieved higher office had earlier 
been councilmen or commissioners. They provided direct ties between the group and the 
 
42 Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 75. 
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government, facilitating the adoption of beneficial policies and the blocking or indefinite stalling 
of potentially harmful legislation. The association also exercised much of its influence through 
less obvious channels. Seldom did the very top men run for office, preferring to publicly endorse 
favored candidates and donate to political campaigns; they also made well-publicized and 
generous contributions to community-wide endeavors. 
Most of the men in the coalition database belonged to professional, business, and special 
interest organizations. As Jackson notes, Atlanta had a reputation as a city of “joiners.” The 
abbreviations list at the front of this study contains federations, unions, consortia, leagues, and 
councils in which many in the growth coalition held memberships, with special emphasis on 
transportation-based associations. These associations proved invaluable venues through which 
businessmen could “collaborate” with city officials to ensure that advantageous legislation 
passed.43  
Licensed professionals like architects, realtors, and engineers had their own institutions. 
Others represented specific types of business, such as advertisers, automakers, car dealers, hotel 
owners, garage managers, builders, and streetcar executives. One example, the Atlanta 
Manufacturers Association, exemplified the coalition mindset to grow the city and increase 
personal wealth. All the prominent businessmen in town joined because its purpose was “to 
stimulate the development of the material resources of Atlanta…, and also to advance the 
pecuniary and other interests of those in the association.” A number of organizations—national, 
 
43 Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967), 29; William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New York: 
Vintage, 1993), 174. 
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state, and local—existed for car owners and drivers. The Atlanta branches of these played 
significant roles in the surveying, financing, paving, and regulating of city streets.44 
In addition to their business and professional relationships, the members of the pro-growth 
coalition had other close associational ties. Virtually all of the men participated in multiple 
fraternal societies and orders, including but by no means limited to Masons, Shriners, Elks, Red 
Men, Knights Templar, and clubs such as Kiwanis, Rotary, and Civitan. Many also took active 
roles in their churches, temples, and synagogues.45  
In 1923, Steiner wrote about his contemporary era as “an age of crowds,” and how the 
then-current vogue for civic and fraternal organizations illustrated the prevalence of the 
communal spirit. He noted that “skilled propagandists” could win support for welfare and 
community drives by whipping up the public through carefully constructed campaigns with 
speeches, publicity, banners, and slogans. In a similar fashion, the members of the clubs could be 
manipulated to support already-decided policies and programs. The monthly meeting format, 
usually including a meal, utilized rituals such as humor, speeches, songs, and boisterous play to 
foster esprit de corps and secure enthusiasm for the group and its pre-arranged agendas.46 
 
44 Official petition of the Atlanta Manufacturers’ Association to incorporate is untitled, on page 7 of the 
Atlanta Constitution, March 28, 1902. 
45 While detailed information on some of the lower-tiered members could not be located, the top decision-
makers, are reliably documented in sources like William J. Northen, ed., Men of Mark in Georgia..., 7 vols. (Atlanta: 
A. B. Caldwell, 1907-1912); Notable Men of Atlanta and Georgia, (Atlanta, 1913); Lucien Lamar Knight, A 
Standard History of Georgia and Georgians, 6 vols. (Chicago: Lewis Publishing, 1917); Daniel Decatur Moore, ed., 
Men of the South: A Work for the Newspaper Reference Library (New Orleans: Southern Biographical Association, 
1922); Dudley Glass, ed., Men of Atlanta (Atlanta: Blosser-Williams, 1924); Cooper, Official History of Fulton 
County; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events; Lorenzo Ferguson 
Woodruff, and Hal M. Stanley, eds., Men of Georgia (Atlanta: Georgia Press Reference Association, 1927); James 
C. Bryant, Capital City Club: The First One Hundred Years, 1883-1983 (Atlanta: Capital City Club, 1991). An 
excellent summary of the various halls, societies, and clubs can be found in Cooper, Official History of Fulton 
County, 803-24.    
46 Jesse F. Steiner, “Community Organization and the Crowd Spirit,” Journal of Social Forces 1, no. 3 
(March 1923): 221-26. 
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Where the clubs held their meetings, the physical surroundings, the type of meal served, 
the prominence of the speaker—all reflected the power, status, and social level of the members. 
The top decision-makers met in private clubs; only select invitees attended those gatherings. In 
contrast, professional associations and other organizations open to the general public gathered in 
the less-expensive hotels and restaurants. The popular and well-known “luncheon circuit” 
provided an arena for men to see and be seen on a regular basis. The frequency of such 
encounters nurtured unanimity—a principle of guiding importance to the coalition.47   
The clubs and other formal associations represented a “chain of command” necessary to 
the functioning of the group. Rivalries of course occurred within the alliance and could present 
significant problems. While members of the business elite held much in common, that did not 
guarantee solidarity or eliminate arguments between competing enterprises and individuals. A 
consistently unified front required careful cultivation, primarily through the mechanisms of the 
professional associations and civic luncheon clubs. The head men at times might resort to 
coercive measures to enforce the chosen party line, but sometimes even they disagreed. This 
study’s best example occurred in the 1920s, when angry businessmen took opposing views of 
Atlanta’s street parking policies. The resulting stalemate meant that the city council took no 
action, to the detriment of the entire community.48  
The very top men also held memberships in 
more select, by-invitation-only entities (see Table 4 at 
right). The Capital City Club, founded in 1883, billed 
itself as “the oldest and most prestigious social club for 
 
47 Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 10-16, 181. 
48 Ibid., 183-93; Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-
1910, 19.  
Club Name Count
Capital City Club 54
Piedmont Driving Club 27
Atlanta Athletic Club 26
Druid Hills Golf Club 15
Table 4. Exclusive White Men’s 
Clubs  
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gentlemen of finance, commerce, and industry,” and claimed, with some merit, its role as “a vital 
force in shaping the destiny of Atlanta.” The Piedmont Driving Club began in 1887 as the 
Gentlemen’s Driving Club for owners and breeders of fine horses, and grew into one of the city’s 
greatest social clubs. Its large tract of land off Peachtree Street was eventually sub-divided, with 
185 acres becoming present-day Piedmont Park. 
The Atlanta Athletic Club organized in 1898 for the sports- and athletically-inclined. Its 
East Lake Golf Course opened in 1905, expanded to 18 holes plus clubhouse in 1915, and was 
the home course to amateur golf great Robert “Bobby” Tyre Jones, Jr. (1902-71). The Athletic 
Club also opened in 1926 a Philip Shutze-designed, magnificently-appointed eleven-story 
building on Carnegie Way, containing a main gymnasium with seating for 2,000 spectators. 
Finally, the Druid Hills Golf Club debuted its course and clubhouse in 1912 on more than 100 
acres in the exclusive Druid Hills 
neighborhood east of the city. The club 
persuaded Georgia Railway & Electric to 
extend the streetcar line to pass in front of the 
clubhouse, allowing businessmen members 
convenient travel to their downtown offices.49  
In these top clubs, Atlanta’s leading, all-
white decision-makers enjoyed privacy and 
association with their own kind. Women and 
 
49 Atlanta Constitution: “Driving and Racing,” January 5, 1887; “Druid Hills Golf Club Has Just Been 
Organized,” July 7, 1912; “Mammoth Construction Projects Are Going Forward,” March 21, 1926; Peggy Mitchell, 
“Athletic Club’s $1,250,000 Home,” Atlanta Journal Magazine, April 4, 1926; Bryant, Capital City Club: The First 
One Hundred Years, 1883-1983, xiii, 162; Jack J. Spalding, Piedmont Driving Club: History of the Club (Atlanta: 
Lyon-Young, 1937), 5-18; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:136-
58, 368-70. 
Figure 2. 1928 Capital City Club banquet; 
Atlanta History Center. 
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children had limited access to designated areas. The men conducted a great deal of business 
while socializing in clubrooms, exercising in the gyms, sporting on links and courts, cooling off 
in pools and shower rooms, drinking beer and liquor from the club’s private lockers beyond the 
reach of Georgia’s prohibition law, and feasting sumptuously in the exclusive dining halls (see 
Figure 2 above). African Americans entered these exclusive clubs only as workers or wait staff.  
The social clubs did not permit Jewish members. But well before the formation of the 
Capital City Club, a group of German and Hungarian Jews in 1866 established the Concordia 
Association to nurture their shared cultural heritage. They first met in the store of Morris Rich on 
Whitehall Street, but in 1892, constructed Concordia Hall on Mitchell Street, designed by famed 
architectural firm Bruce & Morgan. The association re-organized in 1904 as the Standard Club, 
and the following year, moved to 142 Washington Street to better serve the Jewish community 
centered in the Washington-Rawson district southeast of Five Points. By 1929, it had relocated to 
400 Ponce de Leon Avenue, reflecting the influence of the automobile on the movement of the 
population northward. Victor Hugo Kriegshaber (1859-1934) helped organize the Standard Club. 
An engineer, builder, manufacturer, and financier, he presided over the Chamber of Commerce 
and served on the city’s planning commission. A valued member of the power elites, he still 
could never join the most exclusive clubs.50 
Prominent individuals also sought admission to the Social Register, “that most prestigious 
of American institutions.” Listing indicated not only considerable wealth but also approved 
social position. Only individuals or couples recommended by other members could, after 
 
50 David R. Cohen, “At 150, Standard Club Draws on Intown Roots,” Atlanta Jewish Times  (November 8, 
2017). Kriegshaber’s 1909 Beaux Arts mansion on the edge of Inman Park survives today as the Wrecking Bar. 
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thorough vetting, be admitted. Fifty-six members of the coalition appeared in the 1922 Atlanta 
Social Register.51  
 Besides associating professionally and socially, many of the white elites lived near each 
other. Table 5 at right shows the most common streets and 
neighborhoods where they resided, all of which would be 
considered high-end. Some were exclusive: the preeminent 
areas of Inman Park, Ansley Park, and Druid Hills all had 
deed restrictions prior to any official city zoning, ensuring 
that undesirables could not afford to purchase or build 
within their borders. Ansley Park specifically excluded 
African Americans from the neighborhood, except to live in one of the servants’ halls. 
Atlanta’s white elites met frequently in common spaces. They lived, worked, played, 
prayed, and were buried in close proximity to each other. As Hunter notes, the locales in which 
they predominantly existed separated them from the masses and isolated them from the problems 
confronting ordinary citizens. The routes they drove (or were driven) to and from work lay 
mostly along streets with “new store fronts, neon signs, and the gleaming chromium of the new 
cars on display” in the Automobile Row section of Peachtree Street. Professionals and lower-
tiered members of the coalition might pass through industrial areas or depressing neighborhoods, 
but they lived on pleasant streets in attractive sections of town.52 
 
51 Southern Cities Social Register, Social Register Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Atlanta 1922, vol. 36, 
no. 18 (New York: Social Register Association, November 1921), various pages. Quotation from the Social Register 
Association website, https://socialregisteronline.com, 2020. 
52 The majority of individuals listed in this study’s database were buried at Westview Cemetery, established 
relatively late in 1884. Oakland Cemetery, Atlanta’s first city-owned park and burial ground, was established in 
1850. Many of the older coalition members are buried on the 48-acre Oakland site, but by the 1920s, the 600-acre 
Westview had become the preferred location. Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 17-
22. 




Ponce de Leon Avenue 9
Buckhead 8
Ansley Park 7
West Peachtree Street 6
Inman Park 5
TOTAL 72
Table 5. Home Locations of 
White Elites 
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One thing all coalition members had in common: membership in Atlanta’s Chamber of 
Commerce. The city’s alliance of pro-growth advocates took its nascent form during 
Reconstruction when they played a leading role in organizing the  Chamber of Commerce on 
August 7, 1871. The Chamber initially functioned as a way for merchants to band against a 
common enemy: the railroads with their ever-climbing freight charges. The burgeoning national 
economy of the late nineteenth century provided an impetus for businessmen to work together 
for lower shipping costs, favorable tax rates, and a more attractive urban environment. Their 
early efforts proved successful. In 1883, the COC incorporated; it constructed its own building 
two years later. By 1890, it had added a noonday meal service (an early entry into the luncheon 
circuit), and boasted a membership of nearly 600 men representing some 350 firms. By the end 
of the century, a business-based community power structure had developed, exhibiting all the 
characteristics of a controlling pro-growth coalition.53    
 Women could not join the Chamber of Commerce until 1921, when the Department of 
Women’s Affairs was organized. Miss Laura Smith, one of the city’s leading business women 
served as first chair, and as such, became an ex officio director on the COC’s board, the first 
woman to join its deliberations. Smith, a former supervisor of the Atlanta school board, was 
general supervisor for Traffic Instruction for Southern Bell Telephone Company, and trained 
thousands of women as telephone operators. In 1922, the group was renamed the Women’s 
Division, allowing self-supporting women to join, and soon after, Mrs. Samuel M. Inman was 
elected outright to a position on the Board of Directors.54   
 
53 No records have been located for the Atlanta Board of Trade, or for the years of the Chamber of 
Commerce prior to 1883; Cooper, Official History of Fulton County, 339; Doyle, New Men, New Cities, New South: 
Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910, 138-42. 
54 “Women’s Committee Meets at Chamber of Commerce,” Atlanta Constitution, July 21, 1921; Laura M. 
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Even the name of the Atlanta Chamber’s magazine, The City Builder, underscored the 
goal of the organization—to promote city expansion. Its articles and advertisements hammered 
home the pro-growth, city-building message. A 1924 ad directly addressed the journal reader— 
“a substantial business man”—this way: “You want to see Atlanta grow because it means bigger 
and better business for you.” In other words, what was good for the city was good for their 
bottom lines.55  
Doyle notes that “It was largely by the process of city building that local business leaders 
became a class, a social entity bound by a similar world view, by common interests, and by 
associations and instruments of power that could advance those interests…. Upon such 
platforms, a powerful business class formed.” His description accurately traces the formation of 
Atlanta’s pro-growth alliance, which definitely contained men of power and influence.56  
Hunter wrote about the power of Atlanta’s elite in 1953, but his account captures the 
essence and scope of the authority of the decision-makers earlier in the twentieth century. 
Most of the leaders are persons of power status. In some cases they have the 
machinery of government at their bidding. In many cases they control large 
industries in which they reign supreme in matters of decision affecting large 
numbers of the citizenry. They are persons of dominance, prestige, and influence. 
They are, in part, the decision-makers for the total community. They are able to 
enforce their decisions by persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, 
force.57  
 
Hidden or overt, the power exerted by the coalition as a whole shaped the city in 
countless ways between 1920 and 1929. This study investigates one particular sphere of their 
influence. It shows how the group harnessed the motor vehicle as an agent to grow Atlanta and 
build their personal wealth. In this place and during this time period, civic, commercial, and 
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political power resided overwhelmingly in the hands of white men. The African American 
community, largely spurned and shunned, had its own leaders who on occasion could exert some 
indirect power of their own.   
2.2 The Black Pro-Growth Coalition 
A number of Atlanta’s most influential Black leaders also formed a growth-machine type 
of alliance, consisting of the top businessmen, educators, and ministers. It was logically a smaller 
group, as the city’s African American population in the early twentieth century comprised one-
third of the total. Despite Jim Crow restrictions, the city presented economic and commercial 
opportunities from which the members sought not only personal wealth, but also advancement 
for the larger African American community. They were painfully aware of the pervasive crimes 
(even if technically legal) of segregation, injustice, discrimination, and violence aimed against 
them; yet they forcefully protested against lynching, poor schools, low wages, and the living 
conditions of many of their fellow citizens. In Atlanta in the early twentieth century, the Black 
elites exhibited an awareness of the needs of the poor in their communities lacking in the parallel 
white coalition.58 
But like the white pro-growth advocates, Black business leaders encouraged development 
and sought to expand their commercial and real estate interests. However, the white group almost 
totally ignored their African American counterparts—unless they were soliciting votes for or 
donations to campaigns for purportedly citywide improvements. The Forward Atlanta movement 
in the 1920s provides a striking, if stunningly short-sighted example of white leaders completely 
overlooking a substantial sector of the municipal economy. As elite businessmen, many with 
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substantial wealth, the Black coalition shared common features with the white group, yet 
remained outside of the city’s dominant power structure.59  
Before discussing the twenty-one leaders in Atlanta’s Black pro-growth coalition, it is 
important to understand the circumstances under which they existed. Those conditions explain 
why the power they possessed was limited almost exclusively to their own communities. The 
failure of Reconstruction left many African Americans in conditions only marginally better off 
than slavery as the new southern imperative of white supremacy dictated that all persons of color 
be subservient to whites everywhere and all the time. Georgia enacted its first Jim Crow law— 
separating the races on trains and trolleys—in 1891. From then on, its cities and towns continued 
to expand restrictions on African Americans, keeping them, pre-birth to post-mortem, out of 
white space.  
Whites severely circumscribed the physical area available for African Americans, 
utilizing a number of strategies to keep Blacks “in their place” within defined sectors of the city. 
The comprehensiveness of the segregation was stunning. The policy of “in their place” meant 
more than just regulating where Blacks lived; it restricted where they worked and what type of 
work they could do. It limited the type of training they received. Black public schools were 
grotesquely inferior in number, size, and amenities, and so severely overcrowded that they often 
operated daily triple sessions at a time when even double sessions at white schools had been 
eliminated. In 1913, the Board of Education tried to abolish seventh and eighth grades for black 
students on the grounds that future manual laborers did not need that much schooling. African 
Americans had to provide their own higher education, which they did with excellence, 
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establishing in Atlanta a consortium of some of the best Black colleges and universities in the 
nation.60 
African American Atlantans did not have a public high school, park, swimming pool, or 
library they could visit until the 1920s. “In their place” mandated separate restaurants, stores, 
hotels, bars, clubs, playgrounds, shops, theaters, hospital wards, churches, golf courses, burial 
grounds, and cells in the city stockade. Even chain-gangs were segregated. The only time the 
races worked together was when the white bossed the Black. No African Americans sat on juries 
(so much for “trial by jury of one’s peers”), served as police officers or firemen, drove  
streetcars, or cast a ballot in the all-important Democratic “white” primary. Voting restrictions 
and the political environment ensured that no Blacks held elected office. The dirtiest, most 
denigrating, physically demanding, and low-paying jobs fell to them. Even when holding 
identical positions as whites, e.g., public school teachers, they received two-thirds the pay of a 
white person.61     
The ironies and absurdities of the ubiquitous “in their place” system abounded. Blacks 
could not sit down for a meal beside whites, but they could prepare and serve their food. They 
could not live next door, but daily entered white neighborhoods to clean their houses, wash their 
clothes, and raise their children. A black man could not ride in a car with whites, but could drive 
them in a car anywhere. On Atlanta’s streetcars whites sat at the front and Blacks at the back, 
except the Black nursemaids with their small white charges. No line physically delineated the 
separate spaces, so contact and intermingling frequently occurred, often with tragic results. 
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Georgia Railway and Power Company rejected as too expensive the demand by whites for their 
own trolley cars, as profits took priority over purity.  
Noted Atlanta scholar Dana F. White writes of the “two Atlantas.”62 Since 
Reconstruction, two geographical factors generally dictated the settlement patterns for African 
Americans in the city. Low-lying, unhealthy terrains, shunned by most, provided affordable real 
estate for the poorest citizens. Housing in close proximity to industrial locations, despite noxious 
noises, dirt, smoke, and odors, allowed walking to work. Meanwhile domestic help, maintenance 
men, chauffeurs, and workers took trolleys to jobs at the city center or in distant white suburban 
neighborhoods. Their reliance on streetcars would make them easy targets for the white mob 
violence during Atlanta’s 1906 race riot.  
Restrictive legislation hardened the boundaries of the city’s racial divisions as events 
prompted migration both out of and within Atlanta. Boll weevil devastation and increasingly 
mechanized farms forced numbers of Georgian agricultural workers to the city. Finding jobs 
scarce and the environment hostile, many moved on northward. The 1906 riot had an enormous 
impact on African American spaces. Violence and fear drove business owners and residents 
away from downtown into established Black communities near Auburn Avenue to the east, and 
the westside cluster of colleges and universities. The 1917 Great Fire of Atlanta devastated the 
primarily-Black Fourth Ward. Former homeowners had to seek shelter in other already-crowded 
African American neighborhoods. Some left the city altogether, joining the Great Migration to 
the somewhat less restrictive urban North. 
Black districts received far fewer of the services typically provided by municipal 
government. Unpaved and unlighted streets, lack of water and sewage systems, and infrequent 
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trash collection and street cleaning characterized the high-density, low-income, often disease-
ridden neighborhoods. As the Atlanta Independent observed, “The color line is too often drawn 
in the distribution of public services.” In Atlanta, the pro-growth policymakers oversaw the 
distribution of city resources, determining who got what, where, and when. Concerned with the 
direction of urban expansion, they made sure most city amenities went first to their properties 
and developments.63 
The one city service applied generously to African Americans was policing. That of 
course meant policing of Blacks, not police assistance provided to them. Low-level crimes within 
African American neighborhoods received little attention. Serious offenses involving high dollar 
amounts or physical violence took higher priority, as well as every offense, large or small, 
against a white person. The Atlanta Police Department arrested more Blacks than whites every 
year from its founding in 1873 until the 1920s, when majority-white automobile-related 
infractions reversed the trend. Especially after the 1906 riot, many African Americans stayed 
close to home at night to avoid police harassment.64      
Inside this confining atmosphere African Americans carved out their own spaces within 
two miles of Atlanta’s center. They turned inward, as Du Bois observes, working with each 
other, cultivating group self-reliance, and fostering a strong sense of community. They generally 
patronized Black-owned businesses, ate in the restaurants of African American women, and 
worshipped in churches with prominent ministers such as Joseph Simeon Flipper (1859-1944), 
bishop of the A.M.E. Church of Atlanta and chancellor of Morris Brown College. They read the 
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Atlanta Independent newspaper owned by activist editor Benjamin Jefferson Davis, Sr. (1870-
1945) and produced in his offices at 250 Auburn Avenue, Atlanta’s Black Main Street. By 1928, 
they could also read the weekly Atlanta World published by Morehouse College graduate 
William Alexander Scott, II (1902-34). When sick or in need of legal advice, they sought out 
African American physicians and lawyers—professionals whom many whites did not realize 
even existed. When purchasing property, they employed a Black “realtist,” as the title “realtor” 
applied exclusively to white real estate agents.65 
While many African Americans lived in poverty, by the 1920s, a large middle class 
existed. A number of hard-working entrepreneurs achieved even greater success; an elite class 
emerged and leading Black-owned banks and insurance companies constructed offices along 
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Figure 3. Top insurance executives Pace, Perry, and Herndon, ca. 1913.  
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Auburn Avenue (see photo above66). Alonzo Franklin Herndon (1858-1927) led the way, 
becoming Atlanta’s first Black millionaire. Born into slavery, he worked in an Atlanta 
barbershop post-Emancipation. By 1904, he owned three shops with the best barbers in the 
South, including in his flagship at 66 Peachtree Street, outfitted with marble flooring, crystal 
chandeliers, and gold fixtures.67 His whites-only clientele included the city’s leading lawyers, 
judges, politicians, and businessmen, but that did not protect the store from the mob’s 1906 
rampage. He purchased a failing insurance company in 1905, and began offering policies and 
loans to African Americans at a time when white entities refused them service. By the 1920s, his 
Atlanta Life Insurance Company had branches across the South and an imposing building still 
standing at 148 Auburn Avenue. Herndon, the most prominent African American in the city, at 
his death held controlling interest in numerous corporations and had extensive properties in 
Atlanta and the orange groves of Lake County, Florida.  
While none of the other leaders accumulated fortunes the size Herndon’s, many achieved 
stature and wealth despite the obstacles to their advancement. Obviously, many more than the 
twenty-one decision-makers in this study’s database existed; however, few had any impact on 
traffic control or street regulation, though most militated for better conditions within African 
American districts, including transportation opportunities. They organized into a pro-growth 
association, and shared the concern of the white coalition to ensure legislation favorable to 
commerce and expansion. Their power structure generally followed that of that of the whites, 
with a few select business and financial men at the very top, and a larger group of lesser lights, 
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important in the community, but serving more as assistants to carry out the decisions of the 
principals.68  
Given the crushing strictures of Jim Crow, they had little influence over citywide 
policies, but they recognized and harnessed the collective force of the African American 
community as a voting bloc. In this capacity they exercised power and contributed, deliberately 
or inadvertently, to the redefinition of Atlanta’s streets into automobile conduits. After the 
excruciating loss in the bond election of 1919, white power elites worked hard in the 1920s to 
win the Black vote on the critical viaduct bond issues. In return, Black leaders demanded, and 
received concessions in the form of municipal expenditures for increased services within their 
communities—running water, sewer lines, more schools, paved roadways, and healthcare 
facilities.69 
The sole woman in the database, Lugenia D. Burns Hope (1871-1947), played the pivotal 
role in this defining accomplishment. Born in Missouri, but raised in Chicago, Lugenia attended 
the Chicago Art Institute from 1890-93, then quit school to support her mother and siblings. 
Employment at several charitable societies brought her into contact with the settlement house 
movement. The experience defined all of her subsequent work as a social reformer, community 
organizer, and life-long social gospel activist.70  
She met Augusta, Georgia native John Hope (1868-1936) in Chicago at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition. Shortly after their marriage in 1897, he accepted a position at the Atlanta 
Baptist College, later renamed Morehouse College. He became its first African American 
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president in 1906, and in 1929, he was also named president of the Atlanta University 
Consortium—the newly-formed alliance of the historically Black schools of Morehouse College, 
Spelman College, and Atlanta University.  
This burgeoning westside community contained some of the city’s most influential 
African Americans, including Alonzo Herndon, W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), and David Toby 
Howard (1849-1935). The Hopes socialized with them, with faculty members and their wives, 
and with the Reverend Doctor Henry Hugh Proctor (1868-1933), first Black pastor of Atlanta’s 
First Congregational Church. From the college campus, they could watch the leased Black 
convicts working at the Chattahoochee Brick Company, owned by former Atlanta mayor James 
Warren English, Sr. (1837-1925), a prominent member of the white pro-growth coalition.71 
Lugenia Hope launched the Neighborhood Union from her living room in 1908. The 
group of ten women worked to meet the spiritual and physical needs of westside Black 
Atlantans. By 1914, the organization had branches in African American neighborhoods across 
the city. They offered literacy and domestic science classes; held health clinics; provided 
daycare; lobbied for anti-lynching laws; and petitioned for better schools and sanitation facilities.  
But Hope’s crowning achievement in relation to Atlanta’s streets, for which she has 
received virtually no recognition, was her work as chair of a women’s registration committee for 
the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 
Originally working in 1918 to increase the Association’s membership, under her leadership, the 
group also urged Black men to pay their poll taxes so they could vote in the upcoming 1919 city 
bond election. Her committee registered enough men to vote, enabling the stunning (to the 
whites) defeat of the bond issue—twice! It had repercussions for every subsequent bond vote in 
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Atlanta, forcing white elites to make concessions to win Black voters in order to pass their all-
important viaduct financing bonds.72 
This signature accomplishment places Lugenia Burns Hope at the head of the black pro-
growth association in terms of lasting, if unintentional, impact on the configuration of Atlanta’s 
city streets. The achievements by another African American elite had great impact on the city’s 
racial topography. Heman Perry (1873-1929) intentionally crossed the city’s westside color line, 
bringing new residential areas, the first public high school, and the first city park to Black 
residents. 
Of the twenty-one Black pro-growth leaders in this study, eight were businessmen and 
professionals, each of whom eventually added banking and/or real estate development to their 
resumes as secondary occupations. Two others held positions as newspaper publishers-editors, 
and another four, university educators. Unlike the white coalition, which had no clergy members, 
three served as ministers of large congregations—two of whom were also university leaders. 
Two members of the group were noted building contractors; another served as a government 
railroad postal employee. The latter, John Wesley Dobbs (1882-1961), during the time frame of 
this study, was just starting out in the coalition, but would, by the 1950s, become one of the top 
decision-makers. The eastside road he lived on, Houston Street, now bears his name: John 
Wesley Dobbs Avenue. 
Of the group, Lugenia Hope was the sole community organizer, although many of the 
others were activists, working to improve the lives of African Americans both within and beyond 
their official occupations. Herndon, Du Bois, and John Hope took part in the Niagara movement;  
the latter two went on to hold leadership positions in the NAACP and the National Urban 
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League. Lugenia Hope helped establish the Atlanta branch of the National Association of 
Colored Women’s Clubs, and in 1932, became first vice president of the Atlanta NAACP, 
creating “citizenship schools” for African Americans to learn about government and voting. 
Herndon and Howard made substantial financial contributions to and in other ways 
supported a variety of Black churches, schools, organizations, and causes. Rev. Dr. Procter, with 
white lawyer Charles T. Hopkins, formed the Interracial Committee of Atlanta after the 1906 
riot. Davis and Scott utilized their newspapers to promote the good of the Black community and 
redress social injustices. They also provided much-needed advertising space for Black-owned 
businesses catering primarily to African Americans.  
Many in the group socialized together, and like the white coalition, they lived in 
proximity to each other—although split between the eastside Auburn Avenue district and the 
westside University Center area. The top men could not live entirely separated from middle- 
class Blacks as the white elites could and did; there simply was not the square footage in their 
segregated spaces for the construction of an exclusively-elite Black neighborhood along the lines 
of a Druid Hills or Ansley Park. In 1910, Alonzo Herndon constructed his fifteen-room Beaux 
Arts mansion at 587 University Place near Morris Brown College, close to faculty and students.  
Coalition members belonged to a variety of business organizations. In 1900, Herndon 
helped found the National Negro Business League (NNBL); Davis served on its Executive 
Committee. Intent on furthering the economic development of African American businesses, the 
League embraced the “separate economy” concept, that Black businesses understood their 
clientele better than whites, and supplied much-needed services and products to the perpetually 
underserved community. They also provided employment for Blacks, offering jobs and positions 
to which they could not aspire in white enterprises. The League held annual conferences at which 
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Atlantan growth proponents spoke, including A. D. Hamilton on “Contracting and Building,” D. 
T. Howard on “Undertaking and Embalming,” and B. J. Davis on “Negro Newspaper 
Publishing.” Atlanta hosted the League’s seventh annual convention on August 29-31, 1906—
just weeks before the city erupted with white racial violence.73 
African Americans business owners could not join the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 
and it would be 1932 before the Negro Chamber of Commerce was formed. For retail business 
owners, the Atlanta Colored Merchants Association, a member of the national association, 
worked diligently to improve business conditions within the community. Black Atlantans also 
held memberships in national professional groups.74   
Several coalition members belonged to the Knights of Pythias, Knights of Tabor, and a 
number identified as Masons. John Wesley Dobbs, eventual Grand Master, oversaw construction 
of the Prince Hall Masons’ building at 330 Auburn Avenue in 1937. William L. “Bill” Calloway, 
a pro-growth elite from a later era, remarked that “everybody who was anybody in Black 
America was a Mason.” Almost certainly all the men group members belonged to the Grand 
United Order of Odd Fellows in America, which claimed in 1909 to be the largest secret Black 
order in the world. As membership was not divulged, definitively identifying any individual as a 
Fellow is difficult; however, many of the Fellows were known to be businessmen and 
developers, which included several of the men in the database.75  
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The African American pro-growth coalition functioned as a power structure as did the 
whites, but only within Black Atlanta. It utilized luncheon clubs and societies to initiate and 
carry out community-wide campaigns while the white group had broader city and regional 
influence. Blacks furnished the labor which kept much of the city’s commerce and industry 
moving, and provided services demanded by all Atlantans. However, those facts did not ensure 
that the white business leaders gave consideration to the living or working conditions of African 
Americans. 
Interaction between the two coalitions, as far as this writer could discover, arose 
exclusively from some larger policy or program which the whites wanted implemented. Key 
examples include the two 1920 viaduct bond issues and the Forward Atlanta campaign; all three 
are considered in detail later in this study. In none of those instances did Blacks serve on any 
committees or assist in administering the projects. Whites sought only their dollars, their votes, 
and their ability to rally public support within their communities. Only when racial violence, like 
the white riot of 1906, threatened Atlanta’s reputation did some whites reach out to Black 
leaders.76  
Hunter, who personally interviewed his subjects, notes that in the 1950s, white leaders 
privately mocked the Black sub-community and its leaders, even while soliciting their money for 
some program. Certainly the same occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century. One 
condition absolutely did maintain throughout both time periods: “On the basic issues revolving 
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around segregation, the top leaders in the larger [i.e., white] community are adamant in 
maintaining the present alignment of relationships.” Whites dominated, and scrupulously 
maintained that position; Blacks had to be kept in their place.77 
2.3 Boosterism and the Growth Coalition 
A successful Molotch growth-machine alliance must employ strategies to generate good 
will toward its policies and to draw positive attention to its city. These efforts include working to 
generate a “we feeling” among local residents, as well as publicizing the municipality across the 
region and even nationally. A long-standing tradition in Atlanta, the city’s enthusiastic 
boosterism had its own name, the “Atlanta Spirit.” Defined as “the impulse which prompts a 
citizen of Atlanta to let the world know what a great city is his,” the relentlessly upbeat attitude 
outshone the promotional efforts of other southern cities and came to express the ultimate in 
civic patriotism. Victor Kriegshaber, the COC president in 1916, wrote that the loyalty-inspiring 
moniker denoted a commitment to ideological and material city building with the single purpose 
of making Atlanta a worthwhile place to live.78  
While many dismiss boosterism as just over-the-top salesmanship, Brownell credits the 
activity as more complex and substantive than most historians believe. While always zealous and 
often excessive, the rhetoric reflected the social views of the participants, and served to justify 
their policies and maintain their power. J. R. Short describes it as a serious strategy to develop 
the local economy, and an important way to create cohesion within the business community. He 
cites post-Civil War boosterism as critical to southern cities trying to attract northern investment, 
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and credits Atlanta with having one of the most sustained urban booster campaigns of the 
twentieth century.79  
Atlanta’s growth boosters aimed to garner positive attention for the city, promoting its 
pro-business atmosphere (e.g., low tax rates, efficient transportation, abundant labor), as well as 
local natural and recreational attractions, like Stone Mountain and the many golf courses. They 
remained mute other topics, certain groups, and events, such as racial strife, African Americans, 
and lynchings. As much as possible, they pushed the city’s progressive label in an effort to 
counter the prevailing view of southern towns as small, backward, and poor.80 
Pro-growth elites also made what use they could out of Atlanta’s scanty cultural 
offerings, never failing to mention the city’s springtime hosting of the Metropolitan Opera. This 
annual event created regional buzz as Atlanta was the only place outside of New York City 
visited by the full opera company. Frederick J. Paxon (1865-1939), CEO of one of the city’s 
largest department stores, an executive in the Retail Merchants Association, and former president 
of the Chamber of Commerce, wrote an article in the COC’s City Builder about what the opera 
season signified to city merchants—which was, in a word, “everything.”  It meant “actual money 
brought into the city and spent.” From a promotional standpoint, it was an invaluable asset. “The 
press all over the country…carry the story of the Opera here and the wonderful success, musical 
and financial, it is each year.” Opera week brought recognition to Atlanta once a year, but 
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boosters utilized it year-round in promotional pieces—effectively “capitalizing Culture,” as T. 
Cholmondley Frink advocated in Sinclair Lewis’s Babbitt. In the eyes of some, the major value 
of civic aesthetic events lay in their advertising potential.81 
The growth coalition succeeded in merging its own private interests with those of the 
larger public. It both fostered and benefited from boosterish activities that promoted city 
expansion and raised Atlanta’s national profile. The power leaders succeeded to a large degree in 
mobilizing local government to achieve their financial goals while pushing the cost of their 
activities onto the wider community. As the role of business in government increased, the city 
itself came to function more and more like a corporation—which many applauded. Councilman 
and retail executive Robert A. Gordon, despairing of certain government inefficiencies, spoke in 
favor of more businesslike productivity, remarking that, “After awhile the city of Atlanta will 
learn that a city is nothing other than a big corporation, and that its affairs must be managed by 
men who are acquainted with at least the rudimentary elements of business.”82 
The largest and most influential organization of businessmen in most American cities in 
the early twentieth century was the local Chamber of Commerce. Virtually every man in the 
coalition database compiled for this study belonged to the COC, and thirteen served as president. 
Between the years 1908 and 1925, every president of the Atlanta COC was a member of the 
power elites who impacted city transportation policy. Place promotion in the United States has 
always been dominated by the business community, and the Chamber was the organization 
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through which the pro-growth group principally acted in order to sell their agenda to the public 
and advertise the city to the world.83  
The Atlanta COC welcomed all resident white retailers, merchants, manufacturers, 
bankers, professionals, or business men of any type. Its goals were to advise and assist business 
owners, extend commerce and trade, enhance the business environment, and grow the city. 
While the primary focus remained commercial, the Chamber supported multiple causes and took 
active part in community programs, even those with more obviously humanitarian, social, or 
moral goals. As Deaton observes, businessmen endorsed these endeavors in the hopes of directly 
or indirectly improving the local business climate. Even in the most principled of civic welfare 
campaigns, “the practicality of businessmen necessitated that the economic value be added” to 
the cultural or religious arguments. Throughout the early twentieth century, the COC maintained 
a sterling reputation as the most reliable, principled, pro-active, and enthusiastic civic supporter, 
holding the title of “trailblazer of progress for Atlanta.”84  
Constant city expansion functioned as the chief index of that progress, signifying the 
health and character of the city. Brownell asserts that no indicator of the disposition of urban 
development was as compelling as population 
size; by that measure, Atlanta in the early 
twentieth century certainly succeeded (see Table 
6 at right). This “worship of growth” extended to 
all citizens, not just the elites. African Americans 
likewise embraced it; they enthusiastically joined 
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Population Number Percent
1890 65,533 28,124 75.2
1900 89,872 24,339 37.1
1910 154,839 64,967 72.3
1920 200,616 45,777 29.6




Table 6. Atlanta Population Growth, 
1890-1930 
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the 1920 campaign to grow the city’s population to half a million by 1930. Everyone would 
benefit from a more populous city—at least, that was the message, and most people believed it.85 
But for the pro-growth coalition, wider borders and more people were just means to an 
end; their ultimate goal remained financial accumulation, which they derived chiefly from 
selling, developing, or renting out their properties. Cox argues that in order to flourish, they 
needed a friendly regulatory environment and nurturing public policies. A frequent ploy to 
achieve both involved broadly framing real estate issues as “for the common good,” claiming 
that the trickle-down effects from some new development (more tax revenues, new jobs, rising 
home values, better schools) would benefit everyone in the community. Fortunately for the 
group, residents were “all too willing to fall into this sort of trap.” It would happen time and 
again in Atlanta in the 1920s, especially with the construction of the cars-only viaducts.86 
City growth—that key indicator of success—depended on two essential elements: a 
smoothly-running transportation network, and plenty of unoccupied land where newcomers 
could settle and land speculators could prosper. Atlanta has always had open space into which to 
expand, hindered in no direction by geological features or regional boundaries. But people had to 
be able to get there quickly and easily, and policymakers determined that the automobile was the 
best travel mode for suburban as well as urban dwellers—as long as the city built the roads to 
accommodate them.87 
2.4 Transportation as the Key to Growth 
The majority of the members of a Molotch growth coalition are place entrepreneurs, that 
is, individuals interested or invested in land, or who supported real estate development. These 
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can include property owners, business proprietors, investors, financiers, lawyers, realtors. Other 
members may not have direct place-based concerns, but depend on city growth for their financial 
fortunes.  
In Atlanta, real estate investing has long rated among the top ways to make money. In the 
late 1890s, newspaper accounts touted the property markets as responsible for the fortunes of the 
city’s wealthiest citizens. One article presciently observed that “Some periods of depression 
come, but as a rule Atlanta real estate moves steadily upward, and other fortunes will be made 
out of it in the years to come. It is always in demand.” Ten years later, other tales circulated 
about the rising prices in downtown, and the savvy investments of some prominent citizens. The 
brothers Adair, Forrest (1865-1936) and George, Jr. (1874-1921) had long been city real estate 
moguls, but even Asa Candler, Sr., best known for his Coca-Cola fortune, emerged as one of the 
shrewdest land dealers in town. He passed his property acumen to at least one of his sons, 
William Candler (1890-1936), who brokered numerous property deals in Atlanta and Florida. 
The construction of the Spring Street viaduct in the twenties would send parcel prices in that 
section soaring.88  
  But the successful development of real estate depends on accessibility to the property. 
The value of land relates directly to the ease and speed of the transport to reach it. Horse-
powered vehicles running on tracks in the mid-1800s had first allowed the small town to expand 
beyond the original one-mile circle centered on the train depot. The circular city boundary with a 
three-mile diameter represented the distance a man might walk in an hour.89  
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Electric streetcars made possible the 1895 eastern extension of Atlanta to the DeKalb 
County line in order to annex the first streetcar suburb, Joel Hurt’s fashionable Inman Park. The 
availability of the automobile in Atlanta in the early 1900s increased people’s choices of the 
transit mode they would utilize to traverse the city. Edwin Percival Ansley (1866-1923), real 
estate magnate and president of the Realty Trust Company, began developing Ansley Park, the 
city’s the first automobile suburb in 1905. Atlanta would extend its boundaries northward to 
include both the neighborhood and Piedmont Park, situated on the opposite side of Peachtree 
Street.90 
Ansley planned an exclusive neighborhood aimed at buyers who could pay not only the 
price of the lot, architect’s fees, and construction costs of a large home. They could also afford 
an automobile or two which they or their chauffeur would drive. He had tried unsuccessfully to 
convince the streetcar to run a line into the subdivision, but failed. Residents, should they want to 
take a trolley, had to walk, drive, or be driven over to Peachtree Street to catch one. New homes 
in Ansley Park usually included the novel, free-standing structures—garages—to house motor 
cars. The chauffeur would reside in the detached servant’s quarters, the only place in the 
neighborhood where an African American could live.91 
The car clearly offered greater range, infinitely more flexibility, and faster speeds than 
any of the other transit modes. However, private ownership meant that only the wealthy could 
purchase a motor vehicle in the early 1900s. It would remain far beyond the reach of even 
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middle-class citizens until 1914, when Henry Ford’s moving assembly lines produced masses of 
affordable Model Ts, and installment buying became available.  
Cost considerations did not deter the enthusiasm of the growth advocates, however. As 
early as 1909, they had determined that the car would best help them meet their goals for city 
expansion, with no streetcars necessary. As an added bonus, the auto industry itself provided 
exciting new retail and manufacturing opportunities. With Ansley Park in mind, investors started 
surveying the wide-open suburban landscapes for development options.  
Merchants as well as professionals hailed the automobile as a way to grow their 
businesses by increased efficiencies and wider customer bases. David Tobias Howard (1849-
1935), an African American embalmer and undertaker, exemplifies an entrepreneur who 
successfully monetized a motor vehicle. Born into slavery, he became one of the most successful 
operators in the state after purchasing an automobile hearse/ambulance, which expanded his 
business far beyond metro Atlanta.92 As his wealth and his fleet of vehicles grew, he chartered 
the first Black banking institute in Georgia, the Atlanta State Savings Bank, and came to rival 
Alonzo Herndon as a leading philanthropist. Numerous others also increased their personal 
fortunes, directly or indirectly, by or from motordom.   
Having chosen their course, the business elites by 1920 needed to convince Atlantans that 
creating an automotive infrastructure to expand and ease travel by car would benefit everyone in 
the city. This process had deeper significance than simply decisions about moving people and 
goods through the city; it involved an understanding of how the city should be spatially 
configured, and by whom. As place entrepreneurs, their land-based interests and accompanying 
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accessibility requirements dictated their selection of the automobile. They understood that to 
make mobility by car effective, they had to get city government to pave the streets, supply 
parking spaces, and create a system to keep traffic running smoothly.93  
Atlanta’s growth coalition succeeded with its adoption of the motor vehicle as the new 
transportation method. In the twenties, cars began to supplant trolleys, and would have 
completely replaced them much faster but for the interventions of the gasoline shortages and 
rationings of the Great Depression and World War II. Trucks, likewise, made inroads on the 
railroads’ short-haul business, but not until the construction of the interstates would trucking 
substantially replace trains for long-hauling freight.  
By 1929, Atlanta was as automobile city, but it did not arrive there on its own. Always 
promoting itself as progressive, the city really only adopted its modern ideas from somewhere 
else. It never produced a single innovative traffic measure, like street paving, curb cuts, signal 
devices, crosswalks, traffic cops, or stop signs. Instead, it followed the lead of cities like Detroit, 
New York, and Chicago. 
Atlanta officials made frequent trips to the Northeast and Midwest to observe practices 
and study laws in other urban areas, bringing back ideas to try out back home. The city council 
brought in the same national experts used by other cities to advise on the best methods for traffic 
control, zoning, and street regulation. That cross-pollination explains why by 1930, the U.S. was 
well on its way to possessing nationally uniform traffic codes and procedures, with Atlanta an 
eager devotee.  
Atlanta’s induction into the automobile age began with the appearance of the first car 
there in 1899. Thirty years later, local residents and businesses registered more than fifty 
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thousand motor vehicles with the Georgia Secretary of State. The journey from 1 to 51,890 
began slowly, encountering varying degrees of resistance and acceptance along the way. 
Municipal leaders were fairly conservative at the start, though the Atlanta Spirit did exert itself 
with the 1909 auto show. Local automobility continued to progress intermittently over the next 
decade, culminating in the twenties, when the pro-growth coalition consolidated the dominance 
of the automobile. The next chapter introduces the main event: the Roaring Twenties. 
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3 INTRODUCTION TO THE 1920S 
In an address to Congress in 1921, President Warren G. Harding asserted that “the motor 
car has become an indispensable instrument in our political, social, and industrial life.” The 
members of Atlanta’s pro-growth coalition would certainly have concurred; they, too, saw the 
automobile as a modern necessity. They had adopted it as the essential tool in achieving their 
goal of stimulating city expansion, which would, in turn, increase business opportunities leading 
to financial gains. Wealth accumulation remained their chief objective; urban growth supplied 
the means to achieving it; and the car was the engine driving that growth.94  
Promoting and facilitating automobile use was therefore imperative. To accomplish that, 
they had to persuade local officials to put into place the structures, facilities, and regulatory 
apparatus needed to ensure that Atlantans would choose the car as their main transit mode. As 
Tedlow observes, the mass manufacture of motor vehicles may have been one of the great 
technological marvels of the twentieth century, but achieving national automobility required a 
vast legal, social, and economic infrastructure. Atlanta’s growth alliance undertook that massive 
overhaul of roadways, legislation, and culturally-acceptable definitions of street usage in the 
1920s.95 
A number of non-car-related factors assisted their efforts. It was a decade of Republican 
presidents, who ushered in a pro-business “New Era” of peace, prosperity, and virtually 
unregulated capitalism. Anti-trust fervor waned, labor struggled, and the power of corporations 
strengthened. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, from 1921 until his election as president 
in 1929, sought closer ties and cooperation between government and business. Although often 
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expressing a disdain for large government and bureaucratic interference with American 
individualism, Hoover greatly expanded the Commerce Department which published statistical 
data and standardization tools. In the motor vehicle category alone, his office authored numerous 
“recommended” and “uniform” standards, guidelines, policies, and sample legislation for states 
and municipalities to adopt for highways, street signals, 
traffic codes, and road signage. Most states readily complied. 
Hoover’s promotion of interstate connectivity through new 
highways led to the adoption of the official U.S. numbered 
highway system in 1926 (see Georgia sign at right), still in 
use today.96  
The end of World War I brought high unemployment 
levels as industries struggled to re-adjust to post-military 
production and soldiers returned from overseas looking for jobs. A national business recession 
began in January 1920, and reached its nadir in July 1921. Numerous labor strikes had 
Washington searching for ways to better industrial relations. Rising crime rates had cities such as 
Atlanta calling for the federal government to hire men for public works projects, including road-
building, because “the most effective way to keep down crime is to keep down unemployment,” 
and “public construction is better than relief.” President Harding in turn asked municipalities to 
expand their workforces to aid the more than 2.3 million out-of-work Americans. Atlanta, with 
its plans for a new jail, the Spring Street viaduct, and a backlog of war-delayed construction, 
should have had plenty of jobs. But Mayor Key had to urge businesses to hire more men, 
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promising to publicly humiliate any uncooperative employers. It would be early 1923 before the 
post-war slump ended.97 
World War I had effectively halted the state-federal partnership for road building and 
maintenance, as men, monies, and industries diverted to military activities. Within months of the 
war’s end, however, Congress expanded the 1916 Federal Aid Road Act, and in 1921, passed a 
new Federal Highway Act. Many Georgia counties vigorously and successfully pursued federal 
dollars for their road projects, with Fulton County, Atlanta’s home, leading the charge.  
Motorized equipment and trucks made paving more efficient, and specialized machinery 
replaced farm tractors for road work. A flurry of road building led the Highway Board to publish 
the state’s first highway map in 1920. The national safety goal of eliminating at-grade railroad 
crossings spurred counties to build numerous concrete bridges, a practice which Atlanta would 
soon emulate by constructing viaducts over the downtown railroad gulch.98  
American industry had emerged from World War I more bureaucratically structured, an 
outcome of the high degree of organization demanded to create, equip, and transport a fighting 
force, then conduct a successful armed conflict overseas. Wiebe observes the new “bureaucratic 
orientation” in which businesses established their national trade associations, based on principles 
of scientific management. By uniting, group members could share expertise, present a united 
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front, solve common problems, set legislative agendas, and promote their particular industry and 
its products.99  
Herbert Hoover elevated the lobbying power of national trade associations; they served as 
his preferred means for coordinating business interests with government policy. With his 
encouragement, the leading national consortium of municipal engineers produced the country’s 
first uniform automotive standards. Atlanta possessed an array of trade, civic, and professional 
organizations, many of whom would play decisive roles 
in the city’s planning, zoning, and traffic control efforts. 
Their efforts led to the city’s embrace of the federal 
uniform standards in 1929.100 
Recovering from the national business recession 
during its first two years, the 1920s emerged as the 
decade of consumption and leisure. The twenties 
witnessed the crowning efforts of American corporate 
capitalism to create what Leach describes as “a future-
oriented culture of desire that confused the good life 
with goods.” Although not everyone shared in the material prosperity, no one escaped its 
imagery perpetually on display in movies, signs, billboards, store windows, and magazine and 
radio advertisements. Technology, mass production, and managerial efficiency supplied a 
plethora of novel products which transformed daily life, assisting the revolution in manners and 
morals. The automobile played its part by supplying a new sort of freedom. Courting couples 
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could escape parental scrutiny as they went for all-night rides (see sketch above), giving rise to 
the car’s scathing label as “a house of prostitution on wheels.”101 
Automobile manufacturing emerged as the major growth industry of the decade. In 1921, 
Atlanta’s Chamber of Commerce described how the world had come to depend on the motor 
vehicle. “Without the automobile, practically all industry would stop—transportation would be 
paralyzed—living costs would soar higher and higher—the progress of the world would be 
impaired and retarded.” By 1923, the car, that once “indifferent product with an uncertain 
future,” would surpassed meat packing and petroleum as America’s most valuable 
manufacture.102  
The whole of Atlanta’s business community celebrated the automobile’s success. In the 
first months of 1920, civic boosters bragged about the city’s position as the distribution point for 
automotive products throughout the Southeast, and the industry had already established a sterling 
reputation among local real estate investors. “Atlanta automobile firms occupy the finest 
buildings, pay the highest rents, and are requiring a greater number of new buildings than any 
other line of business.” A drive out any direction out from Five Points brought views of 
“handsome and substantial structures which have been recently constructed expressly for the 
automotive industry.” No one doubted that cars were not only good business, but also good for 
business.103  
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The 1920 census officially declared America a majority urban nation, with 54.3 million 
city dwellers compared to 51.4 million people living in rural areas. As a consequence of the 
population growth, now larger, denser cities confronted problems of insufficient housing, 
inadequate city services, and increased conflicts between different social and racial groups. 
Modern technological innovations brought contradictory pressures of centralization and 
decentralization. Steel-framed skyscrapers concentrated workers in downtowns, while the 
telephone and the automobile allowed for population dispersal to the suburbs.104 
Atlanta followed the trend. In twenty years, the city had gone from a population under 
90,000, to a new high just over 200,000. Ebullient over the expansion, the mayor, city council, 
and pro-growth business leaders would spend the decade coping with the outfall of that success. 
Providing merely adequate services required massive expenditures in the form of multiple bond 
issues to add water and sewer lines, construct new schools, and pave city streets with the hard, 
smooth surfaces demanded by the growing numbers of motorists. 
Traffic congestion emerged as a severe problem for downtowns across the country, 
including Atlanta’s. Every commuter was inconvenienced, whether traveling by trolley, 
automobile, or jitney. No one was happy—in addition to the street travelers, pedestrians were 
angry about being crowded onto the packed sidewalks, and by the rush of vehicles which made 
crossing the street as difficult as it was dangerous. Business owners worried that customers 
would go elsewhere if they could not find a nearby parking space. Something had to be done; 
editorials complained about the problem as well as the lack of response by the city council. 
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Throughout the decade, government officials struggled, trying various remedies, searching for 
one that would not only allay the problem, but also—and more importantly—would appeal to all 
of the influential policymakers in the growth coalition. Out of many possible solutions, the one 
that would have been most effective was never tried in Atlanta: limiting the number of 
automobiles using the streets.105    
The city undertook major studies to comprehend and resolve its growth-related problems, 
exercising the progressive era propensity to seek the advice of specialists. Municipal business 
leaders preferred to consult engineers when seeking answers to what McShane calls “the 
diseconomies of urbanization.” Civil engineering at the time epitomized scientific knowledge 
and offered modern technological solutions. Atlanta would turn to three nationally-prominent 
experts for guidance on zoning and traffic, all engineers.106 
Throughout the decade, the city expanded in people and territory. For Atlanta to remain 
the banking and distribution center of the Southeast, civic leaders had to embrace the concept of 
city planning to bring order and direction to current and future growth. By creating a planning 
commission and adopting a comprehensive land use plan, Atlanta would join the ranks of the 
larger U.S. cities, and further enhance its stature as a good place to live, work, and invest.  
City planning in Atlanta had two major components: (1) zoning the city into segregated, 
use- or race-based sectors; and (2) fabricating the physical and regulatory components needed to 
solve the traffic problems caused by the ascent of the automobile. Chapter 4, Planning Atlanta’s 
Streets, describes the creation of the physical infrastructure necessary to provide motor vehicles’ 
 
105 “The Traffic Problem,” Atlanta Constitution, February 5, 1920; Brownell, “A Symbol of Modernity: 
Attitudes toward the Automobile in Southern Cities in the 1920s,” American Quarterly 24, no. 1 (March 1972): 28-
30. 
106 Clay McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” Journal of Urban History 
25, no. 3 (March 1999): 389. 
70 
ease of movement in and around Atlanta, especially in the central business district. The volume 
of traffic generated by cars and trucks required wider roads, which proved difficult-to-impossible 
to achieve in downtown, although sidewalks could usually be trimmed—and were. Uniform 
grades and improved street paving enabled smooth driving and facilitated traffic flow, with 
asphalt and concrete the preferred low-traction hard surfaces for motor vehicles. Grade crossings, 
especially with the magnitude of both railroad and vehicular traffic, caused lengthy backups, not 
to mention crashes and deaths. Building viaducts over the downtown rail lines reduced gridlock 
and injuries.107   
Chapter 5, Regulating Atlanta’s Streets, describes the creation of the legal superstructure 
to regulate all street users. Cars were fast, fun, and flexible; drivers could go anywhere, any time, 
and at speeds unsurpassed by any other earthbound transit mode.108 But cars were also deadly, 
fueling carnage in the streets. The bodies from vehicular collisions piled up to amounts 
exceeding even today’s ho-hum 30,000+ annual national deaths. Cars, and all other users of the 
public roadways, had to be minutely regulated in an attempt to mitigate the hubris and stupidity 
which, then and now, cause most traffic “accidents.”109  
Local power elites founded a number of popular and influential automobile-related 
organizations. These associations worked intimately with city, state, and federal officials, 
crafting car-enabling policies. Together, they spun a legislative “web of regulation” to stem the 
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costs of the human and property damage resulting from countless collisions. This massive 
regulatory apparatus included laws on the books, as well as a tsunami of novel devices, signs, 
signal lights, structures, and painted lines on the streets to control movement and activities on the 
roads and sidewalks. To ensure compliance, the police department re-instituted the traffic squad. 
Its top priority was to check the crime wave sweeping over the city—motor vehicle infractions—
which produced so much death and destruction.110  
A large number of the restrictions applied to non-vehicular street users, such as 
pedestrians, street vendors, peddlers, and child entrepreneurs. Many were banned altogether. 
Foot travelers did retain a place in the public streets increasingly occupied by private vehicles, 
but within a closely circumscribed space. New laws confined them to a small portion of the 
roadway delineated by painted lines at intersections only. The crosswalk dictated where a person 
walking could utilize the street, and local ordinances restricted when they could use it, subject to 
penalties for non-compliance. A major effect of the regulatory network was the removal or 
restriction of anything that was not a motor vehicle or a streetcar. Bicycles did retain street 
privileges as a transit mode, but cyclists had already to a significant degree self-deported from 
Atlanta’s busy downtown.  
Reconfiguring and regulating the streets facilitated the growing presence of the 
automobile, but rapid and chaotic city expansion brought additional challenges. The urbanization 
of America meant greater density as newcomers crowded into city centers. The 20-story high 
rises of the 1920s towered over Atlanta’s now-diminutive, eleven-story “skyscraper” of the 
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1890s. Their presence guaranteed even more people and vehicles in downtown on a daily basis, 
and limited the light and air reaching the streets below. Gas stations and other small commercial 
establishments edged into residential areas, fleeing high rents in the central business district. 
Apartment complexes disturbed the rhythm and density of single-family neighborhoods. Well-to-
do, in-town dwellers escaped to exclusive suburbs sprouting at the city’s edges.   
Chapter 6, Segregating the City, documents how the Atlanta growth machine met these 
challenges. Zoning was a way to manage the chaos by organizing land uses and limiting what 
could be done and where. It provided a mechanism to channel new development into defined 
sectors. By putting more distance between where people lived, shopped, and worked, zoning 
increased the necessity for an automobile. Most power elites eagerly embraced the regulatory 
power of the comprehensive zone plan, which allowed them to maintain their influential position 
within the city while also taking advantage of burgeoning real estate investment opportunities. A 
few realtors resisted, especially if they had properties negatively affected by zoning, but the 
promise of “preserving property values” (usually code for “keeping out the riff raff”) won over 
nearly everyone with white skin.  
For many southern cities during the twenties, zoning also provided a means to tighten the 
noose of Jim Crow. Atlanta’s 1922 zoning ordinance offered the most well-known challenge to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1917 ruling against racially-segregated zoning. The city’s distinctive 
race-based residential districting was eventually found unconstitutional, but its zone map 
continued to influence the racial composition of city neighborhoods into the 1960s.  
Atlanta’s African American population increased during the decade, but remained close 
to one-third of the total as the Great Migration continued. The zone plan straitjacketed those who 
stayed behind into segregated neighborhoods, resulting in severe overcrowding around east 
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side’s Auburn Avenue and west side’s Atlanta University Center. The restricted housing options 
mirrored the restricted seating options on streetcars and the just-introduced “motor buses.” While 
white customers utilized the bulk of available seating, Blacks had to crowd into the back, just as 
they had to crowd into confined race-defined residential districts while whites expanded into the 
outlying suburbs. Whites made sure that Blacks were kept “in their place” everywhere. 
Segregated housing districts might create locational distance between the two races, but 
the confined space inside a trolley permitted no real separation. The daily face-to-face encounters 
often resulted in conflicts and violence. Complete segregation proved impossible to achieve on 
either the streets or the streetcars, but traveling in the privacy of an automobile allowed escape 
from mixed-race crowds. Freedom from a chance confrontation supplied yet another compelling 
reason to buy a car. 
 The physical and legislative re-shaping of Atlanta did, to some degree, relieve traffic and 
land use problems, as well as burnish the city’s modern, progressive reputation. But the mid-
decade rise of a regional competitor and a lull in automobile sales required potent counter-
punches. Chapter 7, Selling City and Car, describes how the advertising industry swooped in 
both to renew the Atlanta’s standing as the Southeast’s leading financial and distribution center, 
and to invigorate sales of new motor vehicles. 
Marketing came of age in the 1920s, solidifying its ascendancy over American consumer 
purchasing. Young college graduates, often from the new business schools, entered the 
increasingly scientific field of advertising. They studied the markets, honed the soon-ubiquitous 
customer survey, and developed fresh merchandizing strategies directed toward specific 
audiences. Advances in color processing led to a wave of vibrant signs and vivid print 
advertisements. The billboard enlarged to become an effective way to reach car-driving 
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consumers, a stark contrast to the poster-sized, black-and-white card ad which had lined streetcar 
interiors since 1900. Electrical displays, especially those with colored lights, meant publicity did 
not stop at sundown, and added exciting tints to Atlanta’s downtown white way.   
Newspapers, journals, and magazines papered the nation, extending the publicity reach of 
those with a story to sell, which Atlanta did in 1924. Florida real estate speculation, long lurking 
at edges of the city’s financial corridors, boomed in the 1920s. Suddenly, tourists and investors 
sought sunny shores instead of Atlanta’s more prosaic attractions. To counter the flow of people 
and dollars southward, the Chamber of Commerce inaugurated the Forward Atlanta campaign. A 
mammoth publicity crusade, it nationally advertised the advantages of the city’s stolid but secure 
banking facilities, its enlarged and zoning-enhanced manufacturing opportunities, its unrivaled 
railroad facilities for shipping, and its status as a provider of airmail service at the city-owned 
Candler Field. Forward Atlanta, a shining example of the media arm of the growth coalition in 
action, produced outstanding results. Hundreds of new enterprises, including some automobile 
manufacturers, located in the city, bringing employment to thousands of local workers.  
It paid to advertise, not just the city, but also the automobile. Mid-decade auto sales 
lagged as the industry for the first time faced market saturation. Consumers hesitated to replace 
their older, still-functional automobile which had cost them so much—a common problem for 
retailers whenever a commodity was heavy, durable, and expensive. Advertising agency 
executives persuaded their car manufacturing clients to create new vehicle models every year, in 
several colors and with a variety of features, as a way to stimulate desire and appeal to new and 
returning customers. Newspaper ads quickly reflected the new marketing strategies. The 
automotive industry eventually grasped what the fashion world had known for decades: if you 
keep changing the styles, you never have to worry about flooding the market. 
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The advertising industry had since the late nineteenth century purposely and with great 
calculation shaped modern consumer attitudes to crave ownership of the latest designs with state-
of-the-art accessories. A new sensibility of out with the old, in with the new, the advanced, the 
up-to-date, the modish had taken over. “Keeping up with the Joneses” proved to be a powerful 
motivator for the American consumer, and the automobile ranked as the most highly visible 
status symbol. Along with advertising and the introduction of planned obsolescence, two related 
factors greatly contributed to the tremendous increase in car sales. The availability of easy 
money and the removal of the stigma of buying on credit allowed middle- and working-class 
families to acquire a vehicle. During the 1920s, more than 70% of all cars were purchased on an 
installment plan; gone were the days of the cash-only cars available in the 1910 Sears catalog.111 
The combination of new advertising with favorable interest rates and changing consumer 
sensibilities soon took effect: between 1920 and 1929, the number of private automobiles in 
Atlanta increased by 66%. All the new cars on the roads, coupled with the city’s half-hearted, 
sporadic efforts to regulate traffic flow, brought renewed gridlock to downtown. The situation 
frustrated commuters, hindered tourists, obstructed business, and smudged the city’s reputation. 
Civic leaders, forced to confront the intractable problem, turned to nationally-known experts for 
guidance.  
Chapter 8, State of the Streets 1929, describes that year’s traffic survey, undertaken by 
the mayor’s specially-appointed Traffic Commission, with the invaluable assistance of the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York City. Most of those participating in the 
survey had strong automotive interests, and the report understandably had a pro-car slant. The 
Commission also intentionally omitted trolleys from its consideration. The study’s authors 
 
111 David L. Cohn, The Good Old Days: A History of American Morals and Manners as Seen through the 
Sears, Roebuck Catalogs 1905 to the Present (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 158-60. 
76 
claimed they were not “in a position to consider the effect of street car operation on traffic,”112 
prompting the question, if they weren’t, who was? Their disingenuous dodge, however, did not 
restrain them from faulting the streetcar as the major hindrance to swift and efficient traffic flow. 
One wonders how they managed to reach that conclusion without even studying trolleys. 
Ignoring the daily transit mode of thousands of Atlantans yielded a distorted view of city traffic 
patterns, but at the same time provided a crystal clear understanding of the vision of the pro-
growth coalition and its legislative allies.   
The study supplied a snapshot of the prevailing travel conditions in Atlanta in 1929. 
“Businessmen and politicians had come to a full realization that the streets of a city are the most 
important element in its economic usefulness” [emphasis added]. The traffic survey made no 
mention of the railroads, except as obstacles to movement. The railroads, the city’s life lines 
which pre-dated Atlanta itself, were viewed as interlopers slicing up downtown, instead of as the 
creators and sustainers of the central commercial hub.113 
The railroads had long held an absolute monopoly on long- and medium-distance 
transportation in the United States. Thirty years of automobility increasingly challenged that 
dominance. Trains maintained their critical economic importance, but trucks had begun to make 
inroads on the short-haul side of rail freight traffic, signaling greater changes to come. With the 
viaducts and laterals built in the twenties, Atlanta had beginnings of a bi-level downtown (now 
greatly expanded). With railroads literally at the bottom, the automobile physically occupied the 
top tier. The concrete structures also symbolized the new order of the hegemony of motordom.  
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The pro-growth coalition succeeded in their goal of city expansion. By decade’s end, 
Atlanta had added nearly 70,000 new residents and received official designation as a 
metropolitan area. The common understanding of the streets as public places where everyone had 
equal rights had disappeared, replaced with a general acceptance that streets were for cars. In 
actuality, the car did not “win” the road. Rather, the civic and business leadership eagerly handed 
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4 PLANNING ATLANTA’S STREETS 
At the 1919 the annual meeting of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, the leadership 
proposed that a city planning commission be formed to meet the demands of what Mayor James 
L. Key described as “the miraculous growth that the city is experiencing.” As a Chamber 
director, the mayor in the coming months would appoint the city’s first official planning 
commission. That the elite businessmen on the six-man commission were all members of the 
city’s pro-growth coalition only affirmed Hunter’s assertion: whenever Atlanta undertook to 
decide major policy on an issue, the top leaders would be well represented on any committee 
having jurisdiction over it.115  
The actions of the planning commission significantly impacted the city’s course for the 
next decade by tackling two major problems: traffic congestion and haphazard growth. A truly 
comprehensive land use plan would have addressed the two interrelated problems together, but 
Atlanta’s planners chose to separate the two issues. They tackled the traffic problem first.  
Trucks and cars, now essential tools for business and city expansion, needed to move 
easily through the city. But the mass of vehicles crowding the narrow streets inconvenienced 
customers and clients, delayed deliveries, and hindered police from chasing down lawbreakers. 
The great advantage of the automobile—speed—was entirely negated by the congestion in the 
central business district, much to the dismay and discontent of motorists. Worst of all, the city 
was gaining a reputation for gridlock. 
Atlanta’s leaders finally began to realize that in order to keep automobiles traveling 
freely, the city’s antiquated road system needed an overhaul. Mayor Key led the way, 
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confidently declared that bridging the railroads would provide “the ultimate solution” to the 
downtown traffic problems. The many grade crossings of the network of rail lines did bring 
traffic flow on numbers of streets to a complete halt multiple times a day; the viaducts would 
eliminate one of the causes of downtown gridlock. However, it did nothing to address the most 
basic reason Atlanta’s streets were so crowded: too many vehicles. The mayor’s assertion in a 
way exemplified the common misconception that a city can build its way out of traffic 
congestion.116 
Throughout the twenties, the growth advocates, acting in and through the official city 
planning commission, undertook major taxpayer-funded road-improvement and viaduct-building 
projects. They reconfigured the city’s physical infrastructure in an attempt to facilitate motor 
vehicle traffic. Despite all the evidence produced throughout the decade, Atlanta’s business and 
government leaders never acknowledged the reality that building more and bigger roads and 
bridges only brought more traffic.  
4.1 City Planning in 1920s Atlanta  
The Chamber of Commerce had proposed a city planning commission in late 1919, and 
William J. Sayward (1875-1945), FAIA, a prominent regional architect and chair of the 
Chamber’s Committee on City Planning, carried the concept into the new decade. In an article 
about city planning in the January 1920 issue of the City Builder magazine, Sayward carefully 
explained the concept of city planning, which most of the general public misunderstood as a 
municipal clean-up or beautification scheme. He defined it as a process which required a 
comprehensive survey of the city’s needs, studying topics like transportation, highways, street 
widening, bridges, housing, parks, and building requirements. Once the situation was 
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understood, solutions could be formulated in an overall strategy to fix pressing issues and 
prepare for future expansion.117 
City planning, while not a new idea, was a relatively new practice in the United States. 
Inspired by George Eugène Haussmann’s massive 1853-70 renovation of Paris, American 
architect Daniel Burnham led the design team of the White City at the 1893 World Columbian 
Exposition in Chicago. It presented to the nation an early example of a comprehensive land use 
plan, and exemplified the tenets of the City Beautiful Movement. Characterized by imposing 
boulevards, elaborate neoclassical public buildings, and spacious, sculpted gardens, the 
movement, which was most popular from 1900 to World War I, emphasized dignity, order, 
harmony, and virtue in urban form. It promised to uplift and improve the mass of citizens 
exposed to its artistry and refinement. Burnham (1846-1912) created plans for other cities in the 
early 1900s, notably San Francisco and Chicago.118 
American cities quickly embraced the new urban aesthetic and many sought, if not city-
wide makeovers, at least the incorporation of some of its elements. Atlanta, ever aware of 
advances made by competitor cities, managed to add a few representative City Beautiful 
features, such as the 1901 Carnegie Library and the 1909 City Auditorium and Armory. In 1903, 
the city hired the Olmsted Brothers to create a master plan for Grant Park, at that time the city’s 
largest recreational space which eventually housed the Atlanta Zoo and the Cyclorama. City 
officials also attempted but failed to implement the 1910 Bleckley Plan which would have 
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constructed a beautifying and unifying central city plaza over the dirty and dividing downtown 
railroad gulch.  
By the time Sayward’s article appeared in 1920, another type of city planning had gained 
acceptance. Planners and engineers sought a less embellished, more down-to-earth and practical 
approach during the second decade of the twentieth century. Civil engineer and St. Louis city 
planner, Harland Bartholomew (1889-1989) espoused the new City Practical, or City Efficient, 
as it was sometimes called. His consulting firm devised comprehensive plans for hundreds of 
American cities and towns. Using a standardized approach, they addressed streets, transportation, 
parks, water and sewer systems, zoning, appearance, housing, and finances. City Beautiful plans 
also dealt with these aspects of urban design, but engineer Bartholomew took a more utilitarian 
approach. His work helped circulate and popularize on a national level the pragmatic approach to 
city planning.119   
 William Sayward advocated for planning to encompass not only the beautiful, but also 
the efficient. “The city beautiful, to be sure, is a very commendable ideal and one which should 
be assured its place; but we must not forget that the city beautiful must absolutely be founded 
upon the ‘city practical.’” Throughout the 1920s, Atlanta’s growth advocates more often chose 
the functional approach rather than striving to create beauty. They supported services which 
promoted the city’s commercial growth, but paid little attention to civic improvements not 
directly related to the practicalities of business. Atlantans in general would not support the 
allocation of public funds for what they perceived as what Lands calls “urban primping.”120  
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The city’s business community did, however, enthusiastically embrace the concept of 
planning; they would take the initiative in implementing it in Atlanta. They saw planning as a 
way to understand present and future needs, to create a city attractive to visitors and investors, 
and to grow the city. Robert Otis, planning commission chair, itemized the qualities necessary 
for a good civic reputation: the city must be well-laid out for convenience and beauty; it must 
provide for transportation, business, and recreation; and it must have comfortable housing. Such 
a city would attract and retain new inhabitants. Warning that “the planned city attracts and the 
unplanned city repels,” he urged that everything be considered upon the basis of expansion: 
zoning, commerce, parks, schools, wider streets, recreation, and entertainment. His claim, 
“Forethought along lines of city planning, with careful consideration for the growth of the city, 
pays from every angle” (emphasis added), encapsulated the coalition’s approach to planning for 
a larger city and the various types of paydays it could bring.121   
As part of preparation for a city plan, Sayward urged that traffic be one of the first items 
studied in Atlanta. He suggested that the main arteries of the city be arranged to improve traffic 
flow by following the most direct pathways at ideal grades. With great foresight, he urged the 
construction of an encircling road around the business district, insisting it would relieve clogged 
streets in the Five Points area and improve access throughout town. His was likely the first 
perimeter highway proposal, embodied today in Atlanta’s Interstate-285, although no such 
roadway was built or even seriously considered during the twenties. The lack of a major arterial 
circumnavigating downtown would impede Atlanta’s drivers for another forty years.122  
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Sayward proposed a council-appointed planning commission provided with adequate 
funding to undertake surveys and studies of the growth of Atlanta and its street traffic. He 
insisted that the newspapers mount an educational campaign first, so the public could understand 
what a city plan might accomplish, and then publish the commission’s findings and 
recommendations. His article, itself an instructive example of public planning education, offered 
a way for the city to move forward. Mayor Key embraced the message, and would soon act upon 
it.123  
In his annual message to the city on January 5, 1920, the mayor celebrated Atlanta’s 
growth, “the most rapid and substantial . . . of any year in the city’s history,” but he also issued a 
challenge. To keep up with the burgeoning population, the city had to increase its services, so he 
asked for an emergency tax imposition to fulfill a long list of needed improvements: expanding 
the school system, waterworks, city parks, and libraries. He called for the establishment of a 
library for African Americans, who at that time were not permitted to use any of the city’s 
existing public libraries.124 
Denouncing the sad state of city streets, Mayor Key urged the development and 
construction of cross-town thoroughfares, viaducts and bridges, as well as widening and paving 
the streets. He blamed the streetcar company for the poor road conditions, and asked the city 
council to force the company to repair the damage. Animosity between Mayor Key and Preston 
Arkwright, president of Georgia Railway and Power Company, dated back to 1906, when then-
Alderman Key first pushed for municipal ownership of all public utilities. The feud continued in 
1919, when Mayor Key, in his inaugural speech, called for city ownership of the streetcar 
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system. That same year, he signed the ordinance allowing jitneys to compete directly with 
trolleys. The hostility persisted until Key left office in 1923, and the ramifications of the ongoing 
dispute would have serious consequences for the traction company in the coming years.125 
Atlanta’s greatness could expand, but only if the city took the long view. “We need to 
adopt a definite and scientific plan to meet the demands for a city of not less than 500,000 
inhabitants,” which he asserted Atlanta would reach in ten years. As the city population in 1920 
was 200,616, the mayor’s claim that it would more than double in the next decade was bold and 
inspiring. Newspaper editorials took up the theme, calling (in increasingly bolder and larger 
type) for “Expansion! Expansion! EXPANSION!” and urged the city council to take decisive 
measures. Atlanta, an editorial writer asserted, was “growing faster than any other city in the 
south. . . .  We are trying to operate a great city with village machinery, and we can no longer do 
it without serious consequences!”126   
City officials quickly responded, passing a tax increase and moving ahead with 
preparations for Atlanta’s imminent unprecedented growth. In January, 1920, the council 
adopted the entire Chamber of Commerce’s city planning recommendation from December 1919 
(see figure below). A new 24-member city planning commission, the result of cooperative action 
between the city, county, and Chamber, included influential businessmen, industrialists, civic 
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leaders, newspaper editors, lawyers, physicians, politicians, and two prominent women. The 
broad representation enabled a 
coordinated, regional approach to 
problem-solving, and the commission 
produced a Greater Atlanta report 
calling for improved schools, parks, 
and roads. However, lack of funds led 
to the disbanding of the commission a 
mere six months after its creation. 
Council had failed to bankroll the 
group.127  
By July, the city council had 
decided to formally create a legal city 
planning commission, and sought authority from the state. In mid-August, the General Assembly 
enacted legislation enabling the city to create a six-member City Planning Commission. On 
October 12, 1920, Mayor Key appointed the first official and legal Atlanta Planning Commission 
codified by city ordinance.128 
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Figure 6. The new City Planning Commission, City 
Builder 4, no. 12 (February 1920): 7. 
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The six men appointed to the commission (plus the mayor as ex officio chair) comprised  
textbook examples from a Molotch pro-growth coalition, and are listed here:  
Michael Hoke Smith (1855-1931) – U.S. senator, attorney, real estate developer, former Georgia 
governor, former owner of the Atlanta Journal;  
Charles Almond Wickersham (1858-1949) – president of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, 
on the board of directors of Coca-Cola and Trust Company of Georgia;  
Frank A. Pittman (1865-1958) –building inspector for the City of Atlanta, owner of Pittman 
Construction which built homes, office buildings, churches and roads; in the 1950s his 
company would construct part of the Expressway, the forerunner to I-85; 
Joel S. Hurt, Sr. (1850-1926) – civil engineer, designer and developer of Inman Park-the city’s 
first suburban neighborhood, built the city’s first electric street railway (second in the 
nation), bank president, real estate developer, one of the city’s most distinguished 
entrepreneurs;  
Fred J. Terry (1880-1923) – superintendent of the composing room of the Atlanta Georgian, 
labor leader, active in the Atlanta Typological Union and the Atlanta Federation of 
Trades;  
Robert R. Otis (1873-1960) – prominent real estate developer, agent for numerous downtown 
properties, including the Piedmont Hotel and the Peachtree Arcade, founder and president  
of Otis Realty Company, ardent city planning activist, and chair of the new planning 
commission;  
Mayor James L. Key (1867-1939) – attorney, former city alderman, mayor, and ex-officio chair 
 of the new planning commission.129 
 
The group which would advise the city council on Atlanta’s comprehensive land use plan 
consisted of some of the very people who stood to gain or lose most in municipal land-use 
decisions. All were members of the COC; the government/business fusion was apparent. Mayor 
Key appointed no ordinary citizens, not one small business owner, certainly no women. 
Neither did the mayor appoint even one African American, despite a request from John 
Joseph Eagan (1870-1924), president of the American Cast-Iron Pipe Company of Atlanta. A 
wealthy industrialist, investor, and generous philanthropist, Eagan lived by his Christian 
 
129 “Atlanta Leaders Placed on City Planning Board,” Atlanta Constitution, February 10, 1920; Molotch, 
“The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” 314-15; Brownell, “The Commercial-Civic 
Elite and City Planning in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans in the 1920s,” 346-47. A 1929 study of planning in 
the U.S. found that in Atlanta, the mayor was reported as seldom present at planning commission meetings; Hubbard 
and Hubbard, Our Cities to-Day and to-Morrow: A Survey of Planning and Zoning Progress in the United States, 
36. 
87 
principles, was active in downtown’s Central Presbyterian Church, and served on the Atlanta 
Council of Churches. Listed in the Social Register and a member of the Capital City Club, Eagan 
worked to improve race relations in Atlanta, and took an active part in the 1919 creation of the 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation. He urged Key to select a group of representative Black 
citizens to work with the new planning commission. Of course, they could not have served on the 
commission, but they could have assisted in making investigations and recommendations 
concerning matters affecting their communities’ welfare. Eagan’s request went unheard.130  
The list of appointees, however, would have appeared eminently reasonable to the mayor 
and other civic leaders. The commission’s charge spelled out the most important concern of 
Atlanta-style city planning, to pay attention to the city’s “economic and commercial 
advancement.” As Brownell notes, such a group, with “more than an incidental interest” in urban 
real estate development, could be trusted to act accordingly. 
Urban planning commissions in the South . . . drew most heavily on those local 
individuals and groups who had considerable experience in finance, 
transportation, and land development and who were most interested in the 
consequences of a comprehensive urban design. Conflict of interest was never 
mentioned. . . . It would never have occurred to them that they might not be 
capable of representing the interests and concerns of the entire city.131 
 
The planning commission employed as their first outside hire a general city planning 
consultant. Nationally-known expert Robert H. Whitten had an impressive resume. A city 
planner with a law degree, he served as secretary of the commission that drafted the 1916 New 
York City Zoning Ordinance, and as advisor to the Cleveland City Plan Commission. At the time 
Atlanta hired him, he also served as the city planning consultant to Indianapolis, and was on the 
 
130 “Service Bureau for Community Highly Favored,” Atlanta Constitution, February 26, 1920. The John J. 
Eagan Homes, a Black housing development in the Vine City section of Atlanta, was constructed in 1940, later 
renamed Magnolia Park, still in use, and managed by the Atlanta Public Housing Authority. 
131 “Planning for Atlanta!” Atlanta Constitution, February 10, 1920; Brownell, “The Commercial-Civic 
Elite and City Planning in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans in the 1920s,” 347-48. 
88 
board of governors of both the American Institute of City Planning and the National Conference 
on City Planning. He had written zoning ordinances for several towns in the Cleveland 
suburbs.132   
Whitten looked like the obvious choice to assist Atlanta’s planning commission, but not 
everyone supported his selection. Joel Hurt lobbied instead for the Olmsted Brothers, a landscape 
architecture and planning firm formed by the sons of Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr. after his 
retirement. In 1893, Hurt had hired the distinguished senior Olmsted to create a master plan for 
the 1300-acre Druid Hills neighborhood, a plan which the brothers updated in 1905. The city had 
also employed them to create a plan for Piedmont Park in 1910. Hurt favored the City Beautiful 
approach of the landscapers, while realtor Robert Otis, the active chair of the planning 
commission, preferred Whitten, whose methods more reflected City Practical concerns.133 
Otis ultimately prevailed. The conflict between the two men represented ideological 
differences, and the outcome signaled a sort of changing of the guard. Hurt, a former éminence 
grise in city policy-making, was in decline, and would be dead in six years. The younger Otis, 
lower in the ranks of the pro-growth advocates, displayed the more modern sensibilities of speed 
and practicality.  
The commission considered hiring three experts for landscape architecture, engineering, 
and zoning, but financial constraints led them to employ only Whitten. While charged with 
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devising both traffic and zoning plans, he tackled traffic first. A truly all-inclusive city plan 
would have combined the two, as properties and streets affected and reflected the activities of 
each other. Addressing them simultaneously could have provided a more thorough and 
ultimately more successful way forward for the growing city. However, Atlanta in the twenties 
would not adopt a comprehensive city plan.134    
A sense of urgency prompted the decision to deal first with the city’s clogged streets. 
Nationally-esteemed traffic expert, Miller McClintock, noted, “The alarming increase in street 
accidents and in street congestion during the past few years has rendered the correction of traffic 
conditions one of the most important municipal problems of the present day.” On May 30, 1921, 
Whitten presented his traffic report to the Planning Commission. In it, he endorsed the already-
approved Spring Street viaduct. He also cited the urgent need for additional north-south routes to 
relieve downtown’s traffic congestion, suggesting the grade crossings at Central Avenue and 
Pryor Street be eliminated, and widening Courtland Street north of the Washington Street viaduct 
to serve as an eastside traffic arterial.135 
Whitten recommended reviving the 1910/1916 Bleckley city plaza plan to span the 
railroad tracks, and relocating the city’s freight and passenger terminals. To the latter he 
attributed special importance, claiming that “the railroad terminals are even more fundamental in 
the city’s development than is its thoroughfare plan.” He encouraged the city to proceed with 
zoning, traffic, and park plans, but always to make certain that those plans did not adversely 
affect the railroads.136 
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While the planning commission officially adopted Whitten’s report, they ignored, 
delayed, or altered a number of his recommendations. The group enthusiastically endorsed the 
plans for Central Avenue and Pryor Street, which before decade’s end would have their own 
viaducts, but the city plaza remained a distant dream. Whitten would eventually be proven wrong 
in his assertion that the railroads were more critical to the city’s development than its roadways.  
At least Atlanta now had a plan. By Otis’ estimate, the city was ten years behind the rest 
of the world in the urban planning process; he was off by at least a decade. Since 1899, European 
nations had held international congresses to discuss city plans, zoning and housing programs, 
land use systems, and street configurations. Americans did not participate in these meetings to 
any consequential degree for another ten years. In 1909, Washington, DC hosted the first 
national conference on city planning, and Harvard offered the country’s first university course on 
city planning. In 1917, a group of planners incorporated the American City Planning Institute 
(today the American Planning Association). By this count, Atlanta lagged behind Europe by 
twenty years, and much of the rest of the country by at least decade.137 
Atlanta’s earlier, feeble planning bodies had acted unofficially, without power or funding, 
and they accomplished nothing. Not until the traffic congestion became, as Sayward described it, 
“unbearable” and near the “breaking point,” did the State of Georgia alter the city charter 
enabling an official planning commission. Motorized vehicles packed the downtown streets 
causing traffic jams and frustrating businessmen, office workers, and shoppers. The intolerable 
situation offered one of two powerful motivations for the city council to create a planning 
commission. The other, which will be discussed in a later chapter, was the balkanization of land 
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uses and segregation of the races through a city zoning plan. But an inescapable conclusion 
remains: the automobile had already impacted street users, street paving, the traffic apparatus, 
the police department, and city, state, and federal laws. During the 1920s, its impact would reach 
into the organization of the official city government.138  
When it came to traffic, the city continued throughout the decade to waste time in more 
studies and surveys, ultimately failing to enact a truly comprehensive and effective plan to 
relieve heavy traffic. The one thing they did, and that very successfully, was to construct more 
and wider roads with the smooth, flat surfaces required by the automobile. Even at this early 
stage in the life of U.S. motordom, Atlanta, like other cities, believed in the fallacy of building its 
way out of traffic congestion. 
4.2 Funding Atlanta’s Street Improvements 
The planning commission could only make recommendations regarding street upgrades, 
while a city council committee had the actual authority to effect change. The Committee on 
Streets and Sidewalks implemented the projects under the direction of the Chief of Construction. 
As Atlanta’s population grew, the number and size of streets needed to expand to accommodate 
all the vehicles. More traffic also meant more wear on road surfaces. The dilapidated conditions 
hampered the smooth flow of traffic, as cars slowed over rough patches and dodged potholes. 
No one disputed the sorry state of many of Atlanta’s streets, but many complained about 
the half-hearted, piecemeal approach taken by city employees to repairs. Whitehall Street [today 
much shortened, with the northern section renamed Peachtree Street], part of the city’s premiere 
commercial corridor, had been torn up by repair crews for nine months during 1920. One 
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editorial writer wondered how a town with so many fine buildings and so much business could 
be so indifferent to the quality of its thoroughfares.139 
Poor road surfacing could also negatively affect development. Deteriorated paving on 
Edgewood Avenue, one of the streets converging at Five Points, was blamed for the downward 
turn of the neighborhood. After instituting street improvements, city officials credited the work 
with reviving the area and making Edgewood again one of the most important thoroughfares in 
the city. Its example underscored the critical connection between the condition of a road and its 
surrounding properties.140  
By the 1920s, the city council had several legislative instruments at its command to pay 
for road repairs while at the same time retaining Atlanta’s low, business-friendly citywide tax 
rate. One such tool was the power to create a tax assessment district. In order to acquire land for 
“street purposes” (defined as widening or extending existing streets, or opening new streets), the 
city planning commission could draw up a district consisting of properties which would benefit 
from the proposed improvements. Council then could levy a tax on the property owners within 
the specified area to pay all or part of the cost of the work.141  
This “arbitrary assessment law” represented a new and expanded view of who should pay 
for road upgrades. Formerly, only those persons or entities whose property actually fronted the 
street slated for work paid a portion of the costs. Now everyone within the assessment district 
would bear some of that expense because their land would benefit from the road improvements, 
even if it lay a block or two away from the road being worked on. The tax assessment district 
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represented a major shift away from the concept that property owners paid for the roads on 
which their property fronted. City government had found an innovative way to bolster the public 
financing of very expensive street projects without having to gain the consent of every affected 
property owner.  
Another funding source for road paving was the long-established assessment on the street 
railway company. Into the second decade of the twentieth century, the streetcar company had to 
pay the whole cost of paving and maintaining a width of eleven feet of any street on which it had 
a single line of track, more if the street contained double tracks. By the 1920s, council had 
amended the city charter to require the company to pay to pave sixteen feet of street width on 
any street carrying double tracks, which included the majority of the streets within the central 
business district.  
Preston Stanley Arkwright (1871-1946), president of the Georgia Railway and Power 
Company, argued in a speech to the Atlanta Automobile Association against the increase in the 
assessment. Arkwright was a prominent attorney whose firm had helped Henry Atkinson win the 
great 1899-1901 trolley war against Joel Hurt. Atkinson, himself one of the city’s great 
industrialists, had helped bring electric street lighting to Atlanta in 1883, and served as first 
president of the Georgia Electric Light Company, founded in 1890. The successful turn-of-the-
century collaboration between the two men led them to incorporate, along with a few others, the 
Georgia Railway and Electric Company in 1902, with Arkwright as president and Atkinson as 
chairman of the Board of Directors.142  
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In his 1922 speech to the auto men, Arkwright described the original, nineteenth century 
excuse for mandating road paving by the traction companies, that trolleys then were drawn by 
horses or mules whose shod hooves wore down the street surface between the rails. However, 
Atlanta’s streetcars had been entirely electric-powered since 1894, and no electric streetcar wore 
down the pavement—it never touched the road surface at all, only the steel rails. Nevertheless, 
the policy remained in place. Arkwright said,  
The street railway is still required to pay for this paving and to keep it repaired, 
although the repairs are made necessary, not by the street cars, but by the 
automobiles that have to run down the center of the street [i.e., in the trolley 
tracks] because other automobiles occupy the sides of the street as parking 
places.143 
 
In 1924, the streetcar company had double and single tracks totaling about 220 miles. 
This number did not include the interurban lines to Marietta and Stone Mountain. As it utilized 
less than ten miles of track for freight operations and moving trolley cars, the company paid to 
maintain the pavement on a substantial portion of 200 miles of Atlanta roads. No wonder the city 
council did not want to change the policy. For decades to come, streetcar riders in Atlanta would 
continue to subsidize street paving for motorists.144 
Arkwright, in his position as president of the city’s franchise trolley system, naturally 
displayed a certain animus towards the automobile. However, he accurately pinpointed the true 
cause of much of downtown’s traffic congestion—parked cars. Many streets within the central 
business district could accommodate four lanes of traffic; unfortunately, parked cars occupied 
two of those lanes, effectively reducing available travel space by 50%. The streetcar president 
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had touched a sensitive nerve, as the city’s business leaders were divided over on-street parking, 
an issue they never satisfactorily resolved.    
The 1920 Georgia Constitutional Amendment for Street Improvements provided a third 
source of road-paving capital. It gave to any municipality in the state having a population of 
150,000 or more permission to sell street improvement bonds. This type of bond could be issued 
without having to hold—and win—an always-contentious bond referendum. Instead, only two-
thirds of the city council had to approve it. The funds could be used only for grading, paving, or 
re-paving streets.145 
This piece of legislation applied exclusively to Atlanta, the sole city in Georgia whose 
population at the time (200,616) met the size threshold. No other city even came close.146 The 
law had been enacted entirely for Atlanta’s benefit. The city took full advantage, and in 1921 
alone laid nearly $1 million in paving with the new bond money. Mayor Key lauded the 
program’s success, observing that “there have been no objections to this plan urged, and no 
antagonism to it, except by the streetcar company,” taking yet another opportunity to denigrate 
Georgia Railway and Power. Nevertheless, the ten-year “baby bonds,” as they were called, 
proved extremely popular and were heavily utilized throughout the 1920s.147   
In sum, the city had multiple reliable ways to pay for street improvements beyond the 
traditional petitions from citizens, and large bond issues. That the city had to cobble together a 
variety of funding strategies for large road projects suggests that Atlanta’s taxpayers perhaps did 
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not rate road paving as high a priority as the business community did—unless, of course, it was 
their own street. The growth advocates worked diligently to keep property taxes low in order to 
retain Atlanta’s pro-business reputation and promote real estate development. The various 
methods of road improvement funding provided the means to achieve those goals. 
4.3 The Spring Street Viaduct 
The city’s most important paving project of 1921 was Spring Street. Prior to 1920, it ran 
2.75 shady miles between Marietta and Peachtree streets. The southern end housed some mixed 
commercial, transitioning to residential as far north as Fifth Street, beyond which mostly 
undeveloped land predominated.  
Spring Street exemplified the piecemeal, crazy-quilt approach to road paving taken by the 
city. The street’s surfaces consisted of the following: 1) Belgian block from Marietta Street to 
Pine Street; 2) macadam between Pine Street and Baltimore Place; 3) bituminous macadam from 
Baltimore Place to North Avenue; 4) water-bound macadam from North Avenue to Sixth Street; 
5) no paving at all between Sixth and Tenth Streets; 6) more water-bound macadam from Tenth 
to Fourteenth streets; and 7) another section of dirt road between Fourteenth and Peachtree 
streets, where Spring ended. Creating a uniform grade for the entire length of the street, and then 
paving it with concrete was a large and expensive enterprise. Fortunately for the city, Fulton 
County agreed to undertake and underwrite the $500,000 project.148  
Spring Street had long been recognized as a westside alternative to the always-crowded 
Peachtree Street. Calls to grade and pave the street began as early as 1909. An already broad 
street, it ran from the business section to the city limits. In 1912, editorials called for designating 
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Spring as the primary north-south corridor, and making the necessary improvements so it could 
provide some relief to growing traffic congestion. That no streetcar lines ran anywhere on the 
street made it ideal for exclusive automobile travel—an advantage noted at the time, but officials 
claimed that, without a bond issue, the city could not afford the outsized project.149  
Improving Spring Street constituted the initial 1920s step to relieving traffic congestion 
on downtown’s throughways, in particular the Peachtree/West Peachtree corridor. The trolley 
company had no plans to lay tracks there, eliminating the problem of streetcars hindering 
automobiles, and vice versa. Once widened and paved to a uniform sixty feet, Spring Street 
would become one of the city’s major arterials. When a section of the newly-surfaced street 
opened in December 1921, hundreds of vehicles began using it, bringing instant, albeit 
temporary, relief to the clogged traffic in the central city.150 
By the end of 1920, another part of the re-imagining of Spring Street had begun. The idea 
was to connect the city’s two railroad stations, Brookwood Station on the north side with the 
south side’s Terminal Station plaza. To accomplish that, a new bridge would have to span the rail 
lines and extend Spring Street to the intersection of Alabama and Madison streets (see map 
below). A group of city business leaders organized to push for the construction. Each had 
expertise in real estate development and/or banking.151  
James L. Key – attorney and mayor of Atlanta; 
J. Oscar Mills (1870-1946)– a civil engineer and landscape gardener, member of the public 
works committee of the Fulton County Commission, and a sales manager for the real 
estate firm of J. H. Ewing, Sr.; 
Jones Henderson Ewing, Sr. (1867-1950) – real estate developer, pioneer of the development of 
both Peachtree and West Peachtree streets, member of the Fulton County Commission;  
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Frank P. Rice (1838-1923) – real estate developer, vice president of the Atlanta Exchange and  
Banking Company;  
Benjamin Joseph Massell (1886-1962) – builder and real estate developer, founder and president 
of Massell Realty Company, and uncle of future Atlanta mayor Sam Massell; 
William T. Perkerson (1874-1943) – vice president and trust officer of the Fourth National Bank 
in Atlanta. 
 
Their vision was extraordinary; such a massive construction project would be costly, and 
the approaches to the new bridge would slash through a swath of downtown properties. If 
realized, however, the viaduct would convey enormous benefits by extending Spring Street to 
relieve traffic congestion on the three bridges to the east (see map of the Spring Street viaduct 
below). A true western arterial street connecting the northside and southside commercial 
districts, it would allow heavy trucks loaded with merchandise and materials (then banned from 
Peachtree Street) to travel efficiently through the city, and would spur investment, especially on 
the southwest side which was rapidly developing into a light industrial area.   
The first and most substantial hurdle was financial. In the early months of 1921, city 
officials and civic leaders worked diligently to get a bond issue passed, headed by Mayor Key 
and Lee Stiles Ashcraft (1871-1953), a prominent business currently serving as president of the 
Chamber of Commerce. Ashcraft made his name and fortune forming a hugely successful 
fertilizer firm, then branching out into numerous manufacturing concerns. He was also a director 
at Atlanta’s First National Bank. His extensive experience in a variety of businesses, as well as 
his leadership of the COC, made him an ideal person to help lead the bond referendum. His 
collaboration with the mayor again demonstrated the close working ties between business and 
government. The new bridge was sold as a benefit not only city business, but also city motorists. 
The gain to Atlanta’s mass transit riders would be the reduction of cars on streets where the 
trolley ran.  
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In order to get public monies 
for the viaduct construction, funding 
for schools, water, and sewer had to 
be included; otherwise, the 
controversial project might not 
succeed. Writing years after the fact, 
Robert Otis, chair of the city 
planning commission at the time, 
acknowledged that for any viaduct 
bond issue, they had “a gentleman’s 
agreement or understanding” that 
other sweeteners had to be added to 
bring the average voter to the polls. 
Without such inducements (see 
cartoon at right), Otis claimed, the 
general public would not have voted for a standalone viaduct bond.  
This does not mean that the pro-growth coalition concerned itself solely with cars, streets, 
and bridges. It took an active role in promoting Atlanta’s overall health, financial stability, social 
well-being, and attractiveness to current and potential citizens, businesses, and investors. The 
group acted with city government to improve schools, healthcare, sanitation, water, jobs, parks, 
cultural amenities, playgrounds, and assistance to the poor.152 However, this study focuses on the 
group’s role in changing Atlanta’s streets. Otis made clear that the new bridge held top priority 
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for the planning commission, but understood it would not for the average Atlantan. Therefore, 
the proposed viaduct funding amount appeared negligible compared to the other much larger 
expenditures for projects with a broader appeal: only $750,000 out of an $8.85 million total bond 
issue. The rest of the money was allocated for city schools ($4 million), waterworks ($2.85 
million), and sewer system upgrades ($1.25 million).153  
 In Atlanta, two-thirds of those who voted had to approve the bond issue, and those 
voting had to constitute half of all registered voters. It proved a difficult bar to reach. As 
Amsterdam notes, “This requirement proved particularly nettlesome for Atlanta’s white business 
elite, whose strategy for luring new firms to the city focused on improving city services while 
keeping taxes low—a dual imperative that made debt spending businessmen’s leading option for 
pursuing public sector growth.” The 1919 bond referendum had failed in no small part due to a 
concerted African American effort. The women, led by Lugenia Burns Hope, organized voter 
registration drives and the men, after registering, either went to the polls and voted “no,” or 
stayed home and did not vote at all, which had the same effect as a “no” vote.154  
That defeat of a bond issue which would not have served the Black communities gave 
notice of the power of African Americans to influence policy despite their limited voting rights. 
Black neighborhoods in general were woefully underserved by city utilities, and their schools 
were few, overcrowded, and ancient. The ability to vote in bond elections was perhaps the sole 
political power remaining to them in the Jim Crow era, and African Americans had learned in 
1919 how to judiciously bestow or withhold their support depending on how a particular bond 
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issue might benefit them or their children. City authorities and business leaders had absorbed that 
lesson, too. 
During the Spring Street viaduct campaign, businessmen and elected officials paid close 
attention to the total number of eligible voters. Mayor Key appointed a sixteen-member bond 
commission to promote the issue, chaired by Frank Martin Inman (1876-1950). Inman was a 
director at Lowry National Bank and a wealthy cotton broker, having inherited both positions 
from his more-famous father, Samuel Martin Inman (1843-1915).  
While most of the commissioners were influential white men, the inclusion of three 
women demonstrated the city fathers’ awareness of the importance of securing women’s votes in 
what would be their first election since the 1920 passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. The 
commission’s associate chair, Kate Richardson (Mrs. Samuel) Lumpkin (1862-1947), organized 
a 450-member women’s committee. Lumpkin, a church and civic leader, had been presented an 
award by the Chamber of Commerce for her Liberty loan work during World War I. She was 
president of the Atlanta Federation of Women’s Clubs, and had invaluable connections to large 
numbers of the new women voters. Key’s inclusion of her on the commission in a leadership 
position was a savvy move which bore fruit.  
The remaining fourteen members included representatives of each of the eleven city 
wards. All were “men and women of character and ability, of the highest type of citizenry, 
representatives of every phase of the growth and progress of Atlanta.” The head of the Labor 
League, a prominent Jewish business and charity leader, a judge, bank officials, real estate 
developers, insurance men, a successful stock dealer, merchants, and former education board 
members, city councilmen, and county commissioners made up the rest of the commission.155  
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The mayor appointed no African Americans, who organized their own commission to 
coordinate with whites in promoting the bonds. Mayor Key and Chairman Inman spoke at Black 
assemblies, while Mrs. Lumpkin appointed a special African American women’s committee 
consisting of community-appointed leaders such as Lugenia Burns Hope. Key, Inman, and 
Lumpkin met with a group of 500 African Americans at Big Bethel Church on February 15, 
1921, to address community concerns over the bond funding for Black schools. The city still did 
not have a public high school for African American students; to fill the gap, the city’s Black 
colleges and universities had to offer high school courses, along with their undergraduate and 
graduate degrees. The mayor attempted to reassure the audience at the church that there would be 
“justice and fair play in spending this money,” while Kate Lumpkin urged the women to “vote 
for the bonds for the sake of your children.”156  
A large publicity campaign took shape, framing the issue as a referendum on whether the 
city continued progressing or moved backwards. Newspapers championed the project. Rallies 
and meetings throughout the city garnered support. Even the schoolchildren got involved, 
reminding their parents to vote. On election day, the white schools opened late to give mothers 
the chance to vote while the Black schools had the entire day off to encourage a large turnout. 
Employers opened their work places one hour later so their employees could vote before coming 
downtown to work. Days before the vote, the newspaper reported a record number of voters had 
registered, and highlighted the African American Christian Council’s endorsement of the project. 
On March 8, 1921, the bond referendum passed “by the most overwhelming majority ever piled 
up in any election in Atlanta,” and Mayor Key signed the ordinance into law on June 7, 1921.157  
 
156 Atlanta Constitution: “Bond Issue Commission Appointed by Mayor Key, February 13, 1921; “Negroes 
Are Told of Big Bond Issue,” February 16, 1921. 
157  “Humanity and Bonds,” Atlanta Constitution, February 1, 1921. The editorial laid out the case for each 
of the designated bond expenditures. “20,000 Atlanta People Eligible in Bond Election,” Atlanta Constitution, 
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The bond issue was the first of several landmark municipal achievements of the 1920s. A 
special victory for African Americans, it secured funding for four new Black elementary schools 
and the construction of Booker T. Washington High School. It demonstrated the community’s 
power to achieve a successful political intervention in Atlanta, as the 1919 bond rejection had, 
but this time by effecting positive changes. Meanwhile, growth advocates, greatly assisted by the 
local media, had their new cross-town automobile viaduct assured.158  
The votes had hardly been tallied when Fulton County expedited its paving of Spring 
Street so the street would be completed along with the viaduct. Another situation suddenly 
emerged: a jump in real estate prices in the area. Barely a month after the bond vote, a small 
property at the southeast corner of Spring and Poplar streets sold for $23,000, considered then an 
extravagant sum. The buyers planned a three-story building for the site. Rumors of other new 
projects flourished: “There seems to be considerable interest attached to the locations on and 
adjacent to the Spring street section, following the bond election, which authorized the erection 
of a big viaduct.” Average 
property values in the area 
increased five-fold, from $200 
to $1,000 a front foot. Already 
the prospective viaduct and 
street improvements were 
 
March 5, 1921; C. E. Robertson, “School Children Help Bond Issue,” American City 25, no. 3 (September 1921): 
246-47. “$8,850,000 Bonds Carry by Overwhelming Vote Assuring Urgently Needed Improvements; Women Are 
Prominent in Success of Fight,” Atlanta Constitution, March 9, 1921.  
158 David Fort Godshalk, Veiled Visions: The 1906 Atlanta Race Riot and the Reshaping of American Race 
Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 250. 
Figure 8. Spring Street viaduct under construction, 1923. 
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generating new development.159  
Construction began in October 1922 (see figure above160). Quickly the initial plan for an 
Alabama Street approach at the southern end of the viaduct had to be scrapped. The desired 
grade could not be achieved without blocking the fire department’s headquarters, located in Fire 
Station No. 1 at 44 West Alabama Street. Switching the approach to Hunter Street [Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Blvd.; hereafter M.L.K., Jr. Blvd.] would cut off frontage or buildings on both 
Hunter Street and Madison Avenue. To pay for the unanticipated change in plans, the city 
council attempted to impose a tax on owners whose properties fronted the two streets, which 
required the consent of all those property owners. When several of them refused absolutely, the 
city resorted to its arbitrary assessment law. For the first time in Atlanta’s history, council 
approved utilization of the law, basically a tax levy, which needed no property owner 
permissions. The planning commission quickly drew the boundaries for the new assessment 
district, and city council levied a tax on all the properties within it to pay for the viaduct 
approach.161  
On schedule and under budget, the Spring Street viaduct opened on December 20, 1923 
(see map below162). A formal ceremony at the Terminal Plaza began with the acceptance of the 
bridge by the city from the engineering firms Harrington, Howard & Ash of Kansas City, and 
Robert & Company of Atlanta, who implemented the project. Military groups, marching bands, 
and a crowd of about 20,000 paraded across the viaduct, and pictures of the celebration opened 
 
159 “Work on Spring Street Is Rushed,” Atlanta Constitution, March 16, 1921. The small property measured 
only 25' x 80'; “Spring St. Property Brings Good Price,” Atlanta Constitution, April 16, 1921; Garrett and Martin, 
Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:797. 
160 The photo clearly shows the businesses at lower right which would be negatively impacted; AJCP338-
036d, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State 
University Library. 
161 “Viaduct Approach Requires New Tax,” Atlanta Constitution, November 28, 1922. 
162 Base map is from O. E. Kauffman, “1906 Map of the City of Atlanta,” (Atlanta: O. E. Kauffman, 1906). 
Geo-referencing and data by author. 
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every movie screening at the Howard and Forsyth movie theaters for days. The last pedestrian 
group crossing the bridge included the new Mayor Walter Sims, the former mayor, James Key, 
the city council, and the bond commission, and an hour later it opened to traffic.163  
The main 
viaduct was 1,800' 
long and 60' wide, 
including the 
sidewalks on either 
side. Built of structural 
steel, the entire 
viaduct was encased in 
concrete to prevent 
deterioration from coal 
gases and the acids in 
locomotive smoke. 
Estimates predicted 
that 8,000 vehicles, 
traveling at a speed of 
15 miles per hour, 
could cross the bridge 
in an hour.164  
 
163 Atlanta Constitution, December 21, 1923: “New Viaduct Formally Opens to Stream of Traffic; 20,000 
People Pack Plaza at Terminal Station;” “Howard” advertisement; “Viaduct Celebration Pictures Are Shown.” 
164 “Spring Street Viaduct Will be Opened Dec. 15,” Atlanta Constitution, October 20, 1923; Garrett and 
Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:796-97.  
Figure 9. Spring Street viaduct route. 
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With the completion of the viaduct, the goal of connecting the north side to Terminal 
Station had been achieved, but the dream of a true cross-town traffic artery remained unrealized. 
The Spring Street viaduct extended only as far as Mitchell Street, and had covered over a section 
of the very modest but grandly named Madison Avenue. Real estate developers urged that  
Madison be extended south to meet Whitehall Street, claiming it would raise property values and 
open up new business space on the south side. Work began in early 1925, and Madison Avenue 
re-opened on September 16, 1926 as the southern end of Atlanta’s newest and finest boulevard. 
People in autos could drive from the Brookwood train station to Whitehall Street unimpeded by 
railroads or streetcars, making the journey much faster. Whitehall Street itself, once a principal 
residential street, rapidly converted to a business and industrial thoroughfare. In late 1926, the 
final act occurred when council renamed Madison Avenue “Spring Street.”165 
Well before that happy ending, the viaduct’s presence had expanded the commercial 
district, adding five large office buildings costing nearly $2 million. The business community 
was ebullient. Walter G. Cooper, chair of the city council’s viaduct committee, wrote that one of 
the best accomplishments of the Spring Street viaduct would be its broadening effect on the 
vision of city citizens. He predicted it would lead to the construction of additional viaducts so 
that Atlanta could truly be a unified city. He wanted no trolleys on the entire length of Spring 
Street, as it was “a natural route for high speed traffic from Terminal Station to the northern 
limits of the city and beyond.”166  
 
165 Atlanta Constitution: “Madison Avenue,” January 21, 1925; “Big Increase in Property Values on 
Madison Avenue Predicted by J. L. McCord,” April 12, 1925; “The Constitution’s Real Estate Review,” August 30, 
1925; “Many Improvements Will Be Made on South Side,” October 11, 1925; and “Madison Avenue Extension 
Complete, Provides Great New Traffic Artery,” September 17, 1926. 
166 Walter G. Cooper, “Millions of Construction Caused by the Spring Street Viaduct” City Builder 8, no. 5 
(July 1923): 3-4. 
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A similar sentiment echoed in a newspaper editorial written the day after the Spring 
Street viaduct opened. Calling it “the march of progress, for which Atlanta has always been 
noted,” the editor asserted the greater value of the project would be its impression upon the 
public. It provided not only traffic congestion relief, but offered the lesson that a viaduct was 
“the only final traffic solution.”167 
In 1920, Mayor Key claimed that the ultimate solution to the city’s traffic problem would 
come from the new viaducts. All three men—Cooper, the editorial writer, and Key—in 1923 
affirmed that constructing roadways free of other street users would alleviate traffic bottlenecks, 
that the city could build its way out of traffic jams. The prognosticators opined that the Spring 
Street viaduct would set a precedent, and a newly-woke public would support future ventures of 
the same kind. Events proved them greatly mistaken as to the true solution for gridlock, but 
correct about garnering public approval of more road projects.168  
The construction of the Spring Street viaduct signified a pivotal moment in Atlanta’s 
history. By agreeing to build a motor vehicle-only arterial (the largest such roadway in the city at 
that time), the city explicitly acknowledged the connection between auto travel and growth. 
Good car-friendly roads led to development and expansion, which in Atlanta equated to progress. 
In order to facilitate business and stimulate investment, the city, with the Spring Street viaduct, 
initiated its conversion of public streets to automobile channels. Once starting down that road 
figuratively and literally, Atlanta never looked back. Streets for cars became, in the 1920s, a 
powerful tool for city expansion, and the growth coalition wielded it frequently and effectively. 
 
167 “Spring Street Viaduct,” Atlanta Constitution, December 21, 1923. 
168 “Traffic Ordinance Signed by Mayor Key,” Atlanta Constitution, May 27, 1920. 
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4.4 The Twin Viaducts 
Even before the Spring Street viaduct opened, plans for another set of viaducts over the 
railroads had commenced. Robert Whitten, the city’s consulting engineer, had developed 
separate traffic and zoning plans. Atlanta did not adopt a single, broad, long-range master plan. 
Its fragmentary schemes and fitful measures always left something more to be done, its goals 
never fully realized. Building more roads emerged as the city’s go-to method of solving traffic 
gridlock.169   
Whitten’s second traffic report, presented in August 1922, advocated more and wider 
streets, viaducts, underpasses, and traffic throughways. Extreme slow-downs still severely 
hampered trucking and commercial traffic. The latter, he claimed, handicapped the city’s 
commerce and industry with the result that the public paid higher prices for goods (emphasis 
added). These last words caught the attention of everyone: the purchasing public, city officials, 
businessmen, real estate developers, and retail merchants.170  
North-south roads were especially important, and Whitten strongly urged construction of 
viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street. Only Central would carry streetcar traffic. Its 
connection to Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] on the north created an excellent trolley 
throughway. Streetcar lines could then be removed from North Pryor Street [Park Place], making 
it an exclusive automobile artery. Whitten’s recommendations centering on efficient traffic 
movement corresponded with the street strategies of city planners across the nation.171  
 
169 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 186. In 1939, renowned city planner, Harland 
Bartholomew, spoke at the annual banquet of Atlanta’s Chamber of Commerce. He noted that then, seventeen years 
after Whitten’s Atlanta plan, the city was still behind in city planning, with much of it the fault of uncontrolled 
expansion beyond the corporate limits; “Active Planning Program Urged for City by Expert,” Atlanta Constitution, 
December 13, 1939. 
170 “Whitten Would Widen Downtown Streets to Relieve Increasing Jam of Traffic,” Atlanta Constitution, 
August 20, 1922.  
171 Ibid.; Brownell, “The Commercial-Civic Elite and City Planning in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans 
in the 1920s,” 354-56. 
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Between the viaduct bookends, 1920s Atlanta experienced plenty of other road and 
building construction as the city expanded. During the decade, the city grew by more than eight 
square miles (from 26.6 at the end of 1919 to 34.79 at the end of 1929), while the population of 
the city proper increased by nearly 35%, adding almost 70,000 people.172 Surfacing and 
improving roads proceeded throughout the decade, with twenty-eight miles paved in 1925 alone. 
Asphalt and concrete, the two smoothest surfaces and most preferred by motorists, competed for 
primacy. Atlanta, however, poured more concrete than asphalt during the decade.173 
The downtown business district expanded in all directions, as more and more of the once-
residential streets turned commercial. Central locations remained desirable for offices, hotels, 
and commerce. While Atlanta would grow in every direction, “its exact geographical and 
business center will be guarded by its main arteries feeding into the city from five points of the 
compass.” As the City Builder explained, Atlanta had plenty of room to spread out, but 
developers still razed buildings in downtown as central real estate had “grown too valuable to 
permit antiquated buildings.”174 
The continuing quest to widen narrow downtown streets led to the passage of the CBD’s 
first setback requirements. Council contemplated establishing a ten-foot building line on all main 
traffic thoroughfares, but started much more modestly, beginning with only specified portion of 
five roads. At those locations, new buildings had to be constructed a certain distance from a fixed 
 
172 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933. Area statistics are from 
the Thirty-Ninth Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta, Georgia for the Year Ending December 
31, 1919 (Atlanta, 1919), 20; and Forty-Ninth Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta, Georgia 
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174 “City’s Growth Fast in Original Center,” Atlanta Constitution, September 8, 1929; Dudley Glass, “Tear 
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point. That point varied; sometimes the center of the road, the inside edge of the sidewalk, or the 
curb, but all of them made a zero lot building line illegal. The new codes mandated that 
structures be set back from the street so that the main downtown arteries could eventually be 
enlarged to carry more vehicles.175 
The setback ordinances in effect represented an Atlanta plan for future street widenings 
to reduce traffic congestion. The placement of the laws into the main body of the city code, 
rather than sequestered inside the building code, lent weight to their message. Lawmakers were 
looking ahead to a time of even more cars on city streets. 
The construction of the “twin viaducts” provided another answer to the city’s traffic 
dilemma. Everyone acknowledged the need for additional bridges over the railroads. At least 
twenty railroad tracks carrying more than 100 trains daily crossed the heart of downtown in 
1920, making it extremely difficult and dangerous for any pedestrian or vehicle to traverse grade 
crossings safely. Most trolleys did not cross at ground level due to the tracking complications. 
The river of rails also created a barrier between the north and south sides of town, a bifurcation 
impacting politics, business, and residents. Trains blocking the crossings caused significant 
traffic delays. City code required them to move after five minutes, but they often remained 
stationary at these crossings much longer, holding up motorists indefinitely. Lack of police 
enforcement of the law exacerbated the backups, but erecting bridges would reduce both traffic 
jams and accidents.176    
 
175 “10-Foot Building Line is Proposed for City Streets,” and “Planning for the Future,” Atlanta 
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As early as 1921, a group of citizens and property owners met at the Kimball House to 
discuss a proposed Pryor Street viaduct to extend between Alabama and Decatur streets at the 
same elevation as the Whitehall viaduct. The meeting was headed by Colonel H. H. Dean, a 
Gainesville attorney with extensive real estate holdings in downtown Atlanta. Not coincidentally 
a few days before the meeting, his letter to the planning commission had appeared in the Atlanta 
Constitution. Dean made the case for viaduct construction as primarily a safety concern, but also 
emphasized that adjacent property holders approved, and suggested that the railroads and traction 
company would also lend their backing. Obviously, he was one of the supportive property 
owners whose holdings stood to increase in value if the viaducts were built. If the example of the 
Spring Street viaduct building bonanza held, anybody with real estate in the area of the twin 
bridges would likely see a jump in values.177 
Robert Whitten supported the twin viaducts, as did John A. Beeler, the consulting 
engineer who had been hired by the traction company to produce a transportation plan for the 
central business district. Beeler had gotten his start conducting only urban street railway surveys, 
but began to add into his reports data on the other transportation options in each city he studied. 
He emphasized the importance of understanding how the various transit modes interacted. In the 
cover letter attached to his 1924 Atlanta report, he acknowledged the city’s traffic problems, and 
noted the need for a comprehensive traffic system. He called for the immediate construction of 
the two viaducts, and relocating onto them all the streetcar tracks on Peachtree and Whitehall 
between Carnegie Way and Fair Street [Memorial Drive]. 
During the progress of our survey, it quickly became apparent that more than a 
survey of transit was necessary. It was obvious that the city’s tardiness in 
 
177 Atlanta Constitution: “Viaduct Plans to be Discussed by Committee,” August 26, 1921; “More Central 
Viaducts Suggested to Planning Commission,” August 17, 1921. Garrett, 2:850, recounts the sale of Dean’s Temple 
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evolving a definite city plan, coupled with the rapid and noteworthy growth in all 
phases of its life, were the underlying causes of the present acute situation.178 
 
The pro-growth community enthusiastically supported construction of the two bridges, 
especially after the unqualified success of the Spring Street viaduct in stimulating new 
construction and soaring real estate values. Predictions abounded for a similar renewal in the 
vicinity of Pryor and Central, which had seen no new buildings in years. Handsome, modern 
offices and hotels might soon replace the old, small wood and brick structures. 
 The viaducts would relieve traffic congestion, though not primarily for pleasure drivers 
who could take other routes over the railroads. The freight-carrying heavy trucks would benefit 
the most. They could not avoid the grade crossings, and lost valuable time waiting for trains, 
with their engines running, burning gas and oil, and polluting the atmosphere already smoky 
from steam locomotives. Trains would move more efficiently, without having to halt for dilatory 
pedestrians or vehicles. Commerce and industry would gain from the time and expense saved by 
the removal of these last two grade crossings in the central business district. 
The twin viaducts would eliminate the terms “north side” and “south side” from Atlanta’s 
vocabulary as the two sections of the city would then be linked up on every principal north and 
south artery. The city’s major business districts would no longer be bifurcated, and city and state 
government entities would be within easy reach of each other. In sum, the construction of the 
Central and Pryor viaducts could bring advantages to a number of Atlanta’s citizens in terms of 
 
178 The Beeler Organization, Inc., Consulting Engineers, was located in New York City. John Allen Beeler 
(1867-1945) produced street railway reports for numerous cities, including Washington, DC, Boston, Kansas City, 
New Orleans, Dallas, Seattle. He also wrote articles, books, and technical publications about modern transit systems. 
Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, iii, 55-56. See Chapter 6 of this paper for 
more on the Beeler Report. 
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traffic relief and convenience. Nearby owners could benefit from rising property values, but 
businessmen, industrialists, and real estate speculators would also see financial gains.179  
Two major entities had to be persuaded before the twin viaduct vision could materialize: 
the State of Georgia and the railroad companies. Permissions from both were crucial and 
uncertain. The railroads owned the tracks over which the viaducts would pass, and the state held 
title to the land on which the rail lines lay, as well as the air rights above them. Georgia also 
owned one of the railroads, the Western & Atlantic. 
Early in 1925, Mayor Walter A. Sims planned a day-long conference, culminating in a 
sumptuous banquet, for high-ranking railroad and state officials. He understood how essential 
their good-will was. For additional persuading, he named ten prominent Atlantans as the 
reception committee greeting the dignitaries coming to town. This group included two bankers, 
two attorneys, the editors of the three daily newspapers, the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce, the president of the Atlanta Convention Bureau, and the editor of the Journal of 
Labor. Commenting on the makeup of the reception committee, the Constitution noted that it 
was “representative of leading business interests here,…composed of civic leaders who are 
interested in what is best for Atlanta.” The article not only approved of the committee and 
supported the venture, but it also equated business concerns with those of Atlanta.180 
On March 25, six railroad officials and Georgia Governor Clifford Walker met with the 
mayor and his committee. The visitors all pledged full cooperation and support of the viaduct 
construction project, with the affected railroads agreeing to pay their share. After a series of 
 
179 J. Henson Tatum, “Benefits to City of Pryor Street-Central Avenue Viaducts,” City Builder 8, no. 6 
(August 1923): 33; W. H. Lee, “Atlanta’s Viaducts in Sight,” ibid. (August 1927): 8, 39; Dana Belser, “The 
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discussions, Thomas Kearney Glenn (1868-1946) provided lunch at the exclusive Capital City 
Club for the 
assembly. As the 




member of First 
National Bank, and 
a director of the 
Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, he would have made an excellent host, being 
conversable in so many fields. The group then took an “automobile tour” of Atlanta to see the 
locations of the proposed viaducts and other attractions.181  
The long day culminated in the mayor’s “Let’s Go, Atlanta!” banquet held at the new and 
luxurious Biltmore Hotel, owned by William Candler (1890-1936), real estate entrepreneur and 
one of the Coca-Cola Candlers (see photo above). More than 200 men attended, including five 
railroad presidents, state and city officials, and a host of prominent business leaders. Numerous 
speakers endorsed the viaduct project. Robert Foster Maddox (1870-1965), president of Atlanta 
National Bank and former Atlanta mayor, spoke for the bankers and other business interests. 
Chairman of the Board H. M. Atkinson gave his personal guarantee of the support of the Georgia 
Railway and Power Company. Prominent attorney Reuben Rose Arnold (1868-1960) vowed to 
lobby the General Assembly for permission to construct the bridges. The five railroad presidents 
 
181 “Atlanta Faces Greatest Era of Prosperity, Declare Speakers at Get-Together Banquet,” Atlanta 
Constitution, March 26, 1925. 
Figure 10. Mayor's dinner at the Biltmore, March 25, 1925; City 
Builder (April 1925): 7. 
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expressed faith in Atlanta and the belief that the project would benefit everyone. All three 
newspaper publishers added their fervent pledges of news articles and editorial columns 
supporting the project.182  
“A spirit of harmony and cooperation” characterized the dinner. Classic booster 
hyperbole accompanied assurances of funding for the viaducts and other civic improvements, 
which would produce “a new era of prosperity, one that should far exceed anything of its kind in 
Atlanta’s history.” Optimism prevailed as Mell Romayne Wilkinson (1864-1947), industrialist, 
banker, and insurance executive, confidently asserted that “Atlanta usually gets what she goes 
after.”183 
Everyone attending the event understood the multi-faceted benefits they and their 
businesses would ultimately reap from the bridges. They also firmly believed that the project 
would benefit the city as a whole, that their interests and Atlanta’s interests were essentially the 
same. Leading newspapers would deliver favorable publicity for the coming bond referendum 
needed to finance the structures. City authorities knew that such “publicity and education was 
necessary in order to pass a bond issue.” The ordinary reader would see nothing but positives 
from this shining example of a progressive city at work.184  
On some level, perhaps, the city elites may have acknowledged that their interests did not 
in fact match those of most Atlantans. Or perhaps they simply discounted the uninformed masses 
whose priorities did not match their own. But whatever their degree of self-awareness, the top 
pro-growth leaders understood that the majority of citizens did not want to spend their tax dollars 
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on a couple of bridges many of them would never cross. As with the Spring Street viaduct, “the 
usual compromises for other city growth items” had to be added to the bond package in order to 
gain the interest and approval of a wider public. Pro-growth civic leaders had to mask their top 
priority—the viaducts—with additional projects which would attract the vote of the average 
citizen.185 
Mayor Sims ended the banquet urging the attendees to contact their state representatives 
to quickly approve the viaducts. The legislature needed to act with speed so the governor could 
sign a bill that year; otherwise, the project would be delayed until 1927, as the general assembly 
would not meet during 1926. On July 23, 1925, the Georgia house approved the senate’s viaduct 
resolution, and the governor signed it later that same day. Atlanta could now officially proceed 
with plans for the Pryor Street and Central Avenue viaducts over the railroad tracks. The mayor 
responded immediately, announcing plans for financing the structures with a bond issue.186  
An enthusiastic campaign delivered the desired result. In March 1926, voters ratified an 
$8 million municipal bond program containing funds for schools, sewers, waterworks, a new city 
hall, and, of course, the viaducts.  Mayor Sims rejoiced, and Alderman William B. Hartsfield, 
chair of the bond committee (and future mayor of Atlanta, the City Too Busy to Hate), lauded 
the old Atlanta spirit displayed by the consensus vote.187  
A number of wrinkles in the plans developed over the course of the next two years which 
delayed the project. The big “Viaduct Row” (as the newspapers called it) involved the railroads; 
a disgruntled property owner brought suit against the city; and the traction company wanted a 
 
185 Ibid., 11, 16. 
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guaranteed public transit monopoly before contributing funds to the project. All three caused 
serious delays. The first, most serious problem began with the city’s proposal to lower the 
railroad tracks 4.5 feet beneath the two bridges. Reducing the grade would shorten the 
approaches, limit the damage to properties on Decatur and Hunter [M.L.K., Jr. Blvd.] streets, 
make the new viaducts level with the existing Whitehall Street viaduct, and greatly reduce the 
cost of the project. The four railroads refused to allow anyone to tinker with their tracks or 
interrupt their service. Their intransigence jeopardized not only the viaducts but the entire bond 
issue.188 
Engineers saved the day. The bond commission, needing assistance with the technical 
details, sought the expertise of professionals with national reputations. The American Society of 
Civil Engineers appointed a committee to collaborate with the commission. Their two reports 
ultimately persuaded the railroads that they, too, would benefit. The lowering of the tracks could 
at last begin, but the malcontent property owner threatened to take his case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In the end, the city council voted to remove the nuisance by settling with the man. Nearly 
a year had passed since the $8 million bonds had been voted and the public was getting restless. 
A newspaper headline proclaimed, “Now, To Work!”189  
A few financial issues remained unresolved. Fulton County had to be persuaded to 
contribute to the viaduct funding; they eventually agreed to a sum of $500,000. Georgia Power 
(by this time, the company name had changed from Georgia Railway and Power) initially agreed 
to help fund the viaducts, but first wanted from the city a traction monopoly. After weeks of 
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October 20, 1926; “Mayor Invites Railroad Heads,” October 23, 1926; “Action by Council Seen as Presaging End of 
Viaduct Row,” December 21, 1926. The four railroads were the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, the 
Central of Georgia Railroad, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and the Western & Atlantic Railroad.  
189 Atlanta Constitution: “Bond Commission Lauds Civil Engineers for Aid in City’s Viaducts Plan,” April 
1, 1927; “Let the Work Begin,” May 5, 1927; and “Now, To Work!” May 12, 1927. 
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discussion, Preston Arkwright, the traction company president, proposed a compromise by which 
the company would donate $400,000 to the project with a city franchise assurance in the form of 
an eventual repeal of the jitney ordinance. On December 13, 1927, Mayor Ragsdale and 
Arkwright signed the viaduct contract, removing the last impediment to the project.190 
A profusion of machines and laborers working 24/7 lowered the level of the railroad 
tracks within two months. The new laterals necessitated razing dozens of buildings and 
constructing concrete retaining walls. Walter F. Schulz, consulting engineer from Memphis, TN, 
drew blueprints for the super-sized structures, while William A. Hansell, the city’s chief of 
construction, solicited viaduct bids. The winning firm, MacDougald Construction Company, 
began building the bridges immediately and made rapid progress.191 
Another form of progress resulted as viaduct work started—real estate development. The 
Spring Street viaduct had produced a building boom in nearby areas, and investors looked for 
similar opportunities around the new viaducts in what had been a depressed section of the 
business district. To attract attention to growth opportunities, the Atlanta Central Improvement 
Association issued a free Viaduct Booklet, listing the names and holdings of property owners in 
downtown along with a map of the viaducts. The Association noted that while the area formerly 
lacked adequate transportation, the viaducts would erase that deficiency, bringing “one of the 
greatest opportunities for real estate activity and growth and development that Atlanta has had in 
many years.”192  
 
190 Atlanta Constitution: “County Portion of Viaduct Fund Made Available,” September 8, 1927; “Power 
Company’s Proposal Breaks Viaduct Deadlock,” September 18, 1927; “Viaduct Contract Signed by Mayor and 
Power Head,” December 14, 1927. 
191 Atlanta Constitution: “Track Lowering Near Completion,” January 22, 1928; “MacDougald Firm 
Awarded Viaduct Construction Work,” April 12, 1928. 
192 Garrett, 2: 850; “Viaduct Section Booklet Issued,” Atlanta Constitution, September 23, 1928. 
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Property owners’ optimism surged though they were spending between $1,000 and 
$100,000 each to remodel their properties. The new roadways did expand the city’s business 
district “with level streets essential to retail shopping.” Alabama and Pryor streets became 
commercial corridors. Central Avenue saw a mix of industry and retail combined with major 
wholesalers and parking garages. The Wall Street lateral opened up businesses along its rail-side 
walkway, and made a more pedestrian-friendly conduit between shopping on Central and Pryor 
(see both the pre-Photoshop “doctored” photo and Sanborn map below193).  The viaducts did 
more than facilitate travel; they generated income and promoted growth. They signaled to the 
rest of the nation Atlanta’s stature as a progressive city.  
The 794-foot-long Central Avenue viaduct opened to traffic on March 16, 1929, less than 
a year after construction began, but officials held no ceremony as the Pryor Street bridge was not 
finished. Both viaducts officially opened on April 15, 1929, but with only the unveiling of a 
 
193 An artist from the Atlanta Georgian created the pre-Photoshop-manipulated photograph of the Pryor 
Street viaduct looking east toward Union Station. The map is a section from Volume 1, Congested District Key of 
the “Atlanta, Georgia 1931” Sanborn map. Colored markings added by author: twin viaducts in green; laterals in 
blue; Plaza Way in yellow; Spring Street viaduct in red.  
Figure 11. Artist’s rendering of the Pryor Street viaduct; City Builder (August 1925): 4. 
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commemorative bronze plaque to mark the occasion. Perhaps the length of the project—nearly 
five years—had muted any celebratory spirit. Also, the total cost exceeded $2 million.194  
The completion of the twin viaducts and their laterals furnished an opportunity to re-open 
discussions about Bleckley Plaza, the original 1910 plan to construct a central square above the 
soot-filled railroad gulch running through the middle of downtown. The idea had been rejected 
by city and railroad officials in 1916. A group of concerned property owners and area merchants 
 
194 Atlanta Constitution: “Central Avenue Viaduct Will be Opened to Travel First Time This Morning, 
March 16, 1929; “Great New Viaduct System Promises the Reconstruction of Central Atlanta,” March 24, 1929; 
“Atlanta Viaducts Completed, Open Monday Morning,” April 14, 1929. 
Figure 12. Downtown viaducts; New York: Sanborn Map Co., 1931. 
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now believed that the new structures over and around the gulch provided an “opening wedge for 
the construction of a plaza over the tracks,” especially as a portion of the work had just been 
done.195  
The city still had no signature downtown park or assembly space. Five Points, never an 
especially large or aesthetically pleasing gathering place, had turned into a gigantic traffic jam. 
Smoke from steam locomotives continued to plague center city businesses with soot-damaged 
merchandise, even though railroad engines were prohibited from emitting black smoke for more 
than one minute when on the tracks between Washington Street and Union Station. Civil 
engineers were well aware of the structural harm caused to metal girders by the acidic smoke. 
The city had just paid extra to have its new viaducts encased in concrete to protect the underlying 
steel—a process costly not only in materials, but also in the additional time and labor required.196  
A Georgia Tech city planning professor, writing in 1927, cited the many disadvantages of 
steam engines beyond air pollution. Atlanta had by then fourteen different railway companies 
running over 1,000 train units daily, and the only way to eliminate the smoke nuisance and other 
problems was to electrify all the railroads. With that accomplished, he claimed, the city could 
then easily place concrete slabs above all the downtown tracks, eliminating the unsightly gulch 
which still cut the city in two and was visible from an airplane. The plaza would create plenty of 
space for traffic-relieving boulevards, beautiful public buildings, and a large number of parking 
places.197  
 
195 “Committee Will Combat Conversion of Union Depot Trackage into Freight Yards,” Atlanta 
Constitution, April 17, 1928;  “Plaza Committee Makes Report,” City Builder 8, no. 5 (July 1923): 61; Tatum, 
“Benefits to City of Pryor Street-Central Avenue Viaducts,” 33.  
196 Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 67, § 2021-23. 
197 “Value of Central Plaza to Atlanta Shown by Newell,” Atlanta Constitution, March 30, 1923; Ralph 
Peters Black, “Greater Atlanta - the City Beautiful,” City Builder  (October 1927): 36-37, 54-55; Tatum, “Benefits to 
City of Pryor Street-Central Avenue Viaducts,” 33.  
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The professor’s solution and the dreams of civic leaders for a central plaza remained 
years in the future. Only a narrow pedestrian strip called Plaza Way was built over the tracks to 
bridge Pryor and Whitehall halfway between Wall and Alabama streets (see map above). Not 
until 1943’s Plaza Park [Peachtree Fountains Plaza] connected the Pryor, Wall, Whitehall, and 
Alabama viaducts did a true public pedestrian plaza exist, but the viaducts and laterals of the 
1920s were foundational towards its creation.  
With Atlanta’s great viaduct project complete, a noticeable improvement in traffic was 
seen across the district. Trains could go into and out of Union Station without having to stop and 
uncouple. Elimination of the grade crossings reduced danger and delays to people and vehicles. 
The Capitol, Fulton County Courthouse, and the in-progress new Atlanta city hall were easily 
accessible from anywhere in town. Construction of the viaducts created a street corridor above 
the east-west rail lines uniting the north and south sections of town.198  
The pro-growth community achieved many of its goals with the construction of the twin 
viaducts. Property values increased, and the many building improvements enhanced the 
appearance of the once run-down neighborhood. The two bridges received at least partial credit 
for the record-breaking number of building permits issued by the city of Atlanta during 1928. 
They exceeded 1923’s previous high by almost half a million dollars.199 
City businesses quickly jumped at the chance to advertise their proximity to the new 
viaducts, and the convenience such a location afforded their customers. One of the city’s 
signature department stores, Chamberlin-Johnson-DuBose, took out nearly a full-page 
advertisement (see ad below), claiming that “All Roads Lead” to their store on Whitehall Street. 
 
198 Garrett, 2:849. 
199 Atlanta Constitution, December 30, 1928: “New Record Is Made by Building Permits”; “New Mitchell 
St. Viaduct Favored By Finance Body.” 
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Patrons could now easily avoid the traffic congestion at the Peachtree-Whitehall viaduct, and 
park conveniently and free for three hours at two nearby garages. 
Both mayors who oversaw 
the viaduct bond issues during the 
1920s had appointed special 
commissions tasked with ensuring 
the successful passage of the 
referenda. These commissions 
consisted of prominent white 
businessmen, professionals, and 
civic leaders, along with a few of 
elite white women to assist in 
securing the women’s vote. In both 
instances, the groups took care to 
reach out to the city’s African 
Americans.  
Without backing from Black 
voters, bonds did not pass in the city 
of Atlanta. Prominent financier 
Frank M. Inman, chair of the failed 1923 city park bond campaign, declared, “In the past few 
years two campaigns for bonds were defeated by the negro vote because of their lack of 
Figure 13. Department store ad; Atlanta Constitution, 
March 3, 1929. 
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confidence in getting any of the benefits therefrom.”200 It should have been obvious that funding 
another city park from which they would be excluded was never going to win their votes.  
Since 1919, Atlanta’s African Americans refused to support any bond project which 
would not contribute to their welfare or interests. However, the city’s leaders ensured that the 
two viaduct referenda included amenities like schools specifically for the African American 
neighborhoods. Similarly, the city’s planning commission understood that average Atlanta voters 
would also not pass a bond referendum that did not address needs and concerns closer to their 
hearts and homes than some downtown bridges.  
Robert Otis, planning commission chair, admitted that the viaducts were their top 
priority. The commission composed of elite businessmen added schools, water, and sewer 
projects—all of which were needed, but which also would guarantee passage. The two city bond 
issues which failed during the twenties contained no viaducts or street upgrades. While each 
would have provided civic enhancements, none would have advanced business growth and city 
expansion as much as new viaducts and better roads. The pro-growth alliance made more 
extensive efforts to pass the viaduct bonds because these mattered most to those dedicated to city 
expansion. When the stakes were high enough, the coalition would even reach across the racial 
divide to achieve its goals.201  
 
The construction of the viaducts is at the heart of this thesis. The city-as-growth-machine 
viewpoint incentivized Atlanta’s businessmen and government officials to embrace the 
automobile as a key driver of municipal growth. Linking efficient transportation with more 
 
200 “Inman Discusses Negro High School,” Atlanta Constitution, September 18, 1924. 
201 The two failed bond referenda of the 1920s included $2 million for city parks in 1923; and $2 million 
for a new city hall in 1925. 
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development led to increased efforts to facilitate traffic flow. The viaducts demonstrated the 
city’s willingness to eliminate other street users from the new roadways; no streetcars ran the 
entire length of Spring Street while the Central Avenue viaduct accommodated no pedestrians.  
But road improvements comprised only the infrastructure portion of the traffic 
component of a city plan. The regulation of street use supplied the legal superstructure. During 
the twenties, Atlanta’s leaders had to confront the problems of collisions and carnage which 
road-building alone could not solve. By the end of the decade, the city council, ably assisted by 
automobile clubs and associations, enacted an enormous amount of legislation to control 
everyone and everything in the city streets. Along with the various necessary enforcement 
mechanisms, a regulatory superstructure blanketed the city. The massive legal apparatus forever 
changed the appearance of the streets and sidewalks, the daily lives of citizens, and local 













5 REGULATING ATLANTA’S STREETS 
On January 5, 1920, James L. Key gave the annual mayoral speech to the city council, 
and as the paper of record, the Atlanta Constitution printed the complete text of his message. 
Following longstanding tradition, his opening remarks mentioned the previous year, during 
which Atlanta had experienced unprecedented growth. In order to sustain that growth, he said, a 
number of issues had to be addressed, one of the most pressing of which was the crowded 
condition of downtown streets.  
Traffic congestion has reached a point where it seriously handicaps business and 
travel. An effort is being made now by bodies of business men and others to 
propose a traffic ordinance that will afford some remedy to the situation. No fully 
adequate remedy can be found by mere traffic regulations. We have more traffic 
in congested areas than the streets will accommodate. The city must furnish 
additional thoroughfares for traffic and remove all possible physical barriers that 
impede its movement.202  
 
The mayor’s comments contained several striking items. First, he cited the grave harm to 
businesses caused by clogged traffic, an indicator of his top priority—keeping Atlanta’s 
commerce and industry healthy and happy. Such a priority was not surprising in a city where the 
Chamber of Commerce had close ties with and held significant influence over the municipal 
government.  
Key’s position as an acting director of the Chamber almost certainly played a role in his 
advocacy for business, as his next sentence confirmed when he noted that members of the 
business community were currently at work on a new traffic ordinance. No one apparently saw 
any impropriety in the fact that bankers, merchants, and professional men might actually write 
ordinances. Such an arrangement exceeded lobbying or personal attempts to influence 
 
202 “Atlanta Urged to Prepare for Population of 500,000 in Mayor Key’s Message,” Atlanta Constitution, 
January 6, 1920. 
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legislation, but it would not be the last time during the decade that a local commercial entity 
prepared the draft of an ordinance for the city’s council’s consideration. 
That Mayor Key even mentioned a new traffic ordinance was ironic, given that he had 
vetoed the city’s 1919 comprehensive traffic law just a few months before giving his speech. The 
new law would have created a one-hour parking zone in the central business district, eliminated a 
number of streetcar stops, and provided other changes to relieve traffic jams. Although council 
had unanimously approved the bill, the mayor vetoed it, and a veto override vote failed. A timely 
meeting between Key and members of the Atlanta Automobile Association, who opposed the 
traffic ordinance, led to the veto and the council’s change of heart. The city’s governing body 
had caved to pressure from a group of “auto men” dedicated to promoting the interests of 
motorists and the automobile industry. Another traffic ordinance, already in the works, would 
surely better represent business and automotive concerns, as it was being composed by members 
of those very groups.203 
The mayor made a third remarkable assertion in his speech: the city must “remove all 
possible physical barriers that impede its [traffic’s] movement.” The notable part of that 
statement was his underlying assumption that the purpose of city streets was the unobstructed 
movement of motor vehicles. The “physical barriers” would include not only streetcars, whose 
stop-and-start motion hindered non-rail vehicles, but also pedestrians and anyone or anything 
else that slowed the flow. Already, as far as the mayor was concerned, the streets functioned as 
automobile conduits, obligating the city, as with the water and sewer pipes, to keep things 
moving along.204  
 
203 Atlanta Constitution: “Numerous Changes Made in City’s Traffic Laws at Meeting of Council,” October 
7, 1919; “Auto Men Oppose Traffic Ordinance; To Protest Today,” October 8, 1919; “Mayor Key Expected to 
Disapprove Today Traffic Ordinance,” October 10, 1919; “Veto of Traffic Ordinance Upheld,” October 21, 1919. 
204 “Mayor Key’s Message,” Atlanta Constitution, January 6, 1920. 
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Key’s speech called for action, yet he personally had contributed to the impasse. The 
frustrated community reaction to the gridlock—in both city streets and city hall—was pointed. 
While not calling out the mayor specifically, editorial writers complained that when it came to 
traffic the city talked too much and acted too little. They strongly urged council to do something 
to relieve the city’s problems.205  
In spite of nearly constant road work, Atlanta’s traffic problems had not been resolved. 
The viaduct projects comprised the city’s initial attempts to build its way out of traffic 
congestion, but the relief they provided proved only temporary. Narrow downtown streets 
remained inadequate for the growing numbers of vehicles. Moving and parked cars competed for 
the shrinking road space. Central city businessmen feared that people would no longer come 
downtown to shop or do business if too much traffic made the trip time-consuming and 
unpleasant. The city code would soon include a formal definition of the “congested area.”206  
Civic leaders also had to contend with other traffic congestion-related consequences: 
collisions and carnage. The rising numbers of deaths and serious injuries from automobiles 
dismayed Atlantans as well as urban dwellers across the country. Traffic expert Miller 
McClintock in 1925 wrote, “The alarming increase in street accidents and in street congestion 
during the past few years has rendered the correction of traffic conditions one of the most 
important municipal problems of the present day.” Authorities embraced two major regulatory 
solutions: (1) reduce the number of pedestrians in the roadways; and (2) control all street 
activities.207  
 
205  “The Traffic Problem,” Atlanta Constitution, February 5, 1920; and “A Golden Opportunity,” City 
Builder 4, n. 10 (January 1920): 16.   
206 Herbert T. Jenkins, Atlanta and the Automobile (Atlanta, GA: Emory University Center for Research in 
Social Change, 1977), 17; Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 95, § 3134 
(o) Congested Area.  
207 McClintock, Street Traffic Control, vii. 
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No evidence could be found to suggest that city leaders ever considered obvious 
alternatives, such as reducing the number of vehicles in the central business district, or reducing 
the speed of those vehicles. Nor did they consistently utilize the one method of effectively 
widening the narrow downtown streets—eliminating on-street parking. Originally four-lane 
major thoroughfares, such as Peachtree, Marietta, and Whitehall streets, had been basically 
reduced to two-lane roads because both outer lanes were occupied by parked cars. The remaining 
two center lanes had to accommodate the double-tracked trolleys as well as masses of new 
automobiles.  
Shifting focus onto moving more people instead of more vehicles would have led to 
significant improvements in the range and efficiency of mass transit options. Instead, the growth 
coalition remained determined to privilege the automobile and its movement. Through the 
imposition of a massive regulatory superstructure, the business-friendly city council radically 
altered the behaviors of all street users, the duties of police officers, and municipal governance. 
The 1920s would prove a decade of trials, failures, stalemates, and unhappy compromises, 
resulting in more restrictions of the use of public streets than anyone had ever imagined. But 
none of their efforts resolved the twin traffic dilemmas: congestion and carnage. 
5.1 Carnage 
Automobiles had been killing people since the earliest days of the horseless carriage,  
creating fresh outrage as the numbers mounted. With more people and cars in urban settings, 
frequent collisions inevitably occurred. The heavier and much faster motor vehicles crashed with 
more catastrophic results than horse-drawn wagons or carriages. The statistics told the story; so 
did the newspapers. Being struck by a moving car was a modern, very public, and especially 
horrific way to die. Society had not yet adjusted psychologically to the massive number of U.S. 
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traffic fatalities, and automobiles could at times appear threatening (see sketch below). Since the 
end of World War II, the national traffic death count has fluctuated between 30,000 and 50,000 
per year. Today, the U.S. as a nation is comfortable with this number of traffic-related fatalities, 
and most citizens apparently are willing to countenance even more traffic deaths, given the 
appetite for unlimited cell 
phone usage and demand for 
more in-car amenities which 
distract drivers.208  
Between 1920 and 
1930, numbers of U.S. traffic 
fatalities ballooned from about 
12,000 to over 30,000—and 
this with vastly fewer people and cars than the nation has today.209 The rate of U.S. traffic-
related deaths per 100,000 population in 1920 was 11.5, but Atlanta’s rate was 26.4—more than 
double the national rate. The following tables demonstrate the rapidly increasing counts of 
registered motor vehicles and roadway fatalities. Automobile-related deaths increased  
 
 
208 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Traffic Crash Fatalities,” Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS) Encyclopedia. Since 1930—the first year traffic-related deaths in the U.S. reached the 30,000 
threshold—the number has not dropped below that figure, with two exceptions: across two years in the heart of the 
Great Depression (1932-33), and during four years of gas rationing in World War II (1942-45). Both examples 
suggest that substantially raising the gas tax would reduce fatalities and congestion. As a former Atlanta police chief 
noted, the war years interrupted the dominance of the car in American life; Jenkins, Atlanta and the Automobile, 59. 
The number of traffic deaths, after a decline in the early 2000s, is again on the rise, with more distracted driving 
(cellphones and complex dashboard entertainment centers), and increased sales of heavier-than-cars sport utility 
vehicles and light trucks. A recent report documents that pedestrian fatalities are up more than 50% over the past 
decade (2010-2020), following a three-decade decline. 
209 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1930 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1930). 
Figure 14. The menacing automobile; “Talion,” Atlanta 





at higher rates than the city and national populations.210 In 1924, an insurance expert noted that 
the number of automobile wrecks had kept pace with the rate of growth of the automobile 
 
210 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1933).The Atlanta table presents two sets of figures for the number of traffic fatalities. The first column's numbers, 
which are considerably lower, are from the annual reports published by the city's police chiefs. The second column 
of fatality numbers are from the 1933 Statistical Abstract of the U.S., a federal government publication. Those death 
totals are higher, sometimes nearly double the figures reported by the chiefs. How could this happen? It would, of 
course, be in a police chief's interest to list a lower count of traffic fatalities; too many deaths reflected badly on the 
department. The discrepancy can perhaps be attributed to what in modern police parlance is known as “juking the 
stats.” This not-uncommon practice involves massaging the statistics to make them more palatable to city officials, 
the public, and the media. Newspapers faithfully reported details of the city's automobile-related deaths as well as 


































1920 29               53                   16,290            200,616      14.5              26.4                  18 33                        
1921 17               53                   17,168            
1922 37               53                   21,561            
1923 34               53                   26,977            
1924 32               53                   36,012            
1925 38               65                   37,946            
1926 40               68                   38,753            
1927 42               65                   42,046            
1928 41               71                   45,788            
1929 56               89                   51,746            
1930 53               87                   51,394            270,366      19.6              32.2                  10                   17                        
Total 419             710                 
Increase 
from 1920 
to 1930 83% 64% 215% 35%
³All years, except 1928, are calculated as a percentage of Fulton County registrations, based on the 1928 figure in the 1929 City of Atlanta Traffic Survey.
¹Atlanta Police Department (APD) numbers from the annual reports of the Atlanta Chiefs of Police.
²Numbers from the 1930 U.S. Statistical Abtract . Figures for 1921-1923 are averages.



















1920 12,155        9,239,161       106,021,537   11.5 132
1930 31,204        26,749,853     123,202,624   25.3 117
2017² 37,133        272,480,899   325,147,121   11.4 14
²The most recent numbers available from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
¹Includes all motor vehicles; buses were not counted until 1925.
Table 7. U.S. Traffic Fatalities, 1920, 1930, 2017 
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industry. He remarked, “To-day more people are accidentally killed by the automobile than by 
any other single means, barring the occasional earthquake or flood catastrophe.”211 
The most commonly calculated death rate gives the number of deaths per 100,000 people. 
However, the number of deaths per 100,000 registered motor vehicles provides a more 
informative comparison. The tables show both, but the startling and horrifying take-away 
remains: the national death rate per number of cars in 1920 was nearly ten times higher than in 
2017—and Atlanta’s rates were worse than either. City and country faced intolerable numbers of 
fatalities from the new death machines.212 
Sensationalism characterized the newspaper coverage of traffic-related deaths in the early 
1900s. By the twenties, reporting had been toned down, as the print media played its part in 
growth machine attempts to reduce negative associations with automobiles. Nevertheless, 
gruesome details enlivened articles about particularly poignant deaths, especially those of 
prominent citizens or children. Besides documenting the crashes, the papers frequently ran 
readers’ letters as well as their own editorials decrying the carnage in the streets. An Atlantian 
editorial railed against 1919’s forty-three automobile-related deaths. “Speed maniacs” drove 
recklessly, knowing they would not be punished, because, as the editor correctly observed, “the 
authorities do not care to do anything that might injure the automobile business.”213 
 
211 Ryder, Automobile Insurance: A Description of the Various Forms of Coverage, Underwriting Methods 
and Selling Plans, 1. 
212 Note that the Atlanta rates in Table 1 are given per 10,000 vehicles, while the U.S. rates are per 100,000. 
Federal Highway Administration U.S. Department of Transportation, Highway Statistics Summary to 1995 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). The total number of U.S. motor vehicle traffic fatalities 
from 1900 through 2017 is 3,766,662, combined from the statistics to 1995 and  Persons Fatally Injured in Motor 
Vehicle Crashes, 1980-2017 (Washington, DC: Federal Highway Administration, 2018). The 2017 motor vehicle 
count is from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics in the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
https://www.bts.dot.gov/content/number-us-aircraft-vehicles-vessels-and-other-conveyances. Allison Arieff, “Cars 
Are Death Machines,” New York Times, October 4, 2019.  
213 On May 9, 1924, well-known retired businessman and former Atlanta postmaster, Hugh L. McKee, died 
under the wheels of a speeding car, which paused briefly, but drove rapidly away, leaving his mangled body with 
broken legs and crushed head lying in the middle of Peachtree Street by the Brookwood train station. Acting Chief 
of Police E. L. Jett launched “a finish fight to put an end to automobile killings.” The article noted that reckless 
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During the decade, the civic leaders and city officials intermittently reacted—only at 
periods of peak public outrage—by calling for more stringent police enforcement, holding the 
occasional safety week, tweaking road laws, and conducting yet another traffic study. They 
ignored the corrective called for by the editorial writer: to impose on all perpetrators prison 
sentences of six months to five years, which would instantly reduce road deaths. They would not 
contemplate such a drastic measure against the motor vehicle. 
Roadway collisions did benefit the flourishing automobile insurance companies, who also 
kept an eagle eye on traffic statistics. As the ones who handled the losses, the insurance carriers 
were experts on the causes of vehicle wrecks. As their profits depended on accident prevention, 
they worked diligently with safety organizations (e.g., the National Safety Council and its local 
branches), car manufacturers, police departments, and government entities to improve safety. 
The insurance companies’ program to prevent automobile accidents included education, better 
highway engineering, safer motor vehicles, proper legislation and enforcement, driver licensing, 
and the offer of lower 
insurance rates for the safest 
drivers.214  
A local insurance 
agency’s newspaper 
advertisement (see figure at 
right) urged subscribers to 
 
drivers had “caused death to some of the most substantial and valuable citizens of Atlanta;” “Police Launch ‘Finish 
Fight on Auto Killers’ As Net Is Tightened Around Slayer of M’Kee,” Atlanta Constitution, May 11, 1924; 
“Automobile Killings,” Atlantian, December, 1920, 5.  
214 Ryder, Automobile Insurance: A Description of the Various Forms of Coverage, Underwriting Methods 
and Selling Plans, 168-69.  
Figure 15. Insurance Agency ad headline; Atlanta 
Constitution, September 17, 1923. 
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purchase travel and pedestrian insurance. The ad pointed out that danger threatened, whether the 
customer walked, rode, or drove. The large numbers of crashes causing deaths and injuries to 
both people and property sent city automobile insurance rates skyrocketing. In 1926, a vice 
president of the Atlanta Casualty Exchange wrote that Atlanta’s insurance rates remained high 
primarily due to incompetent, unlicensed, underage, and “hoggish” drivers; employers who 
inadequately supervised their company drivers; and the failure of the public to learn and observe 
the traffic rules. He called for the city council to put teeth into and enforce existing laws, a 
common cri de cœur throughout the twenties.215  
In 1923, the Chamber of Commerce responded to the carnage by creating the Atlanta 
Safety Council to reduce the “alarming number of deaths and injuries” from automobile 
collisions, and to make Atlanta safe for motorists and pedestrians. Carl L. Smith, the secretary of 
the National Safety Council, spoke at a Chamber meeting, describing how such organizations 
operated elsewhere in the country, noting how one group functioned as vigilante traffic law 
enforcers. That very evening the Chamber organized a committee to initiate its own council 
headed by Mell R. Wilkinson, a leading city manufacturer, head of a large brokerage firm, and 
president-for-life of the prestigious and highly-influential Presidents’ Club. Prominent industry 
leaders pledged financial and moral support from their companies.216  
The safety council had offices, first in the Candler Building, later in the Chamber of 
Commerce Building, and it hired a secretary-manager with national experience as a safety 
underwriter. Both illustrated the group’s substantial financial resources and expertise as well as 
 
215 W. E. Roberts, “Adequate Auto Laws Urged to Reduce Insurance Rates,” Atlanta Constitution, June 14, 
1926. 
216 “Safety Council Plans Launched by Civic Leaders,” Atlanta Constitution, June 13, 1923. The 
Presidents’ Club, created in 1915, was a non-political group consisting of the official heads of, by 1927, ninety of 
Atlanta’s civic organizations, formed to facilitate collective action in public enterprises, Cooper, Official History of 
Fulton County, 802-03. 
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the seriousness of its intent to have an impact on the city’s traffic problems. Composed of civic 
elites, Atlanta’s safety council insisted it did not exist to wage war on motorists, as every member 
owned at least one car and many of them controlled fleets of commercial trucks. Its officers (a 
president, a first vice-president, and fourteen other vice-presidents) represented every sector of 
the growth coalition. Claiming that the 100 members on its Board of Control were 
“representative Atlantans,” the council’s interests clearly lay more with car and business owners 
than with average, working-class, or minority citizens. In 1923, the majority of Atlanta 
households did not own even one car.217  
The Atlanta Safety Council would have enormous impact on all traffic-related matters 
throughout the decade. In addition to educating the public and pressuring the police, the group 
functioned as a quasi-governmental traffic agency, drafting city ordinances and apprehending 
violators. It exemplified the extraordinary reach of the power elites into the basic city 
responsibilities of making and enforcing laws. As a creation of the COC, the safety council acted 
as devoted guardians of Atlanta’s reputation as a good place to do business. Traffic deaths, 
downtown gridlock, and reckless drivers did not match their idealized image of a growing, 
progressive city. Unfortunately, those were precisely the problems of the modern U.S. city; 
Atlanta had plenty of company.218   
 
217 James L. Loftus, “Safety Council Nears Completion Or [sic] Organization,” Atlanta Constitution, July 1, 
1923. “The Atlanta Safety Council,” City Builder 8, no. 11 (January 1924): 22, 55. The first president was Judge 
Shepard Bryan, first vice president was W. W. Orr, and other vice presidents included William Candler, Charles A. 
Wickersham, and Mell R. Wilkinson, all power elites. 
218 Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 87-101, contains a detailed 
discussion of other safety councils and their activities. In “Disinterested Opinion,” City Builder 9, no. 4 (June 1924): 
22, an editorial recounted the comments of a visiting North Carolina editor, who had called Atlanta a marvelously 
hospitable, growing, happy, and friendly city. But the visitor also said, “Only one thing disappointed me about 
Atlanta, and that was the obvious lack of traffic organization. The wonder to me is that they do not have a dozen 
deaths by auto accidents every day.” 
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The mounting death toll, however, demanded even more intervention. The census bureau 
reported:  
Each year it becomes more and more dangerous for a person to walk the streets. 
The reason usually given, and probably the correct one, is that the number of 
automobiles in use is constantly increasing. How, then, shall this ever increasing 
danger be lessened? The obvious remedy is to improve constantly the traffic 
regulations to keep pace with the ever-increasing number of automobiles. . . . 
Automobile traffic must be slowed down and controlled until it becomes safe.”219  
 
The bureau called for more regulations; reducing the number of vehicles on the road never 
received a mention. At no level—federal, state, or municipal—did authorities ever attempt that 
obvious solution, certainly not in Atlanta. The city did not take the census bureau’s advice to 
slow down automobiles. When it came to speed limits in the 1920s, Atlanta only raised—never 
lowered—them.220  
The city did increase controls on all street uses and users, instituting a massive array of 
measures to manage everyone. This legislative superstructure encompassed all the traffic-related 
entities imposed upon the streets, sidewalks, and the air spaces above them. The blanket of  
regulation included devices: painted lines on the roadways, raised safety islands in the middle of 
streets, regulatory and directional signs, and the various types of traffic signal lights embedded in 
the road surface, installed on posts (in the street or at the curb), or hanging in the air above 
intersections.  
It also comprised the plethora of ordinances imposed upon those in or beside the 
roadway, as well as the specialized motorcycle cops and cornermen (policemen who stood on 
 
219 “Autos Killed 3,808 Persons For Last Year,” Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1920. 
220 In one instance, the city council inadvertently decreased the speed limit when they extended the 
boundary of the inner fire limits, which had a lower speed limit, 12 mph, compared to 20 mph outside the inner fire 
limits. They made the boundary change in May, but did not recognize the problem for drivers until October, when 
the newspaper ran a big article, with a map showing the location of the new inner fire limit boundary lines, 
“Committee Votes to Extend Fire Limits of City,” Atlanta Constitution, May 6, 1922, and O. J. Willoughby, 
“Extension of Inner Fire Limit Necessitates Change in Speed Law,” and “Where and When to Park,” Atlanta 
Constitution, October 1, 1922.  
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street corners or in the streets), whose duties consisted primarily of enforcing laws and directing 
traffic. In Foucauldian terms, the superstructure comprised a new “microphysics of power,” 
extended to the public streets, with police as part of the panoptic apparatus.221  
The automobile ushered in a new stage in the development of a greatly expanded 
disciplinary society. The regulatory framework emerged in Atlanta primarily in the twenties in 
response to the car and the resulting chaos, congestion, and carnage it brought to the city. The 
entire structure evolved gradually, with numerous false starts, revisions, and revocations along 
the way. By the end of the decade, it still remained a work in progress, but slowly approached 
the comprehensive and stable system we experience today (albeit with ongoing adjustments and 
alterations). The remainder of this chapter describes the various elements of the superstructure, 
beginning with the regulation of people in the public streets.  
5.2 Regulating Pedestrians 
Civic leaders extolled Atlanta’s expanding population, the influx of tall buildings holding 
thousands of employees, and the concentrated retail sectors and large downtown department 
stores drawing throngs of shoppers. However, they deplored the resulting crowded sidewalks, 
and enacted new local ordinances to remove obstructions between the curb and the building line. 
These included outlawing all commercial sidewalk displays in the central business district; 
requiring property owners to keep walkways and streets clean and clear; scheduling time and 
placement of garbage cans left out for refuse collection; and restricting all street and sidewalk 
encroachments with time-limited permits. But the new regulations could only optimize existing 
sidewalk capacity, not expand it.222 
 
221 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Pantheon, 1977); quoted in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Random House, 2010), 206-07. 











and 2 p.m., 
observers 
counted 27,590 
pedestrians moving through the intersection on a weekday. The Saturday count was 21,125. The 
Report proposed a radical solution to the congested foot traffic: move pedestrians underground to 
stationary and moving sidewalks, the latter called “subways without trains” (see figure above). 
Beeler’s unique approach, unlike any other remedies of the time, prioritized pedestrians over all 
transit modes.223  
The pedestrian far outranks all the rest in both number and importance. It is the 
pedestrian who watches the shop windows and patronizes the stores. He may have 
come down in an auto or a street car, but he becomes a pedestrian as soon as he 
walks on the street. Already the sidewalks are crowded and jammed in many 
places and street intersections are difficult to negotiate. The safety and comfort of 
the pedestrian is of paramount importance.224 
 
Beeler understood that everybody at some point in their journey was a pedestrian. 
 
223 Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, vi, 124. Others offered 
different solutions. A Chicago engineer recommended ramping the sidewalks in Chicago’s Loop so they formed an 
upper tier above the ground level streets; Edward H. Bennett, “Raised Sidewalks and Traffic Separation Urged for 
Chicago,” American City 35, no. 3 (September 1926): 334-36.  
224 Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 54. 
Figure 16. Underground sidewalks and subway; Beeler, Report, 1924, p. 
83, Exhibit 10A. 
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Although sidewalk demand had increased, sidewalk area did not. In any competition for 
the space between building lines, the streets would always win, particularly since national 
experts constantly proclaimed that street widening would solve the congestion problem. 
McClintock correctly observed that creating more space to relieve sidewalk congestion “cannot 
be anticipated by most cities in the near future.” In Atlanta, no future would see downtown 
sidewalk widening, at least not until the twenty-first century and then only infrequently as a 
traffic-calming measure. Instead, city roadways continuously cannibalized portions of the 
walkways as the demands of more vehicles ranked higher than the needs of more pedestrians.225 
Atlanta’s street expansions devoured not only sidewalks but also vegetation and real 
estate. City officials eliminated a traffic bottleneck on Marietta Street by cutting eight feet off the 
sidewalks to widen the road. They removed the trees around city hall “which interfered with 
traffic,” and rounded the curbing so vehicles could more easily make the turn from Marietta onto 
Forsyth. The latter action was the result of a new ordinance requiring intersection curbs to be cut 
on a fifteen-foot radius—a measure which facilitated vehicle movement but reduced the size of 
every single city sidewalk corner. Property owners on South Forsyth Street lost frontage so the 
access to the Spring Street viaduct could be widened and extended. The omnivorous and ever-
hungry motor vehicle demanded more and more territory, which city leaders happily ceded to it, 
relegating people on foot to a distant second class status. 
The city’s first jaywalking ordinance took effect in late 1915, but lackadaisical police 
enforcement emboldened foot travelers to cross the streets at will, as they always had. The 1920s 
 
225  “Whitten Would Widen Downtown Streets to Relieve Increasing Jam of Traffic,” Atlanta Constitution, 
August 20, 1922; McClintock, Street Traffic Control, 159. An example of expanding pedestrian space as a traffic-
calming device can be seen in the Five Points area at the heart of downtown. A square block of buildings was 
demolished in 1971-73 to create Central City Park [Woodruff Park today]. The sidewalks were expanded on the 
south side of the park, reducing Edgewood Avenue from four lanes in 1921 to two lanes in 2019. 
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saw increased regulation of those who walked, designed primarily to limit the time they spent 
with their feet in the roadways. New laws prohibited pedestrians from carelessly or maliciously 
interfering with passing vehicles; required them to exit expeditiously from cars and streetcars 
proceeding immediately to the right-hand curb; and mandated that they keep to the right at all 
times. The Constitution reflected the growing use of the pejorative label for pedestrians walking 
in the street: prior to 1920, it published 48 articles containing variations of the term “jay-walk,” 
while during the twenties, that number more than doubled to 106.226   
As early as 1921, a newspaper editorial called for the city to paint lines at Five Points to 
safeguard against “innocent” jay-walking, and to create stop-lines for vehicles.227 In 1922, the 
city council passed a new traffic code requiring the Chief of Construction to “paint white lines 
upon the streets of the City at the intersection of the streets and other places . . . to indicate where 
pedestrians are to cross streets.” While the new lines would also serve as vehicle stop lines, the 
ordinance specified that their purpose was to delineate where people could walk in the road. A 
corresponding ordinance required pedestrians to walk only in the portion of the street between 
the cross-walk lines, not diagonally. Both statutes effectively corralled pedestrians, limiting their 
presence in the street to the sections between the white lines. As Barrett observes, pedestrian 
control in the early decades of the twentieth century revolved around the principle of traffic 
segregation—keeping the foot travelers out of the streets as much as possible.228  
Another pedestrian regulation new in the 1920s read, “Pedestrians shall not stop or 
congregate in the center of the sidewalk, but must move to either side promptly.”  Not content 
 
226 “Officer Thornton Teaches Big Class of ‘Jay Walkers,’” Atlanta Constitution, December 12, 1915; 
Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 95, §§ 3135-3140. 
227 “To Help Pedestrians,” Atlanta Constitution, August 23, 1921. 
228 Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 39, § 734; Ch. 95, § 
3137; Barrett, The Automobile and Urban Transit: The Formation of Public Policy in Chicago, 1900-1930, 133.  
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with removing people from the roadways, the city code barred them from stopping to chat in the 
middle of the sidewalk. Standing people, like the other sidewalk obstacles, hindered forward 
motion and needed to be curtailed. The new paradigm of streets as automobile conduits also 
applied to the sidewalks, now pedestrian conduits. For both, unhindered and efficient flow was 
the goal, and each represented steps in the development of the automotive city.229  
City authorities frequently waged “war” on both speeders and jaywalkers, who alternately 
received the blame for the rising number of injuries and deaths. Sometimes, but not often, the 
vehicle drivers received heavy sentences for fatal crashes. Whenever they did, it made bold, all-
caps headlines, like “SPEEDER SENTENCED TO PENITENTIARY.” Newspaper editorials 
and opinion pieces tended to fault either the walkers or the motorists, but sometimes called for 
everyone to take responsibility and for police to enforce all the traffic laws.230  
Outcries against speeders and reckless drivers never ceased, but as the decade progressed, 
pedestrians more and more often carried the blame for the rising number of road injuries and 
deaths, including their own. A 1927 article cited the 445 pedestrian injuries which occurred in 
1926, blaming nearly all of them on the pedestrians themselves who had jay-walked or ignored 
traffic signals. Fewer than 12 injuries occurred while those on foot were obeying the law (the 
unstated corollary being that someone else, obviously a motorist, had disregarded the law). The 
 
229 Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 95, § 3139; Norton, 
Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 134. A newspaper editorial urged pedestrians to 
move along, not even stopping to gaze in shop windows, unless one did not impede other walkers; “When You Are 
Walking on the Street, Keep Moving Forward,” Atlanta Constitution, December 31, 1922. The phrase “on the street” 
in the headline did not actually mean in the street, but alongside the street on the sidewalk. 
230 Atlanta Constitution: “Authorities Push War on Speeders, September 30, 1920; “Safety on the Street,” 
November 29, 1920; “Heavy Penalties Given Traffic Law Violators; City-Wide War Opens,” August 14, 1921; 
“War Is Declared on Bright Lights and ‘Jay Walkers,’” May 13, 1924; “No Cases Made in Police ‘War’ on Jay-
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January 30, 1922, stated that there were two sides to every question, and that the pedestrian was “frequently quite as 
much to blame as the motorist.” 
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city’s greatest traffic weakness, the article claimed, was its failure to rigidly enforce pedestrian 
observance of traffic signals. By 1929, the civic and government authorities were asserting that 
most traffic deaths resulted from people crossing the street in the middle of the block or against 
the light at intersections, and condemned pedestrians as a “serious interference to the free and 
efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” People on foot, along with the streetcars, increasingly 
bore responsibility for the carnage and congestion on Atlanta’s streets—neither of which existed 
prior to the coming of the automobile. Yet motordom and its enablers refused to assign much 
blame to newcomer on the scene.231    
In his January 3, 1927 inaugural speech to the city council, the new mayor Isaac N. 
Ragsdale initiated a drive to improve police regulation of pedestrians who, he claimed, 
consistently ignored traffic signals. “The traffic situation, in my estimation, needs to undergo 
improved regulation, particularly as respects pedestrians. . . . The large majority of pedestrians 
ignore the signals unless an officer is present to impress them. Numerous traffic accidents have 
been caused on Atlanta’s streets. . . by failure of pedestrians to regard the traffic laws as rigidly 
as motorists are required to do.” The mayor called for equal enforcement of traffic light 
ordinances on both pedestrians and motorists. Within days, jaywalker arrests increased and the 
Recorders Courts began to crack down on violators. Police assigned two officers to every 
downtown intersection with a traffic signal to watch for infractions by walkers.232  
 
231 William Brady, “Health Talks: The Reckless Pedestrian,” Atlanta Constitution, June 8, 1920, blamed 
pedestrian recklessness, while “Enforce the Law,” Atlanta Constitution, September 28, 1920, faulted speeders and 
reckless drivers, claiming that the “pedestrian hasn’t much more chance for his life than a rat.” Contrast that with 
“400 Pedestrians Injured in 1926 for ‘Jay Walking,’” Atlanta Constitution, January 6, 1927; Atlanta Mayor's Traffic 
Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 58. Earlier, Atlanta’s hired traffic and zoning specialist, 
Robert Whitten, also held the pedestrian as the most serious impediment to traffic flow; Robert Harvey Whitten, 
"Painted Traffic Markings on Streets," American City 24, no. 6 (June 1924): 617.  
232 Atlanta Constitution: “Text of New Mayor’s Message,” January 4, 1927; “‘Jay Walkers’ to be Arrested, 
Starting Today,” January 7, 1927; “Police Campaign on Jay Walkers to be Continued,” January 8, 1927; and 
“Special Traffic Squad to Arrest all ‘Jay-Walkers,’” January 10, 1927. 
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Ironically, Mayor Ragsdale and the mayor pro tem, Alderman Guy Dobbs, were arrested 
eight days later for jaywalking as they strolled south on Peachtree Street. Despite warning 
sounds from a police whistle, the two men crossed against the red light at Marietta Street. Both 
received citations from the two officers working the Five Points intersection, then continued their 
walk south over the Whitehall Street viaduct. A few moments later, another policeman blew his 
whistle as the two men began to cross Alabama Street against the red light. The mayor came to a 
halt, but Alderman Dobbs did not, so he received a second citation. The next day in Recorders 
Court, both men “cheerfully” paid their fines, $6.00 per violation.233  
The incident demonstrated the ingrained habit of pedestrians to proceed across the street 
whenever they deemed it safe, no matter the color of the traffic light. Two prominent city 
officials well versed in the city code still managed to violate the law and become ensnared in a 
process which one of them had made a signature project of his administration. The mayor’s 
actions confirmed his own assertion that Atlanta’s pedestrians did, indeed, ignore traffic signals. 
If even he failed to obey the traffic ordinance, why expect strict compliance from the less-
informed, less-aware average citizen?  
The National Safety Council’s 1927 annual safety congress actually studied whether or 
not pedestrians could even be regulated. They concluded yes, but most effectively via two 
means: a timely blast from a loud police whistle to publicly shame the offender, and ongoing 
pedestrian education. As McShane notes, pedestrians had difficulty adapting to the regulation of 
an old, familiar behavior—walking across the street. New Atlanta ordinances upended the 
traditional English common law concept that street users shared equal rights to the roadways. 
They gave the right-of-way to motor vehicles, except at signal-light-controlled intersections. 
 
233 Atlanta Constitution: “City’s Chiefs Are Arrested in Traffic War,” January 12, 1927; “Eighteen New 
Cases Made for Pedestrian Violations of Traffic Signal Laws,” January 13, 1927. 
144 
Even those, however, gave pedestrians only a partial right-of-way where right turns on red were 
allowed.234   
During the week of August 7-13, 1921, Atlanta held a “No Accident Week” organized by      
the newly-formed Junior Chamber of Commerce. The service organization, later known as the 
“Jaycees,” provided opportunities for young people to study city government and learn a proper 
sense of civic duty and responsibility. City businesses and civic groups contributed to the 
campaign and held employee and member meetings to stress “safety first.” Streetcars displayed 
safety ads. The Atlanta Urban League distributed literature and convened rallies while the 
newspapers promoted the week’s assorted events. Despite the efforts, thirteen automobile 
crashes occurred, leaving two dead and thirteen injured, while several hundred traffic law 
violators were hauled into police court. In one of the week’s collisions, a large car hit a mule-
drawn wagon, and then hastily fled the scene, scattering a group of white children playing on 
Central Avenue, narrowly missing them. A “wave of popular indignation against reckless 
driving” arose at the sorry outcome of the city’s designated “safety” week, manifested in angry 
letters to the newspapers, demanding action. But the mayor and city council had just gotten the 
$8 million bond project passed, and had schools, water, sewer, and the Spring Street viaduct 
occupying their time; someone else would have to take the lead on traffic control.235  
Seven days after the infamously unsafe “safety week” concluded, concerned individuals 
created the Citizens’ Safety Association, headed by Philip Thornton Marye (1872-1935), 
esteemed Atlanta architect. During World War I, Marye was the assistant to the commanding 
 
234  “Regulation of Pedestrians,” Atlanta Constitution, September 25, 1927; Norton, Fighting Traffic: The 
Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 220-24; McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control 
Signals,” 386. 
235  Atlanta Constitution: “Campaign to Cut Accidents Opens,” August 7, 1921; “Urban League Weekly 
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Chamber,” Atlanta Constitution, March 28, 1921. 
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officer in the Motor Transport Corps in France and Germany. The Association’s vice presidents 
were leading Atlanta insurance man, William Thomas Winn (1875-1930), and Coca-Cola heir 
and Biltmore Hotel builder, William Candler. The group mounted an educational campaign to 
eliminate jaywalking; campaigned to reduce traffic hazards on city streets; and waged warfare 
against reckless, speeding, and often-intoxicated auto drivers—the cause, they claimed, of the 
many road deaths.236  
The Citizens’ Safety Association partnered with Junior Chamber of Commerce for 
another safety week the following year. It eventually formed the basis of the Atlanta Safety 
Council, one of the most active and influential motor safety organizations in the city. The Junior 
Chamber continued to hold annual safety weeks throughout the 1920s. Both groups led the larger 
COC’s efforts to decrease traffic injuries and deaths.237  
5.3 Regulating Children 
The failure of safety week underscored the need to increase the security of Atlanta’s 
children, both at play and in travelling to and from school. If grown-ups, even city officials, 
could not re-train themselves to stop, look, and listen before crossing the road, it proved even 
more difficult for children who, until the advent of the automobile, had utilized the street for play 
space, especially in crowded urban centers. Fear for children’s well-being motivated civic 
leaders to provide traffic education school programs, institute school safety zones, and organize 
play areas during the summer recess.  
 
236 Atlanta Constitution: “Citizens Form Safety Association As Result of Traffic Law Cases,” August 19, 
1921; “Automobile Club Organized Here,” October 2, 1921; “Marye Made Leader of Automobile Club,” October 
23, 1921; “Keep It Up!” May 9, 1922. Marye designed many buildings throughout the Southeast; in Atlanta he 
designed residences, including the Randolph-Lucas House, St. Luke’s Episcopal Church, the Walton Building, the 
Art Deco Southern Bell Telephone Building, and the Yaarab Temple, which would later become the Fox Theatre.  
237 Atlanta Constitution: “The Speed Hazard,” October 25, 1921; “Safety First Week Set for Sept. 17-24,” 
August 24, 1922; “Record Indicates ‘Pedestrian Day’ Decided Success,” September 21, 1922. 
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In 1913, the Atlanta Public Schools had launched its first school safety program with the 
catchy slogan, “Don’t Get Run Over!” By the twenties, school safety programs could be found 
across the country, with new curricula designed by recently-formed entities like the Highway 
Education Board and the Education Division of the National Safety Council. High school 
students received driving instruction, while students age 14 or under participated in national 
essay-writing contests on highway safety. Kindergarten and elementary school children had play 
activities to raise street safety awareness. Rules for a traffic game, bearing some resemblance to 
the once-popular “Red Light, Green Light,” appeared in the National Safety Council’s Bulletin of 
Safety Education for school teachers. A newspaper’s children’s crossword puzzle sometimes 
included traffic-related clues.238 
Since 1906, Atlanta had operated “recreation grounds” for white children during the 
summer months; a playground for African American children did not open until four years later. 
Editorials observed that Atlanta’s children had been robbed of areas for play, with the city’s 
crowded buildings and congested streets. “The only play place is the back ally [sic] or the narrow 
streets teeming with street cars and automobiles,” and, until conditions changed, drivers were 
urged to slow down.239  
 
238  “‘Don’t Get Run Over’ Slogan Adopted by 20,000 Public School Children,” Atlanta Constitution, June 
4, 1913; “Schools to Teach Pupils to Observe Traffic Regulations,” Atlanta Constitution, November 14, 1920; 
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(February 1933): 3-6, 60. The essay contests were conducted by the Highway Education Board; “A.A.A. Offers 
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As an alternative, in 1923 Marion Columbus Kiser, Sr. (1880-1933), a real estate 
developer, president a national chain store system, and bank executive, proposed a new city park. 
He suggested that it be constructed on the site of a former leather-tanning yard which had a creek 
running through it. Citing the city’s need for a signature recreational center, he urged passage of 
a $2 million bond referendum to pay for the new park as well as upgrades for existing parks. 
Discontent with city spending of previous bond funds and concerns about the lack of details in 
Kiser’s proposal contributed to the bond issue’s defeat. However, African Americans voted 
overwhelmingly against a park they could never use; they were restricted to Washington Park, 
the sole public recreational space open to Blacks. The only sector in the city which voted in favor 
of the bond referendum was the Sixth Ward, which contained the proposed location of the new 
park.240  
The bond defeat did not end Atlanta’s push for children’s play areas. The city continued 
to expand its summer playground programs, and by 1926 had twenty-one for white children and 
three for Black children, most of them held at public schools. National studies demonstrated that 
playgrounds reduced the number of child fatalities by automobiles (see cartoon below). A 
newspaper commented, “Providing more playgrounds in Atlanta means greater peace of mind for 
our motorists,” suggesting perhaps that the larger concern lay with the ease of the motoring 
public than with safety in the roadways. Atlanta’s playground system continued throughout the 
1920s, with increasing levels of participation, and in 1929, proudly proclaimed that for the first 
time in six years, no child was killed by a car during the summer months.241 
 
240 Atlanta Constitution: “Kiser Declares Park Backers Must Get Busy,” July 8, 1923; “Why Bonds Failed,” 
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Atlanta did not limit efforts at children’s street safety to summer playgrounds. School re-
openings in the fall prompted annual 
back-to-school awareness campaigns 
for motorists. Following the lead of 
the National Safety Council, Atlanta 
installed signs to designate safety 
zones in front of all the schools. The 
Atlanta Automobile Association 
organized the School Boy Patrols, 
who, wearing white belts and arm 
bands, assisted with traffic control 
within the zones. Both the Atlanta 
Safety Council and newspapers 
offered prizes to the schools having the fewest number of car wrecks and child injuries. All were 
part of motordom’s ongoing campaign to keep school children out of the streets.242  
The Atlanta Motor Club and the American Automobile Association annually warned that 
having thousands of schoolchildren in the streets created traffic hazards. Both organizations 
emphasized that school children’s safety in the streets was the responsibility of motorists—a rare 
instance in which civic organizations (but noticeably not the city government) placed the burden 
of a collision solely upon the automobile driver. The city’s younger pedestrians, at least when on 
their way to and from school, received this special consideration—the presumption of innocence. 
 
242 Naomi Wolfe, “Thanks The Constitution for Aid in Safety Work,” Atlanta Constitution, January 31, 
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Figure 17. NSC Cartoon; American City 25, no. 3 
(September 1921): 225. 
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Those same children, however, did not warrant that same level of care and concern if they were 
playing in the street or crossing a road outside a school safety zone. A large distinction existed 
between the child and the schoolchild when it came to assigning responsibility for traffic wrecks. 
Older children were sometimes held liable, but increasingly the public faulted parents for not 
properly watching or instructing their young offspring.243 
A 1923 Atlanta Constitution article lamented the multiple causes of the city’s traffic 
woes, a solution to which appeared elusive. It described the back-and-forth of the blame game 
between motorists, pedestrians, city officials, and police officers, and urged the hiring of more 
traffic cops. It praised the city’s three major car-related organizations (Atlanta Automobile 
Association, Atlanta Safety Council, and Atlanta Motor Club) who worked to introduce new 
traffic control measures and raise public traffic awareness. Even the streetcar company won a 
word of praise for its safety efforts. In one oddly-worded sentence, the article praised everyone 
who was working to make “Atlanta’s streets safe and free from time-killing congestion.” Despite 
the article’s focus on street safety, the writer apparently rated traffic more important as a killer of 
time rather than as a killer of people.244  
Treading carefully, the reporter also partially faulted children—at least the careless 
ones—for playing in the streets, saying, “Automobile traffic cannot be regulated rigidly enough 
by law . . . to make the streets safe as playgrounds for irresponsible children.” Nationally, car 
associations and safety groups also had to maneuver between children’s safety and the 
automobile as an essential resource. A representative of the National Automobile Chamber of 
Commerce said, “Our industry . . . will welcome any program that will safeguard pedestrians, 
 
243 Atlanta Constitution: “School Reopening Demands Extra Care by Motorists,” October 9, 1927; “Keep 
Children Off the Streets,” December 13, 1912; Fred N. Merry, “Another Revision Suggestion,” August 26, 1912. 
244 “United Efforts Failing to Solve Traffic Problem, Atlanta Constitution, July 22, 1923. 
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particularly children. At the same time, the motor vehicle as a medium of great public service 
must be reasonably protected in its rights.”245 
Atlanta’s mayor, Walter A. Sims, even investigated the possibility of legislation to ban 
children entirely from all city streets, but City Attorney James Mayson advised it would not 
withstand a constitutional challenge. Mayson did not mention, at least in the public record, the 
public outrage which would have erupted from such a draconian measure. But the dilemma 
remained of who to blame for child traffic deaths. A false binary eventually emerged in the 
responsibility equation: is it parent or child? The car’s driver was slowly disappearing from 
consideration. Certainly no motorist ever intended to harm a child; therefore, they should not be 
held accountable if they did. However, society demanded that somebody answer for the deaths of 
little ones. Ultimately, the mayor pronounced, “The burden rests finally on the shoulders of 
Atlanta fathers and mothers.” It was not politic to fault children, no matter how “irresponsible” 
they might be, so he chose the less precarious position—blame the parents.246  
Intensifying rhetoric served to demonize pedestrians of all ages, characterizing them as 
motorists’ enemies. Confrontational government campaigns, aided by the print media, stomped-
out the last unregulated pedestrian presence on the city streets. Formerly, the roads served as 
open public space, equally available to all. The introduction of new transit modes in the 1800s, 
such as omnibuses or streetcars, had not altered that understanding, but the motor vehicle did. 
Unlike today, no organized pedestrian resistance arose in Atlanta or much of the U.S. The New 
York City editorialist and publisher, Harold S. Buttenheim, called that city’s 932 traffic deaths in 
1925 “municipal murder” permitted by the citizens. He asked if city dwellers were “baffled and 
 
245 Ibid.; George M. Graham, “Sending the Highways to School” (paper presented at the Second National 
Conference, Education for Highway Engineering and Highway Transport, Washington, DC, October 26-28, 1922), 
88. 
246 “United Efforts Failing to Solve Traffic Problem, Atlanta Constitution, July 22, 1923. 
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beaten, definitely and permanently, by the lethal avocations of machines that should be our 
servants and not our masters?” Their answer ultimately proved to be affirmative.247    
As Norton observes, “Whatever the legitimacy of their claim to street space, the motoring 
minority had the power to drive pedestrians from the pavements. Fearful for their safety, non-
motorists learned to limit their own access to streets and to caution their children to look both 
ways before crossing.” Even children now bore some responsibility for their own safety. 
Everyone on foot capitulated, however unwillingly, to the domination of the larger, heavier, 
faster motorized vehicles, and therefore to the redefinition of the public streets as automobile 
conduits. The city street became a place where pedestrians did not normally belong. But 
throughout the 1920s, the increasingly heavy hand of regulation fell not only on pedestrians and 
children, but also on other street users, including vehicles.248   
5.4 Regulating Traffic 
No one questioned whether Atlanta’s sundry traffic-related problems required immediate 
and comprehensive attention on multiple levels. Prominent businessmen, realtors, and financiers 
worried that traffic issues would sully the city’s reputation, and they weren’t wrong. In 1924, 
Louie D. Newton, editor of the Chamber of Commerce’s journal, City Builder, invited Douglas 
Southall Freeman, then editor of the Richmond News Leader, to record his impressions during a 
visit to town. The resulting article had several positive observations about Atlanta, its beauty, its 
spirit, and the Chamber elites who hosted his tour. But Freeman did make note of neglected 
street repairs, torn-up roads, sidewalks blocked by building construction, and over-all dirtiness. 
 
247 In 1996, Sally Flocks founded PEDS, a pedestrian advocacy group in Atlanta. For a rare instance of 
organized pedestrian resistance, see McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” 386; 
Harold S. Buttenheim, “Start Parks and Stop Skyscrapers,” American City 35, no. 3 (September 1926): 316-18. 
248 Peter D. Norton, “Street Rivals: Jaywalking and the Invention of the Motor Age Street,” Technology and 
Culture 48, no. 2 (April 2007): 335; Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 208, 23-24. 
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In regard to the latter, he politely remarked that the street cleaning department’s equipment was 
“not of the best.” About city traffic, however, he pulled no punches: “The pedestrian apparently 
has fewer rights than in any city I know in the South. Traffic regulation is lax and needs 
complete, expert reorganization.” After commenting on the “slouchiness” and incivility of the 
traffic officers, he noted that taken altogether, these items marred “the favorable impression 
Atlanta makes on visitors.” Not the ringing endorsement hoped for by the Chamber.249  
Traffic congestion spoiled more than just the visitor’s experience of the city. Business in 
the downtown retail district felt the drag as customers and deliveries slogged through the 
crowded streets daily. An editorial summarized the situation in 1920: 
During the hours of heaviest congestion each day, with pedestrians, street cars, 
automobiles, trash wagons, horses, mules and dogs, all in one great heterogeneous 
mass, shouting, clanging, honking and barking, all trying to make headway in 
varying directions, it often requires half an hour for a vehicle to advance from 
Five Points to the intersection of the two Peachtrees [a distance of just over half a 
mile], and to attempt to cross the street at such times is to hazard a trip to the 
hospital!250  
 
Heightened awareness of both the traffic problems and their negative impacts on 
commerce and tourism led to the creation of new levels of city bureaucracy to enact and enforce 
traffic laws. In 1921, the city council created its own Traffic Committee and in 1923, established 
the police department’s first Accident Prevention Bureau—a section allocated specifically for 
traffic control. Newspapers unfavorably compared Atlanta’s traffic woes with those of other 
cities. The mayor, council members, and police brass frequently took “observation tours” to 
places like New York, Chicago, and St. Louis to study their traffic laws and enforcement 
 
249 Douglas S. Freeman, “What a Recent Visitor Saw: A Helpful Diagnosis of Atlanta,” City Builder 9, no. 
4 (June 1924): 13-14, 42. Douglas Southall Freeman (1886-1953) was editor of the Richmond News Leader for 34 
years (1915-49), and won Pulitzer Prizes for his multi-volume biographies of George Washington and Robert E. 
Lee. 
250 “Traffic and Enterprise,” Atlanta Constitution, December 25, 1920.  
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practices. Local officials implemented many of the innovative solutions they acquired in these 
trips, assisting in the creation of national uniformity in traffic regulation. The tours also enhanced 
official awareness of Atlanta’s place as an important regional center—a concept which would 
guide the city’s trajectory over the decade. But, like most southern cities, Atlanta always lagged 
a few years behind those of the northeast and mid-west in implementing traffic control 
measures.251  
Limiting the public streets to vehicles only, or at least primarily, proved a popular method 
of easing congestion and improving traffic flow. The streets as public meeting/gathering/trading 
spaces sharply declined as the city council placed regulatory burdens on fruit peddlers, street 
vendors, and farmers coming into town to sell their produce. New ordinances required everyone 
to have a business license, a tag, and signage on their wagons or trucks, as well as scales to 
weigh their products. Flower sellers had to display business licenses on their hand-held baskets. 
Food vending required a stove to keep cooked foods hot, and the once-ubiquitous bootblack 
stands were banned from both street and sidewalk. Offenders faced fines or time in the 
stockade.252 
Even the construction of the city’s Municipal Market [today’s Sweet Auburn Curb 
Market] functioned as a traffic control measure. Located at the corner of Edgewood Avenue and 
Bell Street, the market, which opened on May 3, 1924, was just outside of the congested district, 
 
251 “City Again Attempts Traffic Jam Solution,” Atlanta Constitution, August 2, 1921; Atlanta, The Charter 
and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 41, § 750, No. 33. “The Traffic Problem,” Atlanta 
Constitution, October 2, 1920; Atlanta Independent, January 27, 1924; “One-Way Traffic on Cross Streets Favored 
by Sims,” Atlanta Constitution, August 4, 1921; “Committee Votes Traffic Control Bureau for City,” Atlanta 
Constitution, November 27, 1923. The tours usually lasted two weeks and often included stops in New York, 
Boston, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. Councilman Walter A. Sims of the Traffic Committee, 
Alderman Jesse W. Armistead, chair of the Police Committee, and Police Chief James L. Beavers took trips in 1921 
and 1923, which ended up with Atlanta adopting traffic towers and creating a police traffic bureau. Detroit often led 
the nation in traffic initiatives; “The Detroit Way, Atlanta Constitution, December 14, 1922. 
252  Atlanta, Ch. 70 §§ 2101-2153. The fine was up to $100, and maximum jail time was 30 days. 
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but still only five blocks east of Five Points. It took the parked vehicles of farmers and truck 
gardeners off the streets and into a segregated space where they could sell their produce. The 
market’s board of directors included influential citizens such as financier Colonel William 
Lawson Peel (1849-1927), former mayor James L. Key (1867-1939), successful publisher Walter 
O. Foote (1871-1933), and Derelle E. Harsey Sharp (1882-1969), president of the Atlanta 
Woman’s Club. They lobbied for and helped construct the market. Sharp and the Woman’s Club 
insisted that the building be constructed of fireproof brick and concrete. The building’s 
cornerstone still bears her name, Derelle, although newspaper accounts always referred to her as 
Mrs. Norman Sharp. The board travelled to see other city markets and incorporate features from 
them in the Atlanta structure. Albert Anthony Ten Eyck Brown (1878-1940), one of the city’s 
most popular and prolific architects, designed the building, which eventually became the largest 
single retail center for farm products in the state.253  
Clearing the streets of most other users, however, did not resolve all of Atlanta’s traffic 
issues. A large apparatus of traffic control measures had to be put into place to achieve the 
smooth flow of traffic envisioned by city officials and elites, although they never truly 
succeeded. The city electrician, an engineer, was in charge of traffic planning for the City of 
Atlanta. Like countless other traffic planners in municipalities across the country, Raymond L. 
Torras followed the lead of larger cities. As McShane notes, no one had predicted that the U.S. 
would end up with uniform traffic controls, but he explained how the system developed.  
Once cities . . . began to employ full-time, professionally trained engineers to 
direct traffic, they deployed only certain traffic solutions. Traffic engineers had 
 
253 The congested area (popularly called the congested district) was defined as the area bounded by Mitchell 
Street to the south, Central Avenue and Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] to the east; Cain Street [Andrew Young 
International Blvd.] to the north, and the Spring Street viaduct to the west; Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of 
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linked themselves together into a large, self-reinforcing, international, 
professional community by the early 1930s. Big-city political groups, especially 
downtown business interests, had a long history of turning to engineers for 
solutions to the diseconomies of urbanization. Engineers carried the enormous 
prestige of modern science and technology. Urban elites liked engineering models 
of problem solving.254 
 
The history of Atlanta’s traffic control devices followed the typical national trajectory in 
the implementation of the new technologies. The hand-held semaphores of traffic officers in the 
nineteen-teens remained in use through part of 
the 1920s, being gradually replaced by crow’s 
nest-type traffic towers in which two 
policemen controlled red and green signal 
lights and sounded a bell when the lights 
changed. Later came the Milwaukee 
mushroom and its variants (see photo at 
right255); red octagonal stop signs; and two-
light, individually-controlled electric signals 
suspended from wires above intersections (see figures on following pages256). The three-light, 
synchronized traffic light system, recognizable today, first went into operation in Atlanta on July 
8, 1925. Earlier that year, the city had its first automobile crash resulting from a driver running a 
stop sign.257 
 
254 McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” 389. 
255 In the photograph, Atlanta Motor Club secretary, Oscar L. Haymond, explains this variant of the in-road 
Milwaukee mushroom stop “button” to Police Chief James L. Beavers; Atlanta Constitution, January 16, 1927. 
256 Street names added by author. The first photograph can be dated by the presence of the traffic tower in 
the center. Photos are AJCP555-027u and AJCP582-14d, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic Archives. 
Special Collections and Archives 
257 The first traffic tower went operational at Five Points on November 29, 1921, “Traffic at Five Point 
Controlled by Large Lights,” Atlanta Constitution, November 30, 1921. By July 1922, the city had installed fifteen 
traffic towers, all in the central business district, “Traffic Light Installed,” Atlanta Constitution, July 13, 1922. 
Atlanta tested the Milwaukee mushroom in 1921, but evidently did not adopt it; “Atlanta Officials to Try New Form 
Figure 18. Variant of the Milwaukee 
mushroom; Atlanta Constitution, January 
16, 1927. 
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Along with the new signals and signs, lines painted on the roadways constituted another 
physical traffic control device. In addition to the pedestrian crossing lines (which also served as 
vehicle stop lines), white stripes marked centerlines to separate vehicles moving in opposing 
directions. For very heavily-travelled areas, roadway marks separated lines of traffic moving in 
the same direction. National authorities urged adoption of on-street traffic markings, claiming 
they increased traffic capacity and segregated fast from slow-moving vehicles. As with all every 
other new traffic control device or measure, Atlanta first installed the new lines and markings in 
 
of Signal Lights,” Atlanta Constitution, November 24, 1921. However, a traffic mushroom variant was introduced in 
1927, “New Type Traffic Boulevard ‘Stop’ Signs,” Atlanta Constitution, January 16, 1927. The three-light 
synchronized traffic signal system went into operation on the evening of July 8, 1925,“New Traffic Signal Lights in 
Use Today,” Atlanta Constitution, July 9, 1925. The first crash from an ignored stop sign occurred on March 22, 





Figure 19. Five Points looking east, after 11/29/1921 and before 07/08/1925. 
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the congested district of downtown, with Five Points the testing ground for modern traffic-
control ideas.258  
In addition to white lines, the city also painted red lines to designate “non-parking” 
zones. Sometimes the curbing was painted red instead of the roadway lines. While the city 
council enacted the 1922 ordinance requiring the lines, and the police chief had charge of line 
locations, the city power elites actually oversaw the painting of the lines. An extraordinary 
 
258 Whitten, "Painted Traffic Markings on Streets," 617. It is difficult for the modern driver to imagine 
streets without line markings, or intersections without at least a stop sign. Any road system without these now-
common forms of traffic control would obviously be a deadly one. The one exception might be Boston’s infamous 
Storrow Drive in the 1970s, at least part of which had no lane markings at all. Instead, drivers would create new 
lanes as needed during rush-hour traffic. This writer experienced the phenomenon first-hand; it was terrifying at 
first, the routine. Surprisingly few crashes occurred there. 
Figure 20. Five Points looking north, after July 8, 1925. 
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section of the city code specified that painting lines on the streets was to be done “under the 
supervision of the Atlanta Motor Club.”259  
The Atlanta Motor Club, a non-governmental civic organization, formed in 1922 for the 
purpose of improving traffic conditions in Atlanta for locals and tourists. Acting under the 
slogan, “Motorists and Progress!” the members, including many business leaders, installed traffic 
signals and directional signs around the city. According to the group’s president, J. M. Van 
Harlingen, the club approached the city council, asking them to co-operate with the club’s efforts 
to relieve congestion “by having parking lines painted on the streets, under the direction of the 
club officials.” Council complied with the club’s request.260  
Atlanta’s growth coalition heavily influenced government’s automotive regulations. 
Acting principally through the big three automobile-related civic groups, they not only 
suggested, but also directed the adoption of numerous traffic laws throughout the decade. 
Examples already presented have illustrated the involvement of the Safety Council and the 
Motor Club in shaping street and automobile regulation, with the photo of the motor club’s 
secretary showing a new signal device to the police chief a telling demonstration of the fact (see 
Figure 17 above).  
Likewise, the Atlanta Automobile Association (the local chapter of the American 
Automobile Association) proudly acknowledged its success in securing legislation favorable to 
the automobile. The newspaper notice of the group’s general membership meeting, scheduled for 
October 17, 1923, quoted their executive secretary, C. V. Hohenstein, saying, “The Atlanta 
Automobile Association is intensely interested in the welfare of the motoring public. The 
 
259 Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, § 3198. See also “The Fading 
Lines,” Atlanta Constitution, October 26, 1921. 
260 “Motor Club Sets 10,000 Members As Goal in Race,” Atlanta Constitution, September 23, 1922; J. M. 
Van Harlingen, “Atlanta Motor Club Auto Talks,” City Builder 7, no. 10 (December 1922): 13. 
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association believes that motor car owners are entitled to reasonable enjoyment in the use of their 
cars, and are opposed to drastic restrictions in the way of traffic regulation.” He announced the 
special guest for the upcoming meeting: Councilman James L. Wells, former chairman of the 
city council’s traffic committee and current member of the police committee. The supper 
meeting, held in the roof garden of the Cecil Hotel, featured a special orchestra providing dinner 
music. W. R. C. Smith, president of a prominent city publishing company and vice president of 
the association, delivered the keynote speech on “The Outlook in the Automotive Industry.”261  
The Atlanta Automobile Association did not limit itself to wining and dining city 
officials to influence car-related ordinances, but actively introduced pro-automobile legislation 
and kept an eye on other bills, ready to block anything which might negatively affect the 
industry. A 1925 City Builder article boldly proclaimed,  
One of the outstanding features of the association’s activities is along the line of 
legislative work. Every year the association’s office checks daily every piece of 
legislation introduced in the Georgia legislature, and during the past five years, 
not a single piece of legislation, seriously affecting adversely the interests of those 
engaged in the automotive industry has been passed. Many constructive pieces of 
legislation have been passed, which were backed and supported by the 
association. What applies to state legislation, applies to city legislation (emphases 
added).262 
 
The article then proceeded to give details about how the association, working closely with the 
Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, had organized local businesses to push through an 
ordinance to reduce city taxes on mercantile assets. The unsigned article concluded that it would 
be impossible for the automotive industry to prosper without such organization behind it.263  
 
261 C. V. Hohenstein, “Auto Dealers to Meet at Cecil Wednesday,” Atlanta Constitution, October 14, 1923. 
262 “The Origin and Development of the Atlanta Automobile Association, City Builder, May 1925, 32. 
263 Ibid, 33. The tax rate was reduced from 52.20% of gross book valuation to 35%, which reduced 
merchant asset taxes by about one-third, according to the article. 
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The association welcomed anyone owning or interested in cars, but all of the city’s car 
dealers held memberships. A newspaper more accurately labeled it “the auto dealers” group. 
John E. Smith, a highly successful dealer, served as president of the Atlanta Automobile 
Association in the 1920s, having been president of the Atlanta Automobile Dealers’ Association 
the previous decade. During the dealers’ association 1919 annual banquet held at the swanky 
Capital City Club, speakers from the National Automobile Dealers’ Association told the 
audience to “get politics out of business and put business in politics,” and declared the necessity 
of passing laws which would promote the interests of the automobile dealers.264 
Absolutely no doubt exists that civic organizations such as Atlanta’s Motor Club, Safety 
Council, and Automobile Association, successfully ensured that city, county, and state laws 
proved favorable to automotive interests. The city’s business organizations, like the Automobile 
Dealers’ Association and the Retail Merchants’ Association, also pressured lawmakers not only 
to refrain from passing legislation that might negatively impact motordom’s commercial 
concerns, but also to pass legislation that positively benefitted them. Similar groups across the 
country, as well as the umbrella national organizations, also worked hard to ensure that 
government at all levels championed motorists, the motor vehicle, and the automobile industry. 
Traffic regulations were written by people with vested interests in motordom, or they were 
members of the upper classes who owned cars and did not take public transit. Few, if any 
streetcar riders or ordinary citizens participated in the crafting of Atlanta’s traffic laws.  
The city enacted reams of this new legislation. The number of street user, vehicle, and 
traffic laws grew dramatically between the publication of the 1910 and 1924 city codes, 
 
264  “Atlanta Automobile Men Hold Annual Meet,” City Builder 4, no. 11 (January 1920): 23. 
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demonstrating the significance of the automobile’s impact on everyday life in the city.265 In 
1910, the list of eight, simple “Rules of the Road” took up one page of the chapter on Streets and 
Alleys. By 1924, “Traffic Laws” warranted its own separate, 18.5-page chapter in the code.266 
In Atlanta as elsewhere, the 1920s witnessed the massive investment of local government 
economic resources into accommodating the automobile. A 1928 newspaper account announced 
that the city now spent more than $230,000 annually just on traffic control. The reporter cited the 
city comptroller’s report, a copy of which he had received, not from the city, but from the 
Atlanta Safety Council, with whom the comptroller had shared his findings. The city had 66 
traffic signal lights and 564 stop signs—all costing the city close to $50,000 a year to operate and 
maintain. The city spent nearly $5,000 a year painting lines on the streets and installing non-
parking signs. Even more of the city’s budget went to the salaries of the 35 policemen assigned 
to the traffic squad, the 125 policemen on traffic duty three hours a day during the “rush” period, 
and the police assigned to protect children in the school zones. These superstructure numbers do 
not include the much higher infrastructure costs of paving, widening, and maintaining the roads 
and bridges, gutters and curbs (which had to be re-shaped and downsized to accommodate a car’s 
turning radius). Beyond infrastructure expenditures on streets and viaducts, the city in 1928 spent 
over $1 million to meet the ever-growing needs of the automobile.267 
 
265 Atlanta’s city council annually passed new ordinances, but these were collected and printed in large, 
single volumes only occasionally. The three published city codes for the general time period of this study were 
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Yet the city still had not solved the problem of so many cars competing for road space. 
Today urban intersections without stop lights or at least stop signs are unimaginable. The lack of 
these essential devices contributed to the horrendous congestion and carnage on Atlanta’s streets. 
The trial-and-error development of traffic controls occurred gradually in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century, and accelerated rapidly in the 1920s. But the dithering of the city council 
meant the continuing condition of traffic congestion in downtown, with no satisfactory resolution 
in sight.  
5.5 Speeding and Parking 
A discussion of the ins and outs of council’s struggles and failures to relieve traffic 
congestion by fiat is not the purpose of this study. However, two contradictory traffic laws in 
particular represent the power elites’ efforts to privilege the automobile: vehicle speeds and 
curbside parking. While city speed limits changed over the thirty-year period, they only moved 
in one direction: up. On-street parking, however, had a bumpier path, with varying degrees of 
restrictions applied across different locations.   
Achieving previously unimaginable speeds of travel was one of the car’s major 
attractions, something no other mode of transportation provided. Not only did it make motor 
vehicles personally exciting to drive, but also it facilitated business by moving raw materials, 
goods, and customers quickly and efficiently. As insurance expert Ambrose Ryder stated in 
1924, “Speed is the essence of twentieth century commerce, and . . . ninety percent of the value 
of the automobile lies in its speed.” Many civic leaders united in their goal to make it easier for 
more vehicles to travel at greater speeds through the city—it was good for commerce and in 
multiple ways would assist in growing Atlanta. They did recognize that heavily-travelled areas 
with scores of pedestrians, such as the central business district, required somewhat lower speeds. 
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Outlying areas of the city had speed limits five to ten miles per hour higher than in the congested 
district. Speed limits in Fulton County, beyond the city limits, were even higher. The problem 
with speed was that it killed (see figure below). 
The truly spectacular wrecks—where the car 
“turned turtle” (flipped over) and crushed the 
unfortunate occupants—usually happened in the 
suburbs or beyond the city limits. Traffic deaths 
did occur in town, but less frequently.268  
Some people failed to realize, or at least 
acknowledge, that higher speeds did lead to 
more deaths. The Atlanta Constitution’s motors 
and highway department editor, O. J. 
Willoughby, insisted that speed did not cause 
most of the injuries and losses to life and 
property. Instead, he asserted that 99% of the time, collisions could be attributed “to other traffic 
violations by motorists or pedestrians, with carelessness leading the list.” He argued, rather 
obviously, that 50% more traffic could pass a given point driving at 20 miles per hour than at 12 
miles per hour.269 
 
268 Ryder, Automobile Insurance: A Description of the Various Forms of Coverage, Underwriting Methods 
and Selling Plans, 171. Ambrose Ryder was superintendent of the Automobile Department of the National 
Workmen’s Compensation Service Bureau, and later manager of the National Aircraft Underwriters’ Association. 
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269 Ryder, 168; O. J. Willoughby, “Extension of Inner Fire Limit Necessitates Change in Speed Law,” 
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Figure 21. Editorial cartoon; Atlanta 
Constitution, January 21, 1928. 
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Perhaps persuaded by Mr. Willoughby’s all-too-fallible logic, the city council never did 
lower speed limits— intentionally. On one occasion they did inadvertently lower speed limits 
when, on May 1, 1922, they expanded the boundaries of the inner fire limit. Inside the inner fire 
limit, the speed was restricted to 12 miles per hour, while beyond, the speed was 20 miles per 
hour. The council did not realize the problem until five months later, when numbers of hapless 
drivers received speeding citations. At that time, the city did not post speed limit signs; motorists 
just had to learn for themselves where the speed limits changed. Council then made a concerted 
effort, assisted by the newspaper, to publicize the enlarged lower-speed-limit area. Willoughby 
suggested council set the speed limit to 20 miles per hour in all of downtown, but they eventually 
did better in 1929, setting the maximum speed limit throughout the city to 30 miles per hour, 
even in the congested district.270 
One city councilman did note a particularly attractive feature of higher speed limits and 
faster-moving cars—they intimidated pedestrians. Council’s traffic committee member Harry 
York made improving traffic flow a priority. He urged synchronized traffic lights as one 
solution, but also condemned those on foot as impediments to moving vehicles. He called 
pedestrians “the most flagrant and consistent traffic law breakers on the streets,” observing,  
The slow speed of motor traffic encourages them to disregard the red light signals 
because they know that a motorist can and will stop rather than hit a pedestrian, 
regardless of who has the legal right of way. If motor traffic moved at high speed, 
as it does in practically every other large city, pedestrians would not cross until 
the proper signal was given, because it would not be safe.271 
 
 Using higher speed limits to threaten pedestrians constituted a remarkable example of the 
mindset that roads were for cars, not people. The ultimate goal was rapid movement at any cost, 
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a cost which is unthinkingly accepted today. Car dealers abetted the speed narrative with 
advertisements touting high performance vehicles capable of quick getaways at traffic lights. A 
1926 ad for the newest model of Hupmobile assured buyers that they could experience “the thrill 
of being away first at the traffic signal.” The 1929 new Chevrolet Six, however, could 
accommodate any driving situation: “At the slower speeds of city traffic it idles along with 
wonderful silence and ease. It shoots you ahead at the traffic light like an arrow from a bow. . . . 
Its spirited performance on the open road is a delight to everyone.”272  
By the end of the decade, speed had become an important goal for city officials and civic 
leaders. Its presence symbolized modern society and a progressive city. “Speed used to be a 
luxury; it is now one of the necessities of life.” Everything now moved faster, as seen in the 
rapidity of the telephone, radio, express mail, modern machinery, and the automobile.273 But 
higher speeds could only be achieved on roads cleared of all obstructions. After the city had 
removed or severely curtailed all other street users, motor vehicle traffic congestion persisted. 
Why? Because the biggest obstacles to cars traveling on city streets were other cars—parked 
cars.274  
Unimpeded traffic flow might mean higher speeds and shorter travel times, but no one 
wanted to give up their right to park anywhere, anytime, and for free—just as they had since 
1837 in the small village of Terminus.275 Not until the 1930s did municipal zoning ordinances 
 
272 “The New Prestige In Motoring,” Atlanta Constitution, June 29, 1926. The ad was placed by Thompson-
Cauthorn Motor Company located at 471 Peachtree Street on “Automobile Row.” The new Chevrolet Six also had 
the advantage of being manufactured in Atlanta, “National Demonstration Week! Drive the New Chevrolet Six,” 
Atlanta Constitution, February 17, 1929. 
273 Ryder, Automobile Insurance: A Description of the Various Forms of Coverage, Underwriting Methods 
and Selling Plans, 172. 
274 For a masterful discussion of the parking evil, see Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age 
in the American City, 138-46. 
275 Atlanta was first called Terminus, the name given to the small settlement which grew up around the 
railroad terminal and junction point established southeast of today’s Five Points intersection in the fall of 1837; 
Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 1:150. 
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require off-street parking to relieve parking shortages and improve traffic flow, but during the 
twenties, city leaders understood that they had a major conflict on their hands.276 “Active” 
(moving) vehicles competed with “standing” (parked) vehicles for space in the public streets, 
with the greatest friction occurring on downtown’s narrow streets lined with office buildings and 
retail stores. Curb parking in the congested business district effectively turned four-lane 
thoroughfares into two-lane streets (see photo below277). With half of the roadway unavailable to 
moving vehicles, gridlock prevailed. On-street parking not only took up traffic lanes; it 
contributed to street traffic by individuals cruising in search of a vacant parking place, or by 
chauffeurs driving around while waiting for their car’s owner to shop or transact business. The 
1924 Beeler Report showed 4,652 automobiles parked in Atlanta’s business district one day, 
more than half of them parked in the streets. Preston Arkwright, citing the narrowed travel space 
due to parked cars, said that unless the city acted to solve the congestion problem, “it will choke 
us to death.”278 
Parked cars on city streets had emerged as a major problem in most large U.S. cities by 
the 1920s. William Phelps Eno, an early advocate for traffic regulation beginning with the stop 
sign in 1900, had by 1924, turned his attention to the problem of “dead” (parked) vehicles. He, 
along with other nationally-renowned engineers, advocated painted lines to delineate parking 
 
276 Donald Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking (Chicago: American Planning Association, 2011), 7, 22-
23. Referring to the traditional concept of the English and early American “commons,” Shoup calls free curb 
parking an “asphalt commons,” where drivers compete for parking spaces like cattle used to compete for grass. 
277 View is looking south from the Candler Building. On Peachtree Street (left), two of the three car travel 
lanes are blocked by parkers, so autos freely used the double trolley track space. Broad Street (right), aptly named, 
could accommodate two lanes of parking, three lanes of cars, and double trolley tracks. Both streets were “white 
ways,” as seen by the rows of five-lamp street lights lining each road. The 1897, eleven-story English-American 
(Flatiron) Building is at the center.  
278 Hawley S. Simpson, “Downtown Storage Garages,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 133 (September 1927): 84; Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 
6; Preston S. Arkwright, “Greatest Need for 1925: Traffic Regulation,” City Builder 9, no. 10 (December 1924): 43. 
Of the 4,652 parked cars in downtown, the count showed 814 in surface lots, 1,478 in parking garages, and 2,360 
parked in the streets. 
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zones, which should only be located in places where they could not hinder moving traffic. They 
all viewed vehicular travel as the primary purpose of roads, permitting only brief pauses to load 
and unload passengers or freight. Traffic specialists suggested a variety of parking options 
preferable to curbsides: vacant lots, rooftops, basements, even public parks. Most agreed that 
eventually the construction of multi-story parking garages would provide the best solution, 
especially once entrepreneurs recognized their profit potential.279  
 
279 William Phelps Eno, “The Storage of Dead Vehicles on Roadways,” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 116 (November 1924): 170-73; Kerry Segrave, Parking Cars in America, 1910-
1945: A History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012), 15, 53, 55; Miller McClintock, “Parking--When, Where and 
Why,” American City 30 (April 1924): 360, cited by Segrave, 56. The adjectives “dead” and “standing” in reference 
to parked vehicles had been popular in the first two decades of the twentieth century, but by the 1920s, most people 
referred to “parked” cars, though “standing” was still used, as it could refer to a car that was stopped temporarily to 
take on or discharge a passenger.    
Figure 22. Peachtree (left), Broad (south), 1925; Progressive Atlanta, pg. 27. 
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Eno and others had a pretty good grasp of the main issues and offered some reasonable 
solutions, but their considerations omitted one important party with a large stake in downtown 
parking: the downtown businessmen. Most members of this group usually had no problem 
meeting their own parking needs. They could easily afford to rent personal spaces for their cars 
in one of the city’s new parking garages, and probably preferred to do so given the security, 
proximity, and variety of amenities and services provided by these luxurious entities.  
Throughout much of 1920, the city council debated creating a “non-parking” zone in the 
central business district where traffic congestion had become intolerable. A citizens’ committee, 
composed of prominent citizens, drew up an ordinance eliminating on-street parking in much of 
downtown. They also proposed making some downtown streets one-way to increase flow.280  
One letter writer to the Constitution weighed in heavily against the proposed legislation, 
claiming that it reflected only the interest of the “electric octopus” (the streetcar and its riders), 
not the interests of the city as a whole. In an early indicator of the probable reaction of the 
commercial community, the writer declared that the non-parking regulation would bring harm to 
“one of the most essential of all the classes in Atlanta—the business people.” He urged the 
newspaper to keep in mind the “business usefulness” of all the cars driving in downtown daily.281        
Nevertheless, city council passed a new traffic ordinance, effective June 15, 1920, which 
created a non-parking zone within a radius of several blocks around Five Points. Marietta Street, 
with its 60' width, remained available for curbside parking. The law prohibited parking in the 
zone from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. weekdays and Sundays, and also made ten downtown streets one-
way. It was a draconian measure by Atlanta standards.282 
 
280 The customary phrase for an area where parking was prohibited was “non-parking,” not today’s “no 
parking.” “Committee Will Consider Changes in Traffic Laws,” Atlanta Constitution, May 4, 1920. 
281 “Interesting Discussion of the Parking Problem,” Atlanta Constitution, May 15, 1920. 
282 “New Traffic Law Effective Today,” Atlanta Constitution, June 15, 1920. 
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City councilman J. C. Murphy, who wrote the ordinance, toured the business district that 
first day, asking businessmen their opinions. He announced that, to a man, they declared that 
clearing the parking from central streets was a great benefit and a long step toward solving the 
city’s traffic problem. The Constitution reported, 
Members of the police force, the motorists themselves, and most of all, the street 
car riding public were quick to see big benefits accruing from the new non-
parking traffic ordinance which went into effect Tuesday morning. With the 
principal downtown streets, except Marietta . . . cleared of standing vehicles, 
notable acceleration in the speed of street cars and vehicular traffic was apparent. 
Prohibiting the parking of cars and other vehicles on the streets was like removing 
logs jutting out from the bank into a stream, each one deadening and checking the 
current as it flowed past. No maze of automobiles got caught up behind a trolley 
car and no traffic jam was noted during the day.283 
 
An additional benefit appeared when the owners of a number of vacant lots opened them up for 
parking, making substantial sums. Storage garages (all-day parking garages) did big business that 
first day, too.  
The city had apparently discovered a way out of the congestion puzzle: remove the one 
remaining street obstacle, the logjam of parked cars. Such a positive outcome appeared to please 
a large number of citizens, with police, streetcar riders, and even motorists happy. The new 
ordinance had achieved one of the goals of the growth community: smooth flowing traffic on 
city streets. 
Within six months, however, steady and vocal opposition to the ordinance had emerged. 
The Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, the Atlanta Federation of Woman’s Clubs, and the 
Atlanta Automobile Association protested the designation of non-parking zones, which they 
claimed interfered with shopping and restricted customer access to businesses. Morris Rich, head 
of the city’s flagship department store, called the new ordinance unfair and discriminatory. In 
 
283 “Non-Parking Rules Prove Beneficial,” Atlanta Constitution, June 16, 1920. 
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response to the pressure by these influential groups, and disregarding the lobbying efforts of the 
streetcar company, on December 20, 1920, city council reversed itself and voted by a substantial 
majority to substitute limited parking in place of non-parking now in force on downtown 
streets.284  
Businesses’ anxiety about parking focused exclusively on customers, and never 
mentioned where their employees might park. Others saw workers as part of the problem.  
Someone who worked downtown would often occupy a single on-street parking space for the 
entire working day. A 1929 study of city planning in the U.S. found that “many cars assumed to 
be those of shoppers are really those of mercantile and commercial employees who use the 
streets for day-storage purposes, an uneconomic and unsocial proceeding in the whole scheme of 
urban life.” Lack of turnover translated into reduced sales, so the worker who hogged a space all 
day long deserved censure.285  
Atlanta merchants firmly believed that parking facilitated shopping, and the upper class 
women’s groups concurred. These were women who would drive themselves, or be driven, 
downtown to shop. They would not have to take a trolley. The automobile associations opposed 
almost any sort of restriction on motorists. The combined pressure from these powerful groups 
led the city to adopt parking policies which they erroneously believed would stimulate 
development.286  
 
284 “May Change Atlanta Auto Parking Laws,” Atlanta Constitution, December 10, 1920; “Limited Parking 
Will Be Allowed,” Atlanta Constitution, December 21, 1920; Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a 
Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 114. 
285 Harold S. Buttenheim, “The Problem of the Standing Vehicle,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 133 (September 1927): 144; Hubbard and Hubbard, Our Cities to-Day and to-Morrow: 
A Survey of Planning and Zoning Progress in the United States, 213. 
286 Even today, most people believe that limiting parking will hurt business; see Preston, Automobile Age 
Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 114. Modern research indicates otherwise. A 2000 
survey of statistical studies on the economic impacts of parking restraint policies in urban centers concluded that no 
clear evidence exists of any link between parking restraint and retail success. Ben Still and David Simmonds, 
“Parking Restraint Policy and Urban Vitality,” Transport Reviews 20, no. 3 (July 2000): 291-316. 
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The major reason for the intransigence of the accessibility dilemma was that the growth 
coalition divided over the issue. Some wanted smooth, efficient traffic flow, which they insisted 
would enable city growth, while others willingly sacrificed flow to ease customer access to 
downtown businesses. The Atlanta Motor Club argued for congestion relief by keeping the main 
traffic arteries free of parking. They wanted to abolish the thirty-minute parking provision on 
those streets, equating it with all-day parking. Writing in the City Builder, the club’s secretary, 
W. G. Peebles, Jr., opined that the merchants did not understand that “thirty-minute-parking is 
taking dollars and cents out of their business. Nevertheless, it is true.”287 
Peebles questioned how one car owner had the right to park his vehicle and clog the 
entire street, blocking and inconveniencing a hundred other car owners. Police Chief James L. 
Beavers informed the motor club that merchants constantly complained about cars blocking their 
entrances, yet those same men also said to him privately, “We want all the congestion we can get 
and would like to see every street in Atlanta congested almost beyond movement.” Calling such 
sentiment “petty selfishness,” the COC secretary called for city council to take action against 
traffic jams, “the convenience of the entire public being of more importance than the 
accommodation of a minority.”288 
Virtually all of the city’s merchants pushed back against any parking restraints, even 
against their fellow pro-growth partners. John E. Smith, successful car dealer and chair of the 
traffic committee of the Atlanta Automobile Dealers’ Association, wrote to the newspaper 
demanding parking privileges for customers. He maintained the thirty-minute turnover brought 
more customers into the shopping district. “Deprive the car owner of parking space and he will 
trade where he can park,” Smith declared, telling his fellow car dealers that in the interest of their 
 
287 W. G. Peebles, Jr. “Atlanta Motor Club Auto Talks,” City Builder 7, no. 7 (September 1922): 23.  
288 W. G. Peebles, Jr. “Atlanta Motor Club Auto Talks,” City Builder 7, no. 8 (October 1922): 17. 
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customers, they should fight no-parking regulations and support time-limited parking. He 
concluded by urging everyone simply to accept the unalterable fact that the Peachtree-Whitehall 
corridor would never be a speedway.289 
Councilman James L. Wells, chair of the committee which had drafted the 1923 traffic 
ordinance, answered Smith’s letter directly in his address to the Atlanta Automobile Association. 
He contended that the no-parking regulation would not harm merchants or automobile dealers, 
and that if they would give it a six-month trial, they would be convinced. His memory must have 
been short. The 1920 no-parking regulation had proved very successful in relieving congestion, 
and popular with motorists and trolley riders. Merchants and car dealers hated it, and got it 
rewritten within six months.    
Wells predicted that one day, the Peachtree-Whitehall corridor would become a no-
parking zone (as it is today). Similarly, Judge Shepard Bryan, president of the Atlanta Safety 
Council, decried the parking of automobiles in narrow downtown streets, asserting, “It is not 
congested streets which make an enterprising city. It is the movement of traffic, and the more 
speedily the current of traffic is enabled to move . . . the more business the city can transact.” 
Individual businessmen had conflicting opinions on how to regulate cars to maximize profit, but 
the growth coalition did not divide over the automobile. It did split over which should occupy the 
majority of the roadways: moving or stationary vehicles. The roads had been turned over to the 
cars; but the question remained. How would they divvy up the most prized real estate of all—
Atlanta’s city streets?290  
 
289 “Non-Parking Will Hurt Retail Shop,” Atlanta Constitution, October 7, 1923.  
290 “Wells Outlines City’s Traffic Relief Program,” Atlanta Constitution, October 18, 1923; “Steady Traffic 
Flow Sought By Council,” Atlanta Constitution, October 21, 1923. 
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Atlanta never generated a satisfactory answer to that question. Neither did any other city 
in the United States. The problem of the “standing vehicle” proved unsolvable to officials and 
businessmen who refused to act in their own best interests.291 Most did not foresee a time when 
traffic congestion would actually drive customers away, and retail merchants would be forced to 
follow them out to suburban neighborhoods where a growing portion of the city’s white 
population was already en route. 
During the 1920s, the decentralization of commercial downtown began, led by smaller 
food-related shops and, ironically, the filling stations essential to the operation of the automobile. 
In response, the city’s so-called leaders did not lead, but continued to dither between parking and 
non-parking, between constant congestion and easy travel. The automobile made possible 
residential development in outlying areas, but gridlocked streets negated one of the car’s major 
amenities—speed. The success of the automobile in its conquest of city streets would contribute 
greatly to the decline of the center city. 
Not everyone was as short-sighted as city leaders in Atlanta and elsewhere. In 1927, a 
group of nationally-prominent city planners and traffic consultants studied the problem. Their 
report included a set of principles designed to assist municipal authorities in formulating parking 
and traffic flow policies. Their first principle stated that the streets existed for the general public, 
to be used for pedestrians and for the transportation of people and goods. This statement, which 
outrageously included the rights of those on foot, stood in strong contrast to the prevailing 
opinion that streets should serve primarily as vehicle conduits. Sadly, most city governments 
ignored the pedestrian aspect of the experts’ first principle.292  
 
291 Peebles, City Builder 7, no. 8 (October 1922): 17. 
292 Buttenheim, “The Problem of the Standing Vehicle,” 144-45. Some of the worthies who participated in 
the study, conducted under the auspices of The American City magazine, included Robert Whitten, the Beeler 
Organization, Harland Bartholomew, Miller McClintock, and the federal Department of Commerce. The American 
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The report strongly recommended a multi-faceted, street-control superstructure, with 
various laws and regulatory 
devices to ensure safety and 
expedite traffic flow. The 
experts cited one specific 
example of a street 
obstruction common in 
most cities, including 
Atlanta: the curbside 
gasoline pump (see figure at 
right293). Besides the fire 
and safety hazards, 
pumping gas at the curb also obstructed moving traffic to an incredible degree. By the late 1920s, 
many gas stations offered drive-in service, as the experts suggested. To do so, however, required 
more land and they had to move away from downtown to find affordable property to expand.294  
The report urged that street regulations take into account the needs of “public 
transportation vehicles.” It acknowledged that streetcars and buses, which had to stop in the 
street to load and unload passengers, had the right to do so, and should be accommodated. As 
 
City (1909-1942) was an urban affairs journal of the Buttenheim Publishing Corporation of New York City, which 
published a number of business magazines and directories until its acquisition in 1974. 
293 Hunter’s Garage had a second pump was located just right of this photo. Note the curbside water hose; 
Atlanta’s “white way” five-light street lighting; the asphalt road surface worn where vehicles stopped to refuel; 
trolley tracks; concrete sidewalks; and granite curbing with a curb cut for cars to drive into the garage. Hunter’s also 
offered “day storage” (parking) for cars; AFPL005x_011, Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System Glass Plate 
Negatives Digital Collection, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library (Courtesy of 
Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System). 
294 Buttenheim, “The Problem of the Standing Vehicle,” 146-47. 
Figure 23. Curbside gas pump, 36-40 South Pryor Street, 
Atlanta, ca. 1927. 
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with pedestrian rights, most civic authorities, including Atlanta’s, ignored the experts’ opinion 
on the validity of the needs of mass transit.295 
The traffic consultants also called for limited parking in business districts, and asserted 
the superior right to move a car over the right to store a car in the public right-of-way. They 
bemoaned the short-sightedness of merchants who opposed any restrictions on curb parking, and 
predicted that eventually all large new buildings would be required to provide on-site parking for 
their employees, tenants, and customers. Overall, the report contained an accurate assessment of 
the parking problem and offered reasonable solutions, which most cities ignored.296 
Atlanta’s city council, between 1919 and 1929, enacted, then retracted or overhauled new 
traffic ordinances on at least eight different occasions.297 Often the new no-parking signs were 
not completely installed before council voted to lift the parking restriction. Eliminating on-street 
parking proved to be the intractable issue of the decade, one which was never satisfactorily 
resolved. Municipal governments in cities like Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, and New 
York also enacted, revoked, and re-enacted parking regulations, but none with the cyclic rapidity 
of Atlanta. They never settled on a permanent solution. The uneasy half-measures satisfied no 
one and did not relieve traffic congestion. As a New Jersey traffic engineer wrote in 1927, 
hoping for a single solution to traffic congestion that would “benefit all and injure none” was 
absurd; traffic relief could only come through compromise. The inability of the power elites to 
reach a consensus or a compromise perpetuated the “parking evil,” and ensured that traffic 
gridlock remained a constant in Atlanta’s business district.298 
 
295 Ibid., 146.  
296 Ibid., 147-52. 
297 These occurred in 1919, 1920, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1928, and 1929. Perhaps during the years 1921, 
and 1926-27 the council was too busy building the viaducts and implementing the other bond measures to address 
traffic concerns. 
298 Simpson, “Downtown Storage Garages,” 82. For a discussion of the various parking restrictions 
enacted/revoked/re-enacted in other U.S. cities, see Segrave, Parking Cars in America, 1910-1945: A History, 5-84.  
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Atlanta, like most urban areas, still struggles to achieve stability between parked and 
moving vehicles on its public streets. It is more successful now than in the 1920s due to the large 
amount of land devoted to parking. About 20% of Atlanta’s central business district parcels are 
utilized exclusively for parking decks or surface lots. That percentage goes up to about 33% 
when mixed-use sites, comprised of building(s) and parking on a single parcel, are included. The 
percentage would go even higher if on-street parking were counted. In the twenties, city officials 
and businessmen had not yet realized just how much downtown land parked cars required.299  
The dearth of off-street parking contributed to the parking problem, and the development 
of this important new element of the motordom infrastructure took some time. Although growth 
coalition members divided over on-street parking, none argued over the benefits of off-street 
parking, and a number of them eagerly embraced opportunities to profit from this emerging 
enterprise. Owners of valuable vacant downtown parcels converted them to surface parking lots, 
but greater returns could be found constructing public parking garages. Once again, the 
automobile demanded accommodation, and pro-car, pro-growth advocates altered the city’s 
physical environment to give it more space.  
The new facilities had the capacity to provide real traffic congestion relief, if only they 
had been fully utilized. But Atlanta’s 1929 traffic survey showed that of the nearly 10,000 
parking spaces available in downtown lots and public garages, only 6,000 were regularly in 
 
299 Author’s analysis of the land use codes of 2115 parcels in a section of downtown Atlanta, for the City of 
Atlanta’s 2013 Downtown Atlanta Contemporary Historic Resources Survey. The boundaries of the survey area 
were Ralph McGill and Ivan Allen boulevards to the north; Piedmont Avenue to the east; Memorial Drive to the 
south; and Spring Street/Mitchell Street/Centennial Olympic Parkway to the west. 
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use.300 Of course, one had to pay to park in those, while curbside parking remained free. The 
country’s first parking meter was six years in the future.301 
By the mid-1920s, most new hotels and department stores offered parking spaces to their 
guests and customers. Office buildings did not lag too far behind. Developer Charles Palmer 
observed, regarding his construction of a parking garage attached to the Glenn Building, “It is as 
essential in this modern day for office buildings to make provision for the automobiles of those 
who visit them as it was three generations ago for the storekeeper on Main street to have rails 
and hitching blocks for . . . the many people who visited his establishment using horses and 
buggies.”302  
The City of Atlanta had its own municipal garage in which to storage and maintain city-
owned vehicles, and car dealership buildings combined showrooms and garages into their 
designs. These smaller facilities served only clients and employees. In contrast, the new-build 
public garages expanded dramatically to meet the demand created by the city’s on-again, off-
again curbside parking restraints. The multi-story, car behemoths holding more than a thousand 
cars dwarfed the single-story, full-service garages of the early 1900s, many of which went out of 
business or re-located to the growing suburbs.303   
 
300 W. Graham Cole, “How a Fact-Finding Traffic Survey Was Conducted,” American City 42 (April 
1930): 91. 
301 Henry F. Long, “Among the State Tax Commissions,” Bulletin of the National Tax Association 21, no. 3 
(December 1935): 82, mentions the successful installation of the Park-O-Meters in Oklahoma City, OK, in 1935. 
For a complete history of the development, installation, and legal challenges to the first parking meter, see LeRoy H. 
Fischer and Robert E. Smith, “Oklahoma and the Parking Meter,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 47, no. 2 (Summer 
1969): 168-208. Documentation for when Atlanta first installed parking meters remains elusive, but certainly 
occurred beyond the boundaries of this study. 
302 “Palmer to Build Garage of Nine Levels as Glenn Annex,” Atlanta Constitution, February 19, 1928. An 
ad for the Biltmore Hotel mentioned “a complete, modern garage with private compartments for 60 cars with a 
qualified service man in attendance day and night,” in “The Atlanta Biltmore Now Open,” Atlanta Constitution, 
April 19, 1924. For customers of its large department store, Rich’s built a 200-car capacity garage at the corner of 
Forsyth and Hunter [M.L.K., Jr. Blvd.] streets; “New Garage for Rich’s Customers Is Latest South Side 
Development,” Atlanta Constitution, April 15, 1928.  
303 Atlanta’s garage was located at 126-130 Walton Street, “Municipal Garage Will Be Removed to Walton 
Street,” Atlanta Constitution, September 19, 1916; the city code dealt in detail with the municipal garage’s functions 
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The old moniker “automobile stable” had understandably faded from use as horses 
disappeared from the city’s streets. By the twenties, “automobile hotel” emerged as the 
descriptor for a very high-end parking garage. These large, modern, luxurious structures offered 
repair, maintenance, and cleaning services in 
addition to parking, and provided elevators for 
the customers (see advertisement at right). Earlier 
garages had used freight elevators to transport 
cars to upper floors, but new ramp systems 
allowed for self-parking, an innovation which 
appealed to a driver’s sense of independence and 
reduced costs for budget-conscious operators. 
The higher-end garages, however, continued to 
employ car “jockeys” (valets), showing that 
horse-related terminology was sometimes still in 
use, even if the horse was not.304  
One of Atlanta’s finest new automobile hotels, the Ivy Street Garage, was the city’s first 
to incorporate the very latest access mode, the Fernand E. d’Humy Motoramp System of 
Building Design, patented in 1919. The d'Humy system used a two-unit staggered floor 
construction, with level of the floors in one unit located midway between the level of the floors 
 
and users, Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 30, §§ 536-557. The Buick 
Motor Company’s new building at the corner of Spring Street and Baltimore Place had 90,000 square feet of floor 
space, with plate glass windows on three sides of the showroom and a garage in back, Theo. S. Lewis, “Buick Co. 
Opens Branch Here,” City Builder, September 1925, 46. 
304 Shannon Sanders McDonald, The Parking Garage: Design and Evolution of a Modern Urban Form 
(Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute, 2007), 25-33. McDonald’s is the definitive study of parking garages.  
Figure 24. Ivy Street Garage ad; Atlanta 
Constitution, July 27, 1925. 
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in the other unit (see image below305). Shorter ramps reduced the grade, making it possible for 
large cars to ascend in high gear and with improved visibility. The design also maximized 
valuable parking surface, and was recognized as the best configuration for a multi-story parking 
garage.306  
The six-story Ivy Street building had room for 1100 parked cars, but the owner chose to 
limit parking to 600 spaces, reserving the upper floors for leased offices. The efficiencies of the 
d’Humy and other ramp systems soon rendered the elevator garage obsolete, and by 1929, the 
ramp garage was recommended in traffic studies as the complement to no-curbside-parking 
regulations.307 
The garage at 37-39 Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] was the brainchild of Bolling 
Hampton Jones (1897-1933), a banker, manufacturer, progressive thinker, and enthusiastic 
 
305 Cross-section of d'Humy ramp system used in the Ivy Street Garage; compare with photo below right;  
Howard F. Blanchard, “Ramp Design in Public Garages,” Architectural Forum 35, no. 5 (November 1921): 174. 
306 United States Patent Office, Fernand E. d’Humy of Englewood, New Jersey, Garage, utility patent  no. 
1,298,183, March 25, 1919. 
307 Ivy Street Garage To Stage Formal Opening June 10,” Atlanta Constitution, May 24, 1925; Simpson, 
“Downtown Storage Garages,” 86-87; Hubbard and Hubbard, Our Cities to-Day and to-Morrow: A Survey of 
Planning and Zoning Progress in the United States, 214.  
Figure 25. Cross-section of d'Humy ramp system, 1921. 
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participant in the social, civic, and political life of the city. One-time postmaster for the City of 
Atlanta, and chairman of the board of the Fulton National Bank, Jones financed the venture with 
7% real estate bonds offered by his new company, the Ivy Street Corporation. The yet-to-be-
constructed garage, sometimes called the Bolling Jones Building, served as security for the 
bonds.308  
Designed by local engineering firm Lockwood-Greene and built by Griffin Construction, 
the Ivy Street Garage, like other modern garages, had a rather plain façade: pale yellow brick 
exterior with brown diapering on the front (west-facing) cornice; ground floor storefront 
windows; upper-story windows in every façade to provide light and ventilation; and multiple 
vehicle entrances, each requiring a new sidewalk curb cut. The Yellow Cab Company building 
on the east side of Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.] had to be demolished to make room for the 
new combination garage/office building. The implementation of the new structure exemplified 
the cycle of 1920s urban redevelopment, the old being demolished to make way for a new and 
different addition to the increasingly motorized landscape. The location proved ideal for 
businessmen, situated only two blocks off Five Points and across the street from the newly-
enlarged Hurt Building, reputed at the time to be the largest office building south of 
Philadelphia. Opening on May 5, 1925, the new garage helped meet downtown Atlanta’s 
desperate need for parking space.309 
 
308 “$535,000 First Mortgage 7% Real Estate Gold Bonds,” Atlanta Constitution, October 2, 1924; “Hon. 
Bolling H. Jones, Postmaster, Atlanta, GA.,” The Post Office Clerk 12, no. 12 (December 1913): 3-4. Officers and 
directors of the Ivy Street Corporation included President Jones and a group of attorneys, bankers, financiers, and 
textile manufacturers from Georgia and Massachusetts. 
309 Atlanta Constitution: “Large Automobile Hotel To Be Erected on Ivy Street,” October 5, 1924; “Ivy 
Street Garage To Stage Formal Opening June 10,” May 24, 1925; “Opening of Atlanta’s New $1,000,000 
Automobile Hostelry,” May 24, 1925; John A. Jakle and Keith A. Sculle, Lots of Parking: Land Use in a Car 
Culture (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 119-23. 
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It must be stated clearly and definitively and in the face of widespread misinformation 
that the Ivy Street Garage most emphatically was not Atlanta’s first garage. Neither was it the 
city’s first parking garage, nor even its first multi-story parking garage. Its only “first” was its    
d’Humy ramp system—the first one in Atlanta, that is. Garages in forty-two other cities in the 
U.S., England, and Canada already employed the ramp system, and another d’Humy-type garage 
was under construction in downtown at the time the Ivy Street Garage (see photos above310) 
opened.311 
 
310 Figure 26 shows the southwest corner; from AJCN048-014d, Atlanta Journal-Constitution Photographic 
Archives. Special Collections and Archives, Georgia State University Library. Figure 27 shows the former Ivy 
Street garage/soon-to-be former Kell Hall of Georgia State University being demolished, by author. The view of the 
south façade shows the two-part staggered floors and ramp system; compare with d’Humy cross-section above. 
311 Ramp Buildings Corporation, “Building Multi-Floor Garages,” in Building Garages for Profitable 
Operation (New York: Ramp Buildings Corporation, September 1925), 14. 
Figure 27. Kell Hall being demolished, 
August 3, 2019. 
Figure 26. Ivy Street Garage, October 27, 
1946. 
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George M. Sparks, director of the Atlanta Extension Center of the University System of 
Georgia [now Georgia State University], purchased the garage for the school in 1945.312 Well-
known regional architect G. Lloyd Preacher undertook extensive renovations to render the 
structure into something remotely resembling a classroom building. Everyone complained about 
the small elevators, not appreciating the fact that at the time of their original installation, they 
represented the height of luxury for an automobile hotel. 
Kell Hall, for the duration of its existence, exemplified how-not-to-do historic 
preservation by the choice of an incompatible new use for a very specifically designed historic 
structure. After its totally inadequate conversion to a classroom building, the interior appeared 
inexplicably and frustratingly convoluted to the uninitiated, while others simply enjoyed the 
recreational opportunities afforded by the indoor ramps (e.g., skateboarding, bike riding, roller 
blading). The building’s plain and unassuming exterior was typical for a parking garage of the 
era. Despite its rather pedestrian nature, the pattern on Kell’s west façade was valued as the sole 
surviving example of brick diapering in downtown Atlanta. Some preservationists, including this 
writer, actually did mourn the passing of this quixotic and irreplaceable relic.313 
Ivy Hall anchored the school’s central campus development for the next 30 years. On 
March 11, 1964, Georgia State College re-named it Kell Science Hall in honor of the school’s 
first dean, Wayne Sailley Kell. In the summer of 2019, Georgia State University demolished Kell 
Hall to make room for a pedestrian plaza, a striking reversal of the city’s usual pattern of cars 
displacing people. Atlanta lost its last, but never its first, early twentieth-century parking garage. 
 
312 Not surprisingly, Sparks immediately found his school in desperate need of parking spaces—having just 
eliminated 600 of them. Ever since, GSU has been playing catch-up, struggling to meet the parking demands of its 
growing academic community. The school continues to buy up downtown buildings—for the land beneath them—to 
convert to surface parking lots, per to the Facilities Management department. 
313 For an in memoriam and retrospective of the non-functionality of Kell Hall, see Alex Sayf Cummings to 
Tropics of Meta, August 29, 2019, https://tropicsofmeta.com/2019/08/29/the-house-that-mc-escher-and-the-
marquis-de-sade-built/.  
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Upon its opening, the “mammoth” Ivy Street garage was lauded with customary Atlantan 
boosterish extravagance as “one of the largest and perhaps the most modern structures of its 
nature in the world,” and “perhaps the best and most efficiently constructed building of its kind 
in the world.” More important than its architectural marvels, however, the garage provided 
protection from weather and theft. Motor vehicles required indoor storage until the mid-1920s, 
when durable paints and engines that could withstand the cold became available.314 
A garage also gave businessmen “a place to leave their cars without the danger of being 
stolen or their owners being served with a summons to court for parking too long on the central 
business streets.” The possibility of auto theft was quite real in Atlanta, with an average of 1,174 
cars reported stolen annually between 1920 and 1929. Getting a parking ticket in downtown, 
though, remained an infrequent occurrence during the twenties. That situation changed only 
occasionally, depending on the varying levels of enforcement provided by Atlanta Police 
Department.315  
5.6 Policing Traffic 
The problem of an inadequate number of officers to serve and protect perennially plagued 
Atlanta’s police chiefs. Its crime rate, higher than the national average for cities of its size, rose 
during the twenties. The arrival of the automobile, with all its attendant necessities, only 
exacerbated the situation. But the number of policemen in proportion to the city’s population did 
not increase at all. Civic organizations clamored incessantly for more enforcement of traffic laws 
 
314 “Opening of Atlanta’s New $1,000,000 Automobile Hostelry,” Atlanta Constitution, May 24, 1925. 
315 Car theft numbers, separate from those of trucks and motorcycles, are from the Annual Reports of the 
Chiefs of Police of the City of Atlanta. “Atlanta—A Paradise for Automobiles Thieves!” Atlanta Constitution, 
January 11, 1920. Automobile stealing in the 1920s was a recognized industry, with networks of professional thieves 
and fences. Stolen cars in Atlanta were found in states like Pennsylvania, Kansas, Montana, California, and Oregon, 
and cars from cities like Chicago, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Erie, Philadelphia, and Atlantic City were recovered in 
Atlanta. 
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to relieve congestion and reduce carnage, and the police chiefs pleaded with the city council for 
more men. The ongoing lack of personnel meant juggling officers between regular patrol duty 
and specialized traffic duty, leaving one or the other understaffed and everyone, except 
miscreants, unsatisfied.316  
Into the void stepped the Vigilance Committee of the Atlanta Safety Council. This group 
of 100 motorists (whose identities were kept secret) cared greatly about the city’s business-
friendly reputation. If the police had inadequate resources to keep traffic flowing safely and 
smoothly, they would assist. Their enforcement activities included observing traffic violations; 
taking license numbers; warning violators via mail that subsequent infractions would be reported 
to the police; keeping a list of violators and their offenses; reporting third-time offenders to the 
police; and testifying against them in court. The vigilantes proved remarkably watchful; in the 
first week they sent more than fifty letters to violators. By the end of their tenure, they had 
recorded thousands of violations and induced many motorists to drive more carefully.317 
The Vigilance Committee lasted only about six months. In early 1924, the Atlanta Safety 
Council instituted in its place a Safe Drivers’ Club, whose members promised to support safe 
motoring by their exemplary driving habits. Dovetailing with the ending of the Vigilance 
Committee was the creation of the police department’s Accident Prevention Bureau. Although 
never explicitly stated, the creation of the Vigilance Committee was an act of desperation by 
concerned businessmen to improve traffic conditions and Atlanta’s image. After that brief stint 
 
316 William J. Mathias and Stuart Anderson, Horse to Helicopter: First Century of the Atlanta Police 
Department (Atlanta: Georgia State University School of Urban Life, 1973), 82. 
317 Atlanta Constitution: “Atlanta Vigilance Committee Is Organized in Effort to Enforce Traffic Laws of 
City,” August 5, 1923; “Steady Traffic Flow Sought by Council,” October 21, 1923; “Vigilance Committee Warns 
50 Motorists,” August 9, 1923; “The Atlanta Safety Council,” City Builder 8, no. 11 (January 1924): 22, 55. 
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of considerable citizen involvement, city leaders finally instituted an official police squad to take 
over enforcement. 
Most large cities in the U.S. already had a special section within their police departments 
devoted exclusively to traffic control. Atlanta’s belated bureau, enthusiastically endorsed by the 
Atlanta Safety Council, went operational on January 1, 1924.318 The new section was tasked with 
preventing accidents, facilitating travel, and relieving traffic jams and congestion; it proved 
highly effective. During its first year, traffic arrests increased 40%, and traffic casualties dropped 
50%.319    
Despite the impressive numbers, the city council voted to abolish the bureau after only 14 
months, purportedly in the interests of “efficiency and economy.” Immediately, the number of 
crashes and deaths rose. Over the course of one week in 1925, six people died and 33 were 
injured in 62 traffic collisions. An editorial railed against the mounting carnage, blamed it on the 
loss of the traffic bureau, and stated, “Every big city in the country finds it necessary to 
specialize in traffic enforcement. Atlanta cannot longer be an exception. . . . Atlanta is suffering 
economically from the present situation. Something must be done.”320   
The writer smartly hit on the two points most likely to spark some action from city 
leaders: (1) other big cities have a traffic bureau; and (2) it is costing us money not having one. 
Usually Atlanta leapt at an opportunity to prove its progressive character by emulating 
 
318 In 1911, the city had established a horse-mounted traffic squad, but seems to have been disbanded 
within a few years; “Mounted Traffic Squad for City,” Atlanta Constitution, July 12, 1911. 
319 “Special Traffic Bureau Indorsed By Police Heads,” Atlanta Constitution, November 17, 1923; “Traffic 
Bureau Plan for City Wins Approval,” Atlanta Constitution, November 29, 1923; Mathias and Anderson, Horse to 
Helicopter: First Century of the Atlanta Police Department, 82-93. 
320 Atlanta Constitution: “Traffic Bureau Abolished By Council Action,” February 6, 1925; “Put the Bureau 
Back!” March 5, 1925; “Flood Tide of Tragedy,” June 18, 1925; “6 Killed, 33 Hurt in 62 Accidents Here in Week,” 
October 18, 1925; “Traffic Bureau Needed,” October 21, 1925. 
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northeastern cities, and acted quickly when negatives like carnage and congestion threatened its 
business reputation. But neither argument proved persuasive this time.  
No new version of a special police traffic division materialized. Instead, the pile of bodies 
grew higher as traffic arrests plummeted. It got so bad that Councilman Edward Hamilton Inman 
(1881-1931), chair of the council’s police committee and city influencer par excellence, 
threatened to fire any officer not making enough traffic arrests. Reciting the abysmal statistics 
for the first six months of 1925 (849 collisions, 21 deaths, more than 800 injured), he said, “If 
you men don’t work better, you simply won’t work at all.” As usual, enforcement efforts briefly 
increased for a time, then quietly subsided.321  
Three deadly years later, the newspaper wrote even more emphatically about the effect of 
traffic casualties on the city: 
Something must be done to stop the number of accidents, in the name of 
humanity, and—cold-bloodedly speaking—in the interest of the economic welfare 
of this city and community. This is the great trading center of the southeast. 
Atlanta has the largest retail and department store trade of any city in the sixth 
federal reserve district. . . . Visitors must not become apprehensive as to the safety 
of Atlanta’s streets. Thousands motor to the city each week to shop, go to the 
theater, and enjoy the cosmopolitan life.322 
 
According to this article, traffic collisions negatively impacted the health of Atlanta’s citizens, 
but more importantly, the health of its reputation as a regional shopping and entertainment 
destination. Playing its role in the growth coalition, the paper publicly called for civic action to 
halt this ongoing threat to city expansion and prosperity.  
 
321 “Get Speeders Or Quit Force, Police Warned,” Atlanta Constitution, July 2, 1925. Inman, of the wealthy 
cotton-broker Inman family, was an early auto enthusiast, owning and racing expensive cars as early as 1909. In 
addition to the brokerage firm, he was president of the Kimball House Company, and served on the boards of 
multiple financial and industrial entities. In 1924, he built the Philip Shutze-designed Swan House in Buckhead, a 
mansion now owned by the Atlanta History Center. 
322 “Make Streets Safe At Once,” Atlanta Constitution, November 22, 1928. The Sixth District of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and portions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee, “Atlanta Wins Her Fight for a Regional Bank,” Atlanta Constitution, April 3, 1914; Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, https://www.frbatlanta.org/about/atlantafed/. 
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The understaffed police department had no adequate response to the dilemma. Focusing 
resources on downtown traffic enforcement allowed robbers and burglars to operate more freely 
in the suburbs. Taking officers off traffic duty to walk patrol in residential neighborhoods left the 
central streets in a tangle. In 1928, Chief Beavers observed how untenable the situation had 
become: 
The increased traffic on our streets has made it necessary to take a large number 
of officers off of patrol duty and put them to regulating traffic, thus leaving a 
large portion of the city without police protection. This condition is growing 
worse, and will continue to grow worse until we are given sufficient officers to 
properly police the city as well as to regulate traffic.323  
 
Not until 1929 did the city again create a special squad of officers assigned exclusively to 
traffic duty, which they continue to maintain in various forms today. When the new section with 
20 men on foot and 24 on motorcycles went to work, the number of traffic arrests more than 
doubled (see graph below). Traffic arrests had hit a new peak of over 8,000 in 1924 with the 
creation of the Accident Prevention Bureau; they dropped to less than 5,000 in 1925 after the 
bureau’s dissolution. With the establishment of the new traffic squad, traffic arrests more than 
doubled in 1929.324 
By the end of the decade, city and community leaders as well as the police department 
had come to understand that traffic enforcement could no longer be a sporadic affair. The nature 
of policing had changed. Traffic control was on its way to becoming a principal component of 
policing, and the reason why today’s officers often refer to their job as “working the streets.” 
 
323 Forty-Eighth Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta, Georgia Year Ending 
December 31, 1928 (Atlanta, 1929), 8. 
324  “Special Traffic Squad Is Assigned To Daily Duties,” Atlanta Constitution, February 21, 1929; Forty-
Eighth Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta, Georgia Year Ending December 31, 1928 
(Atlanta, 1929), 3; Forty-Ninth Annual Report of the Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, Year Ending 
December 31, 1929 (Atlanta, 1930),  27. 
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The police were not the only ones having to accommodate the new circumstances created 
by the more cars on city streets. In addition to status, speed, pleasure, and convenience, driving 
an automobile provided countless citizens with a novel experience: an up-close and personal 
encounter with a city policeman. In 1906, officers made only 56 traffic arrests; in 1929, they 
made 10,921. Large numbers of city dwellers for the first time faced an arrest for vehicle law 
infractions, though few were taken to jail immediately. Most violators simply received a 
summons to appear the next day in Recorder’s Court, but the process was unfamiliar and 
upsetting. It also proved costly in higher insurance rates for serious or repeat offenders.325 
The number of overall arrests in the city of Atlanta during the 1920s skyrocketed. Also, 
the number of white arrests rose dramatically. The automobile accounts for both. In general 
fewer African Americans owned cars than whites, and consequently broke fewer traffic laws. 
The car proved to be the great equalizer in the city’s race-based policing: for the first time, 
greater numbers of whites, both men and women, were arrested than Blacks. An in-depth look at 
vehicle ownership and traffic arrests can be found in the next chapter. 
The possibility of an in-the-street interaction with law enforcement would have been 
unthinkable to the majority of Atlantans in 1900 or 1910, but during the 1920s, had become an 
increasingly commonplace occurrence. Life would never be the same again, as even the most 
respectable citizens and elected officials now appeared in court on traffic charges. Alternatively, 
riding a trolley seldom resulted in an arrest and citation—an additional benefit of mass transit 
seldom considered then or today. Declining streetcar ridership exposed more people, as 
automobile drivers or passengers, to the regulatory superstructure established for motordom. 
 
325 The citizen of today is likewise “arrested” when given a traffic ticket, even though most people are 
unaware of the fact. A police officer is free to take a driver to jail for running a stop sign, but seldom does as the 
jails would be even more crowded than they are now, plus it is a boring waste of time.   
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5.7 Regulating Streetcars  
The high volume of automobiles resulted from the actions taken by the pro-growth 
coalition to remake the city to accommodate and privilege cars at the expense of other street 
users. Mass transit in the form of the streetcar paid the highest cost, as motor vehicle proponents 
marginalized and eventually eliminated it completely. Continuous city expansion during the 
1920s required the traction 
company to lay always-expensive 
new track as it double-tracked 
formerly single-track lines (see table above326). By mid-decade, Georgia Power began utilizing 
“motor coaches” (aka, buses) to serve customers residing in outlying suburbs. It was a significant 
concession, signaling the switch from rail to road—the latest development in mass transit.327  
In the early twenties, the Georgia Railway and Power Company faced significant 
challenges on numerous fronts: labor conflicts, low fares, poor morale, a bad public image, and 
stiff competition from the jitneys. They also confronted a skeptical city council and an 
antagonistic mayor (James Key) who saw no need to lend any form of aid. Labor problems took 
early precedence as the local union staged a three-day walkout on March 10, 1920 in a pay and 
contract dispute, following two strikes the previous decade. During the strike, the Atlanta 
 
326 Table data is from James M. Wright, “The Fare Problem of the Atlanta Street Railways,” Journal of 
Land & Public Utility Economics 6, no. 2 (May 1930): 183. 
327 Atlanta’s last streetcar ran on April 10, 1949. It could be argued that the demise of the streetcar system 
would have occurred much earlier except for two exceptional events: the Great Depression and World War II. Both 
curbed the use of automobiles by the general public and increased reliance on trolleys. The reasons are numerous 
and not the subject of this study, but both events brought disruptions to the nation’s transportation system as it 
functioned in late 1929. The result was a sort of artificial extension of the life of the streetcar while the use of 
motorized vehicles was temporarily curtailed.  
Type of Track 1905 1918 1920 1927
Single Track 72 68 68.324 58.582
Double Track 70 150 157.840 175.722
Table 9. GA Railway & Power Track Mileage Increases 
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Constitution reported on the resulting “grand parade” of nearly 20,000 cars and trucks in 
downtown—with not a trolley in sight.328  
Unfortunately, worse-than-usual traffic congestion ruined the party. “The statement has 
often made that our streets would take care of the traffic if it were not for the streetcars. Another 
balloon bursted. . . . Anyone who was down town between 5 and 7 p. m. during the strike will 
affirm this.” The reporter’s eyewitness testimony that streetcars actually provided traffic relief 
quickly faded from memory, and the familiar narrative—streetcars cause congestion—quickly 
regained and retained its dominance.329  
Annual contracts and pay raises brought the strikers back to work. A second fare hike, 
from six cents to seven cents, went into effect. The company hired the nationally-renowned 
public relations firm of Ivy Lee to refurbish its image. President Arkwright instituted a campaign 
to train workers and build collegiality and pride. He personally travelled the local speaking 
circuit to push back against the false narrative that streetcars caused congestion.330     
In one speech to the Atlanta Automobile Association at the prestigious Capital City Club, 
he made three main points. First, his company paid for the pavement that motor vehicles 
destroyed. Second, the automobile cut into the company’s revenues by free-hauling prospective 
streetcar passengers, and by competition from the jitneys. Third, parked cars created congestion, 
 
328 Martin, Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 60; James M. Wright, “The Fare Problem of the Atlanta Street 
Railways [Continuation],” Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 6, no. 3 (August 1930): 278, 87. 
329 O. J. Willoughby, “Motor Pep,” Atlanta Constitution, March 14, 1920. 
330 The first fare hike, from five to six cents, was enacted in 1919—the first streetcar fare hike in 22 years. 
“‘Come Seven’ Is Cry of Car Conductors To Their Passengers,” Atlanta Constitution, October 2, 1920; Martin, 
Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 80-81. “Ivy Lee Retained by Power Company,” Atlanta Constitution, May 17, 1921; 
Carson, The Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 78. Ivy Ledbetter Lee (1877-1934), a native Georgian, 
established a publicity firm in New York City with clients like Pennsylvania Railroad, Bethlehem Steel, the 
Rockefellers, and Standard Oil. He is considered one of the founders of modern public relations.  
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slowing streetcars and disrupting their schedules. He predicted that on-street parking in 
downtown would eventually be banned altogether with so many people driving cars.331  
Amazingly, the automobile men gave Arkwright an enthusiastic reception. He was one of 
the power elite, a member of the most prestigious clubs, listed in the Social Register, and an 
owner of cars. He had an abundance of close friends in the automobile industry. He also presided 
over Georgia Railway and Power Company which supplied electricity and gas as well as 
streetcars to the city; every person at that meeting was one of his customers. While the speech 
might not have changed any minds about the place of the motor vehicle in Atlanta, it did 
generate some much-needed goodwill toward the traction company—goodwill which would 
soon prove critical. 
By 1923, things were looking up for the street railway system, and they placed an order 
for 33 new streetcars. Even better, the company’s arch nemesis, Mayor James L. Key, was voted 
out of office. New mayor, Walter Arthur Sims (1880-1953) had never been a huge streetcar fan, 
complaining that they did not have enough “hustle.” Sims, like all of Atlanta’s mayors during the 
1920s, was not in the top tier of the growth coalition. An attorney, he was active in numerous 
fraternal organizations, belonged to none of the exclusive clubs, but was a member of First 
Baptist Church as well as the Ku Klux Klan. During his two terms in office (1923-27), the Klan 
prospered until its self-implosion; the traction company won its ten-year battle against the 
jitneys; and Atlanta became one of the best paved cities in the South.   
 
331 “Trolley Company Auto Benefactor, Says Arkwright,” Atlanta Constitution, April 20, 1922.  
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The first jitney appeared 
on the streets of Atlanta in 
January 1915. It operated like a 
cross between a city bus and a 
taxicab (see photo at right332), 
running up and down Peachtree 
Street between Five Points and 
the split at West Peachtree 
Street, stopping to pick-up or discharge riders. The standard fare was a jit, a slang term for a 
nickel (five cents).333  
Atlanta’s first jitney ordinance passed in 1919 at the urging of Mayor Key, who had been 
militating for municipal ownership of all public utilities since 1906. The law imposed few 
requirements on the owners, and did nothing to restrict their areas of operation, even when their 
runs matched the most heavily-traveled sections of trolley routes. Unlike the streetcar franchise, 
no regulation required jitneys to cover all sectors of the city, leaving them free to cherry-pick the 
most profitable lines.334 
By the twenties, many jitney operations had evolved into sophisticated operations, having 
standardized routes with scheduled stops very much like a trolley line, except on tires, not rails. 
The earliest jitney type, a small five-passenger touring car, was joined by seven-passenger cars, 
and even 10- to 20-seat Mason Road King buses, making serious inroads into streetcar revenues. 
 
332 Figure 27 photo is FUL-940-85, from Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Archives, University System of 
Georgia, https://vault.georgiaarchives.org/digital/collection/vg2/id/6971/. 
333 “Fleet of ‘Jitney’ Busses May Soon Be Running in Streets of Atlanta,” Atlanta Constitution, January 29, 
1915.  
334 “Let City Own Her Utilities, Say The People,” Atlanta Constitution, August 26, 1906; Carson, The 
Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 67. 
Figure 28. Lakewood Jitney, Fulton County, 1920-29. 
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The jit fare increased to ten cents.335 The American Electric Railway Association issued this 
stern warning: 
Just so long as jitneys and buses are permitted to skim the cream off of street 
railway traffic, they are working an injustice . . . to the car company. . . . The 
jitneys take away a large part of the street railways profitable portion of the 
business. The short haul business in the thickly populated districts is the portion 
of the revenue of the street railway companies from which they can obtain that 
comparatively small amount of profit which enables them to live and give service 
to the community as a whole. . . . The operation of jitneys should be confined to 
non-competitive and supplementary or auxiliary service. 336   
     
Some city council members saw jitneys as healthy competition to the street railway 
system, but estimates place the amount of fares they cost the streetcars during the 1920s at 
$1,500-$2,000 per day. The street railway system was losing money. New, outlying 
neighborhoods requested that trolley lines be extended to their locations, but the company could 
not raise enough capital for expansion. Carson observes that by this time, “The permissive jitney 
control law was looking more and more like an act of revenge perpetrated by petulant politicians 
rather than action taken in the public interest by responsible legislators.”337 
In 1923, city council did pass an ordinance requiring each jitney owner to obtain a $1,000 
indemnity bond. Because of the cost, 66 of the 95 jitney companies ceased operations. The 
remaining jitneys could no longer conduct business on roads with trolley tracks or within two 
blocks of a streetcar.338 
Even with its competition curtailed, Georgia Railway and Power remained unsatisfied. 
The company had already contemplated expanding into the motor coach business because laying 
 
335 Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 45. 
336 “Report of the Committee on Fare Systems”  (paper presented at the Proceedings of the American 
Electric Railway Association, Albany, NY, 1920), 170-72. 
337 “Street Railway Wants Added Responsibility,” Atlanta Constitution, May 30, 1923; Carson, 75. 
338 “$1,000 Indemnity Bond for Jitneys,” Atlanta Constitution, April 3, 1923; “Jitney Men Given One Day 
of Grace,” Atlanta Constitution, July 1, 1923. 
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track to reach riders in outlying suburbs proved too costly. It also realized that its bus service 
would be subject to a number of regulations from which jitneys were exempt. In a preemptive 
move to eliminate jitneys entirely, it boldly petitioned council in 1924 for an exclusive franchise 
to supply all of the mass transportation within the city. It was an either/or proposition in their 
view. As Atkinson, stated, “A highly regulated and taxed business and an unregulated business 
cannot both live on the same streets. . . .  It must be a choice between jitneys and the street 
railway. Both cannot survive on the same streets.”339 
The city council held a well-attended public hearing on the petition. Power company 
executives Atkinson and Arkwright spoke in its favor. Not surprisingly, the major speaker 
against was attorney and former mayor, James Key, representing the Atlanta Jitney Bus 
Association. Council chose to defer action, but citizens in the community, including many 
influential businessmen and real estate investors, continued to express their support of the 
streetcars, along with Atlanta’s City Club, Motor Club, and Safety Council. The Atlanta 
Automobile Association took a neutral position, simply calling on the city to build more streets 
in every direction. In general, growth advocates endorsed the abolition of jitneys, whose unfair 
competition threatened the streetcar and soon-to-be bus company, both of which aided municipal 
growth.340  
In the midst of the jitney war, the traction company gained a strong ally in John A. 
Beeler. The city council agreed that Atlanta needed a survey of its traffic problems. In February 
1924, they chose the Beeler Organization, Inc., Consulting Engineers, of New York City to 
conduct a ten-month-long study paid for by the traction company. The report’s findings and 
 
339  “Bus Line Service Plans Perfected, Says Atkinson,” Atlanta Constitution, February 5, 1924. 
340 “Power Company’s Petition Heard; Action Is Deferred,” Atlanta Constitution, June 2, 1923; “Safety 
Council Against Jitneys,” Atlanta Constitution, January 15, 1925. 
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recommendations, issued in December 1924, vindicated the streetcar company’s assertions about 
fares, the jitneys, and prevailing traffic patterns.341   
The street railway had long claimed, based on its own studies, that during the evening 
rush hour (5-6 p.m.), motor vehicles constituted 90% of the traffic, and streetcars only 9%. 
However, autos conveyed only 17.75% of the people, while streetcars carried more than 82% of 
the people. Most traffic surveys counted the number of vehicles, when in reality the number of 
passengers was a more important count. Cars carried on average two persons, while a streetcar 
averaged 49 persons. Taking into account the greater length of streetcars, the average trolley still 
transported 49 people to the six carried by three automobiles. The street rail system did not cause 
the bulk of the city’s gridlock (cars did), and it provided a much-needed service to Atlanta’s 
traveling public.342 
Beeler’s report fully supported the streetcar company’s statistics. During a single rush 
hour, it documented 346 streetcars carrying 16,286 people, while 3,505 other vehicles carried 
only 6,345 people in the same period. More than ten times the number of cars transported less 
than half as many individuals as the trolleys. A compilation of the annual numbers, costs, and 
miles traveled were even more compelling (see table below343). The study documented the 
overwhelming economy and efficiency of the streetcar over the automobile in moving people 
through the city. It recommended that streetcars should be given precedence in traffic movement 
because more people were dependent on them.344 
 
341 Martin, Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 149. 
342 “Power Company Asks 10 Cents for Single Fare,” Atlanta Constitution, December 2, 1923. 
343 Table 10 created by author from data in Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local 
Transportation, 3, 5-6, 73. 
344 “Engineer Urges Need of Revision of Traffic Laws,” Atlanta Constitution, May 6, 1924; ibid., 39; John 
W. Colton, “Streets Becoming Choked,” AERA 12, no. 5 (December 1923): 948, 951, 953-54.  
196 
A 1928 Detroit report comparing private automobiles to public transportation, echoed 
Beeler’s findings, declaring that “if either type of vehicle is to be given preference over the other, 
it unquestionably must be the street car and bus.” That study, conducted by civil engineers, found 
that nearly 80% of the passengers in the afternoon rush hour were carried by mass transit 
(streetcars and buses), which comprised less than 6% of all the vehicles on the road. In 
comparison, only 20% of passengers traveled by automobiles and taxicabs, which comprised 
85% of the moving vehicles. The motorists were the ones contributing the most to traffic 
congestion. Mass transportation in its most efficient forms provided the only solution to 
transportation problems in the largest cities.345 
Beeler’s report also had suggestions for improving the efficacy of the streetcars; 
specifically, re-routing trolleys off the Peachtree-Whitehall corridor, leaving it and the Spring 
Street viaduct free for motor vehicle traffic only. In addition to increasing trolley fares, the report 
 
345 Rapid Transit Commission, The Relation of Individual to Collective Transportation (Detroit: Heitman-
Garand, 1928), 29, 31. The report recommended high-speed motorways to and inexpensive parking at the street-rail 
termini, making the use of trolleys for transport downtown more attractive (they were already more economical). 
The reduction in autos in the central business district would reduce traffic congestion as well as increase the speed of 
mass transit, making all the riders happier. Atlanta never attempted any coordination between trolleys and cars; 
never advocated “park and ride” solutions, adopted in cities like New York, Detroit, and Chicago in the 1920s; never 
considered rapid transit in the form of a subway or elevated railway with an exclusive right of way—at least until 
the inauguration of MARTA in 1975. Instead, Atlanta only sought to eliminate streetcars—the dominant mass transit 

















Total Cost to 
Users in the 
Seven Mile 
Zone²
Streetcars 330 75,500,000 35.3 14,000,000 2.00 $5,139,000
Private automobiles 27,540 54,000,000 1.8 176,000,000 5.16 $16,391,000
Jitney buses 136 4,500,000 3.6 6,000,000 4.26 $417,000
Taxicabs 147 1,300,000 1.4 3,000,000 32.18 $742,000
¹In round numbers.  ²The Seven Mile Zone denoted the area of operations of the Georgia Railway and Power Company (which 
included electricity, gas, steam, and streetcars). It was a circle with a seven-mile radius, centered at the northeast corner of the 
Union Passenger Depot, and extended well beyond Atlanta's 1924 city limits. Its modern boundaries would roughly be Buckhead, 
north; Decatur, east; Hapeville, south; and I-285, west.
Table 10. 1924 Atlanta Passenger Vehicle Use and Cost 
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also strongly advocated for a unified transportation system, eliminating jitneys and allowing the 
streetcar company to extend its service using motor coach lines.346 
Beeler, in no uncertain terms, censured the jitneys as parasites. “The jitney is merely 
living off the best and most highly developed territory and operating on well paved 
thoroughfares largely paid for by the railway.” In 1925, as a result of his Report, the city council 
finally voted to revoke the 
1919 jitney ordinance, and 
created a new, much more 
restrictive law. Among other 
requirements, jitney buses had 
a 17-passenger minimum, and 
could not operate in sections 
of the city already served by 
the street railway company.347 The jitneys were not abolished and could still run in Atlanta, but 
not where the streetcar company had operations. Within days of the new ordinance taking effect, 
Georgia Railway and Power announced the inauguration of its bus service to the suburban 
 
346 “Increase in Trolley Fares and Elimination of Jitneys Are Favored in Beeler’s Report,” Atlanta 
Constitution, December 21, 1924; Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, v-vii, 
79. 
347 Beeler, 45. “Jitney Busses Are Banned From Operating In Atlanta; Court Action Threatened,”  Atlanta 
Constitution, February 3, 1925; “Text of Ordinance Barring Jitneys From City Streets,” Atlanta Constitution, 
February 3, 1925;  Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 56, §§ 1700-19, 
35-45. Legal challenges to the ordinance by James Key and the Atlanta Jitney Bus Association were not sustained, 
“Court Upholds Jitney Decision,” Atlanta Constitution, September 23, 1925. 
Figure 29. Fageol double-deck bus to Morningside Park. 
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neighborhoods of Ansley Park, Sylvan Hills, and Morningside (see photo above348). It proved a 
successful power move which effectively eliminated jitney bus service in Atlanta.349 
The company implemented other Beeler recommendations throughout 1925 and 1926 to 
increase efficiency, attract customers, and reduce traffic congestion. It re-routed tracks, 
purchased larger streetcars, and spruced up all rolling stock, inside and out. The public 
responded with generous patronage and company revenues increased, especially with the new 
bus lines. The power company’s public relations manager exuberantly proclaimed the street rail 
systems good service, without which no city could progress. “It would be futile for Atlanta to 
invite new industries to locate here if good street car service could not be listed among Atlanta’s 
many assets.” Some writers have called the late 1920s the trolley system’s golden years, yet 
Garrett registers the irony that at the height of the company’s popularity, the rubber-tired buses 
“sounded the first faint death knell for the steel-wheeled street car.”350    
One negative constant remained from the early years of the decade: the refrain that 
streetcars caused congestion. Studies, statistics, logic, even the assertions of the national traffic 
engineering experts did not matter. Most city officials and influential businessmen cast the 
trolley in the role of “villain rather than victim” of road congestion. Instead of seeing mass 
 
348 The new Fageol double-deck bus operated under the traction company’s subsidiary, Atlanta Coach 
Company. The one pictured served one of the new suburban neighborhoods, Morningside Park; Georgia Railway 
and Power Company, Georgia Railway and Power Company 1926 (Atlanta: Georgia Railway and Power, 1926), 12. 
349  Atlanta Constitution: “Council Gives Trolley Heads Bus Monopoly,” March 3, 1925; “Power Company 
Installs Subsidiary Bus Service To Suburbs of Atlanta,” March 8, 1925; “Bus Service Begins Today,” March 8, 
1925; Timothy J. Crimmins, “Bungalow Suburbs East and West,” Atlanta Historical Journal 26, nos. 2-3 (Summer-
Fall 1982): 84. 
350 L. K. Starr, “Atlanta’s Street Car Service Unsurpassed,” City Builder  (April 1927): 12, 40-42; Garrett 
and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:429; Carson, The Trolley Titans: A 
Mobile History of Atlanta, 91; Martin, Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 159. One writer takes a different position, 
saying that the 1920s was decade when the automobile eclipsed the streetcar in providing transportation for Atlanta 
citizens, and ended the only period in the twentieth century when mass transit flourished in the city; see Preston, 
Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 45, 70-73. A careful look at the data 
demonstrates that trolleys, by 1929, still carried more riders than automobiles; therefore, the car did not completely 
eclipse the streetcar entirely within the decade of the 1920s.   
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transit by rail as a solution, they saw it as the problem. Either they truly did not understand the 
difference between moving numbers of people versus moving numbers of vehicles through the 
streets, or they chose to ignore the facts. They undeniably preferred to retain the autonomy and 
flexibility afforded by automobiles for private and commercial use. At the same time they 
endlessly bemoaned the congestion, collisions, and carnage—and the subsequent damage to 
Atlanta’s reputation—generated by their own actions and choices.351  
In 1925, city leaders began to push for the elimination of “unnecessary” trolley stops 
throughout the city. The moves were part of the Forward Atlanta campaign, a massive city 
advertising scheme initiated by the Chamber of Commerce, which will be discussed in more 
depth in a later chapter. As the name made obvious, a major theme of the campaign was the 
progressive character of Atlanta, its constant forward motion as a successful and expanding locus 
of commerce, industry, and economic opportunity. 
A series of newspaper ads referenced a more literal component of the “forward motion” 
idea—the rapid movement of traffic through the city. Three prominent men and Forward Atlanta 
leaders personally appeared in these ads. Ivan E. Allen, Sr.’s credentials are listed (see 
advertisement below). Thaddeus Johnson (1879-1953) was president of the Atlanta Automobile 
Dealers’ Association and manager of the city’s Olds Motor Works (later Oldsmobile). W. R. C. 
Smith (1872-1941) was president of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, a highly successful city 
publisher and the prime mover in the Forward Atlanta campaign. Their three ads called for 
Atlanta to speed up and give automobiles a chance to move. Slow street rail service hindered not 
just traffic, but also city progress. Streetcars acted as “a dam against the swift and regular flow of 
 
351 Carson, The Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 91. 
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automobile traffic during rush hours,” because other vehicles could not pass a stopped streetcar. 
Unnecessary trolley stops absolutely had to be eliminated.352 
Ironically, the streetcar 
company paid for the ads. Georgia 
Railway and Power played an 
active role in Forward Atlanta, and 
it also had an interest in reducing 
the number of streetcar stops. 
Routes with more stops created 
scheduling difficulties, especially 
coordinating with feeder buses and 
interurban lines, plus they were 
slower and more costly for the 
company to operate. The Beeler Report even recommended increasing the distance between 
stops in downtown to speed up traffic flow.  
By reducing trolley access points the company may have alienated some customers, but 
the streetcar division was just part of its business. Hydroelectric power overwhelming provided 
the most revenue, and the company signaled its increasing importance in 1927. It changed its 
name to the Georgia Power Company when becoming a subsidiary of the Southeastern Power & 
Light Company (today the Southern Company).353  
 
352 Atlanta Constitution: “‘Eliminate Unnecessary Stops’—says Ivan Allen,” December 7, 1925; “‘Give 
Traffic a Chance to MOVE’—says T. K. Johnson,” December 10, 1925; “‘Atlanta Must Speed Up’—says W. R. C. 
Smith,” December 14, 1925. It was illegal for other vehicles to pass a stopped streetcar which was taking on or 
discharging passengers, Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 95, § 3148. 
353 Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 37-38. A summer-long drought 
in 1925 reduced the company’s hydroelectric power output so much that electrical service had to be rationed, 
affecting manufacturers, homeowners, and even the streetcars across north Georgia. The setback demonstrated the 
Figure 30. Forward Atlanta ad, Atlanta Constitution, 
December 7, 1925. 
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Despite dropping “railway” from its name, Georgia Power by no means abandoned its 
transit operations. That same year, the Railroad Commission of the State of Georgia granted the 
company another fare increase, from seven cents to ten cents, along with the rather remarkable 
admission that the 1920 one-cent fare increase had been too low.354 The traction company also 
continued to push back against the narrative that streetcars caused congestion. The publication of 
the city’s 1929 traffic survey had conclusively proved that cars—not trolleys—made up the bulk 
of Atlanta’s traffic, so the company ran a series of ads touting the number of passengers the 
streetcars carried. The ad copy concluded that, “Obviously street cars don’t cause traffic 
congestion, they reduce it. Without them to do the biggest part of the job in city transportation, 
traffic conditions would be insufferable.”355 
Suburban residential development, initially driven by the streetcar in the 1800s and early 
1900s, was almost exclusively driven by motor vehicles in the twenties. Most Atlantan families 
still did not own an automobile (see Figure 31 below), as the clamor for mass transit by the 
suburban residents of Ansley Park, Morningside Estates, Virginia Highlands, and Sylvan Hills 
demonstrated. For Georgia Power, the motor coach proved a more cost-effective way to expand 
its operations into the outlying suburbs as laying trolley track was too expensive. Glidewell notes 
that the suburbs destroyed the densely developed urban communities that provided residents with 
 
company’s need for more water-powered electricity generating plants, but the parent company, Georgia Railway & 
Electric Company, refused to act. In response, Georgia Railway and Power (after some consolidations) in 1926-27 
affiliated with Southeastern Power and Light as Georgia Power Company. It then was able to operate statewide. The 
transit system’s personnel remained the same, with Atkinson and Arkwright serving as board chair and president. 
Today, Georgia Power is the largest subsidiary of the Southern Company, which itself is one of the largest 
electricity-producing entities in the U.S.; Carson, The Trolley Titans: A Mobile History of Atlanta, 88-89; Casey P. 
Cater, Regenerating Dixie: Electric Energy and the Modern South (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2019), 110.  
354 Wright, “The Fare Problem of the Atlanta Street Railways [Continuation],” 288-89. 
355  “The Traffic Model,” Atlanta Constitution, May 29, 1930. 
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nearby everyday necessities. Their automobile-oriented development spread out those amenities 
over distances that one could only cross in a motor vehicle, car or bus.356 
The pro-growth community did not vilify buses, despite the fact that they shared the 
traffic-congesting characteristics of streetcars so-often complained about (frequent stops, wait 
times for passenger loading and unloading). Instead, it actively championed the elimination of 
jitneys in favor of the power company’s embrace of coaches. Apparently, a city franchise on 
mass transit per se was not the problem, just mass transit on rails. After all, automobile 
manufacturers produced buses, too.  
By 1920, the motor vehicle clearly had surpassed the trolley as the key transportation 
component of city expansion, with unmatched advantages for industry, trade, and, to an extent, 
residential development. By their own admission, powerful city figures deliberately crafted the 
automobile-centric superstructure (financing, traffic controls, personnel, and legislation) along 
with its corresponding infrastructure (viaducts, attenuated sidewalks, curb re-design, and wider 
roads with smoother paving). While the pro-growth advocates enacted the various components of 
both structures in a piecemeal fashion over the years, the overall effect was a comprehensive 
remaking of Atlanta—physically, legislatively, organizationally, and fiscally.  
The sweeping transformations implemented in the 1920s overshadowed earlier efforts; it 
was the decade of the consolidation of motordom. Like the construction of the viaducts, the 
revision of the city codes and the restructuring of city government lie at the heart of this 
dissertation. Transportation had long been recognized as key to city growth, and the latest 
mode—the motor vehicle—now superseded all others. Powerful decision-makers initiated, 
 
356 Collin R. Glidewell, “A Pedestrian Transit Mall on Peachtree? How History, Policy, and Legislation 
Can Recreate a Proud Town,” bepress Digital Commons (March 2007). 
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enacted, and sustained that process of city transformation for the car. All of these massive 
changes were instituted before most Atlantans even owned a one. 
However, in Atlanta, numbers of the wealthy owned multiple cars. In 1909, elite 
businessman Edward H. Inman personally owned two cars. He paid $6,500 for a six-cylinder 
Stearns roadster (about $182,000 today), which he used for racing, while his four-cylinder 
Stearns touring car cost $5,000 (about $140,000 today). Ivan Allen, Sr., in 1928, owned several 
cars, including one he gave to his son, Ivan Allen, Jr., upon his matriculation at Atlanta’s Boys 
High School. The members of the Atlanta Safety Council in 1924 all owned at least one 
automobile, and most owned fleets of vehicles for their businesses.357    
A meaningful way to look at numbers of people and cars is to consider the number of 
families who owned a car. The graph below (Figure 31) charts the percentage of Atlanta families 
who owned a car from 1916 to 1930.358 In 1929, the percentage reached a high of 47.9% (and 
fell again after the onset of the Great Depression). But it never reached 50% during the time 
period of this study. Despite the fact that a slim majority of its citizens did not own a motor 
vehicle, the city of Atlanta passed copious amounts of legislation and invested millions of dollars 
in transforming its streets and their usages to accommodate the car and to restrict all other street 
users. No one can reasonably contend that such actions exemplified democracy in action when 
the majority of “the people” had little or no say in these transformations.359   
 
357 “Ed Inman’s Autos Injured By Flames,” Atlanta Constitution, July 24, 1909; “Damaged Machines Are 
Sold By Ed Inman,” Atlanta Constitution, August 1, 1909; modern prices are based on the Consumer Price Index, 
calculated at Measuring Worth, 2020, https://www.measuringworth.com/dollarvaluetoday/. Gary M. Pomerantz, 
Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: A Saga of Race and Family (New York: Scribner, 1996), 98. Not many 
teenagers had their own cars in the 1920s, and Ivan, Jr.’s made him very popular. “The Atlanta Safety Council,” City 
Builder 8, no. 11 (January 1924): 22. 
358 Percentage of families living in Atlanta who owned a car, from 1916 to 1930; data from the U.S. 
Census, the Georgia Secretary of State, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration, and the National Automobile 
Chamber of Commerce. 
359 Using data from multiple sources, numbers were adjusted to include private automobiles only and to 
make an allowance for multi-car families: Annual Reports of the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, 1916-
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While all non-vehicular street users lost ground in the contest for street space, the biggest 
loser was the streetcar system. Although trolleys moved much greater numbers of people through 
the city than cars, the great fiction, perpetrated by the power elites in traffic studies and in the 
media, counted a single automobile as equivalent to a single streetcar. The number that weighed 
most heavily was number of vehicles, not number of passengers carried. In that argument, the 
trolley—or any mass transit system—by definition could not win, and consequently lost street 
space. Adding insult to injury, the street railway paid taxes to use the public streets and paid to 
pave the roadways. No automobile owner paid to use the public streets. The gasoline tax, which 
was (and still is) minuscule, has never covered the cost of road maintenance and paving, 
 
1932; U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Office of Highway Information 
Management, “Highway Statistics Summary to 1995, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/; “18% of Car 
Owning Families Have More Than One Car,” National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, Facts and Figures of 
the Automobile Industry (New York: National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, 1930), 1927, pg. 39; U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933, Population, Vol. 6, pg. 296. 
Figure 31. Atlanta car-owning families, 1916-1930. 
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especially since most state legislatures, including Georgia’s, frequently utilized the gas tax for 
purposes other than road maintenance.  
Atlanta by the end of 1929 could without dispute be labeled an automotive city, even if 
all its people were not yet “automobilic.”360 Influential business and civic leaders had engineered 
the reshaping of the city infrastructure, and had without compunction inaugurated ordinances 
privileging the car on the city’s streets, shunting aside or outlawing other street users. Taxpayer 
dollars in ever-increasing amounts paid for changes to the streets and sidewalks as well as the 
installation and maintenance of all the regulatory devices and personnel to enforce the laws. The 
system of automobility was well on its way to being fully integrated into the city’s fabric, 
society, and culture.361 
The streetcar had the disadvantage of running on a schedule and only in specified  
locations; it lacked the autonomy afforded by a car. The trolley also was shared space; anybody 
could ride one, if they had a nickel (or a dime in 1927). Streetcars were the transit mode of 
necessity for ordinary office personnel, shop girls, store clerks, non-elite housewives, domestic 
workers, and laborers of all types. A well-to-do white person might have to sit beside or near 
them. The automobile freed the monied not only from time and space constraints, but also from 
the possibility of contact with other classes—and races.  
African-Americans on streetcars, even though segregated at the back, sat or stood nearby. 
The closely-confined trolley interiors, where the races daily met face-to-face, were the sites of 
ongoing conflict. Jim Crow laws might effectively separate Blacks from whites in many city 
 
360 “Automobility,” New York Times, March 3, 1922, p. 12, one of the first documented uses of the term 
“automobility,” and the description of an “automotive” or “automobilic” people. 
361 Norton observes that by the mid-1920s, organized automotive interest groups began calling themselves 
“motordom,” Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 3. Urry describes the 
“automobility system,” and its exercise of domination, John Urry, “The ‘System’ of Automobility,” Theory Culture 
& Society 21, no. 4-5 (August-October 2004): 25-27. 
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spaces, but on the street and in the streetcars, that division broke down. Traveling in the privacy 
of an automobile provided an escape from the mixed-race crowds on mass transit. Automobile 




















6 SEGREGATING THE CITY 
The census of 1920 marked the first time that the majority of Americans lived in urban 
areas. Although the state of Georgia remained overwhelmingly rural, Atlanta’s population grew 
by nearly 35% between 1910 and 1920. Increasing urbanization in the U.S. meant cities with 
expanding territories, populations, influence, and wealth. Valuable downtown real estate became 
scarce and more costly than ever. Aided by advances in construction technologies and 
architectural designs, builders erected ever-taller skyscrapers for maximum square footage on 
minimal lot sizes, intensifying density in the city core.  
Increasing automobility served as an urban segregating mechanism. Cars facilitated the 
development of suburban residential areas, deepening the live/work divide, at least for whites. 
Automobile ownership was virtually mandatory for those who lived in the outer neighborhoods 
with no streetcar service and sparse bus lines. Downtown morphed into the central business 
district as elegant homes on graciously-landscaped parcels along Peachtree and Washington 
streets fell when owners sold out to commercial concerns and moved north toward Buckhead or 
east into Druid Hills. In the poorer, in-town neighborhoods, more people jammed into closer 
quarters, especially African Americans, many of whom could not afford private automobiles and 
had to rely on the streetcars for transportation. They could not have lived in an Atlanta all-white 
suburb anyway, even if they had a car and the money to purchase a house there.   
One method of gaining control in the midst of unregulated, chaotic growth was to zone 
the city, identifying its essential elements and separating them into discrete, carefully delineated 
geographic sectors. The component parts could be variously defined by land use, building or 
parcel size, economic indicators, or cultural constructs. A form of Taylorism writ large, zoning 
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provided a means of scientifically managing city growth, and as such held great appeal for place 
entrepreneurs. 
The racial animus already codified in Georgia’s and Atlanta’s Jim Crow laws intensified 
with the city’s zoning efforts during the 1920s. The 1922 Atlanta Zone Plan extended the 
partitioning to residential race sectors, claiming that such zoning would benefit everyone. After 
neighborhoods were segregated, the streets constituted perhaps the largest remaining space 
where the races mixed by necessity and on a daily basis. Pedestrians jostled on overflowing 
sidewalks and riders jammed into overfull trolleys. In the downtown district, virtually all 
categories of persons intermingled frequently. Not all the encounters were friendly or harmless. 
No matter how much power elites and city officials sought to divide the city into functionally 
and racially distinct sectors, the public streets remained inescapably integrated. 
6.1 Segregating Stratagems 
Atlanta, like other southern cities, was already well-practiced in hegemonic segregation 
before the 1920s zoning craze. Acting illegally but with impunity, whites since Reconstruction 
had employed brute physical force in the form of lynchings, peonage, and individual as well as 
mob violence to dominate, suppress, terrify, and kill African Americans. Legally, white 
Georgians enacted the first race-based transportation restrictions in 1891, and continued to 
buttress their supremacy with Jim Crow legislation throughout the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Segregation of the races in Atlanta was mandated by both custom and municipal 
ordinance in restaurants, hotels, saloons, barber shops, prisons, chain-gangs, parks, libraries, 
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swimming pools, and cemeteries where, even in the paupers’ section, Blacks and whites were 
separated.362  
Conditions for Blacks further deteriorated with the 1915 re-emergence of the Ku Klux 
Klan, the vigilante enforcers of racial separation. Atlanta carried the designation as the Imperial 
City of the Invisible Empire, and estimates of the number of Atlantans in the local chapter, 
Nathan Bedford Forrest Klan No. 1, range between 15,000 and 40,000. The city benefitted 
economically by the presence of the Klan through its robe factory, publishing company, and 
other entities. The Atlanta Constitution covered its activities, meetings, participation in 
community events, and Lanier University without editorial comment. One national journal editor 
remarked on the city’s 
attitude toward the group, 
“Atlanta . . . does not 
consider the Klan a menace 
or a joke, but an institution, 
like the Elks, the Salvation 
Army, or any other.” In 
other words, for many white 
Atlantans, the Klan was 
simply another civic association for men of good will.363  
 
362 The law required railroad and streetcar companies to provide separate but equal accommodations for 
“white and colored passengers;” State of Georgia, The Code of the State of Georgia, Adopted December 15th, 1895, 
vol. 2 (Atlanta: Foote & Davies, 1896), § 2269 -2274 (Acts 1890-91, p. 157, § 2188). 
363 White, “The Black Sides of Atlanta: A Geography of Expansion and Containment, 1870-1970,” 215, 
lists 15,000 in 1923. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930, 262, fn. 17, cites a 1921 estimate of 40,000. 
Edward T. Devine, “The Klan in Texas,” Survey 48, no. 1 (April 1, 1922): 10. 
Figure 32. Klan advertisement, 1924. 
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In 1920, the Klan began to recruit nationally under the direction of a fund-raising agency, 
the Southern Publicity Association. Disavowing the terroristic acts attributed to it, the group 
endorsed Americanism, Protestantism, temperance, and adherence to traditional social mores 
(see advertisement above364). Their message proved attractive to many white city dwellers 
disturbed by modernity, changing cultural values, and perceived threats to their racial 
supremacy. Henry Ford called Klan members patriots, and claimed the group was working for 
“the preservation of the supremacy of the true American in his own land.” The Dearborn 
Independent, his weekly newspaper, was filled with anti-Semitic articles. It was mailed free to 
schools and libraries across the country; Ford dealerships were required to sell subscriptions 
along with their automobiles.365 
Between 1923 and 1927, Atlanta was led by Mayor Walter A. Sims, and the state of 
Georgia by Governor Clifford M. Walker, both Klansmen. Having them in the two highest 
offices in the state lent respectability to the group, as well as significant influence. A former 
Atlanta police chief admitted that at one time, most of the members of the police department 
were Klan members. However, violence and scandals brought sharp declines in membership, and 
by the late 1920s, the Klan had lost much of its potency. Zoning provided an alternative, non-
violent way to keep African Americans in their places.366 
 
364 The Klan advertisement is from W. E. McAllister, Confederate Veterans Annual Year Book 1861-1924 
(Atlanta, 1924). 
365 Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 21; Tera W. Hunter, To ‘Joy My Freedom’: Southern Black 
Women's Lives and Labors after the Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 221-22; Jackson, 
The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930, 9-12, 18-19; Victoria Saker Woest, “Insecure Equality: Louis Marshall, 
Henry Ford, and the Problem of Defamatory Antisemitism, 1920-1929,” Journal of American History 91, no. 3 
(December 2004): 882. Atlanta Constitution: “Defense Is Made of Ku-Klux Klan,” November 8, 1920; “Ford Takes 
Role as Klan Defender,” August 27, 1924.  
366 The police chief in question was Herbert T. Jenkins, who joined the Atlanta police forced in 1932, and 
served as chief 1947-72; Kuhn et al., Living Atlanta: An Oral History of the City, 1914-1948, 311-16. In an 
interview with Floyd Hunter in the late 1940s, Atlanta’s mayor admitted that there was still considerable Klan 
activity in the city, and that many of the police, firemen, and streetcar conductors were members; Hunter, 
Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 147.  
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Long before Jim Crow, city authorities controlled Black areas with unjust measures by 
sometimes (literally) turning off the municipal spigot. Those citizens received far less than their 
fair share of public services like running water, schools, sewer lines, and street lighting. Even the 
streets in Black neighborhoods remained “unwashed, unswept, and unmended,” despite near-
constant protests from the African American media and leadership. Only one city institution 
would never be charged with a lack of attention to African American citizens, at least while they 
were on the street in a white section of town: the police department.367  
African Americans made up a constituency easily ignored as they could not vote in most 
municipal elections. No city official’s job depended on African American ballots; whites 
comprised the critical voting bloc. Only when seeking the passage of bond referenda did elite 
policymakers and government authorities patronize the Black electorate by promising to build 
new schools or extend sewer lines in exchange for their support. Otherwise, African American 
neighborhoods seldom entered into the political calculations of those in power, i.e., white men.  
 Whether by police harassment or withholding vital utilities, civic leaders ensured that 
almost one third of its population was less healthy, less safe, and had fewer educational and 
economic opportunities. As Brownell’s notes, the commercial-civic elites’ manipulation of the 
distribution and utilization of municipal resources and facilities functioned as a means of 
institutionalized social control. Zoning would provide another hegemonic oversight tool for 
white authorities.368  
The paving and naming of roads also afforded very tangible means of separating citizens. 
A single street could serve as a physical delineator of racially-distinct sectors. Crossing through 
 
367 Atlanta Independent, May 29, 1920. 
368 Amsterdam, Roaring Metropolis: Businessmen's Campaign for a Civic Welfare State, 143; Brownell, 
The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 166. 
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an intersection, the modern asphalt or concrete paving might give way to an inferior surface, 
such as macadam or Belgian block, or no surfacing at all. The name of the roadway could 
change, often indicating that one had traversed between Black and white living spaces. Atlanta 
today retains numerous street name changes which appear random to the uninitiated and are 
frustrating to all. A typical example is the north-south thoroughfare, Glen Iris Avenue-Randolph 
Street, which runs through 1.3 miles of the old Fourth Ward district between Ponce de Leon 
Avenue on the north and Edgewood Avenue on the south. The northern, Glen Iris Avenue end 
housed whites in the 1920s, mostly Jews and persons of German descent. South of Highland 
Avenue, the named changed to Randolph Street and was exclusively African American.369 As 
former city mayor Maynard Jackson observed, “Whites didn’t want to live on the same street as 
blacks. So blacks lived on ‘Randolph Street’ and whites lived on ‘Glen Iris.’”370 Despite their 
location on the same street, the two neighborhoods remained physically and experientially 
distinct, exemplifying the two different Atlantas.  
6.2 Zoning: Segregating the City 
Zoning proved to be the most comprehensive and effective way to segregate the races in 
a citywide fashion, but it accomplished much more than that. It allowed city officials to organize, 
direct, and facilitate Atlanta’s explosive expansion. In a way, the place entrepreneurs had been 
almost too successful. Rapid and haphazard expansion had brought unforeseen problems, such as 
traffic congestion, which threatened to undermine the smooth functioning of the city and 
 
369 The 1925 Atlanta city directory is the first to list Glen Iris Drive (originally named Drive, today is 
Avenue), running north from Highland Avenue, a continuation of Randolph Street. Earlier city directories show 
Randolph Street running north to the city limits; from Atlanta City Directory 1925 (Atlanta: Atlanta City Directory 
Company, 1925), 1365, and Atlanta City Directory 1923 (Atlanta: Atlanta City Directory Company, 1923), 1463. 
370 Pomerantz, Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: A Saga of Race and Family, 18. Maynard Holbrook 
Jackson, Jr. (1938-2003), grandson of legendary Black leader, John Wesley Dobbs, was Atlanta’s first African 
American mayor, serving three terms: 1974-82, and 1990-94. Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport is partially 
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jeopardize the very growth it sought. Yet it was not solely for local well-being that they sought to 
tame the civic disorder. They had positioned Atlanta as a regional leader with an increasingly 
national reputation which could suffer if the problems associated with progress continued. 
Zoning provided a tool by which the growth coalition could maintain its position of control 
within the city while allowing it to correct existing problems, encourage economic growth, and 
take advantage of development opportunities in newly-annexed city territory.371 
Zoning, in its segregation of land uses, separated where people lived from where they 
worked, shopped, worshipped, and sought services (e.g., banks, barbershops, the post office, hair 
salons), entertainment (e.g., theaters, restaurants, sports venues), and recreation (e.g., parks). 
Slowly, the city was being reconfigured so that owning an automobile was becoming more of a 
necessity. Between 1900 and the start of World War I, the majority of car owners lived in rural 
areas. Urban dwellers could walk or take a trolley to most places in town. All that was about to 
change.  
U.S. cities had, from the 1600s, directed how property owners could use their land, 
whether it was keeping pigs off public roads or requiring fireproof construction of buildings. 
During the 1800s, regulating land use by means of deed restrictions and land covenants was 
common, but enforcement difficulties led most American cities to terminate these forms of 
private regulation. By the 1920s, municipalities had turned to a public and more comprehensive 
land-use strategy which utilized their delegated police powers to protect the public order, health, 
safety, and morals of the community by a local zoning ordinance.372  
 
371 Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 101-02, 24, 84.  
372 Garvin, The American City: What Works, What Doesn't, 428-30. Police powers are regulated by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and local authority to “police” land for the public 
welfare derives from state constitutions. Georgia first passed zoning enabling legislation for Atlanta’s City 
Commission in July 1921, effective in August; Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 
1924, Charter of the City of Atlanta, Ch. 26, § 403. The intricacies of the proper wording of the enabling legislation 
led U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, in 1924, to appoint a committee to draft the Standard State Zoning 
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Welke documents the widespread “regulatory urge” as part of the process of early 
twentieth century state formation. From railroad legislation in the late 1880s, Jim Crow laws in 
the 1890s, anti-trust and truth-in-advertising acts in the early 1900s, and traffic ordinances 
throughout the 1920s, government at all levels employed police power to regulate a broad 
spectrum of activities and relationships that previously had been viewed as “inappropriate for 
state intervention.” This centralization of authority, she explains, was often though not always 
designed to protect individual liberties from the expansive reach of corporations.373   
The creation of the traffic control system represented another example of this type of 
governmental interposition. The automobile, with the carnage and congestion it spawned, 
necessitated government action to protect the safety of the public, though in this instance by 
curtailing individual liberties in the roadways. Initiated in the early 1900s and exploding during 
the 1920s, the system extended the insinuating reach of regulatory power into the daily lives of 
American citizens through their use of the public streets.374  
In a similar fashion, zoning controlled Americans’ use of their private land. Another 
shrinking of personal freedoms, this intervention served to protect the welfare of the greater 
public, and was in direct reaction to urban growth. All of these actions were justified as the 
exercise of police power in the interest of the public welfare. Each served to expand and 
centralize government authority.375 
 
Enabling Act, widely used by states, and another effective federal maneuver to ensure national uniformity. It is not 
the purpose of this study to mine the details of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which 
regulated police powers, or recount the opinions in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), 
which affirmed the constitutionality of municipal zoning ordinances. However, fundamental knowledge of both is 
crucial to understanding the legal bases of much of the regulatory legislation passed in this time period. Both shed 
light on the mindsets of corporate and municipal actors. 
373 Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920, 351. 
374 Ibid., 377.  
375 Ibid., 351. Welke never references traffic control, street usage, or zoning laws in her study, but all three 
are consistent with her assertions about this era of government regulatory intervention which expanded and 
centralized state authority. 
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In the well-known 1926 zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court found a comparable justification for both traffic and zoning regulation. The court noted 
that building zone laws had existed in the U.S. for only about twenty-five years. During that 
time, the increase and concentration of urban populations created problems which necessitated 
new restrictions on the use and occupation of private land within city boundaries. “Such 
regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to 
those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit 
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable” [emphasis 
added]. The court basically acknowledged that Americans of an earlier era would properly have 
denounced the stringent new zoning and traffic laws, but a modern, urban society demanded 
government abridgement of individual liberties for the greater good of, presumably, everyone. 
But in the laws limiting land use, just as those limiting street use, there were winners and losers; 
“in the public interest” did not always equate to “in everybody’s interest.” Atlanta’s growth 
community, in both instances, acted to safeguard a primary interest: their continued ability to 
direct activities to ensure a vibrant, expanding municipal economy.376  
Surrounding land uses could directly affect conditions on city streets. The number of 
vehicles on the roads, the severe traffic congestion in downtown and its attendant damage to 
property and persons, even the types of vehicles predominantly in use in certain areas—all 
depended to a degree on the uses of the properties lining the roadways. Zoning not only affected 
activities on the public thoroughfares, those activities were part of the impetus for zoning in the 
first place.  
 
376 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), 386-87. The case found that the zoning 
ordinance of the Village of Euclid, Ohio (a Cleveland suburb) did not constitute an unreasonable extension of its 
police powers and was a valid exercise of authority, and it did not deprive Ambler of liberty and property without 
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case provided substantial support of the zoning precedent. 
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Opponents to zoning in Atlanta and elsewhere saw it as a gross intrusion of state power 
into their private property rights, which it was. Zoning advocates asserted its many positive 
effects, including the benefits which could accrue to the public streets. Height limitations on 
downtown buildings ensured that lower nearby structures and the surrounding roads could get 
sufficient light and air. Taller buildings meant more people and more traffic—burdens Atlanta’s 
narrow central streets could not bear. Limiting skyscraper heights reduced population density 
which facilitated traffic flow. Siting commerce and industry away from residential streets meant 
fewer cars parked at neighborhood curbs, and the absence of the dirt, noise, and disturbances 
caused by the bustle of workers, clients, shoppers, and vehicles coming and going. With heavy 
freight traffic kept off single-family housing streets, neighborhoods experienced fewer vehicle 
collisions, children could play in safety, and the quiet, home-like character of the area was 
preserved.377  
The creation of distinct commercial and manufacturing districts could even lead to 
economies in street paving. Heavy trucks continuously delivering goods and raw materials to and 
from stores and factories required durable and costly pavement, which now could be limited to 
those zoned areas. Less expensive paving sufficed for residential neighborhoods with their light-
weight, low-volume traffic.378 
But the most important benefit of a zoning system, far exceeding any other, was that it 
conserved property values. In many cases, it even increased property values. Segregating land 
uses facilitated that objective. Nobody wanted to live next door to a factory belching filth into 
 
377 Euclid v. Ambler, 394; Robert Harvey Whitten, “Atlanta Adopts Zoning,” American City 26, no. 6 (June 
1922): 542; “Zoning Plan for Atlanta,” City Builder 7, no. 10 (December 1921): 23; The Atlanta Zone Plan: Report 
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the sky; it was unpleasant and unhealthy. Nobody’s house in such a location would have a high 
resell value.379  
The minimum lot sizes which zoning imposed in some residential areas preserved 
property values by preventing overcrowding and congestion, which many would view as 
admirable goals.380 But they also excluded working-class people who could not afford to 
purchase a large lot or house. Collins Park, south of Buckhead, opened in 1922. Its average lot 
size was 100' x 300', selling for from $60-$100 per front foot; that is, between $6,000 and 
$10,000 per lot. An article about the new development stated, “It is probable that purchasers will 
be required to erect residences costing not less than $15,000;” in other words, working class 
families should look elsewhere.381 
The phrase “preserving property values” served as a class- or race-distinction signal, code 
for keeping out the riff-raff. These types of zoning restrictions acted like land covenants, but they 
had the advantages of covering the entire city and never reaching an expiration date. Lower-
class, multi-family, and African-American-occupied housing could be relegated to less-desirable 
areas of the city, away from the new suburbs and the older areas of the city that whites viewed as 
white.382  
As Richard Sennett asserts, the segmentation of zoning introduced a rational 
homogeneity which investors in new construction found reassuring. “They knew exactly what 
 
379 Hubbard and Hubbard, Our Cities to-Day and to-Morrow: A Survey of Planning and Zoning Progress in 
the United States, 188; Sting / The Police, “Synchronicity 2,” in Synchronicity (Quebec, Canada: A&M, December 
1982-February 1983). 
380 Whitten, The Atlanta Zone Plan: Report Outlining a Tentative Zone Plan for Atlanta, 6.  
381 Atlanta Constitution, July 30, 1922: “A Wonderful Opportunity to Invest Backed by Peachtree 
Subdivisions;” “Plan Fashionable Residential Park.” Collins Park is between Peachtree Street and Hemphill Avenue, 
south of West Wesley Avenue. 
382 Lands, The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in Atlanta, 1880-1950, 136. Her 
book provides an outstanding analysis of how white civic elites directed the development of Atlanta’s public and 
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kind of area they were putting their capital into.” Zoning regulations classified each residential 
area in two senses. First, it categorized every neighborhood by lot size, house price, and the 
presence of amenities like sidewalks, street lights, and parks. Second, those defining 
characteristics ensured that the occupants had sufficient wealth to purchase a home there. In 
effect, every suburb and residential neighborhood was “class-ified”—identified by the social 
class of the individuals who could afford to live there. As Robert Whitten preferred, the “bankers 
and leading business men lived in one part of town, storekeepers, clerks and technicians in 
another, and working people in yet others where they would enjoy the association with neighbors 
more or less of their own kind.” A zone plan ensured neighborhoods homogenized by wealth 
and, by proxy, class and race. It provided a legal mechanism to maintain exclusivity and bar 
undesirables.383    
Atlanta’s zoning system employed neither subterfuge nor euphemism when it came to 
skin color. Racial classification was an explicit component. The 1922 plan created, within 
residential areas, three race districts. R1 was “white;” R2 was “colored;” and R3 was 
“undetermined,” meaning that neither race comprised a majority of the occupants. It claimed to 
provide additional space for the housing areas of both white and “colored” groups to expand 
without encroaching upon each other’s territory (see population distribution map below).384  
Lands notes the progression marked in Atlanta’s introduction of racial classifications into 
its comprehensive land-use plan. In the race zoning efforts of the previous decade, whites had 
 
383 Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 135-36.  
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attempted to protect only their own neighborhoods from objectionable persons. In the new plan, 
they had moved “to formally sort the entire city.”385   
The map above shows the racial distribution of Atlanta’s population, with the African 
American areas highlighted in light red, and the city limits in green. The two largest 
concentration of African Americans are in the two areas north of the east-west rail line: Auburn 
Avenue to the east; Atlanta University Center to the west. South of that rail line are Summer Hill 
to the east, and Mechanicsville to the west, with the Clark University neighborhood south of 
both. The clustering shows how compact and discrete the space for Blacks was in the city.386 
 
385 Lands, The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in Atlanta, 1880-1950, 6. 
386 Map adapted by author from the Atlanta population distribution map in Beeler, Report to the City of 
Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 85. 
Figure 33. Racial distribution of Atlanta’s population, 1924. 
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“Preserving property values” was one of the main goals of zoning, as Atlanta’s plan 
frequently asserted. But the report did not, nor did it need to, utilize that phrase explicitly when 
discussing residential segregation. Whites universally believed that the presence of African 
Americans depreciated property values, except in servants’ quarters located at the back of the big 
house. That assumption provided the most direct and effective argument for race-based zoning, 
according to Johnson, who recites this common example. “When Negroes move into a block, 
there frequently follows a rapid exodus of white residents who put up their property for forced 
sale and accept the loss as inevitable.” By not allowing Blacks to move in at all, zoning 
maintained higher property assessments for whites.387 
Johnson asserts that, when it came to property values, African Americans were more 
often the symptom rather than the cause of their depreciation. Other factors undermined land 
values which bore no relation to the actual character and traits of African Americans. Much of 
affordable Black housing was situated in unattractive and unhealthy areas. He calls special 
attention to the negative effects of the automobile. Its display shops, garages, and filling stations 
dragged down the appearance and functionality of a residential neighborhood. The car itself 
made escape from the deteriorating conditions possible for wealthier families, while the poor had 
no option but to endure in place.388 
Isenberg notes that in the 1920s and 1930s, most of the real estate community believed 
that racial mixing to any degree led to depreciated properties. The early decades of the twentieth 
century had brought an immense movement of African Americans off the farms, into the cities, 
and out of the south. This unprecedented and unregulated mobility of a population once confined 
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to plantations as slaves or to white-owned farms as sharecroppers or tenants troubled many white 
leaders. Increased African American consumer activity, and the achievement of upward mobility 
and higher social status (some of them even owned automobiles!)  heightened white concerns 
and contributed directly to the institution of race-based zoning regulations. That the U.S. 
Supreme Court had ruled those ordinances unconstitutional did not stop Atlanta or other cities 
from continuing to enact racially-segregated neighborhoods.389  
No one debated whether or not Atlanta needed a zoning plan. A building boom, sparked 
by postwar pent-up demand, created new in-town neighborhoods, outlying suburban residential 
areas, and an expanded downtown district. Skyscrapers proliferated to the degree that the period 
1918-1930 won the designation as Atlanta’s second skyscraper era. An editorial spoke out about 
the failure of the city to meet the modern standard of governmental service to its inhabitants: 
“Everybody knows, and must admit, a situation that is patent: That Atlanta is suffering, every 
day of its existence under present conditions.” Mayor Key stated, “A zone plan is very essential 
to the city. It will prevent a vast amount of waste and destruction which has been going on 
account of the unrestricted and unrestrained power in each individual to build without regard to 
the welfare or development of the neighborhood.”390  
Uncontrolled growth and traffic congestion, coupled with the opportunity to implement a 
zoning solution, led directly to the creation of the city’s first legal planning commission in July 
1920. A myriad of problems confronted the six-man commission: increasing population, high 
demand for city utilities, gridlocked downtown streets, and random building construction. The 
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commission decided to tackle streets and buildings first. But, as Robert Otis, real estate 
developer and acting commission chair, observed, “zoning became such an all-absorbing 
question” that a separate sub-committee had to be formed just to deal with it.391 
The commission hired Robert H. Whitten, “perhaps the most influential zoning adviser in 
the United States,” as the city’s 
planning consultant in May 1921. 
His work on the city traffic plan was 
important, but he had a greater 
impact and augmented his national 
renown with his Atlanta zoning 
plan. Whitten studied the city while 
also embarking on an intense 
promotional campaign to explain the 
concept of a zoning system and its 
success in other major U.S. cities. 
He spent a substantial amount of 
time meeting with influential civic 
and professional groups to explain 
how a zoning plan would affect real 
estate investment. He also met with parent-teacher associations, religious organizations, and the 
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Figure 34. Atlanta un-zoned and zoned, 1922. 
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clubs of ordinary citizens to educate them about the work of the city planning commission. The 
local press greatly assisted his advertising efforts. News reports, editorials, and cartoons (see 
figure above) boosted the zone plan.392  
Whitten diligently courted the most powerful city leaders. At lunch meetings with the 
Atlanta Rotary Club in the posh Capital City Club dining room, he discussed depreciating 
property due to lack of zoning, and predicted ruinous results if the city’s haphazard building plan 
continued. At Chamber of Commerce forum luncheons, he reassured members about the 
constitutionality of zoning laws.393  
In December 1921, Whitten capped off his public relations efforts with an article in the 
Chamber of Commerce’s journal, the City Builder. This final appeal went to Atlanta’s business 
community just before his presentation to the planning commission. Using New York City as his 
prime example, he described residential blocks invaded by garages, stores, and apartment 
buildings, and downtown skyscrapers which blocked the air and light on downtown streets, 
reducing the rental values of lower-rise buildings. In 1916, New York had instituted 
comprehensive zoning—a plan, not incidentally, devised by Whitten.  
He previewed the general outline of the Atlanta plan, explaining the concepts of the use 
districts (residential, business, industrial), and the height and area zones superimposed over the 
use districts. He also introduced the big innovation—racially segregated residential districts. He 
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justified race zoning as essential to public peace, order, and security. It would, he insisted, 
promote the welfare and prosperity of both races without discrimination.394 
Atlanta’s planning commission, all members of the growth coalition, adopted the plan on 
January 2, 1922, and sent it to the city council’s ordinance committee for consideration. The pro-
zoning campaign continued, with five thousand copies of the report and maps printed and 
distributed. Whitten embarked again on the luncheon circuit for the hard sell, assisted by 
planning chair Robert R. Otis and H. D. Cutter, Jr., the commission’s engineer.395  
On Thursday, February 16—the day before the ordinance committee’s vote on zoning—
Whitten and his surrogates shifted into high gear. He lunched with the local chapter of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers at the elegant Winecoff Hotel, while Otis and Cutter 
attended the meeting of the Atlanta Real Estate Board at the Peacock Café. Whitten joined them 
later that afternoon. Both realtors and engineers voted to send delegates to appear before the 
ordinance committee in support of the zoning plan.396 
While Whitten met with realtors he, significantly, did not meet with any of the city’s 
Black real estate men. The term “realtor” applied only to white men, and was the designation 
given only to those affiliated with the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB). 
That group had formed in Chicago in 1908 as the National Association of Real Estate 
Exchanges, but changed their name in 1916. At the same time, they adopted the term “realtor” to 
identify white real estate professionals who were members of their organization and subscribed 
to its strict code of ethics. They would register the terms “REALTOR” and “REALTORS” with 
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the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 1949. In 1947, Black real estate agents would form their 
own national organization, the National Association of Real Estate Brokers (NAREB), adopting 
the slogan “Democracy in Housing,” and copyrighting their own professional designator, 
“REALTIST.” Meanwhile, Atlanta’s white power structure completely omitted any Black real 
estate professionals from the discussions about zoning the city.397 
At the meeting of the city council ordinance committee on Friday, February 17, 1922, 
opposition to the zone plan arose from Atlanta’s city attorney, J. W. Mayson, and Judge E. C. 
Kontz, who said zoning was unconstitutional and declared that it would strip citizens of their 
legal rights. Endorsements for the plan came from elites such as eminent developer Forrest Adair 
for the realty board, builder Victor H. Kriegshaber for the civil engineers, architect P. Thornton 
Marye representing the American Institute of Architects, realtor Benjamin D. Watkins, and the 
Ansley Park Civic League.  
A number of groups and individuals urged modifications of the plan where it affected 
their particular interests. Thomas H. Connally requested an exception for his new building, then 
under construction at the corner of Whitehall and Alabama streets. It had been designed to be 16 
stories, which exceeded the 12-story, 150' height limit in the proposed zone plan. As construction 
technologies improved, buildings in this time period were reaching new heights, sometimes 
eliciting outcries of dismay from local citizens or next-door property owners. The Building 
Owners and Managers’ Association, a national group, represented large and powerful real estate 
interests—including brokers, builders, investors, and property owners; Atlanta’s local chapter 
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was no exception. The group, sometimes called the “skyscraper men,” led the fight against any 
height limits, claiming that such restrictions threatened property values. The city council would 
grant Connally a variance for his tall building in 1922, and in 1929, would raise the downtown 
building height limit to 325' with no setbacks required, effectively demolishing the height 
restriction.398 
With all the controversy, the ordinance committee tabled their vote, pending further 
study. The battle for Whitten’s zone plan continued in the pages of the local newspapers, with 
much of the opposition coming from real estate men. Some saw zoning as a threat to their private 
interests while insisting publicly that it would throttle city growth. Adair admitted the 
disagreements, but emphasized that the Atlanta Real Estate Board unanimously indorsed the 
plan. Ward Wight, board president, said that no more than 10% of realty dealers opposed zoning, 
and the ones who did owned properties which might be adversely affected. As in the on-street 
parking dilemma, the divided members of the growth coalition did not hesitate loudly and 
actively to disagree when a policy might hamper or harm their personal financial interests. 
Unlike the never-resolved curbside parking problem, however, a clear majority prevailed in the 
zoning dispute.399  
Generally, zoning in Atlanta met with less resistance than that encountered by other 
cities, despite three spirited public hearings and some bitter fights in the ordinance committee. At 
one of the hearings, Judge Kontz declared that racially segregated neighborhoods had already 
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been found illegal, and predicted the overturn of Atlanta’s plan. Mayor Key pointedly asked him, 
“Are you opposed to separation of whites and blacks?” In an artful dodge, Kontz replied that he 
was simply stating the law, and did not care to indulge in personal views. On March 31, by a 
vote of 4 to 1, the ordinance committee approved the law, and sent it to the city council.400  
On April 10, 1922, the city council adopted the zoning system ordinance, by a vote of 24 
to 3. Alderman J. L. Carpenter attacked the ordinance, calling it one of the most vicious laws the 
city had ever passed. He criticized the experts from “up north” whom he held responsible, and 
vowed to “fight ‘em to the finish. I’ll build to the moon if I want to.” Mayor Key signed the 
ordinance the next day.401  
Most zoning laws tended to fix the already-established development patterns, and 
Atlanta’s did the same. Major shifts in the building and commercial activities over the previous 
twenty years had already altered the city’s central business district, where older residential streets 
such as Peachtree, Whitehall, and Washington were gradually giving way to business and 
industrial uses. Whitten’s plan introduced no major changes, but followed the existing 
trajectories where business extended north along Peachtree Street, and industrial enterprises 
expanded south and west along Peters, Lee, and Whitehall streets. His only real innovation in the 
Atlanta plan was the explicit racial zoning.402  
 
400 “City Zoning Plan Praised and Hit by Civic Leaders,” Atlanta Constitution, March 11, 1922. 
401  “Complete Zone Plan, Recommended for City by Planning Commission, Adopted by Council,” Atlanta 
Constitution, April 11, 1922; Amsterdam, Roaring Metropolis: Businessmen's Campaign for a Civic Welfare State, 
131; Whitten, “Atlanta Adopts Zoning,” 541-42. 
402 Lyon, “Business Buildings in Atlanta: A Study in Urban Growth and Form,” 373; Beeler, Report to the 
City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 2. 
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When the city adopted Whitten’s zone system, it won the dubious distinction of being the 
nation’s first “to embody in an outspoken form segregation along the line of social composition 
of the population.” Silver maintains that Atlanta’s plan was the most celebrated post-Buchanan 
v. Warley residential segregation plan. The 1922 plan’s race zone section did not differ greatly 
from the city’s 1913 and 1917 racial zoning ordinances, both declared unconstitutional, except it 
employed the professional language of zoning and was part of a city-wide plan. The lack of 
substantive change in the framing of the racial segregation portion of the plan should have 
alerted the planning commission to the coming rejection of the ordinance.403  
Notable by its almost total absence 
was any controversy over the racial 
component of Whitten’s plan—at least in 
the white press. Leaders of the white real 
estate community already agreed that any 
African American property constituted a bad risk and should be kept segregated. However, 
whites often owned the properties rented by Blacks because, as the ad above said, “For an 
investment it can’t be beat.” A national journal observed, “The Atlanta plan is the first which 
makes a distinction concerning type of residents as well as types of residence. To judge from the 
support it has received from the local newspapers and organizations of citizens, it seems to 
answer the prevailing desire of the white Atlantans.”404  
 
403 “The Atlanta Zoning Plan,” 114. Baltimore enacted the first comprehensive racial zoning ordinance in 
the U.S. in December 1910. Christopher Silver, “The Racial Origins of Zoning: Southern Cities from 1910-1940,” 
Planning Perspectives 6, no. 2 (May 1991): 197. In 1917, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled racial zoning 
unconstitutional, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
404  Johnson, Negro Housing: Report of the Committee on Negro Housing, 48; “The Atlanta Zoning Plan,” 
115. The article did go on to warn about the precedent the Atlanta zone plan set, that it might open the way for new 
restrictions against immigrants or those of other races, religions, occupations, or modes of life. Whitten personally 
responded to the article, dismissing the writer’s fear of restrictions against immigrants or others as something so 
Figure 35. Real estate ad, Atlanta 
Constitution, May 31, 1924. 
229 
The outcomes of the zone plan on Black Atlantans elicited a different response. Despite 
their already crowded living conditions, the new plan provided no overall expansion of Black 
residential areas. The zoning ordinance map virtually deconstructed one eastside African 
American neighborhood, and segregated the majority of others on the west side of the city. 
Whitten claimed that there were “very few buildings of any value” in that eastside space, and 
opportunities existed for its improvement. His so-called valueless buildings primarily housed 
African Americans and their small shops. The plan called for their wholesale removal and 
replacement with white commercial and apartment house districts. Despite Whitten’s assertion 
that sufficient area for extending housing space for both races, Blacks found themselves more 
closely circumscribed by the plan within the city sectors they already occupied. No new space 
existed for them in the outlying suburbs, which were reserved exclusively for white residents.405  
In 1923, Benjamin J. Davis, editor of the Atlanta Independent, wrote about other 
proposed city actions which, if enacted, would displace African Americans. Zoning, he claimed, 
had already drastically reduced where they could live, and their overcrowded residential districts 
had little room to spare. The only remaining option was for African Americans to migrate out of 
the city to find jobs and space. Davis predicted their leaving would constitute a devastating 
economic loss to the city, and most Black leaders agreed. A full year would pass, though, before 
relief appeared via judicial authority.406 
 
foolish that it would never be seriously considered or attempted; Robert Harvey Whitten, “Social Aspect of Zoning,” 
Survey 48, no. 10 (June 15, 1922): 418. He did not anticipate the follies of the 45th president. 
405 “Whitten Would Widen Downtown Streets to Relieve Increasing Jam of Traffic,” Atlanta Constitution, 
August 20, 1922. The area Whitten was talking about was scribed by North Avenue to the north, Courtland Street to 
the west, Edgewood Avenue to the south, and Bedford Place/Fort Street to the east. Bedford Place today is Central 
Park Place to the north, Fort Street to the south, and access roads to the Downtown Connector in between. Whitten’s 
disrespect for the homes and people living in them was echoed years later when the interstates carved up Atlanta, 
taking a part of this same section of African American housing. Amsterdam, Roaring Metropolis: Businessmen's 
Campaign for a Civic Welfare State, 131; Lands, The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in 
Atlanta, 1880-1950, 153. 
406 Benjamin J. Davis, “The Colored Man Bottled In,” Atlanta Independent, August 20, 1923. 
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 On October 12, 1924, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled the racial districting portion of 
Atlanta’s zoning plan unconstitutional.407 Two years later, the court ruled the city’s entire zoning 
ordinance was unconstitutional, based in part on the unconstitutionality of the state enabling 
legislation.408 That ruling basically meant that no zoning anywhere in Georgia was valid. Within 
a year, the bad effects of a lack of zoning could be seen in the Atlanta. A local editorial 
documented the evidence, with automobile structures mentioned as part of the chaotic, beauty-
destroying, zone-less infill.    
Since the zoning law in Atlanta was killed, the suburbs of Atlanta—even the 
close-in residence districts—have become a hodge podge with garages, grocery 
stores, filling stations, and the like, destroying not merely the old resident sections 
but materially damaging the home owners. And yet there is no recourse and 
cannot be until a zoning law is enacted.409 
 
The editor called for new zoning which would preserve the city’s aesthetic appeal, 
segregate and systematize construction, enhance values, and give new impetus to development. 
His words could have been taken from a Molotch growth machine action plan, and might as well 
have been. The editorial demonstrated the how the media, itself a member, promoted the goals of 
the group. Another zone plan was needed soon; Atlanta was suffering. 
A “prominent realtor in Atlanta” described the enormous injury to the city by the sudden 
revocation of all zoning restrictions. Builders and developers had moved quickly to construct 
 
407 Bowen v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145 (1924); “Segregation Section Is Unconstitutional,” Atlanta 
Constitution, October 18, 1924.  
408 Smith v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 769 (1926); the ruling was handed down on February 11, 1926. 
Subsequent to Smith, in 1928 the Georgia General Assembly approved an amendment to the state constitution 
granting Atlanta, and other cities with a population of 25,000 or more, the power to pass zoning and planning laws; 
Georgia Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 7, Par. 25, ratified November 6, 1928. The 1921 change in Atlanta’s city charter 
had been deemed insufficient to empower the city to enact a zoning ordinance. 
409 “Atlanta Needs Zoning Law,” Atlanta Constitution, June 10, 1927. 
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whatever they could wherever they pleased before another new zone plan emerged. He estimated 
that, between 1926 and 1928, the damages from the lack of zoning amounted to $15,000,000.410  
This scale of economic loss did not accord with the goals of the pro-growth advocates, 
nor did the harm to both Atlanta’s and Georgia’s reputations. Efforts immediate began to 
remediate the damages, as city councilmen worked to create a sustainable city zoning law. In 
addition, the mayor, council members, and county and state officials met to seek a state 
constitutional amendment to enable zoning. Their endeavors ultimately succeeded.411  
The General Assembly in 1927 created a new City Planning Commission as part of the 
Atlanta’s city charter, giving it very broad powers, including the power to regulate streets and 
sidewalks, relieve traffic and congestion, develop housing, and establish zones or districts to 
promote the public interests, health, morals, safety, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the 
city. In the 1928 November election, an amendment to the state constitution gave Georgia cities 
with populations of 25,000 or more the authority to pass zoning and planning laws, and on 
December 21, Mayor Ragsdale signed the new zoning ordinance approved by city council that 
same day.412  
The new law did not include a racial segregation component, but that did not mean that 
race was no longer a consideration for guiding Atlanta’s growth. Other invidious means of 
excluding specific populations from certain residential sectors remained available: required 
minimum lot and building sizes, along with prohibiting apartments effectively ensured the 
exclusivity of higher-end neighborhoods. As Lands notes, white elites “created a collection of 
 
410 Hubbard and Hubbard, Our Cities to-Day and to-Morrow: A Survey of Planning and Zoning Progress in 
the United States, 188. The realtor was not named in the report. 
411 Atlanta Constitution: “White To Seek City Zoning Law,” February 6, 1927; “Atlanta Needs Zoning 
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412  “Republicans Break Through Democratic Ranks in Fulton; Hoover Given 462 Majority,” Atlanta 
Constitution, November 7, 1928; “Zoning Ordinance Goes Into Effect,” Atlanta Constitution, December 22, 1928; 
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cultural constructions around property that effectively stood in for one another.” Class zoning 
substituted for race zoning; language about tenants and rentals took the place of racist rhetoric; 
and the phrase “preserving property values” never lost its power to persuade.413  
Amsterdam estimates that “by 1930, roughly 60 percent of Atlanta’s eighty-five thousand 
African Americans would live in just three of the city’s wards. Those three were also the city’s 
most populous.” Although all three of Atlanta’s racial zoning ordinances were declared 
unconstitutional, racial segregation continued in practice, and the city maintained its tightly-
circumscribed African American residential districts, adhering to its conception of two separate 
Atlantas.414 
6.3 Black Atlanta in the 1920s 
Dana White observes that “Biracial is the qualifier that best describes the history and 
geography of Atlanta. There have always been . . . two Atlantas—one white, the other black.” 
Before Jim Crow, the city was racially divided. Clusters of Black working-class communities 
sprouted around factories, warehouses, stockyards, and railroad maintenance shops. As a result, 
ninety percent of the city’s Black population lived within a radius of two miles from the business 
center.415  
 
413 “Commentary on Village of Euclid V. Ambler Realty Corporation (1926),” in Urban Planning and the 
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Most of the city’s African Americans dwelt in these racially-defined and overcrowded 
locales. Although their numbers increased during the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
they declined as a proportion of the total population (see table below). The 1920 census showed 
that the state experienced 
only a 0.4% overall 
population growth, much 
of it due to the loss of 
more than 11% of its 
Black inhabitants. The decade began with plummeting cotton prices, part of the national 
economic and industrial malaise. Adding to the state’s woes, the boll weevil devastated the 
cotton fields. Increasingly, the mechanization of farming replaced laborers, horses, and mules 
with motorized equipment.416  
Many people abandoned agriculture altogether, hoping to find jobs in southern towns and 
cities. Even more African American farm workers left the state as part of the Great Migration. 
Newspaper articles downplayed the exodus of Georgia’s African Americans, but unquestionably 
a northward movement was underway. Bishop Joseph Simeon Flipper (1859-1944), former 
Chancellor of Morris Brown University and head of the A. M. E. Church of Atlanta, maintained 
that African Americans left the south because they sought “equal protection of life and property 
and equal justice in the courts.” The remedy for Black migration, Bishop Flipper asserted, lay in 
the hands of the white man. But no such relief was forthcoming; equality and justice remained 
elusive; and thousands of African Americans continued to leave the state. The 1920 census 
 
416 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933; Numan V. Bartley, The 
Creation of Modern Georgia, 2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 170-71.  
1890 65,533 37,416 57% 28,098 43%
1900 89,872 54,090 60% 35,727 40%
1910 154,839 98,451 64% 51,902 34%
1920 200,616 137,785 66% 62,796 31%
1930 270,366 180,247 67% 90,075 33%
Black % of TotalPopulation
Census 
Year White % of Total
Table 11. Atlanta’s Black & White Populations, 1890-1930 
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showed Atlanta with only a modest 2% increase in its Black population as whites outnumbered 
Blacks more than two to one.417 
Atlanta’s Black pro-growth advocates, however, remained committed to improving local 
conditions as well as sustaining their own commercial enterprises. They worried about 
overcrowding in African-American neighborhoods, the lack of housing and jobs, and they urged 
a more equitable distribution of government services. Like their white counterparts, they saw the 
city as an economic generator, and they did not encourage their communities—or customers— to 
relocate up north; rather, they sought to halt the exodus. The Black press also discouraged 
migration as bad for business.418  
By 1930, the percentage of Blacks to whites in the city had slightly increased. In accord 
with Du Bois’ 1911 principle of internal integration, Atlanta’s African Americans embraced their 
sense of solidarity and self-reliance. They patronized Black businesses and grew their civic 
organizations such as the Neighborhood Union and the Atlanta Urban League. They expanded 
and enhanced their educational institutions. Women’s clubs and religious groups strove to 
improve neighborhood living conditions. The African American community and its leaders also 
continued to protest lynchings, resist the terroristic Ku Klux Klan, call for full enfranchisement, 
and demand revocation of Jim Crow laws. To the eternal shame of the United States of America, 
another hundred years would pass before Congress finally passed a federal anti-lynching law.419 
 
417 Atlanta Constitution: “No Alarming Exodus of Georgia Negroes, State Survey Shows,” February 4, 
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African American businessmen, along with their white counterparts, sought continuous 
expansion for Atlanta. They applauded Mayor Key’s 1920 goal of a city population of 500,000 
by 1930, although their model metropolis would include social justice and exclude racial 
discrimination—two items absent from the white leaders’ formulation. The Atlanta Independent 
urged, “Let us build the greatest city in the south where race relations are most cordial and 
employment most abundant for every man who is willing to work; where the enforcement of all 
laws is the slogan of every citizen without regard to race, color or previous condition of 
servitude.” Common goals of increased commerce and growth led Black and white elites to 
occasionally do business together, but in their disparate visions of the ideal city, the two different 
Atlantas endured.420 
The geographic boundaries of those two Atlantas did not remain entirely static. Two 
shattering events in the previous two decades, the 1906 race riot and the 1917 great fire, caused 
large numbers of African Americans to relocate away from the city center. The riot led many to 
congregate in the Eastern Business District, effectively creating an African American equivalent 
of the city’s central business district. It centered on Auburn Avenue. The fire destroyed large 
numbers of homes in the Fourth Ward, the elite residential section for African Americans. Many 
sought housing around the Atlanta University Center, the west-side cluster of Black institutions 
of higher learning.421  
 
https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20200224/BILLS-116hr35-SUSv2.pdf; Felicia Sonmez, “House Passes 
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The twenties saw the continued concentration of African American enterprises on and 
near Auburn Avenue. A profusion of banks, offices, real estate companies, stores, restaurants, 
civic and professional associations, social groups, and entertainment venues joined the long-
established churches. Black leaders located their businesses and office buildings there. The 
Atlanta Urban League, with offices on Auburn, persuaded the city to repave three blocks of the 
“black” portion of the street in time for the 1921 meeting of the National Negro Business 
League. That same year, the city’s only public library for African Americans opened at the 
corner of Auburn Avenue and Courtland Street. The Butler Street Y.M.C.A., often called 
Atlanta’s “Black City Hall” because it was home to so many influential African American 
organizations, opened its new facility in 1920 at 22 Butler Street [Jesse Hill, Jr. Dr.], half a block 
south of Auburn Avenue. Wealthy entrepreneurs Alonzo Herndon and David T. Howard made 
substantial contributions to the building fund, and Alexander Hamilton (1870-1944) was the 
African American builder who implemented the Y’s design by noted architectural firm Hentz, 
Reid & Adler.422  
The Prince Hall Masonic fraternity, which welcomed Black men from the upper and 
middle classes, had its temple at 330-334 Auburn Avenue. Between 1908 and 1924, its 
membership grew from 82 to 24,000, and the building provided a gathering place. The Masons 
published the weekly Atlanta Independent, the first Black newspaper in the city. It had offices on 
the fifth floor of the Odd Fellows Building at 228-250 Auburn Avenue. The editor, Benjamin J. 
Davis, the Masonic Imperial Potentate, was considered one of the city’s most powerful African 
American leaders. In 1928, William Alexander Scott started the Atlanta Daily World newspaper 
 
422 “Urban League Weekly Bulletin,” Atlanta Constitution, July 31, 1921; “Negro Y.M.C.A. Building Will 
Open on May 16,” Atlanta Constitution, May 9, 1920. NOTE: All Auburn Avenue addresses in this section utilize 
the latest street numbers, which date from 1926.  
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in a former print shop at 145 Auburn Avenue. Initially a weekly, by 1932, it was the only 
African American daily in the United States.423  
Entrepreneur extraordinaire Heman Edward Perry (1873-1929) also expanded his 
business empire on Auburn Avenue. To his 1909 Standard Life Insurance Company, he added 
Citizens Trust Bank in 1921, the second bank established by Blacks in Atlanta. His remarkable 
advertisement of the stunning achievement of the bank’s inception appeared on page six of the 
Atlanta Constitution (see advertisement below424). His 1917 Service Company expanded into an 
umbrella corporation. Standard Life, Citizens Trust, and the Service Company were housed in 
Perry’s three-story building at 210 Auburn Avenue, while his many subsidiary enterprises were 
located on or around the avenue. Henderson accurately asserts that, with these various 
enterprises, “Perry initiated a substantial part of the business foundation of the modern black 
community in Atlanta.”425  
Not until the 1930s did John Wesley Dobbs bestow the name “Sweet Auburn” on the 
street, but well before then, the avenue had the reputation of housing the largest concentration of 
African American financial institutions in the nation. Numerous explanations for Dobbs’ 
selection of the term “sweet” exist. Most compelling is Calloway’s assertion that Dobbs gave it 
 
423 Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:842. Scott started the 
World after he purchased Heman Perry’s failed printing company and its equipment which had been housed at 145 
Auburn Avenue. 
424 Perry’s advertisement, crafted to appeal to white investors as well as his Black clientele, extolled the 
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425 Henderson, “Heman E. Perry and Black Enterprise in Atlanta, 1908-1925,” 226-27. The Service 
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that name after hearing the expression, “there’s nothing sweeter than money,” an 
acknowledgement of the consolidation of Black wealth and commerce there.426 
Whatever motivated its selection, the name “Sweet Auburn” stuck, and partly because of 
it, Auburn Avenue became and remains, the second most famous street name in Atlanta.427 The 
street’s physical space, as well as its name, emblemized Black Atlanta. In a time of lynchings, 
 
426 Calloway, The “Sweet Auburn Avenue” Business History, 1900-1988, 2. For a more poetic version, see 
the National Register of Historic Places nomination for the “Sweet Auburn Historic District,” NRIS 76000631, 
1976. 
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Figure 36. Heman Perry’s ad, Atlanta Constitution, October 31, 1923. 
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disfranchisement, Jim Crow restrictions, and daily humiliations, it endured as a palpable 
presence—a place— which enabled as well as displayed the strivings and successes of the 
community. Their limited access to space in Atlanta forced African Americans to focus their 
attentions and concentrated energies within their defined enclaves. Territorially and 
psychologically, Auburn Avenue emerged as a space which projected and protected Black 
culture and identity. It exemplified Lefebvre’s complex concept of global social space: a 
geographical location, a generator of social structures, a place of production as well as a 
commodity itself, a political instrument, and a means for and facilitator of creative expression.428 
In the 1920s, the avenue was not entirely occupied by Black entities. Around Piedmont 
Avenue stood a side-by-side racial mix of businesses. Farther east was solely African American. 
On the west end of the street, however, some well-known white enterprises resided, including the 
very exclusive Atlanta Athletic Club, Haverty Furniture, J. K. Orr’s shoe company, and Alvin L. 
Belle Isle’s garage and taxi service. Ironically, even the Ku Klux Klan had an Auburn Avenue 
address for a time. The two Atlantas might be separate, but sometimes they were not very far 
apart.429  
During the decade, another Black enclave, ultimately larger than the Auburn Avenue 
district, emerged. Heman Perry did not limit his vision to the Eastern Business District, but 
looked west. Since the 1890s, a Black residential section had clustered around the African 
American institutes of higher learning in Ward One: Morehouse College, Spelman College, and 
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429 Atlanta City Directory, 1921 (Atlanta: Atlanta City Directory Company, 1921), 1223-25. The Ku Klux 
Klan office was, for a time in the early 1920s, on the third floor of the Haynes Building at 2½ Auburn Avenue, just 
off Peachtree Street. By 1923, the propaganda arm of the Klan, the Southern Publicity Association, had moved in. 
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Atlanta University.430 But these all adhered to the dictate of the acknowledged east-west racial 
dividing line, Ashby Street [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.], which limited Blacks to sections east of 
Ashby. Perry, through his many business affiliates, broke that residential color line by 
purchasing land west of Ashby, building houses, and offering financing to prospective 
homeowners. He opened Atlanta’s western suburbs to African Americans for the first time.431  
Technically, the city had already crossed the line in 1919. First, the Atlanta Board of 
Education voted to make the white Ashby Street School (on the west side of the street) into a 
grammar school for African American children due to changing demographics in the area. Later 
that year, the city created Washington Park by accepting a land donation from a group of white 
churches. That first city park exclusively for Blacks was technically also on the “wrong” side of 
the color line; the former barrier was slowly being erased through multiple transgressions.432   
In 1920, Heman Perry purchased seventeen acres of land near Atlanta University, hoping 
eventually to develop it into an African American residential neighborhood, even though it lay 
literally on the wrong side of the street. In 1922, he persuaded the school board to buy some of 
that land for the city’s first Black public secondary school. Booker T. Washington High School 
was constructed with bond money from the 1921 Spring Street viaduct referendum, and opened 
in the fall term of 1924.433 
 
430 On April 1, 1929, Morehouse College president John Hope, Atlanta University president Myron Adams, 
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The city’s establishment of public facilities for African Americans beyond an established 
racial divide in no way indicated that officials were moving to integrate the west side. The 
balkanizing of African Americans into geographically distinct enclaves remained the policy in 
spite of necessary boundary adjustments. Dana White states that “controlled segregation was the 
accommodation arrived at.”434 
The nearby locations of these amenities—a grammar school, a combination junior-senior 
high school, and a public park—proved successful draws for middle-class African Americans. 
Perry purchased some 300 additional acres west of Ashby Street [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.] for a 
new development in the area known today as Washington Park. His earliest subdivision opened 
in the two blocks east of the high school, beginning with homes along C Street [Whitehouse 
Drive]. In 1924, he had West View Park under construction farther north.435 Understanding that 
the city usually skimped on public resources in Black neighborhoods, Perry successfully pushed 
officials to extend paving, electricity, water, sewer, and gas lines to his developments.436 
African Americans in the Washington Park area were primarily middle-class white collar 
or skilled workers. Many owned their own homes and could afford some modern household 
conveniences. But fewer African Americans owned automobiles than whites in comparable 
suburbs. Even by the mid-1930s, less than 12% of the homeowners on Ashby Street had cars. 
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Most had to rely on the streetcars for transportation around the city—for work, church, shopping, 
or recreational activities. 437  
If west siders needed to get anywhere in the Eastern Business District, they could easily 
hop a Route 3 trolley at the corner of Ashby [Joseph E. Lowery Blvd.] and West Hunter [M.L.K. 
Jr. Dr.], passing through Five Points and continuing the length of Auburn Avenue as far as 
Boulevard. The 2.85-mile trip connecting the city’s two major African American enclaves 
supported the Beeler Report’s claim that ninety percent of the Atlanta’s Blacks lived within a 
two-mile radius of the central business district. Although the line terminated at both ends in 
densely-populated Black neighborhoods, it also travelled through the heart of downtown. Whites 
would certainly have ridden Route 3, especially on the central part of the line, and they would 
have encountered African Americans there.438 
6.4 Semi-Segregated Streetcars 
Streetcars remained a flashpoint for confrontations between the races. In a 1920 public 
speech, Ku Klux Klan Imperial Wizard W. J. Simmons directed some of his ire at Atlanta’s 
streetcars which, he claimed, violated Georgia’s mandatory segregated transportation laws. He 
urged racially distinct trolleys, not just separate seating sections. Despite the Klansman’s fiery 
demand, the traction company retained its long-held economic decision not to provide racially-
defined individual streetcars. Whites and Blacks continued to share each trolley, with whites 
sitting in front while African Americans stood or sat in the back. For Georgia Railway & Power, 
financial considerations could transcend the dictates of Jim Crow.439  
 
437 Crimmins, “Bungalow Suburbs East and West,” 92. 
438  Route 3 was the Boulevard-West Hunter line; Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local 
Transportation, 2, 13; O. E. Kauffman, “Kauffman's Map of the City of Atlanta and Suburbs,” (Atlanta: Southern 
Map, 1921). 
439 “Relations of Races Discussed at Rally,” Atlanta Constitution, June 14, 1920; Welke, Recasting 
American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920, 279. 
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On two levels, Atlanta’s streetcars regulated and reflected the spaces open to African 
American occupation within the city. Inside the trolley car, Blacks were relegated to the back 
sections at all times. If the streetcar became crowded and whites needed more seating, African 
Americans had to give up their seats and stand farther back. Outside the trolley car, some 
streetcar routes ran to the segregated Black enclaves, while others ran to nearby white residential 
sections. The geographies of the streetcar routes themselves often demarcated the boundaries of 
Black communities, while simultaneously providing a means of escaping beyond those 
boundaries.440  
This spatial ordering of African American travel, whether defining which line to use or 
dictating where to sit, reflected and protected the hierarchy of race. The traction company did 
have limits in how far it would go to accommodate Jim Crow. As in its refusal to provide 
racially-separate trolleys, the company built race-based, geographically-separate routes only 
when there was sufficient traffic to bear the expense of two lines; in other words, only if both 
were profitable.441  
In its catalog of Atlanta streetcar routes, the Beeler Report made a point of noting which 
lines carried which races. The Route 4 line served a “high-class white section” on the north 
(Emory University), and a “mostly white” territory on the south (Grant Park). But in between the 
two, it had to pass through “a colored section.”442 Similarly, the document reported that the 
Route 1 Decatur Street-Marietta Street line had an African American district on its eastern end 
and passed many Black retail shops on Decatur Street. It made no mention of race when 
 
440 Brian McCammack, “‘My God, They Must Have Riots on Those Things All the Time’: African 
American Geographies and Bodies on Northern Urban Public Transportation, 1915-1940,” Journal of Social History 
43, no. 4 (Summer 2010): 975.  
441 Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920, 250. 
442 Beeler, Report to the City of Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 14. 
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describing Marietta Street—an indicator that that street’s buildings housed primarily white 
enterprises. It did comment that the road’s expansive 60'-90' street width attracted “much 
automobile parking.”443 
The Beeler Report did more than just describe streetcar routes. It also suggested ways to 
minimize contact between the races, insofar as it was economically feasible. Route 13 began just 
west of Joel Hurt’s white—and exclusive— Inman Park neighborhood. It ran through mostly 
Black Fourth Ward, into downtown, west through the Black Atlanta University district, then 
south into the white West End. However, few white riders from West End took that trolley. The 
report recommended eliminating that section, and initiating a new route to connect West End 
directly to the Alabama Street commercial district. Besides giving whites a convenient 
connection to downtown shopping, the changes would “stop an essentially colored line from 
operating unnecessarily into white territory.” The authors of the Report understood the 
undesirability of race mixing on streetcars, and suggested ways to reinforce the separation 
between racially divided communities.444     
Atlanta’s older two-man trolleys had the entrance at the back and the exit in front. With 
the motorman driving the vehicle, the conductor stood at the rear entry collecting tickets and 
fares. White passengers complained about having to walk through the crammed Black section at 
the back to get to their seats up front. In 1925, the traction company introduced new one-man 
streetcars, in which the driver doubled as the conductor. The trolley entrance door was moved to 
 
443 Ibid., 10. 
444 Ibid., 23-24. 
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the front end of the vehicle, so Black passengers now had to traverse the length of the trolley to 
get to their area (see figure below).445  
Inevitable close encounters, especially on the mixed-race smoking platforms at the rear of 
the trolleys, quickly escalated into physical violence, frequently with weapons and often fatal. 
Newspapers printed sensational accounts of the many racially-charged altercations, fights, 
injuries, and deaths. Every such instance underscored for the traveling public the sometimes 
objectionable or even dangerous nature of a streetcar ride. No wonder individuals and families, 
whatever their race, purchased a car as soon as they could afford one. An automobile freed them 
not only from the geographic and scheduling constraints of mass transit, but also from the 
anxiety and stress of a likely uncomfortable, possibly perilous contact with a stranger in a 
streetcar.446 
 
445 Martin, Mule to Marta, 2, 1902-1950, 141-42.  The above description pertains to the Atlanta streetcars; 
elsewhere in the south, other customs prevailed. In Charlotte, NC, all trolley passengers entered and exited from the 
front of the streetcar, while in Memphis, TN, Blacks entered and exited from the rear while the whites did both at 
the front of the entrance. Some streetcars (though not in Atlanta) had moveable signs marked “White” on one side 
and “Colored” on the other, and could be changed to accommodate the changing racial profiles of passenger loads. 
For more details, see George S. Schuyler, “Traveling Jim Crow,” American Mercury 20, no. 80 (August 1930): 431. 
Figure 37 shows one of the forty new cars put into service by Georgia Railway & Power Company in 1925; 
AJCP552-068a, Atlanta Journal Constitution Photographic Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Georgia 
State University Library. 
446 Examples abound in the Atlanta Constitution, but such sensational accounts of conflicts on mass transit 
were not limited to southern newspapers; see McCammack, “‘My God, They Must Have Riots on Those Things All 
Figure 37. A front-loading “one-man safety car,” 1925. 
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One such confrontation happened on the smoking platform of a streetcar on where a 
white man, M. V. Ragsdale, was standing. A Black man, Ernest Williams, hopped on the running 
streetcar between stops, stepping on the white man’s toes in the process. An argument broke out. 
Another African American man struck Ragsdale with a billy club, and Williams pulled out a 
knife. Ragsdale drew a gun and shot him. The unnamed Black man jumped off the trolley and 
fled. Williams was taken to Grady Hospital and was not expected to live. Jumping on and off 
moving streetcars was illegal, but common. The incident underscored the fraught nature of even 
incidental physical contact between the races, and demonstrated how, literally, a trivial misstep 
quickly escalated into armed conflict and death.447  
In another fatal encounter, the African American man was not even riding on the trolley. 
On January 8, 1920, Sergeant Ernest Casey, a 17-year Army veteran, was shot and killed around 
8:00 p.m. on Auburn Avenue near Ivy Street [Peachtree Center Ave.]. Casey had been walking 
down the street, and apparently exchanged words with the conductor on a passing trolley. The 
motorman stopped the empty streetcar and the conductor got off and fired four shots at the 
unarmed Casey, who was running away. None of the witnesses got the trolley number, and 
Georgia Railway and Power Company filed no report of the incident. Police authorities said they 
believed the conductor shot the Black soldier in the back because of something he said. Military 
police at Camp Gordon, where Casey was stationed, said he had two previous arrests, and had 
been something of a trouble maker. In twenty-first century parlance, Casey was another victim of 
“living while Black.”448  
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Atlanta police were apparently stymied, but Coroner Paul Donehoo proved to be a 
Holmesian in his relentless investigation. The unidentified streetcar, out of service and heading 
to the car barn, carried no passengers at the time of the shooting. However, it had a driver as well 
as the conductor—an obviously reticent motorman who had not come forward. Comparing 
streetcar schedules with witness accounts, Coroner Donehoo tracked down all the out-of-service 
trolleys heading to the car barn between 7:30 and 8:30 p.m. on the date of the incident, and 
subpoenaed every motorman and conductor on those streetcars. During those interviews, he 
identified motorman J. W. Gibbs, who admitted that his conductor, J. T. Thrasher, did the 
shooting. A murder warrant was issued, but when police arrived at his home, Thrasher had taken 
his belongings and disappeared.449  
The incident provides yet another example of the hair-trigger reactions of whites when 
they felt challenged or threatened by an African American man in public or on the streets of 
Atlanta. The encounter could be verbal or physical, no matter how accidental, or trivial. Violence 
often resulted, whether or not the Black person had a weapon. A third encounter, echoing 
modern headline events, demonstrates how the perception that an African American man might 
be reaching for a weapon could lead to his death. 
Streetcar conductor Claud B. Hulsey shot and killed Will Randolph, an African American 
passenger, on Sunday night, March 30, 1924. The story that eventually emerged in conflicting 
news accounts stated that four noisy and drunk Black men boarded the streetcar on its route 
between Atlanta and Decatur. Hulsey was collecting their fares with the assistance of a helpful 
 
non-criminal activities, see Brandon Griggs, “Living While Black,” December 28, 2018, CNN, © 2019 Cable News 
Network, https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/us/living-while-black-police-calls-trnd/index.html. 
449 “Conductor Is Sought For Killing of Negro,” Atlanta Constitution, January 15, 1920. It is not known if 
Thrasher was ever located or tried; nothing further appeared in the Constitution. Atlanta police had demonstrated a 
lack of initiative during the initial investigation, and the case would not have advanced as far as it did without the 
extraordinary efforts of the city coroner.  
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white passenger, H. P. Williams. When the conductor attempted to quiet the group, one of the 
Black men, Will Davis, cursed him, and Williams slapped him in the face. Another Black man, 
Will Randolph, butted in, and the conductor threatened to eject them all from the trolley. Both 
white men asserted that Randolph then made a motion as if to reach for a revolver in his hip 
pocket. They claimed to have seen the pistol, but Davis, the man who had been slapped, said 
Randolph did not have a weapon. No gun was found on Randolph or in the streetcar. Later, 
witnesses stated that a revolver had fallen out of Randolph’s pocket, and one of the Black 
passengers picked it up, rushed off the stopped streetcar, hid it somewhere, and then got back 
on.450  
Despite the fact that Randolph was unarmed at the time and was shot in the back, Hulsey 
claimed he fired in self-defense. An all-white DeKalb County Superior Court jury, after 
deliberating less than two hours, acquitted Hulsey of the murder charge. The incident 
demonstrates how friends and bystanders eagerly jumped in to support the person of their same 
race who was involved in the fracas. Again, a commonplace, unremarkable encounter almost 
instantaneously erupted into violence. The escalation of the use of force was rapid and excessive, 
and completely predictable—then as now.451  
African Americans were not always the victims; they perpetrated some of the violence in 
the streets and on the streetcars. A dispute over seating on a trolley sparked one such episode. 
Around noon on Friday, October 21, 1921, Conductor Giley O. Phillips was working the 
Piedmont Avenue line. At Five Points, two white women entered the car, and he forced a “surly” 
Black man to give up a seat near the front of the trolley so white women could sit there. 
 
450 “Hulsey Bound Over on Shooting Charge,” Atlanta Constitution, April 2, 1924. 
451 “Conductor Freed of Murder Charge,” Atlanta Constitution, June 14, 1924. 
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According to the conductor, the man said, “I’ll get you for this,” when he exited the streetcar at 
the next stop.452  
That evening, Phillips’ trolley made its regular stop at Piedmont Avenue and Fifteenth 
Street in front of the Piedmont Driving Club [near Piedmont Park today]. When Phillips opened 
the door to admit passengers, he recognized the Black man from earlier in the day, waiting on the 
sidewalk. The man fired four shots, all of which struck the conductor, then fled on foot. Phillips 
was in critical condition but survived, and the African American remained unidentified. Streetcar 
employees created a reward fund to catch the perpetrator, with Georgia Railway and Power 
Company pledging an additional $200. Eight months later, Willie Brown was arrested, based on 
information “furnished by other parties,” and jailed in the Fulton County Tower. He was charged 
with the assault on Phillips, whose wounds had left him disabled.453 
A noticeable difference marks the approaches taken in the cases of the wounded white 
conductor (Phillips) and the fatally shot-in-the-back Black army sergeant (Casey). In the Casey 
case, Atlanta police basically gave up on apprehending the white conductor or determining 
which streetcar he worked on. Georgia Railway and Power Company filed no report. Only the 
remarkable diligence of a city coroner led to the identification of the motorman, who, under 
interrogation, admitted that his conductor had killed Casey. The guilty man was not 
apprehended.  
In stark contrast, the motormen collected money for a reward to find the shooter of white 
conductor Phillips; the traction company filed a report and contributed handsomely to the 
reward. The Atlanta police did not give up on the investigation, and within six months, the 
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perpetrator was behind bars. Both incidents had initially unidentified perpetrators. Based on the 
reactions of the police and the streetcar company, and the time and effort expended to solve the 
crimes, one could reasonably conclude that the greater crime was the serious wounding of the 
white conductor, and the more trivial incident was the fatal shooting of a Black soldier. As with 
all other municipal resources, Atlanta police investigations were unequally distributed. 
6.5 Race-Based Policing of Atlanta’s Streets 
In 1930, George S. Schuyler wrote that there was “no more trying state . . . than being 
simultaneously a Negro and a traveler.” He urged all African Americans to buy a car as soon as 
possible to be free from the discomforts, discrimination, segregation, and insults they received on 
trains, buses, and streetcars, in the north as well as the Jim Crow south. An automobile meant 
freedom. It might also bring a modicum of equality, as service stations and garages, even in the 
south, treated Black customers with some courtesy. That civility, however, was primarily due to 
the stiff competition between rival oil companies.454  
Just owning a car could be problematic for African Americans. It took some years for 
whites to become accustomed to the sight of a Black man driving his own automobile, not 
merely chauffeuring the white owner of the vehicle. Police frequently stopped African American 
drivers on the suspicion that the vehicle they were driving had been stolen. Schuyler recounts the 
experience of an acquaintance in an undisclosed Georgia location.         
I know a prominent Negro politician in Georgia who was forced to stop his 
limousine in a backwoods village and be questioned by some ignoramus as to its 
ownership. He managed to get away all right by saying that the car belonged to 
“Mister _________ of Atlanta” (giving his own name). The use of the term mister 
convinced his interrogator that the automobile must belong to a white man.455 
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All of Atlanta’s policemen were white and armed. In 1922, the union of African 
American ministers considered petitioning city council for Black policemen to work in the 
African American sections of town. When Mayor Key heard of the proposed petition, he stated 
that it did “not fit the plan of the police department and would not meet the approval of council 
or the police board.” It would be another 26 years before Atlanta would hire an African 
American patrolman.456  
Like the police, all of Atlanta’s streetcar drivers and conductors were armed white men. 
The state of Georgia gave them police powers, so they carried weapons while serving in a dual 
capacity as both employees of the traction company and as agents of the city. As Brownell notes, 
there existed at that time an “unfortunate readiness on the part of white patrolmen and streetcar 
conductors to fire on blacks with the least provocation.”457 African Americans found themselves 
most often on the receiving end of gunfire, but all-white juries seldom convicted white 
perpetrators on the rare occasions law enforcement brought charges against them. The entire 
legal system was premised upon a “reasoning world of men”—and all of those men were 
white.458 
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Atlanta’s arrest statistics display the unequal application of the law on Black and white 
citizens. Table 11 (see previous chapter) shows that after 1900, whites in the city generally 
comprised slightly more than two-thirds of the population, while African Americans made up 
slightly less than one-third of the population. For the purposes of comparison, two representative 
years, 1906 and 1929, were selected to demonstrate the disparity in numbers of total arrests 
based on race and gender. The number of traffic arrests are compared with the number of total 
arrests, as they help explain changes in the race and 
gender arrest percentages. The year 1906 was 
selected, as that is the first year of available data for 
traffic arrests; Atlanta’s first traffic ordinance was 
passed in 1904. The year 1929 was selected as it is 
the last year of this study.459  
Table 12 above shows the number of total arrests in 1906 and 1929, broken down by race 
and gender. In 1906, although African Americans comprised less than 40% of the population, 
they accounted for more than half of all arrests. That year, arrests of Black men alone made up 
nearly half the total, and Black women were nearly five times more likely to be arrested than 
white women.  
These numbers had changed dramatically by 1929. Atlanta’s population more than tripled 
between 1900 and 1930, from 89,872 to 270,366. As expected with a larger population, the total 
number of arrests also increased, although the 1929 total was not even double that of 1906. The 
significant changes occurred in the number of white persons arrested. Nearly 4,000 more white 
men were arrested than Black men, and the number of white women arrested almost quadrupled. 
 
459 Arrest data are from the Annual Report of the Chief of Police for the City of Atlanta for the various 
years; population numbers are from the U.S. Census for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930.  
Race/Gender 1906 1929
Black Women 3,194     3,951     
White Women 676        2,607     
Black Men 10,317   13,389   
White Men 7,515     17,277   
Total 21,702   37,224   
Table 12. Total Arrests by Race and 
Gender 
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Table 13 at right shows arrests by race and gender as percentages of the total number of arrests. 
For both Black men and women, the percentage of 
arrests decreased between the two years, while the 
percentages for whites, especially women, saw 
notable increases.460  
The advent of the automobile in Jim Crow 
Atlanta explains the striking new disparities in arrest statistics.461 Table 14 below demonstrates 
why. The police chiefs’ annual reports documented that regulation of traffic had become a major 
portion of the average policeman’s duties in the 1920s. The table below shows that in 1906, 
traffic arrests made up less than 1% of total arrests, while in 1929, traffic arrests accounted for 
29% of all arrests. Traffic arrests by race are not 
available.  
The numbers of whites and Blacks owning 
personal automobiles in Atlanta are not known for 
the period of this study. However, home ownership 
and the values of the homes owned can act as a 
rough proxy for car-ownership. In 1930, 25% of all white families in Fulton County owned their 
own homes, and the median value of a non-farm home owned by a native-born white person 
there was $5,651. That same year, about 17% of all African American families in Fulton County 
 
460 Unfortunately, no individual causes of arrests are broken down by race and gender; only total arrests. 
461 Total arrests for the decade (not counting 1920 and 1921, which are not available) amounted to 265,112, 
with an average of 33,139 arrests per year. To ascertain that traffic arrests were the major cause of the increase, all 
arrests in the available police chiefs’ annual reports for the decade were scrutinized. The passage of Prohibition did 
result in increased arrests, but those cases were bound over to state court, and were not included in the annual arrest 
counts. However, a new category of arrest related to Prohibition, “occupant of a dive,” appeared in 1923. These 
totaled to 8,694 arrests for the decade, averaging to 1,242 arrests annually. However, traffic arrests for the decade 
totaled 53,519, averaging to 6,690 per year. Despite growing numbers of Prohibition-related arrests, traffic-related 
arrests overwhelmingly accounted for the increase in total arrests.  
Race/Gender 1906 1929
Black Women 15% 11%
White Women 3% 7%
Black Men 48% 36%
White Men 35% 46%
Total 100% 100%
Table 13. Percentages of Total Arrests 
by Race and Gender 
Type of Arrest 1906 1929
Traffic Arrests 56          10,921   
Other Arrests 21,646   26,303   
Total Arrests 21,702   37,224   
Traffic Arrests 
% of Total 0.26% 29%
Table 14. Traffic Arrests and Total 
Arrests 
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owned their own homes, and the median value of a non-farm home owned by a native-born 
Black person there was $2,305.462 
More white families owned their own homes and those homes were worth more. Those 
families likely possessed greater wealth, and therefore a greater ability to afford an automobile. 
Fewer African American families owned homes, and those homes had a lower market value. 
This suggests that those families might have less disposable income to spend on a car.463  
Fewer Black car owners than white car owners would logically account for the greater 
number of total arrests of whites in 1929. A greater percentage of arrests were the result of traffic 
offenses. More white drivers meant more white traffic arrests, and the vast majority of drivers 
were white men.  
The enormous jump in arrests of white women can also be attributed to traffic violations. 
By the 1920s, more women were driving, using the car to shop and visit, but also for family 
outings and picnics and even more extended ventures such as auto camping and cross-country 
touring. Conversely, African American women comprised the segment of the population least 
likely to be behind the wheel of an automobile—and therefore least liable to commit a traffic 
offense. Their arrest numbers bear this out.464   
The economics of car ownership produced, for the first time in Atlanta’s history, more 
arrests of whites than Blacks. Arrests of white men exceeded those of Black men in every year 
between 1922 and 1929, with traffic offenses the primary cause. African Americans, especially 
men, were also arrested for moving violations. Many worked as car or truck drivers, as they had 
 
462 The census numbers for home ownership and value are available only at the county level. Atlanta, then 
as now, lay almost completely within the county, and Fulton, during the time of this study, was much smaller than it 
is today. It was not until January 1, 1932 that Fulton tripled in size by annexing Campbell and Milton counties. 
463 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933. 
464 Virginia Scharff, Taking the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age (Albuquerque: University 
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during the era of horse-drawn vehicles, transporting people, goods, and freight. Despite these 
many opportunities to violate traffic laws, arrests of African American men declined as a 
percentage of the totals. In the 1920s, automobility, especially the personally-owned vehicle, was 
substantially a white domain, and they had the arrest records to prove it.465  
 
Throughout the twenties, more and more Americans—no matter their race—desired to 
own an automobile. The number of car sales rose dramatically in the first years after World War 
I, but beginning in 1923, sales slumped as the market reached saturation. The novel situation 
caused great agitation throughout motordom. At the same time, the Atlanta’s civic and financial 
leaders had an additional concern, the Florida real estate boom. Both circumstances threatened a 
slowdown in city expansion, and no amount of zoning or new roads would fix either problem. A 
number of strategies would, by decade’s end, solve the difficulties of the automotive industry as 










465 The numbers for 1920 and 1921 are not available, but it is probable that the tipping point was reached 
during one of those years. In 1919, arrests of Black men exceeded whites by 1,405, while in 1922, arrests of white 
men exceeded Blacks by 2,191. Traffic arrests began to increase significantly beginning in 1916. 
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7 SELLING CITY & CAR 
In the 1920s, Atlanta’s civic and commercial leaders employed zoning as an expansion 
strategy. New neighborhoods, carefully stratified by race and class, stretched the city limits and 
spilled into outlying suburbs, initiating the city’s first official designation as a “metropolitan 
area.” A national recession during the first two years of the decade depressed the city’s 
commerce and industry, yet did not dampen the boosters’ ceaseless extolling of the city’s 
numerous advantages. Many businessmen supported the mayor’s optimistic “500,000-People 
City by 1930” campaign, displaying the chimerical number in their advertisements. The 
Chamber of Commerce urged businesses to relocate to the city. The Atlanta Convention Bureau 
announced plans to acquire more conferences and assemblies each year—an effective way to 
promote the city and help achieve the mayor’s goal.466 
Atlanta’s retail-trade territory greatly expanded with the increasing use of the automobile. 
With nearly two-thirds of Georgians now within easy reach of the city, newspapers advised local 
merchants on how to attract a new type of consumer: the out-of-town shopper arriving by car. 
“Courteous treatment to automobile customers makes trade and adds to the general business of a 
city.” More business translated into a growing city.467  
Atlanta’s ten-year growth to a half a million inhabitants, so optimistically predicted by 
Mayor Key at the beginning of 1920, never materialized. That year’s census count, 200,616, did 
not even come close to doubling. Instead, the population increased by just over a third, reaching 
a total of 270,366 in 1930. Yet, between the viaduct-construction years of 1921 and 1929, the 
 
466 “Atlanta Enjoys Glorious Fourth,” Atlanta Constitution, July 6, 1920; “Come to Atlanta – The Center of 
Southern Commerce and Wealth,” The City Builder, 5, no. 3 (May 1920): 5-11; “Atlanta’s Facts and Figures,” The 
City Builder, 5, no. 6 (August 1920): 22, 24; “1,502 Conventions Bring Net Profit of $2,790,844 Report of Bureau 
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467 Cator Woolford, “How to Bring Trade to Atlanta,” Atlanta Constitution, November 7, 1920. 
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city added to its skyline and street infrastructure. By mid-decade, Atlanta was well on its way to 
consolidating its position as the financial nucleus and central distribution point of the 
southeastern United States. A 1923-24 construction boom brought new offices, department 
stores, apartments, major hotels, as well as a substantial expansion of one of downtown’s finest 
locations, the Hurt Building. Throughout the twenties, Atlanta annexed new territory in all four 
directions. By 1930, the city’s area would reach nearly 35 square miles and the Greater Atlanta 
metropolitan area would encompass six boroughs.468  
However, a regional competitor, aided and abetted by the automobile, threatened the 
city’s growth. Florida’s great real estate boom had developed gradually over the first decades of 
the twentieth century, but by the mid-1920s, motorists from around the country on their way to 
paradise were blithely driving through—not to—Atlanta. A deluge of realty company ads 
promised untold wealth to prospective Florida property owners, enticing local citizens and 
developers to relocate their cash, and sometimes themselves, to this coastal gold mine.469  
In 1925, local investors and businessmen decided they had a true crisis on their hands; 
too many people and far too much money were moving south. The Chamber of Commerce 
proposed a nationwide publicity campaign to promote the city, the Forward Atlanta movement. 
Lyon accurately observes, “Nothing suggests Atlanta’s mood of the twenties quite so well as the 
name ‘Forward Atlanta’. . . . This slogan epitomizes the optimistic and expansive attitude of the 
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city’s businessmen as they faced the problems of the postwar decade. . . . No problem was 
insurmountable if approached with energy and the proper Atlanta spirit.”470  
Utilizing modern advertising techniques which targeted specific national markets, the 
venture proved incredibly successful, bringing in nearly 600 new enterprises and more than 
16,000 workers to the city over a four-year period. One of the operation’s premier acquisitions 
was a General Motors regional assembly plant for Chevrolets. The Forward Atlanta movement 
collected the city’s financiers, elite and ordinary citizens, elected officials, civic organizations, 
and businesses large and small, all working to grease the wheels of the municipal growth 
machine. And it worked.471  
American industrial production had increased 12% between 1910 and 1920, but exploded 
by 64% during the twenties. The automotive industry led the charge; passenger car output more 
than tripled over the decade, from 1.5 million in 1919 to 4.8 million in 1929. Motor vehicle 
manufacturing spurred the petroleum, steel, tire, glass, lumber, upholstery, and a host of other 
supplemental and subsidiary industries. The construction of new suburbs and taxpayer-
subsidized roads boosted the economy and intensified appetites for more cars. Atlanta’s 
Chamber of Commerce declared that “the world today depends to a large extent on the 
automobile. Without the automobile practically all industry would stop . . . the progress of the 
world would be impaired and retarded.” As early as 1921, many in the business community 
began to believe that car companies had become too big to fail, a generally accepted notion 
today.472  
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Eager buyers mortgaged their futures for new cars—and any other novel and up-to-date 
product or venture—as the urban consumer culture entrenched itself in the American psyche. 
More and more of the nation’s workforce toiled in cities, and the assembly line rendered factory 
jobs rote and uninspiring. Leisure time gained a new importance as it afforded the opportunity 
for escape, pleasure, and adventure. Automobiles allowed exploration and brought a wide array 
of experiences within easy reach. Popular magazines, jazz, Hollywood movies, and ubiquitous 
advertising shaped and stimulated desires as greater wealth enabled greater consumption. The 
old-fashioned values, traditions, and economies of the Victorian era disappeared in the rush to 
modernity. 
Throughout the decade, Atlanta’s growth elites continued to exercise their collective 
muscle, moving the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, larger borders, and 
substantial wealth. The group seized on new opportunities to extend the city’s regional influence, 
and established Atlanta as the locus of finance, transportation, commerce, and manufacturing in 
the southeastern U.S. Embracing the automobile as their vehicle to fortune, they profited as 
motordom further entwined itself with national and municipal government, industry, and culture.  
They worked diligently to promote automobile use and the auto industry, utilizing 
Atlanta’s position as the region’s leading advertiser, publisher, and paper producer. The print 
media by this time depended on advertising for the bulk of their revenues. In return, the 
newspapers in particular saluted businessmen and corporate leaders for forging the general 
affluence, especially for upper- and middle-class urban dwellers. 
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In 1929, more vehicles crowded onto city streets. Many Atlantans rode the wave of 
prosperity as business boomed, purchasing new or used vehicles, now within reach of even some 
in the lower classes due to price-segmented car lines and installment buying. Downtown traffic 
congestion grew worse, prompting the city council to undertake yet another traffic survey.  
7.1 The Business Cycle 
The “Roaring” Twenties did not start out that way. The decade began, not with a bang, 
but a whimper.473 The economic boom, launched with the signing of the armistice on November 
11, 1918, had shuddered to a halt. Falling stocks started a nationwide recession in October 1919, 
which reached its nadir in July 1921. Business owners, who had placed optimistically-sized 
orders just months before the new decade began, ended up sitting on excess goods with few 
customers. American industries, geared up to a high degree of efficient wartime production, 
filled their lots and warehouses with surplus output. In the glutted market, retailers slashed prices 
in frantic attempts to liquidate their inert inventories. With orders canceled, manufacturers idled, 
and hiring ceased.474  
Unemployment became rampant; all the soldiers had by this time returned from overseas 
to a dearth of industrial and commercial jobs. Agriculture, too, felt the effects of the economic 
malaise, which was exacerbated in the South. During the war, many farmers had taken on large 
debt as they expanded and mechanized their farms to increase output. The recession brought 
lower prices for agricultural products, and the boll weevil continued to devastate the cotton crop, 
the main source of income for much of rural Georgia. Easy credit dried up as market prices fell. 
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Land values dropped and farms failed, sending masses of sharecroppers, tenants, hired hands, 
and owners out of the fields and into the cities, searching for jobs and swelling the 
unemployment numbers. Metropolitan populations rose so much that by 1920, a majority of 
Americans lived in towns and cities, and Atlanta reached its new population high of 200,616.475  
Labor strikes, pan-handlers in the streets, and rising urban crime had Washington 
searching for ways to better industrial relations and put people back to work. Cities like Atlanta 
called for the federal government to hire men for public works projects, including road-building. 
Newspaper editorials asserted that public construction bested relief as a recovery strategy, and 
claimed that employment would reduce crime. President Harding in turn asked municipalities to 
expand their workforces to aid the more than 2.3 million out-of-work Americans. Atlanta’s year-
round building climate and backlog of public and private construction work should have 
provided plenty of jobs. But Mayor Key had to goad businesses into hiring more workers, 
threatening to publicly humiliate any reluctant employers.476 
One stimulus to the economy came in the form of the 1921 Federal Highway Act, which 
would put men to work and improve the nation’s transportation system. The new bill 
appropriated $75 million of 1922 federal funding for the construction of interstate and 
intercounty roads and bridges. A new component required the paving surfaces to be durable and 
adequate for current as well as future needs. The highest level of government again spent 
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taxpayers’ money to ensure good roads for automobiles. Without the requisite infrastructure, cars 
would never have succeeded as the preeminent transportation mode in America.477   
Adding to the economic woes, U.S. railroads faced problems on multiple fronts. In 1917, 
President Wilson had nationalized the railways, creating the U.S. Railroad Administration to 
temporarily take over their management during the war. The 1920 Transportation Act returned 
them to private operation on March 1 in a less-than-smooth handover. Company executives met 
in Atlanta, the Southeast’s predominant railroad center, to negotiate the confusion and delays of 
the difficult transition.478   
Railroad companies found themselves, post-government ownership, in poor condition. 
With the country crying out for increased production, the railways lacked sufficient numbers of 
freight cars to meet the needs. During the war, many of the usual activities of commerce and the 
public had been put on hold, halting building construction and business expansion. As life 
returned to normal, pent-up demand exploded. Manufacturers required rail transit for raw 
materials coming in and finished products going out, but the railroads could not handle all the 
traffic now requested of them. An editorial in Railway Age declared, “The commerce and 
industry of the United States would have to stop growing if the expansion of railroad facilities 
were not revived on a large scale.”479  
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The editor probably spoke too soon. Around the country, motorized vehicles began to 
take up the slack created by the inadequacies of the railroads. A bumper wheat crop in the 
Midwest forced farmers, during the 1920 freight car shortage, to utilize every available truck and 
car to transport the crop to 
safe storage. Farmers and 
businessmen hailed the 
rescue operation as a sign 
that “the day of the motor 
truck is rapidly 
approaching.” During the 
1925 Florida freight 
embargo, an Atlanta manufacturer would institute a direct shipping innovation in the form of a 
small fleet of trucks to carry his beds, mattresses, and box springs to Miami (see photo above). 
Two of his trucks could carry the equivalent of one regulation railroad freight car, and had the 
ability to stop at points all along the route, delivering goods to small towns as well as large cities. 
This “new method of shipping” was hailed as “another example of Atlanta’s undaunted spirit.”480 
Throughout the twenties, the trucking industry would rapidly expand its efforts to make 
commerce and agriculture independent of the railroads. By mid-decade the railway companies 
had awakened to the changing situation. In Atlanta, at the annual meeting of the local chapter of 
American Society of Civil Engineers, Hunter McDonald spoke. A former Society president and 
chief engineer for the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, McDonald acknowledged 
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that motor vehicles and streetcars had become the most serious contenders for railroad business. 
Short-haul passenger and freight was fast becoming a thing of the past as more people took buses 
or used their private automobiles for pleasure trips, while trucks and interurban electrics carried 
local cargo. Railroads would have to excel in the long haul of both passengers and freight if they 
wanted to succeed.481  
One executive astutely observed that the capacity of transportation limited all production. 
Railroad problems exacerbated the ongoing economic woes, impacting countless industries. 
Automobile manufacturing was not exempt from the general business slowdown. High-capacity 
factory assembly lines could now build far more vehicles than a nation in recession could absorb. 
The industry’s go-to alternative market, Europe, had borne the brunt of the war, and overseas 
customers were in short supply. With demand plummeting, a number of car manufacturers went 
bankrupt; the rest chose to grit their teeth and endure.482  
With the economy in decline, Americans voted with their pocketbooks in November 
1920, opting for the promise of Warren G. Harding’s “return to normalcy.” In the past four years, 
the nation had lost thousands of lives in a world war and a global pandemic, and had suffered 
through the fear and uncertainty of race riots, labor strikes, anarchist bombings, widespread 
unemployment, and a president with serious health problems. Harding’s mild demeanor, front-
porch campaign, and pledge to restore a regular, steady order led to his landslide victory. 
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Republican administrations would govern until 1932, when Roosevelt won his own majority as 
empty wallets again directed American voters.      
Upon reaching its lowest point in July of 1921, the recession technically ended, but the 
nation’s economic distress did not. The slow upward climb began. Not until a year later could 
business and industry claim that the danger point had passed. Markets remained uncertain and 
most dealers had to let their stock to run low. However, merchants saw glimmers of a rising 
demand which they hoped would bring prices along with it.483 
In a signal of optimism, Atlanta enthusiastically hosted the Great Southern Automobile 
Show in February 1922. The sponsoring Atlanta Automobile Association afterward expressed 
great appreciation to the Constitution for the “splendid cooperation” and “generosity in news 
space” allotted for coverage of the exhibition. O. J. Willoughby, editor of the paper’s Motors and 
Highway Department, effusively praised the show “worth many dollars” to the city as a whole.484  
In April 1923, the U.S. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis declared the slump officially 
ended, celebrating “empty shelves, plenty of work, no strikes, and both employer and employees 
sharing in the general prosperity.” His remark about unstocked shelving referred to the growth in 
consumer spending which sent goods flying out of stores. But it could equally have referred to 
the unconventional low-inventory strategy just coming into vogue.485  
Industry and commerce began to embrace the hand-to-mouth inventory control system. 
Better known today as just-in-time (JIT) purchasing, the novel approach featured a policy of 
buying for immediate needs only. This style of inventory management marked an about-face 
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from the typical “forward buying” of goods months in advance of the time they would actually 
be required. As-needed purchasing limited the stocks of merchandise and raw materials carried 
by retailers and manufacturers. The unorthodox stratagem reflected the recent extreme economic 
conservatism of both producers and sellers, who vowed never again to be stuck with large, 
capital-devouring inventories of goods, as they had at the beginning of the decade. The system 
promised to reduce consumer prices, bringing buyers into the marketplace.486 
An absolutely essential component of successful hand-to-mouth buying was the ability to 
re-stock rapidly. The postwar extension of the rail network and eventually-upgraded railway 
facilities resulted in greatly reduced shipping times. Heavy trucks carried loads of freight from 
terminals to stores and factories, and, with increasing frequency, directly from producer to seller. 
Unlike trains, trucks could provide efficient service across town. Altogether, the improved and 
expanded national transportation system allowed merchandisers and manufacturers to quickly 
and reliably replace sold items.487 
The hand-to-mouth inventory system held particular importance for Atlanta. Mandatory 
rapid re-stocking ability meant that corporations could no longer concentrate all their factories 
and warehouses in a single location. Transporting goods across great distances, even with 
improved shipping, produced time lags, higher costs, and lost customers. Establishing regional 
headquarters, offices, and distribution centers offered the solution. Atlanta, with its extensive rail 
connections to seaports and the interior, found itself uniquely positioned to assume that role for 
the southeastern United States.  
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7.2 The Florida Boom 
Even during the worst of the recession Atlanta heralded itself as the financial center and 
distributing point of the Southeast. City boosters exaggerated and promoted its status as the 
region’s primary governmental locus, leader in building construction, supreme convention city, 
golfing haven, largest advertising center south of Philadelphia, and the regional headquarters for 
railroads, telephone service, and film distribution. In addition to taking great pride in its 
abundance of professional and manufacturing enterprises, Atlanta also considered itself the most 
important automobile center in the South.488  
While poised for a quick economic recovery, the city faced a significant new problem—
major regional competition. The Florida real estate boom had its beginnings in the late 1800s 
when Henry Flagler completed the East Coast Railway connecting Jacksonville to Key West. A 
wealthy industrialist, Flagler had co-founded Standard Oil with his friend, John D. Rockefeller, 
in 1870. His next project focused on developing the Florida frontier, already an agricultural 
leader, into a magnet for vacationers. He constructed luxurious hotels along the rail lines and 
created the city of Miami. By the early twenties, tourism contested farming for the title of major 
state industry. 
Georgia and Atlanta initially welcomed the volume of Florida-bound motor vehicles 
traveling across theirs borders, but had to acknowledge that the southern neighbor had much 
better roads. Winter storms often rendered Georgia roads impassable at the height of the tourist 
season, forcing many travelers to ship their automobiles by rail from Chattanooga to 
Jacksonville. The bypass cost city and state thousands of dollars in lost revenue every year. In an 
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effort to promote the Good Roads movement, the state advertised the newly-created Georgia 
State Automobile Association, an affiliate of the American Automobile Association.489  
In 1920, the Atlanta Constitution’s motors and highways department published an up-to-
the-minute map and description of Florida’s major roads, which were “possibly the best in the 
South.” A large number of tourists travelled in automobiles and trucks, stopping at the “motor 
tourist” camps available at many small towns along the way (see photo below). Compiled with 
the help of a local travel and transport bureau, the column provided assistance to private and 
commercial motorists. By 1923, the newspaper was sending out its own employee to tour the 
Florida routes and create a free-of-charge guide booklet for south-bound travelers.490    
By 1924, owning a piece of Florida real estate had taken on an opulent mystique, and get-
rich-quick promises lured thousands to the Sunshine State. On their way to the new goldmine, 
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cars from every state passed through Georgia via Atlanta, which had the best roads, hotels, 
restaurants, and filling stations. The leisured classes from the Midwest could take the famous 
“Dixie Flyer” from Chicago to Miami, to which a special “Atlanta section” had been added. 
Travelers of modest means arrived by car or truck on the Dixie Highway which ran through 
downtown. Georgia’s state highway engineer documented “the enormous increase in tourist 
traffic coming through the state en route to Florida,” which was heaviest in the fall and spring, 
with the bulk of the volume concentrated on north-south routes.491  
Ads flooded the newspapers, promoting properties across Florida with exotic amenities 
such as motorboat harbors and tarpon fishing. One advertiser invited his Atlanta friends to secure 
profits beyond their expectations by purchasing a plat in a “restricted” (i.e., whites only) Tampa 
subdivision. Leading local realtors got in on the action. The prestigious Adair Realty & Trust 
Company, with offices in Atlanta’s Healey Building and on Madison Avenue in New York City, 
offered coupon bonds in a Miami luxury apartment hotel overlooking Biscayne Bay.492 
Some local advertising agents attempted to counter the stream of Florida promotions and 
stanch the flow of money there. Positioning Atlanta as a tourist destination—especially against 
swimming, sunning, sailing, seafood, and real estate speculation—was probably not the best 
strategy. But the metropolitan area did have a draw which Florida never could, the new Stone 
Mountain memorial carving. City boosters stood ready to make the most of it.  
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The United Daughters of the Confederacy had persuaded the Venable family, owners of 
granite quarries and enthusiastic Klan supporters, to deed the north scarp of Stone Mountain to 
the group. As part of the June 18, 1923 dedication ceremony, a great automobile parade wound 
through the city, then carried distinguished guests out to the mountain some 14 miles east of Five 
Points. Notable sculptor Gutzon Borglum began drilling rock as patriotic songs and speeches 
rang out, celebrating the southland’s “immortal cause which rose so white and fair.” In what has 
to be one of the most inherently contradictory and ahistorical proclamations in the nation’s 
public history, the carving was dedicated both “to the southern Confederacy” and “to the 
indissoluble union of the American people.”493  
Stone Mountain’s memorial represented a high point in the early twentieth century spate 
of statue-building and street re-naming to honor Confederate “heroes.” White southerners, 
increasingly distanced from their inglorious defeat, pursued their relentless quest for superiority 
to and domination over Black people. With the institution of slavery demolished, they 
institutionalized white supremacy in its place. Atlanta had some 40 streets named after 
Confederate or Klan leaders; about 30 remain in place today. The very public effigies (now 
protected by Georgia state law) and street name changes solidified the whites’ interpretation of 
the Civil War re-defined as the noble “Lost Cause.” The frequent use of “Dixie” to describe 
anything southern, including south-bound trains and highways, further exemplified the systemic 
cultural entrenchment of Jim Crow oppression.494 
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Whatever else Stone Mountain might represent, it did epitomize growing automobile 
tourism. While a train and a streetcar brought sightseers from downtown to the village of Stone 
Mountain, only a car could deliver non-hikers and non-bikers to the base of the carved face. 
Promotional booklets and brochures listed it as an obligatory excursion, but the mountain never 
really succeeded as a leading tourist destination. It certainly could not compare to the attractions 
of coastal real estate to the south.495      
Most of the contra-Florida advertising copy championed Atlanta’s municipal growth and 
the extension of its residential development into the suburbs. Local real estate offered a safe 
investment, which was in rising demand, “as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar” and uninflated by 
risky booms. The city’s continuous expansion guaranteed enhanced property values, but 
measured reasoning and promises of future security could not counteract the lure of rapid 
riches.496    
With even the city’s oldest real estate firm now sending precious underwriting dollars 
south (Adair was founded in 1865), Atlanta’s business and civic leaders grew more and more 
concerned. The state of Florida had a tax-exemption policy and shockingly little regulation. 
Despite hopeful-sounding editorials about how much it was an asset to both Georgia and Atlanta, 
the boom to the south threatened the city’s status as a premier investment site.497  
Beginning in 1924, the Chamber of Commerce began to push back against the Florida 
tide. City Builder articles by businessmen and city officials urged a publicity campaign to tell the 
world about Atlanta. Mayor Sims with others authored a piece titled, “Why Atlanta Should 
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Advertise,” noting that large, progressive cities were advertising themselves as if they were 
commodities, and recommended that Atlanta adopt the same strategy (see sketch below). Too 
many motorists passed through 
without stopping. The city needed 
to promote its advantages and 
opportunities, letting everyone 
know that they would receive a 
cordial welcome whether they 
came to invest their capital or 
establish their home.498  
The Chamber itself 
pledged that the City Builder 
would become the mouthpiece for 
Atlanta, with news and stories on 
its trade territory. Efforts began to 
create a national mailing list, and 
upgrades to high-quality paper 
with three-color printing on the covers gave the journal a more attractive, up-to-date appearance. 
In another thoroughly modern move, the COC took to the airwaves, broadcasting on the Atlanta 
Journal’s WSB radio station an invitation to the world to come and see Atlanta.499 
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Not content with publicity alone, the city’s power elites sought advantageous laws to aid 
local industries. In late 1924, the state legislature ratified a bill which granted municipal and 
county tax exemptions for new or expanded factories. The favorable legislation laid the 
groundwork for the city’s most successful venture of the decade, the Forward Atlanta Campaign, 
launched in mid-1925 and maintained over the next four years.500  
 Meanwhile, the Atlanta Convention Bureau acknowledged the Florida-bound crowds 
and the push for municipal advertising. On January 1, 1925, the organization announced the 
addition of new tourist and publicity departments, and changed its name to the Atlanta 
Convention and Tourist Bureau. It put greater efforts into destination marketing, ably assisted by 
its directors, all prominent men representing the city’s most important businesses: hotels, 
railways, automobile dealerships, high-end department and clothing stores, telecommunications, 
insurance, publishing, and real estate.501  
William Candler’s Atlanta-Biltmore Hotel took the lead in reaching out to Florida 
vacationers. In March 1925, as the snowbirds began moving back north, the hotel established a 
tourist office in Miami. It offered a number of booklets and pamphlets about Atlanta’s virtues as 
a stop-over point, including, of course, specifics about one particularly fine hotel. By June, the 
Convention and Tourist Bureau had organized its own outreach strategy. Gathering information 
on the approximately 30,000 tourists who visited Florida the previous winter, it planned mailers 
to each one at their home address in the fall (before they headed south next winter), inviting them 
 
day under WGM; James A. Hollomon, “Radio Telephone License Granted to Constitution,” Atlanta Constitution, 
March 17, 1922; Constitution’s Radio Service Broadcasted for First Time Friday, Atlanta Constitution, March 18, 
1922. The call letters were changed to WGST in 1923 when the newspaper donated the radio station to the Georgia 
School of Technology. The assignment of call letters and their purported derivations is a complicated and fraught 
history; no attempt is made here to explain their meanings here. 
500 Bartley, The Creation of Modern Georgia, 170; State of Georgia, Constitution of the State of Georgia, 
1877-1928 (Atlanta, 1929), art. VII, § 2. 
501 Atlanta Constitution: “Paxon Reelected to Head Bureau,” January 28, 1925; “Convention Bureau Will 
Move Tuesday,” March 29, 1925; “‘Atlanta Spirit’ Plant Will Open to Visitors Today,” April 9, 1925. 
274 
to break their journey in Atlanta. The Bureau also worked with the state on highway projects, 
recognizing that making Atlanta into a tourist town required good roads.502  
The fall of 1925 brought unprecedented numbers of southbound travelers to the city. 
Railroads carried larger crowds than ever before. At the time, the city boasted eight railway 
systems with fourteen radiating lines carrying 130 trains daily—an average of one train arriving 
every eleven minutes. The volume of passengers required additional “tourist trains” on the 
southern routes, and the railroads’ liberal layover privileges allowed many vacationers to spend 
some time in Atlanta while on their way to Florida. City streets, too, carried heavier traffic 
volumes. A reporter noted the great numbers of out-of-state cars in downtown, even from 
faraway New York, Massachusetts, and California. He observed that most of them had parked 
near a hotel or restaurant, indicating that the visitors were “spending money with local people.” 
Clearly, the Florida boom brought a degree of winter-time prosperity to the metropolitan region, 
but the big money in the form of real estate development bypassed the city.503 
A freight embargo enacted by Florida in 1925 added urgency to the municipal concerns. 
Initially applying only to its east coast locations, by the end of October the state had put a 
general embargo on all inbound cargo, with a few exceptions. The embargo affected only the 
railroads, the sole suppliers of heavy freight transportation throughout the interior. The infant 
trucking industry could not yet carry goods in large enough quantities to threaten the state’s 
 
502 Atlanta Constitution: “Tourists Invited to Stop-Over Here By Biltmore Hotel,” March 15, 1925; 
“Campaign to Bring Tourists to Atlanta Planned by Bureau,” June 28, 1925. 
503 Paul Jones, “Atlanta to Profit by Unprecedented Florida Traffic,” Atlanta Constitution, September 6, 
1925; Fred Houser, “Atlanta as a Railroad Center,” City Builder  (September 1925): 30-31; Southern Railway 
System, Progressive Atlanta, 2. 
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economy, but, as mentioned earlier, some desperate producers organized small fleets to deliver 
their wares. Any railroad failure offered a new opportunity to truckers.504  
Thousands of railroad cars were almost literally frozen in their tracks, and sat loaded with 
shipments for months in side-yards in Atlanta, Jacksonville, and around the country. A few 
enterprising automobile manufacturers devised a clever workaround. With no prohibitions on 
incoming cars, they shipped their cars via train to Brunswick, Georgia, where they hired men to 
drive them across the border to various Florida destinations. Not until early 1926 did the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Florida end the embargo so the freight trains could run 
again.505 
Writing some years later, Walter C. Hill, vice president of the Retail Credit Company of 
Atlanta, described the city’s increasingly-ominous situation this way. 
In the summer of 1925, Atlanta, Georgia, faced a crisis. Psychological, perhaps, but 
a crisis nevertheless. Many were dismal and discouraged about the exodus of its 
people to Florida. They could see a business depression drawing the community 
into financial ruin. . . . Something was needed to overcome this psychological 
depression. Atlanta needed an awakening to her own resources, needed shaking out 
of the inferiority complex that had been induced by high-flown talk about millions 
made overnight in the Florida boom. She needed some spiritual stimulant that 
would cure this blight of hopelessness that seemed so speedily gaining ground.506 
 
Without some sort of intervention, or until the Florida boom went bust, competitor cities to the 
south would soon overshadow Atlanta. 
 
504 Atlanta Constitution: “Atlanta Furniture Shipped to Florida,” October 4, 1925; “General Embargo Put 
Upon Florida Inbound Freight,” October 30, 1925. Embargo exceptions included livestock, perishables, foodstuffs, 
and any materials relating to preparing fruits and vegetables—Florida’s chief crops—for shipment. 
505 Atlanta Constitution: “Boats and Trucks Used to Get Florida-Bound Freight From Brunswick,” 
November 16, 1925; “Embargo Relief to Benefit State,” December 31, 1925.  
506 Forward Atlanta Commission, Report of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 8. Hill’s article originally 
appeared as “Atlanta Advertises” in The Clevelander, August 1929. 
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7.3 Forward Atlanta: Selling the City 
Although attracting travelers created some economic benefits and free publicity, 
Atlanta’s leadership wanted to attract more substantial and enduring investments. As a tourist 
destination, the city could never compete with Florida’s surf, sun, speculation trifecta, and 
catering to seasonal, pass-through vacationers only temporarily bolstered sales. Instead of “tin 
can” tourists, the growth coalition sought more citizens, commerce, and industry, along with the 
new housing that would be needed by incoming corporate executives, office workers, and factory 
laborers. The establishment of plants, regional offices, warehouses, and distribution centers 
would permanently grow the city’s fabric and population.507 
The current president of the Chamber of Commerce, Wilbur Richard Carroll Smith 
(1872-1941), decided the circumstances warranted a bold response. He proposed a nation-wide 
campaign to advertise the city. Recognizing that Atlanta was “the only metropolitan city in the 
entire southeast that is not doing its part to attract in a large way people and capital to it,” he 
suggested the Chamber raise $250,000 to publicize the city’s advantages. Dick Smith had 
founded and led the W. R. C. Smith Publishing Company, one of foremost publishers of 
engineering and technical journals in the South. His business vocabulary comprehended the 
concept of “publicity,” as the majority of the revenue for journals, newspapers, and popular 
magazines now came from advertisements. He understood the media and methods of effective 
publicity. A nation-wide campaign, too, would not appear daunting to someone whose 
publications had wide distribution across the country. No doubt the project had the additional 
side attraction of possibly bringing more business his way.508  
 
507 Dudley Glass, “Let’s Tell the Nation About Atlanta,” City Builder  (October 1925): 3; Forward Atlanta 
Commission, Report of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 10. 
508 “Atlanta To Raise $250,000 For Advertising,” Atlanta Constitution, September 13, 1925; Cooper, 
Official History of Fulton County, 393. Wilbur Richard Carroll “Dick” Smith (1872-1941) came to Atlanta as a 
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On September 17, 1925, as COC president, he invited 100 municipal leaders to a 
planning dinner at the elegant Atlanta Biltmore Hotel. William Candler, the Biltmore’s builder-
owner and a well-known civic patron, agreed to chair the venture. The board of directors’ 
announcement of the fundraising drive sought to arouse community spirit, and solicited the 
participation of every business, enterprise, association, agency, school, and religious 
organization in one of the city’s “most ambitious forward movements.” Smith declared that once 
the world became acquainted with its many opportunities and advantages, Atlanta would “move 
forward even more rapidly” to its great destiny. The Forward Atlanta campaign was launched.509 
Immediately, the crusade gained momentum. Haverty Furniture volunteered to house 
campaign headquarters in its building, providing a ground-floor office whose show windows 
soon filled with slogan banners and posters. On the recommendations of trade organizations in 
other cities, the Chamber hired the acclaimed American City Bureau, a New York and Chicago 
advertising firm, to handle the fundraiser. Ironically, it was the same company which had 
spearheaded very successful publicity campaigns for Miami, Daytona, and other Florida cities—
Atlanta’s arch nemeses. Vice President Daniel H. McFarland came to Atlanta to personally guide 
the operation. Noticing how everyone he met talked about Florida’s marvelous growth, he 
 
McGraw Publishing representative in the early 1900s. He soon started W. R. C. Smith Publishing Company, 
publisher of multiple trade publications including the Southern Automotive Journal. In addition to heading the 
Atlanta COC, he was president of the Rotary Club; served on the mayor’s 1925 twin viaducts committee, and was a 
founding member of the Brookhaven Country Club. His office was in the Grant Building on Broad Street, and he 
lived in Inman Park.  
509 “Atlanta To Raise $250,000 For Advertising,” Atlanta Constitution, September 13, 1925. William 
Candler (1890-1936) was one of the sons of Asa Griggs Candler, Sr., Coca-Cola magnate. He was president of the 
Biltmore Corporation, builder of the Atlanta-Biltmore Hotel and the Biltmore Apartments, broker of numerous real 
estate deals, and active participant in the elite local clubs. His office was in the Candler Building, and his home, Rest 
Haven, was on Springdale Road in Druid Hills.  
278 
declared, “Advertising did all that. . . . Florida had something to sell and she advertised for 
buyers.” He promised that the same could happen for Atlanta.510 
Candler appointed George West, the youthful president of West Lumber Company, to 
head the working forces, while Ivan Allen, a former Chamber president and veteran of civic 
crusades, led the drive for advance subscriptions from potential big contributors. Businesses 
volunteered hundreds of workers to canvass door-to-door. The Atlanta Automobile Association 
pledged funding and cooperation, as did dealers, distributors, and other members of the 
automotive community. Realtors quickly jumped on board; merchants incorporated “Forward 
Atlanta” into their ads; and newspapers devoted countless column inches to promoting the 
movement and detailing every step of its progress.511 
And progress it did. A “Let’s Go” dinner for more than 700 filled the Ansley Hotel’s 
rooftop garden on October 2, 1925, where the volunteers received instruction on salesmanship. A 
few days later, an American Legion band led the “army” of campaigners on a parade through the 
downtown streets, after which they dispersed to begin fundraising. Cognizant of modern 
advertising techniques, the ten-man commission had the event filmed and made sure local 
theaters screened it with their newsreels. By October 10, the entire $250,000 had been raised, 
and the Constitution declared that the Forward Atlanta campaign was finished.512  
 
510 Ibid; “$250,000 Fund Success Sure, State Leaders,” Atlanta Constitution, September 27, 1925; Glass, 
“Let’s Tell the Nation About Atlanta,” 3-4. The Haverty Furniture store was located on 13-15 Auburn Avenue at the 
intersection with North Pryor Street [Park Place], not to be confused with the Haverty Building on Edgewood 
Avenue.  
511 Atlanta Constitution: “$250,000 Fund Success Sure, State Leaders,” September 27, 1925; “‘Atlanta 
Forward’ Campaign Is Given Unanimous Support,” September 20, 1925; “Atlanta Forward Campaign Will Prove 
Great Success, Predicts D. H. McFarland,” September 22, 1925; “Forward Atlanta Leaders Selected,” September 23, 
1925; “Reports Progress In Fund Campaign,” September 24, 1925. The existence of a very early Rich’s Department 
Store ad, “Forward Atlanta!” Atlanta Constitution, July 29, 1925, indicates that Smith and the Chamber had been 
making plans well in advance of the September launch.  
512 Atlanta Constitution: “$250,000 Fund Workers Ready For Big Drive,” October 3, 1925; “$250,000 
Drive Will Begin Today With Big Parade,” October 6, 1925; “Call to Civic Pride,” October 11, 1925. The fund 
eventually topped $300,000. 
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But only the fundraising part of the campaign concluded; now the real work of actually 
advertising the city could begin. A new supervisory committee chaired by Ivan Allen consisted 
of what was billed as a group of “representative” Atlantans. Not surprisingly, the thirteen were 
all power elites: white, successful, well-to-do, and well-known men. The committee had no 
African American, women, working- or middle-class members. A large segment of the city’s 
population was not merely under-represented, but had no voice at all. The unspoken assumptions 
again prevailed—what was good for businessmen was good for Atlanta, and everyone benefitted 
when the city grew.513 
While a nationally-known ad firm had handled the initial fundraising, the committee 
selected a local ad agency to direct the marketing phase. Eastman, Scott and Company had 
already achieved regional and national success within a few years of its founding, and had as 
clients some of the South’s leading manufacturers and financial houses. Their staff had expertise 
in the dual components of cutting-edge marketing: research and advertising. They began by 
surveying all of Atlanta’s industrial resources and advantages. U.S. companies required hard data 
before making any business decisions, especially momentous changes like opening a regional 
headquarters or building a branch factory far distant from the corporate base. The ability to 
provide industry-specific documentation in response to any inquiry emerged as a signature 
feature of the Forward Atlanta Campaign and one of its greatest marketing tools. Eastman, 
Scott’s first task was accumulating and organizing that information, which, at the insistence of 
 
513 “Ad Fund Handled by Local Agency,” Atlanta Constitution, November 8, 1925. Familiar power elite 
names show up on the list of the members of the  Forward Atlanta supervisory committee, such as Ivan Allen, 
William Candler, W. R. C. Smith, Frank Adair, J. K. Ottley, Frank Neely, A. J. Orme, Louis Marquardt, and Philip 
Alston. Ivan Earnest Allen, Sr. (1876-1968) had come to Atlanta in 1895 to sell typewriters, but stayed to co-found 
Fielder and Allen, an office supplies company. It thrived, and he eventually formed Ivan Allen-Marshall Company 
on Marietta Street, of which he was president. Allen served on the boards of multiple banks, was in the Georgia 
legislature, and president of multiple location organizations, such as the Convention Bureau, the Southeastern Fair 
Association, the COC. He was a member of the most prominent local clubs, and lived on West Peachtree Street.   
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Chairman Ivan Allen, contained only the facts with no boosterish exaggerations. “The sole 
motive of this campaign,” he said, “is to ‘tell the world the truth’ about Atlanta.” Later, a New 
York City ad executive would remark that one of the strengths of Forward Atlanta’s ads was 
their lack of “blatant bombast.”514 
The actual advertising began with a two-page, kick-off spread in the February 20, 1926 
issue of the Saturday Evening Post. The campaign targeted specific groups via the types of 
media they most often accessed, and tailored advertisements to individual audiences. Business 
papers and financial publications carried ads aimed at commerce and industry executives. 
Technical periodicals and trade journals reached professionals and the heads of industries best 
suited to Atlanta’s territory and amenities. The general public could read about Forward Atlanta 
in high-end journals like the Post, or in leading newspapers such the New York Times and 
Chicago Tribune. Throughout, the ad copy promoted the city’s dominance in the financial and 
industrial fields of the southeast, its transportation facilities, and its central location.515 
The diligent research and massive publicity program paid off. In December, the Chamber 
of Commerce’s Industrial Bureau reported that, after ten months of advertising, 136 new 
businesses came to the city, employing 4,630 people, and bringing in annual payrolls of more 
than $7.3 million. The majority of the newcomers came from the East and Midwest (plus one 
from London), and most of them had established regional branch offices in town. The consensus 
 
514 Atlanta Constitution: “Ad Fund Handled by Local Agency,” November 8, 1925; “Selling Program to 
Advertise City Being Mapped Out,” November 29, 1925; “Advertising Expert Sees Great Atlanta in New Few 
Years,” December 3, 1926. Eastman, Scott and Company was a continuation of Watts & Beutell, an advertising 
agency created in 1919 by J. R. Watts, Jr. and C. R. Beutell, two former Georgia Tech engineers. They found 
success quickly, and by 1921 had expanded, hiring Myra C. Scott as a vice president. She was an Atlanta native, a 
graduate of Agnes Scott College with a journalism degree from Columbia University. Adding her name to the firm’s 
title, a bold stroke at the time, not only demonstrated her importance to the company, but also the growing presence 
of women professionals in the public relations field.  
515 Atlanta Constitution: “City’s Advertising Campaign to Begin Early in February,” January 2, 1926; 
“Plans Are Made For Nation-wide City Advertising,” January 31, 1926; Forward Atlanta Commission, Report of the 
Forward Atlanta Commission, 10. 
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opinion was that Atlanta’s first year of advertising had been an unqualified success. The mood of 
the citizens lifted, business morale improved, bank clearances climbed, retail trade increased, 
new buildings sprang up, and an $8 million bond issue passed—including funds to build more 
viaducts. Having shaken off the last vestiges of the recession, Atlanta, at least some of it, was on 
a roll.516  
The Black community had mixed reactions to Forward Atlanta. African American 
entrepreneurs saw economic promise in the large numbers of Florida-bound automobile tourists, 
but many rejected the city’s big publicity campaign. It completely ignored them and their hopes 
for expanded communities and businesses. The Atlanta Independent refused to endorse Forward 
Atlanta and denounced the white press’s acclaim of the “Atlanta spirit.” However, it occasionally 
published the campaign’s slogans, and reluctantly acknowledged that perhaps Blacks would 
benefit somewhat from general city growth.517  
City officials, the Chamber of Commerce, and white businessmen united in celebrating 
the success of Forward Atlanta. New York ad expert Jesse H. Neal praised their work, claiming 
that “no other city in the country is using the business press with the intelligence and foresight of 
Atlanta.” In keeping with the dictum of modern marketing that continuous advertising achieved 
the greatest benefits, the city’s power brokers decided Atlanta could not afford to take a break. 
Eager not to lose momentum and to take advantage of the prevalent civic optimism, they 
proposed another fundraiser, this time for $1 million, with an even larger-scale publicity 
campaign to run for three years instead of one. In late November 1926, the new drive began, 
 
516 Atlanta Constitution: “Greater Atlanta,” March 28, 1926; “Ad Club Given Wood Gavel From 
Independence Hall; City Advertising Discussed,” May 12, 1926; “Great Industrial Gain To City From Advertising 
Campaign, Report Shows,” November 23, 1926; W. R. C. Smith, “What Are the Returns on Our Investment? An 
Analysis of the Profits Accrued from the Forward Atlanta Advertising Campaign,” City Builder  (December 1926).   
517 Atlanta Independent, November 27 and December 16, 1926, quoted in Brownell, The Urban Ethos in 
the South, 1920-1930, 150-51.  
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headed by the same men and ad agencies who had achieved such sterling results with the 
previous effort. On Monday, December 13, a parade of Atlanta’s schoolchildren through 
downtown started the subscription drive. By Saturday, the entire sum had been pledged.518 
The great enthusiasm and incredible fundraising speed probably had some basis in 
Florida’s recent setbacks. By 1926, the boom had subsided somewhat, leaving numbers of 
property owners with land they could not sell and mortgage payments they could not make. A 
more devastating event in the form of the Great Miami Hurricane brought death, destruction, and 
an immediate check on sunshiny real estate promotions. Front-page headlines and photographs 
detailing flattened buildings, wrecked cars, overturned boats, and the newly homeless stalled the 
Gold Coast rush. Atlantans who once eyed beachfront investments re-focused on opportunities 
closer to home.519 
New mayor Isaac N. Ragsdale, in his January 1927 inaugural speech, spoke of the power 
and value of advertising. If business grew bigger by advertising, so should cities. By April, the 
second round of publicity began. Ivan Allen, chair of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 
concurred with the mayor’s opinion, and noted that “the Atlanta campaign is considered by 
 
518 Atlanta Constitution: “$1,000,000 Advertising Campaign for Atlanta is Inaugurated Monday,” 
November 30, 1926; “Advertising Expert Sees Great Atlanta in New Few Years,” December 3, 1926; “Advertising,” 
December 6, 1926; “Drive Leaders Feel Certain of Success,” December 12, 1926; “Campaign Launched,” 
December 14, 1926; “Million Dollar Fund to Advertise Atlanta Raised, Candler Announces as Campaign Ends,” 
December 18, 1926. The advertising expert, Jesse H. Neal, an executive with the Associated Business Papers of 
New York, was speaking at the Presidents’ Club dinner at the Biltmore Hotel. William Candler benefitted personally 
from the many campaign-related events held at his hotel. This was not coincidence, but just another example of how 
members of the growth coalition took care of each other.  
519 The hurricane lasted from September 14-20, 1926, and made landfall in Miami in the early hours of 
September 18. The eye passed over the city’s downtown at 6:15 a.m., bringing crowds of hurricane novices outdoors 
rejoicing that the storm had ended. The lull lasted about a half an hour when the wind abruptly increased to about 
150 mph, taking some 372 lives and cause property damage of more than $164 billion in 2007 dollars. Paul J. 
Richards, “Miami’s Majestic Buildings Crumble Before Devastating Fury of Tropic Hurricane,” Atlanta 
Constitution, September 20, 1926; “Striking Illustrations of Hurricane’s Fury as It Swept Playground City of 
Miami,” Atlanta Constitution, September 22, 1926; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Weather Service, "Great Miami Hurricane of 1926,"  
https://www.weather.gov/mfl/miami_hurricane; Richard Gray, “Monthly Meteorological Notes at Miami, Fla. For 
September 1926,” (Miami Weather Bureau Office, September 1926). 
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national advertising authorities as the most successful community advertising ever launched. In 
fact, it has started a new form of city advertising, a form that more nearly approaches the 
advertising of American 
manufacturers.” Besides the actual 
ads, editorials in newspapers and 
journals across the country 
commended Atlanta on its novel 
approach, incidentally providing 
additional free and positive press for 
the city.520  
A three-point formula formed 
the basis for the campaign’s 
publicity. (1) The South was 
America’s fastest growing market 
and as such warranted careful 
attention. (2) Industry could no 
longer serve the entire United States 
from any one place, however centrally located. Modern merchandising, with its hand-to-mouth 
inventory systems and rapid re-stocking requirements, demanded decentralized distribution. (3) 
Atlanta, aka “Distribution City,” provided the point of greatest efficiency from which to serve 
the South. Transportation featured heavily in the new series of ads extolling the city’s now 
fifteen railroad lines and 70 million people within a day’s run. One of the ads (see figure above), 
 
520  Atlanta Constitution: “Text of New Mayor’s Message,” January 4, 1927; “Forward Atlanta Contract 
Placed,” April 24, 1927. 
Figure 41. Forward Atlanta ad with the 3-point 
formula, 1929. 
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incorporated the three-point formula in the copy, plus sketches of air, rail, and road 
transportation, as well as people working, shopping, at leisure, and having fun.521  
The crowning achievement of the campaign occurred during 1928, when General Motors 
established its southeastern regional headquarters and a Chevrolet assembly plant in Atlanta. 
Chevrolet, an inexpensive car competing directly with the Ford Model T, had experienced record 
growth in the past two years, going from sales of less than 20,000 in 1925 to more than to more 
than 80,000 in 1927. The factory, located on 32 acres along Sawtell Avenue in southeast Atlanta, 
occupied 410,000 square feet of floor space in five buildings, had a loading dock adjacent to the 
Southern Railway tracks, and a parking lot accommodating 5,000 cars. Employing close to 1500 
men, most from the metropolitan area, it could produce 350 cars a day. As a result of the plant’s 
location, adjoining property values increased eight-fold, going from $50 to $400 a square foot.522  
The 1929 Forward Atlanta Commission Report documented the step-by-step wooing of 
Chevrolet, quoting from company letters. The initial contact in late 1926 produced this 
discouraging result, “We have no plans…for any new locations.” Another outreach in early 1927 
brought something a bit more hopeful: “We are fully aware of the advantages your city offers as 
the location for a car distribution plant…and it is not impossible that one of these days we will 
have to come to see you.” The campaign continued to send persuasive data to General Motors, 
no doubt mentioning the city and county tax exemption for new factories. In October 1927, 
commission leaders received this happy news from GM: “We are thankful for all the information 
 
521 Ivan E. Allen, “Atlanta Carries On,” City Builder  (June 1927): 46-47; Forward Atlanta Commission, 
Report of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 9, 55-56, 93. Figure 41 is from the Report of the Forward Atlanta 
Commission, Atlanta, 1929, pg. 93.    
522  Atlanta Constitution: “Atlanta Chevrolet Plant to be Center of New Southeastern Region,” January 29, 
1928; “A Mammoth Industrial Exhibit in the South’s Greatest Automobile Plant,” August 5, 1928; “Thousands 
Atlantans Amazed at Magnitude of Chevrolet Plant,” August 7, 1928; Boyd Taylor, “Chevrolet’s Fine Plant in 
Atlanta,” City Builder  (July 1928): 10-11, 33-34. 
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we have received describing the facilities of your city. . . . A plant in your city became not only a 
possibility but a necessity.”523 
The campaign chalked up other wins benefiting the city’s automotive interests. One of 
the major ones was the decision, in 1929, by the B. F. Goodrich Company to build a tire factory 
north of downtown near Georgia Tech. The plant would initially employ 1,000 workers and 
produce 5,000 tires per day.524 
By any metric, the Forward Atlanta Campaign was an outstanding triumph. During its 
four-year run, the city gained 594 establishments with 16,911 employees and estimated annual 
payrolls of $29.2 million. The movement cemented Atlanta’s reputation as a distribution center 
and branch office town, and according to one contemporary writer, turned “depression into 
progress.” While the campaign ended with the decade, its stunning success virtually ensured a 
continuation into the 1930s, a hope dashed by the onset of the Great Depression.525  
Forward Atlanta exemplified the power and energy of the united business community. It 
took strong, sustained action on a national scale to ensure the city’s position as the regional 
leader. The group successfully utilized modern advertising techniques to market Atlanta, and 
along the way, also managed to protect their existing business interests as well as create new 
opportunities for the city and themselves. With ordinary folk excluded from leadership positions 
 
523 Forward Atlanta Commission, Report of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 60. 
524 “Atlanta Facing Greatest Era of Prosperity; Record of Progress Draws National Attention,” Atlanta 
Constitution, March 18, 1928; Frank Shaw, “Goodrich Tire Factory Now a ‘Fact’; Will Be Making Tires in Few 
Months,” City Builder  (August 1929): 22. 
525 Forward Atlanta Commission, Report of the Forward Atlanta Commission, 57, 73; Cooper, Official 
History of Fulton County, 412; Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 49; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta 
and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:814-15. The Forward Atlanta campaign was so successful 
that Ivan Allen, Jr. (1911-2003) followed in his father’s footsteps by recycling the concept. Shortly before his 
election as mayor of Atlanta (1962-70), he persuaded the Chamber of Commerce into a $1.5 million fundraiser to 
advertise the city for three years; “The Great Leap Forward,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 18, 1961. 
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(although their subscriptions were welcomed), the campaign epitomized the city growth coalition 
in action. 
7.4 Atlanta and the Automobile Rollercoaster  
During the twenties, Atlanta experienced the downs and ups of recession and recovery, 
civic malaise and municipal success. The fortunes of the motor vehicle industry followed a 
similarly fluctuating trajectory, although the overall trend was up (see graph below526). Any 
market downturn caused great concern and brought a search for quick remedies because, locally 
and nationally, the automotive trades held an increasingly important position in the economy.  
 The automobile industry and associated businesses had emerged as significant entities 
within the city’s physical and economic presence. By 1920, Atlanta boasted 81 car dealers and 
255 related businesses, such as garages, paint and repair shops, and parts and accessories stores. 
Automobile Row (the section of eight blocks of Peachtree Street between Ellis Street and Ponce 
de Leon Boulevard) had grown to include 79 automobile dealerships and related enterprises. In 
 
526 Data is from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933, Part 7, 
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1922, the city had 156 garages alone, the high point for the decade. With so many automobile-
dependent businesses, Atlanta leaders worried greatly about the impact of the recession.527     
 Late in the first recession year, the Georgia Automotive Dealers Association held a 
dealer-banker convention at the prestigious Capital City Club. John Edward Smith (1877-1956), 
president of both the Atlanta Automobile Dealers Association and the city’s largest, most 
prestigious automobile dealership, helped organize the event which sought to allay widespread 
worry. In November 1919, the Federal Reserve Bank had upped the rediscount rate on cars 
purchased on installment. The effect raised the down payment required for an automobile bought 
on a time plan from the earlier rate (which hovered between 25% and 33%) to almost 50% of the 
purchase price.528  
The increase had an immediate and obvious dampening effect on car sales. Mayor James 
L. Key, in his welcome speech, stressed the significant role of the automobile industry, the city’s 
largest, in supporting Atlanta’s economy. He asserted “It does more to uphold the value of real 
estate, to keep bank deposits high and for our general and commercial welfare than any other 
business.” M. B. Wellborn, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, spoke to the 
standing-room-only crowd of nearly 400 troubled convention-goers. He described the current 
financial crisis as typical post-war inflation, and assured attendees that the Federal Reserve stood 
ready “to accept automobile paper from our member banks,” as long as they met the 
requirements.529  
 
527 Counts are from the Atlanta City Directory, 1920, pages 1339-44. The Automobile Row numbers are 
from Preston, Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935, 37. I dispute some of the 
numbers in Preston, pg. 41, which may be miscounts or failure to take into account businesses which had multiple 
locations within the city.  
528 Flink, The Automobile Age, 83. 
529 M. B. Wellborn, “Industry Important, Says Wellborn,” Automotive Industries: The Automobile 43, no. 
18 (October 28, 1920): 887. Maximilian Bethune Wellborn (1862-1957) was the first chairman of the board of the 
Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, helping to open it on November 16, 1914. He served as its governor from 1919-1927. 
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The automotive trades embarked on a series of actions which, in little over a year, began 
to restore their profits. The Ford Motor Company slashed prices, cut costs, and forced very 
reluctant dealers to carry excess inventory. General Motors experienced catastrophic losses. Only 
a massive cash infusion from affluent patrons like J. P. Morgan and the du Pont family saved the 
corporation from the bankruptcy suffered by many other car manufacturers.530 
With greater sales volume the goal, automotive entities expanded their advertising 
budgets dramatically. Advertisers no longer acted as simple brokers placing ads in the daily 
newspaper for in-town customers. Now, large ad agencies served multiple clients across the 
country, creating detailed promotional campaigns aimed at national audiences, and utilizing 
diverse media platforms. Vastly improved visuals and clever copy sought to break down 
consumer resistance to spending, emphasizing both the work utility and leisure possibilities of 
the automobile.531  
Manufacturers, in their efforts to sustain a year-round production schedule, sought to 
coordinate their marketing strategies with local dealerships. Most dealers believed that winter 
was a dead time for car sales, and waited until spring to place orders and begin promotions. The 
manager of the Southern Oakland Company, headquartered in Atlanta, encouraged his fellow 
retailers to take advantage of their brand’s nationwide publicity programs, calling them “the road 
to prosperity.” The massive efforts bore fruit, eventually engineering “one of the most 
phenomenal business recoveries of 1922,” a triumph which would extend throughout the 
following year.532   
 
530 The efficacy of the very different approaches of Ford and General Motors to the recession are well 
documented; Chandler, Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors, and the Automobile Industry, 12-13, 71-73; Flink, 
The Automobile Age, 83-108; Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America, 148-50.  
531 Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 84.   
532 “Martin Tells of Dealer-Manufacturer Relationship,” Automobile Trade Journal 24, no. 9 (March 1, 
1920): 264-65. Walter B. Brown, “Recovery of Auto Industry in 1922 Was Phenomenal,” Atlanta Constitution, 
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The growing popularity of “closed” cars contributed to the success. Before the twenties, 
manufacturers mainly produced the 
less expensive “open” cars, i.e., 
convertibles, with folding fabric 
tops which had to be maintained or 
replaced (see ad at right). Only the 
well-to-do could afford the more 
costly hard-tops, commonly called 
“sedans.” Sales for open cars were 
seasonal, but the increasing demand 
for sedans eliminated the dealerships’ usual winter slowdowns. With the automobile now a 
necessity rather than just a vehicle for pleasure rides, motorists required an improved year-round 
utility.533  
George Babbitt himself drove an open-roofed, hand-cranked Model T Ford, while his 
family militated for a sedan: his wife, because it was cleaner and didn’t muss her hair; his son, 
because it had more class; his daughter, because her friend’s father had one. As Sinclair Lewis 
observes, the family’s discussion of their dream car represented “more than a study of 
 
January 1, 1923, was originally published in the New York Commercial, December 31, 1922; B. F. Ulmer, 
“Springtime Favorite Period of New Motor Car Sales,” Atlanta Constitution, February 24, 1918. 
533 Atlanta Constitution: Brown, “Recovery,” January 1, 1923; “Pretty Type of Oakland Car Designed for 
Use Both in Summer and Winter, February 24, 1918. The major body styles were divided into two types. Open cars 
included the two-seater roadster and the four- or five-seater touring car. Closed cars with permanent tops included 
the two-seater coupe, the four- or five-seater sedan, and the limousine, which could seat five to seven passengers. In 
1925, closed car production first surpassed open car production, and in 1928, nearly eight times more closed than 
open cars were produced.  
Figure 42. Ad for car tops; Atlanta City Directory, 
1923, pg. 6. 
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transportation. It was an aspiration for knightly rank.” In America, the omnipresent automobile 
was emerging as a highly visible and very precise indicator of social rank.534  
Motordom’s surge continued, and in 1923, a Constitution lede triumphantly proclaimed: 
“Ladies and gentlemen, the automobile—America’s most valuable manufacture today.” That 
year’s biennial manufacturing census ranked motor vehicles first among U.S. industrial products, 
outstripping steel (#2), meatpacking (#3), and petroleum (slipped from #2 in 1921 to #7). Over 
13 million cars, trucks, and buses now travelled the nation’s roadways.535  
The automobile industry’s #1 position provided a huge boost to railroad traffic, yet also 
aroused significant concerns within a railroad community only just shaking off its post-war 
doldrums compounded by the recession. The production of vast numbers of motor vehicles 
required massive rail shipments of raw materials to factories and parts to assembly plants like 
those in Atlanta. Trains also carried the finished vehicles to terminals across the country. 
Atlanta’s railroads, and the city’s reputation, benefited from greatly from the automobile 
freight. A solid train called the “Automobile Special” ran from Cincinnati, leaving there at 12:30 
a.m., and reaching Atlanta at 4:45 a.m. the following day. The early morning arrival allowed 
locally-destined vehicles to be unloaded and inside city dealerships by the start of business, 
while the rest continued their journey to other locations in Georgia and Florida. The magnitude 
of traffic necessitated a daily run of the Special.536    
To accommodate the volume, the Southern Railway in Atlanta constructed a new 
terminal, just west of its mainline tracks on North Avenue. The location was within easy reach of 
 
534 Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (New York: Signet Classic, 1920), chs. 1, 6; pagination not available in 
online edition, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1156/56-h/56-h.htm. 
535 “Autos Are First Product of U.S.,” Atlanta Constitution, September 22, 1923; Bureau of the Census U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Biennial Census of Manufactures 1923 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1926), 24. 
536 Lauren Foreman, “Southern Railway Operates Automobile Special,” City Builder 10, no. 2 (April 1924): 
40-41. A “solid” train had no cars added or removed en route and therefore could make better time. 
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the automobile district, which had spread considerably from Peachtree Street’s original 
“Automobile Row” onto West Peachtree and Spring streets. Fifteen railroad cars at a time could 
line up at the 592-foot-long platform. A ramp allowed trucks and cars to drive directly from the 
platform to dealer showrooms via North Avenue, a route which avoided the most congested 
downtown streets. The combination of the Automobile Special and the new terminal contributed 
immensely to Atlanta’s designation as one of the leading automobile centers in the U.S.537 
Although happy about their expanding heavy-freight traffic courtesy of the motor vehicle 
industry, the railroads feared their new competitors driving on the roadways. As early as 1923, 
the rail carriers began to complain about federal subsidies of highways and roads. Thomas H. 
MacDonald, chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, spoke reassuringly, “The highway will never 
be a competitor of the railway. It will be a supplementary servitor. . . . Far from being a danger to 
the railroads, the highways we are building will be their faithful allies.”538  
Buses and trucks, however, increasingly usurped the railroads’ passenger and freight 
short-haul traffic, so much so that in 1925, the railways claimed that they had lost nearly 3,800 
miles of track to motorized challengers. MacDonald testified before President Coolidge’s 
National Transportation Committee, insisting that highway transportation caused only a very 
small percentage of the abandoned trackage. As Goddard flatly states, MacDonald, that relentless 
pro-highway propagandist and promoter of the government-motordom coalition, flagrantly lied 
to the committee. Interstate Commerce Commission annual reports bear out Goddard’s assertion. 
 
537 Foreman. The Southern Railway, founded in Richmond in 1894, was one of Atlanta’s premier corporate 
citizens, both as a taxpayer and an employer. In the 1920s, its North Avenue terminal, along with its tracks by the 
General Motors plant in southeast Atlanta, brought a high percentage of the automotive freight to the city; Garrett 
and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 2:295. 
538 The railroads’ complaints about federal aid to a competing industry have to be the mother of all 
hypocrisies, given the massive land grants worth billions which they received from the U.S. government in the 
1800s. Thomas H. MacDonald, “What Our Highways Mean to Us,” Trade Winds  (February 1923): 16. 
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The documents show that the majority of track abandonments were the direct result of motor 
vehicle competition. Railroads had good reason to fear.539 
Motordom’s relentless momentum appeared unstoppable. As traffic increasingly clogged 
downtown streets and the numbers of auto-related fatalities swelled, the Chamber of Commerce 
applauded the great automobile industry which had done so much for the state and the city. In 
Georgia, more than 500 buses carried children to and from schools in rural as well as urban 
areas. Motorized tractors transformed agriculture and trucks allowed farmers to transport their 
goods to market more efficiently. The automobile had considerably extended Atlanta’s retail 
territory; customers now drove from 50 to 150 miles to shop in city department stores. It also 
redefined retail geography at the city boundaries as merchants established branch stores adjacent 
to the new suburban neighborhoods. Some 5,000 local automobile workers received decent 
wages, most of which they spent in town. The Chamber enthusiastically credited the automobile 
with securing Atlanta’s position as the financial center of the South.540 
A similar sentiment prevailed nationally, as many hailed the booming automobile 
industry as the backbone of Coolidge prosperity. Allen notes, “The phenomenal activity of this 
one part of the body economic—which was responsible directly or indirectly for the employment 
of nearly four million men—pumped new life into all the rest.” The rising tide of motordom may 
have lifted other industries, but the Republican administrations of Coolidge and Hoover greatly 
assisted business generally, and the car industry specifically. Reduced regulatory oversight, non-
interference in business affairs, the lack of anti-trust actions, hostility to labor unions, and tax 
 
539 The railroads dated their track loss from 1916; Stephen B. Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle 
between Road and Rail in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 115-17. 
540 T. K. Johnson, “The Day of the Automobile: Business Conditions Hopeful in Atlanta and Entire 
Southeast,” City Builder  (October 1925): 11, 41-42; Isenberg, Downtown America: A History of the Place and the 
People Who Made It, 80-81. 
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policies which favored corporations and the rich—all gave confidence to the business 
community.541 
Throughout the twenties, government and business became more intertwined, particularly 
through the efforts of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce for both Harding and Coolidge. 
Under his direction, Commerce grew from a small department with little control into a powerful, 
multi-agency organization. Acting with the trade associations, he brought corporate leaders and 
federal officials into public-private coalitions for the benefit of business. Each industry within 
multi-faceted motordom had its own trade group to participate in the quasi-governmental 
commissions and studies, to lobby and to secure policies and legislation advantageous to 
themselves.542   
The Highway Education Board stands out as an example of a government agency whose 
constituents represented various sectors of motordom, and whose actions had a direct impact on 
Atlanta’s streets. In 1920, the head of the Bureau of Public Roads, the president of the Hudson 
Motor Car Company, and an executive from the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce 
together urged the appointment of a Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee. 
Renamed the Highway Education Board in 1922, its members all had vested interests in 
 
541 Allen, Only Yesterday; an Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties, 114, 118; Dumenil, The Modern 
Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s, 34-37; Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise 
of a New American Culture, 179-80, 265; David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General 
Motors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 95; Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and 
Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement,” Harvard Business Review  (December 15, 2017): 
https://hbr.org/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-the-u-s-antitrust-movement. The auto industry prohibited unions 
until after the organization of the United Automobile Workers in 1935. The group’s first strike was at General 
Motor’s Chevrolet plant on Sawtell Avenue in Atlanta beginning on November 18, 1936; “‘Sit-Down’ Strike Grips 
Fisher Plant,” Atlanta Constitution, November 19, 1936. General Motors and Chrysler would recognize the UAW in 
early 1937, but Ford held out until 1941. 
542 Allen, Only Yesterday; an Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties, 114, 118; Mazur, American 
Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 76; Dumenil, The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 
1920s, 34-37; Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail in the Twentieth Century, 111, 14. 
On Hoover’s ambition for building up the nation’s commerce, see “‘Boss’ of Radio Tells of Great Growth in U.S.,” 
Atlanta Constitution, February 3, 1923.    
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furthering the construction of new roads, nurturing engineers to build them, and instructing the 
public on their proper use. A principle tenet of the Board was its insistence that all citizens 
should subsidize building and maintaining highways, whether they owned a motor car or not. 
Since everybody benefitted, everybody should pay.543 
The Highway Education Board wrote road safety curricula for public schools, produced 
popular booklets and scientific bulletins, created traveling exhibits of properly constructed 
highways and bridges, and sponsored school good roads and traffic safety essay-writing contests. 
Atlanta’s public school system adopted the federal agency’s curriculum and approaches, and its 
students participated in the national essay contests. The city’s future citizens would be well 
indoctrinated into the promise of the Board: that the scientific regulation of streets, highways, 
and traffic would promote the prosperity, welfare, and domestic happiness of American 
communities.544  
The federal government, with its national educational programs and helpful regulatory 
stance, created a friendly operating environment for carmakers and their products. In 1922 and 
1923, the industry produced record numbers of vehicles. But in 1924, they faced a thoroughly 
unfamiliar and distressing situation: their home market had reached saturation, something many 
thought would never occur. Virtually everyone in the country who could afford a car had by this 
time already purchased one. Many American families simply did not have enough money to buy 
 
543 Norman Damon, “The Action Program for Highway Safety,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 320 (November 1958): 16; Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road 
and Rail in the Twentieth Century, 112-13; Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee, “Proceedings of 
the Second National Conference” (Washington, DC, October 26-28, 1922), various; Graham, “Sending the 
Highways to School,” 87. 
544 Atlanta Constitution: “Schools to Teach Pupils to Observe Traffic Regulations,” November 14, 1920; 
“A.A.A. Offers Prizes for ‘Safety’ Essay,” November 6, 1921; Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education, 
“Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting” (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, June 20-23, 1923), 29-31; 
Walton C. John, “The Purpose of the Second National Conference on Education for Highway Engineering and 
Highway Transport” (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Second National Conference, Washington, DC, 
October 26-28, 1922), 15. 
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even a low-priced Model T Ford, no matter how much they might wish for one. They would 
remain trolley-riding “straphangers” for the foreseeable future.545 
Those who already owned cars saw no need to replace them. Mazur documents the 
tremendous, often insurmountable reluctance of the average buyer to replace a heavy item like a 
car while it retained usefulness. Manufacturers could not wait 6.75 years (the average lifespan of 
a motor vehicle at the time) until an automobile started to wear out, and the owner began to think 
about shopping for a replacement. Slowing down production was far too costly; instead, 
automakers needed to surmount the wall of consumer resistance and increase sales volume to 
match their tremendous output.546  
The industry had just unexpectedly entered into a new period of its history: competition 
rather than growth. The era of peak profitability, the 1910s, had ended; the period of peak 
production capacity had begun. Prior to World War I, the problem had been for factories to make 
enough cars, not to sell them. Dealers did not have to hone their marketing skills; instead, they 
just pleaded with manufacturers to send them more and larger shipments quickly.547  
That time had passed. The challenge now was not selling someone their first car; rather, it 
was getting the current car owner to purchase a new one, and make sure it was one of yours 
rather than one of the other guys’. The growing presence of a price-friendly used-car market 
 
545  Robert H. Martin, “The Future of the Automobile Industry,” City Builder 6, no. 9 (November 1921): 3. 
Data recorded in table is from U.S. Department of Commerce’s census statistical abstracts for 1930, 1933, and 1950. 
In 1922, the idea of the auto industry would reach market saturation seemed absurd. The most serious problem 
engineers then worried about was running out of oil. The Mining and Metallurgical Engineers met in March 1921 to 
discuss the regional oil supplies of North and South America. They were not panicked. “No one appears to 
doubt…that, somehow, somewhere, new sources of power will be found to make possible man’s continuing and 
heightened mobility,” “Motor Car Statistics,” Atlanta Constitution, April 4, 1922; “Automobility,” New York Times, 
March 3, 1922. 
546 Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 72-73, 92; Tedlow, New and Improved: 
The Story of Mass Marketing in America, 155-56. Paul M. Mazur (1892-1979) was a leading investment banker 
working in 1927 for Lehman Brothers, where he eventually made senior partner. The 1929 average car lifespan cited 
is from National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, Facts and Figures of the Automobile Industry, 14.    
547 Chandler, 13; “How to Sell Automobiles,” Fortune (February 1939): 71-78, 105-09, quoted in Chandler, 
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296 
complicated matters and threatened new car sales. More and better advertising helped bring 
motordom out of the recession. 
7.5 Advertising the Automobile 
The novel situation encountered by automakers in 1924, a saturated marketplace, 
demanded an immediate response. The many technological innovations in engineering and 
manufacturing inaugurated by the Ford Motor Company’s moving assembly line had 
dramatically expanded the ability to make record numbers of automobiles. Routinized and 
progressive assembly tasks, heavier machinery, specialized tools, parts-sharing across car lines—
all combined to reduce costs and speed up production. By the mid-twenties, the other carmakers 
had followed Ford’s lead with significant re-design and re-tooling of their shop floors.548  
Automakers understood that, to sell all the vehicles they now produced, they needed to 
market to new and returning customers, and to nurture an easy buying experience for everyone. 
Both continuous demand and a constantly increasing demand were necessary to handle their 
expanded production capacity, which grew from less than 2 million cars in 1920, to nearly 5 
million in 1929. Through various persuasive methods, manufacturers could, as Leach observes, 
forge a new consumer consciousness, and create a culture of desire.549   
By the mid-1920s, an entire field of marketing had emerged, peopled by professionals, 
the graduates of business schools. Harvard led the country, establishing its School of Business in 
1908, and offering the first master’s degree in business administration. By 1920, numbers of 
colleges and universities had established graduate programs in retailing.  
 
548 Daniel M. G. Raff, “Making Cars and Making Money in the Interwar Automobile Industry: Economies 
of Scale and Scope and the Manufacturing Behind the Marketing,” Business History Review 65, no. 4 (Winter 
1991): 723-24, 31, 35, 43-44. 
549 Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 21; Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, 
Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture, 37. 
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Atlanta’s business school began at the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1913, with 
Wayne S. Kell as dean. Officially named the Evening School of Commerce in 1914, it offered a 
three-year Bachelor of Commercial Science degree, and its classes met at night. Dean Kell 
oversaw the move off the Georgia Tech campus into a building on Walton Street in downtown to 
facilitate access by the non-traditional students, who made up a large part of the school’s 
attendees. These “irregulars” consisted primarily of men employed full-time, who could only 
attend classes after working hours. In 1917, to offset the declining enrollment due to the war-
time draft, the dean began admitting women students. The school, which eventually morphed 
into today’s Georgia State University, grew rapidly during the twenties under the guidance of 
director George M. Sparks. A 1921 Constitution article credited the prominent place of women 
in the city’s business life to their attendance at the Evening School. They took classes in 
accounting, office management, finance, and commercial law, but “the alluring field of 
advertising” was one of the most popular courses of study.”550  
Modern, scientific marketing had two distinct components: research and advertising. Ad 
agencies as well as large corporations created their own research departments to gather facts and 
figures about specific industries. The data included surveys of consumer needs and preferences 
as well as statistical studies of sales and trends, taking account of seasonal fluctuations and 
regional differences. The information fed into corporate forecasting and planning, and enabled 
better coordination between the divisions responsible for ordering, manufacturing, shipping, and 
sales. According to Isenberg, “industry experts well understood those who researched and 
 
550 Stantec and Georgia State University, “Campus Historic Preservation Plan,” (Atlanta: Georgia State 
University, June 6, 2014), 3-4. Georgia State buildings were named for two of the early leaders: Kell Hall (the 
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defined markets often had the power to create them.” In the twenties, the obvious goal was to 
create a new market.551 
The advertising side of marketing involved the promotion of commercial products and 
services in public media outlets. Trachtenberg notes how the earlier manifestations of 
advertising, which merely provided product information to potential customers, now assumed a 
different configuration. The modern advertisement supplied facts, but also described how the 
consumer required the product to meet a specific need—“a need incited and articulated by the ad 
itself.” As early as the late nineteenth century, department stores, the great innovators in 
advertising, had introduced this type of “story-telling” ad (a descriptor which aptly captures both 
its narrative and deceitful characteristics). Automakers, in this as in other aspects of selling, 
lagged behind the early merchandising geniuses, but caught up quickly after World War I.552     
Allen describes the new approach this way:  
The advertisers met the competition with better design, persuasively realistic 
photographs, and sheer volume. . . . They met it . . . with a subtle change of 
technic. The copywriter was learning to pay less attention to the special qualities 
and advantages of his product, and more to the study of what the mass of 
unregenerate mankind wanted—to be young and desirable, to be rich, to keep up 
with the Joneses, to be envied. The winning method was to associate his product 
with one or more of these ends, logically or illogically, truthfully or cynically.553 
 
Each ad created its own portrayal of promise and aspiration, not just with words, but 
increasingly with images. The printing industry’s lithograph departments had progressed from 
the simple line sketches of the late 1800s. By the 1920s, they could photograph anything, transfer 
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Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1982), 135, 37.  
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it onto a zinc plate, and print between 6000-7000 impressions per hour. The higher-end national 
publications offered four-color printing to their advertisers, and pictures crowded the Sunday 
rotogravure supplements of large city newspapers, including Atlanta’s three dailies.554 
The city’s printing industry had emerged as the South’s leader. In addition to the 
newspaper companies, by the mid-twenties, nearly 100 printers, binders, and engravers worked 
in Atlanta, employing more than 2,000 workers and supplying the largest payroll of any single 
business, after the cotton mills. They produced telephone and city directories, books, catalogs, 
commercial forms, direct mail advertising, and agricultural and religious newspapers. Their 
leading outputs were the class journals—magazines of all types—which had nationwide 
circulation. Every major regional industry had its own class journal, many of which were 
published in Atlanta. It consumed more paper and printers’ ink than any other city in the 
southeast due to journal production. Local postal authorities recorded higher receipts than any 
other city of comparable size in the U.S. due to the print mailings originating in Atlanta.555 
Fortunately for the printers and publishers, Atlanta also stood at the center of the South’s 
paper trade. Samuel P. Richards started the first paper mill in the city in the late 1800s, and in the 
early 1900s, multiple companies from the northeast and Midwest established branches in Atlanta, 
along with local entrepreneurs. By 1920, the city was the wholesale and distribution center for 
papers and paper goods of all kinds for the southeastern U.S.556   
 
554 Walter O. Foote, “The Printing Industry in Atlanta,” City Builder  (August 1926): 48. In 1919, the 
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Advertisements did not only appear on paper. Signage of all types and sizes publicized 
products, businesses, special sales, and promotions. Electric signs, introduced in Atlanta in 1902, 
had grown in size, numbers, and colors. After 1912, panoramic and moving signs appeared. In 
1921, the just-opened Howard Theater on Peachtree Street installed on its rooftop the city’s 
largest flashing-light sign. Even the Chamber of Commerce, located one block east of Five 
Points, erected a big electric sign—visible from Peachtree Street—so visitors could easily find 
the building.557  
Another type of sign, roadside billboards, aimed to capture the attention of the motorist. 
These had to be large enough to be easily seen and read while traveling at some speed. Earlier, 
outdoor signs in cities and small towns had been affixed to fences and buildings. With the 
coming of the automobile and the greatly improved streets and highways, advertisers preferred 
side-of-the-road locations. One of the country’s first national out-of-home advertising groups, 
the Associated Bill Posters’ Association, formed in 1891. By 1900, they had standardized sizes, 
allowing national brands to mass-produce posters that would reliably fit onto any billboard 
anywhere in the nation.558  
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Atlanta’s own St. 
Elmo Murray 
Massengale (1876-1929) 
established the South’s 
first outdoor bulletin 
system in 1910 (see 
figure at right). The 
company, an outgrowth of the successful ad firm he created in 1896, was one of the first in the 
nation to hire landscapers to plant grass and care for the grounds beneath the lighted outdoor 
signs. Massengale, one of the city’s elite businessmen, was called the “dean of southern 
advertising.” He founded the Atlanta Ad Men’s Club, the first association of ad agents in the 
South, and helped create the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World. His firm was one of 
Coca-Cola’s first ad agencies.559  
In 1925, the billboard industry established the Outdoor Advertising Association of 
America to protect its interests. That year, a merger between several firms created the gigantic 
General Outdoor Advertising Company, which had a strong presence in Atlanta. Large car 
manufacturers utilized the outdoor ad firms to place their displays on billboards across America, 
so Atlantans saw the same product promotions as people in New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles.560 
 
559 Atlanta Constitution: “Glowing Tributes Paid Massengale On Anniversary,” June 15, 1921; “St. Elmo 
M. Massengale, Prominent Advertising Man, Dies After Lengthy Illness,” August 20, 1929. The Cusack ad with the 
Massengale Bulletin System is from the 1923 Atlanta City Directory, pg. 153. 
560 “Cusack,” Time 4, no. 14 (October 6, 1924): 29. Massengale sold out to Thomas Cusack in 1919. 
Cusack was one of the leading firms in the big merger of 1925, which consolidated a large number of agencies 
throughout the U.S.  
Figure 43. Ad for Massengale Bulletin System, 1923. 
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Over the decade, the city earned the reputation as the leading advertising center in the 
Southeast, offering the region’s most extensive promotional facilities. Local auto dealers utilized 
every medium available to advertise their biggest event of the year, the Southern Automobile 
Convention. The Atlanta Automobile Association, which sponsored the annual show, placed ads 
in newspapers and posters on billboards. They also printed and distributed 100,000 pieces of 
direct mail for dealers to give to prospective customers. In 1924, for the first time, they also 
advertised on radio from the Atlanta Journal’s station, WSB.561 
In the early 1920s, few radio stations had on-air advertisements (the term “commercials” 
meaning broadcast product advertisements did not come into common usage until the 1930s). By 
decade’s end, most sold ad time just like newspapers sold ad space. Calvin Coolidge became the 
first president to campaign on the radio when he addressed an estimated 20 million listeners on 
Monday, November 3, 1924, the night before the election he won. Edward L. Bernays, noted 
publicist and promoter of advertising techniques to create and control the desires of the masses, 
found the new medium a superb way to influence a large consumer audience.562  
In 1928, Bernays orchestrated a promotional campaign for the new Dodge automobile, 
the Victory Six. It included the “Victory Hour,” a one-hour national radio broadcast, involving 
multiple performers contributing live from Detroit, New Orleans, Chicago, and New York, 
 
561 Atlanta Constitution: “Many Answer Dodge Bros. Slogan Query,” September 25, 1921; “Buyer Sees All 
Of ‘Em At Show,” January 28, 1923; “Southern Auto Show Publicity Planned,” January 13, 1924. Besides its 
publications and radio stations, Atlanta offered superior telephone and telegraph services, being the home to the 
Southern Bell Company. The city also led the south in aviation, with its acquisition of Candler Field (now 
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport), and the inauguration of air mail in 1926; Cooper, Official History of 
Fulton County, 775-81.  
562 Carole Scott, “History of the Radio Industry in the United States to 1940,”  EH.Net Encyclopedia of 
Economic and Business History (March 26, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-history-of-the-radio-industry-in-
the-united-states-to-1940/. Use of “commercial” for broadcast ads from OED Online, June 2020, Oxford University 
Press. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37081?redirectedFrom=commercial; Raymond Clapper, “Commercial Era 
Looms for Radio, Atlanta Constitution, January 12, 1924; Library of Congress, “Radio: A Consumer Product and a 
Producer of Consumption,” http://lcweb2.loc.gov:8081/ammem/amrlhtml/inradio.html; Edward L. Bernays, “What 
Future for Radio Advertising?” Advertising and Selling  (February 8, 1928): 27, 59, 61-62; Allen, Only Yesterday; 
an Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties, 117. 
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emceed by Will Rogers in Hollywood (see ad below). Called “the most intricate engineering feat 
thus far attempted in radio broadcasting,” 33 stations, including WSB in Atlanta, aired the NBC 
program. The entire country learned at the same moment about the newest Dodge motor car.563    
A retired ad man, writing of his years 
in the industry during the first decades of the 
twentieth century, called it the “golden era of 
advertising-merchandising history.” Many 
strategies and media had been introduced or 
reached maturity during the time period. 
Improved transportation and communications 
supported the profusion of promotional 
devices. From the classified newspaper ads 
and streetcar posters of the early 1900s, 
publicity now reached audiences via direct-
mail pieces, colorful magazines, sponsored 
radio programs, tabloids, telephone surveys, 
electric signs, half- or full-page newspaper 
display ads, lighted highway billboards, mail-
order catalogues, and even the movies.564  
 
563 The NBC one-hour broadcast cost Dodge about $67,000; “Radio In the Home: Dodge Hour Costs More 
Than $60,000,” Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1928. Starting in 1927, the newspaper carried a special “Radio In 
the Home” section. The Victory Hour had another broadcast in March 1928. Walter Chrysler would buy Dodge 
Brothers later that year, and rename the car the “Dodge Brothers Six.”    
564 Harden Bryant Leachman, The Early Advertising Scene (Wood Dale, IL: H. B. Leachman, 1949), 247; 
White, "Hand-to-Mouth Buying," 136. Leachman does not include movies in his summary.  
Figure 44. Ad for 1928 Dodge radio show; 
Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1928. 
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Motion pictures brought advertisers multiple merchandising opportunities, such as 
product placement within a movie or product endorsements by movie stars. Film provided an 
excellent way to display motor vehicles and tell stories, as Charlie Chaplin brilliantly did in The 
Kid (1921), where he utilized cars to underscore his tale of class and wealth inequality. But one 
did not have to go to Hollywood to shoot an ad. Atlanta’s Graphic Films Corporation produced 
motion pictures for sales or publicity purposes, which local theaters screened ahead of the feature 
film. As the company’s own ad copy read, movies had the ability to attract, entertain, interest, 
explain, and above all, convince.565 
Despite the variety of promotional venues available by the end of the 1920s, newspaper 
and magazine advertising still led the field. Car manufacturers utilized every possible medium to 
plug their products, while local dealers continued to place their ads in print publications whose 
readers lived within Atlanta’s retail territory. Newspapers in particular won commendations from 
the Chamber of Commerce for their optimistic boosting of the city through their publicity about 
new businesses, enterprises, citizens, and buildings. The Chamber claimed that the papers had 
“contributed more to Atlanta’s upbuilding and progress than any other one factor.”566   
Automakers spent heavily for newspaper and magazine advertising. In 1924, the national 
print ad dollars for passenger cars alone reached nearly $9 million, making it the third largest 
class of merchandise advertiser in the U.S., after foods and toiletries. It was money well spent. 
Market research proved conclusively that people read ads and bought advertised merchandise.567  
 
565 Graphic Films Corporation ad, City Builder 11, no. 3 (April 1925): inside front cover. 
566 “Newspapers Lead Advertising Field, Declares Bryson,” Atlanta Constitution, November 1, 1929; Stiles 
A. Martin, “What the Newspapers Have Done for Atlanta,” City Builder 8, no. 1 (March 1923): 3. 
567 Charles Coolidge Parlin, The Merchandising of Radio (Philadelphia: Curtis, 1925), 7, 40, 42; Farber, 
Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, 103; Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and 
Consequences, 88. Automakers continue to spend heavily on advertising.  
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Census data (see table below) shows the increase in revenue received by newspapers and 
periodicals from advertising. In 1900, ad revenue provided just over 50% of the total revenue for 
the two print classes. Neither papers nor magazines relied on subscriptions and sales for the bulk 
of their earnings. By 1929, just over 70% of their $1.5 billion total revenue came from 
advertisements.568  
Atlanta had more ad agencies than any other city in Georgia. The 1920 city directory 
listed 39 different entities under the “Advertising” category. That number grew to 58 by 1929. 
The Atlanta Ad Men’s Club, founded in the early 1900s, had 350 members at the beginning of 
the decade. While the club retained “Men” in its name, women advertisers could join and had 
equal privileges, a privilege rarely accorded to women in this time period. The local organization 
was a member of the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, and successfully lobbied to 
bring the international group’s annual convention to the city in 1921.569 
 
568 Table is adapted and expanded from James D. Norris, Advertising and the Transformation of American 
Society, 1865-1920 (New York: Greenwood, 1990), 49. The 1929 data is from Table 742, Printing and Publishing 
Census Statistics, pg. 734, volume 12, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933.  
569 Atlanta City Directory 1920, vol. 43 (Atlanta: Atlanta City Directory, 1920), 1334-35; Atlanta (Georgia) 
City Directory 1929, vol. 52 (Atlanta: Atlanta City Directory, 1929), 1810-11; Bessie Kempton, “Atlanta Women 
Prominent in Advertising Work,” Atlanta Constitution, June 12, 1921; Paul Warwick, “3,000 of World’s Leading 










% Increase in 
Advertising 
Revenue 
1880 $39,136 $89,009 43.9% -----
1890 $71,243 $143,586 49.6% 82%
1900 $95,862 $175,789 54.5% 35%
1910 $202,533 $337,596 59.9% 111%
1920 $528,299 $806,305 65.6% 161%
1929 $1,120,238 $1,580,565 70.9% 112%
Table 16. Advertising Revenue of Newspapers and Periodicals, 1880-1929 
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Prominent publisher and one of the city’s most influential power elites, W. R. C. Smith, 
led the campaign to bring the international convention to Atlanta. Possessing a knack for 
advertising, he took an active role in the Ad Men’s Club, whose members included businessmen 
as well as advertisers. The local club had a significant and self-proclaimed role in promoting 
activities leading to city expansion. The group described itself as “one of the most progressive 
civic forces engaged in the upbuilding and betterment of Atlanta,” and boasted that “hardly any 
local movement of any responsibility is inaugurated without the support, advice and 
encouragement” of the ad women and men.570 
The Atlanta Ad Men’s Club’s stated goals included: (1) working for truth in advertising; 
(2) educating the public as to the economic benefits of advertising; and (3) working to secure 
favorable legislation and blocking laws that might harm the industry. Concerning goal #1, while 
the industry might not actually produce honest ads, it did succeed in spreading the idea that ads 
conveyed accurate and reliable information. Frederick, writing in 1929, admitted that she and 
others, especially women, saw ads as a great source of knowledge. By the twenties, goal #2 had 
been met. Every merchant understood the financial impact of ads, and every consumer paid 
attention to ads, if not fully cognizant of their impact. Goal #3 was a work in progress, but had 
already achieved a consequential victory in the federal income tax law, which categorized 
advertising as a deductible business expense. In some tax brackets, companies could actually 
make money by expanding their ad budgets. Leachman attributes some of the massive post-war 
growth in the industry to this novel fiscal benefit. Manufacturers “seized upon the windfall—
 
570 “History of the Advertising Club of Atlanta,” City Builder 5, no. 3 (May 1920): 12-13. Smith, in 1925, 
would initiate the Forward Atlanta campaign.  
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glad to have Uncle Sam pay their advertising bills.” Ad men found it easy secure orders in such 
an environment.571 
The automotive businesses of Georgia and Atlanta thoroughly appreciated the importance 
of advertising to their financial security. The Georgia Automotive Dealers’ Association had 
formed in 1919, with the goals of increasing service to customers and advancing dealers’ 
interests. They held their first annual meeting in early 1920, hosted by the Atlanta Automobile 
Association at the Capital City Club. The keynote speak addressed some 400 dealers on the 
important topic of “Selling and Keeping the Customer Sold.” He praised the state’s advertisers as 
knowledgeable and well-versed in their art.572  
 The Atlanta Automobile Association, among its various activities, provided advertising 
assistance to members. One of their more memorable efforts was the “Buy Something for the Car 
for Christmas” campaign in 1924. They placed numerous display ads (see ad below) in the city’s 
three big daily newspapers, and utilized other forms of publicity to maximize their results. The 
promotion appealed to everyone in the Association—car dealers, accessory retailers, 
 
571 LeRoy Rogers, “Facts About the Atlanta Advertising Club,” ibid. 8, no. 2 (April 1923): 37; Christine 
Frederick, Selling Mrs. Consumer (New York: Business Course, 1929), 336, 38; Leachman, The Early Advertising 
Scene, 221. The Code of Federal Regulations regarding income tax has always considered advertising an ongoing 
business expense, an allowable deductible; 26 CFR § 1.162-20 and 26 CFR § 1.263(a)-4.  
572 Atlanta Constitution: “Georgia Auto Men to Banquet,” January 11, 1920; “Mathers Is Head of Auto 
Dealers,” January 22, 1920. The keynote speak was Edward S. Jordan, president of the Jordan Motor Car Company 
in Cleveland, OH. 
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wholesalers, and members of the other allied automotive trades. Charles V. Hohenstein, 
executive secretary of the group, declared that 50,000 car owners lived within a 25-mile radius of 
Five Points. Most used their vehicles for pleasure or a combination of business and pleasure. 
Their families would appreciate 
useful accessories. However, for 
some fortunate few, there was only 
“one supreme gift—a new car.”573  
During the 1920s, Atlanta’s 
motordom industries were not the 
only ones investing in advertising 
and taking note of the changing 
buying habits of the American 
consumer. At a quarterly meeting of 
the Atlanta Retail Merchants’ 
Association in 1928, executive 
secretary Charles V. Hohenstein 
described the changes in marketing 
over the past 20 years. R. A. Kline, a local department store executive, spoke about the new 
consumer. He described the passing of the old era of necessities-only purchasing to “the present 
age of prosperity and widespread buying of luxuries.” The high wages of American workers, he 
correctly claimed, had given them the best standard of living in the world. While not applicable 
to everyone (especially farmers), per capital disposable income in the U.S. did rise 50% between 
 
573 Atlanta Constitution: “Auto Men to Conduct Advertising for Xmas,” September 28, 1924; J. V. Freitag, 
“Accessories Make Ideal Xmas Gifts,” November 2, 1924. 
Figure 45. Atlanta Auto. Assn. ad, Atlanta 
Constitution, December 3, 1924. 
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1922 and 1928, as industrial productivity almost doubled. The average wage of working 
Americans was the highest in the world, and automobile workers’ typical earnings exceeded that 
average. Coolidge prosperity had made possible the widespread spending on non-essentials, 
purchasing based wants, not needs.574  
More and better advertising helped bring motordom out of the recession; but it could not, 
on its own, overcome the challenge of market saturation. Eventually automakers adopted three 
additional approaches to the problem, which together enabled them to dispel forever the 
saturated market specter. Besides more sophisticated marketing to generate customers for the 
mass of new cars, their strategies included: establishing diversified, price-segmented car lines to 
reach shoppers with different wallet sizes; introducing new annual models; and offering 
installment purchase plans to enable even marginal buyers to acquire an automobile. Should 
these all prove insufficient, government assistance in the form of additional spending for 
highways and bridges could provide a backstop. Economists asserted that public expenditures 
reliably bolstered business whenever consumer demand was low. But that was unlikely to be 
needed because American culture had become a culture of consumption.575  
Most auto manufacturers, led by General Motors, embraced the idea of the annual model 
release—a new re-designed (more or less) car every year to stoke society’s craving for the latest 
thing. Henry Ford was having none of it. In his opinion, advertising based solely on stylistic 
changes constituted an immoral form of consumer manipulation. He derided any ornamentation 
 
574 “Retail Merchants Told of New Selling Conditions,” Atlanta Constitution, April 20, 1928. Hohenstein 
was executive secretary to both the retail merchants and the automobile associations which shared offices, indicating 
how closely the retail merchants and pro-auto advocates worked together. Raymond A. Kline was a vice-president 
and general manager of the Davison-Paxon Company, which had sold out to Macy’s in 1925. Two years later, 
Macy’s had completed its massive new store at 200 Peachtree Street, still standing. Statistics on income and 
standard of living are from Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, 94. 
575 William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings, The Road to Plenty (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 
94-95. 
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on cars and amenities, having in 1909 famously asserted, “Any customer can have a car painted 
any color that he wants so long as it is black.” While the “black only” option did not apply to the 
Model T until 1914, his resistance to new business strategies (price segmentation and planned 
obsolescence) and to offering superficialities (a choice of colors and accessories) cost him 
dearly.576   
A number of consumers, especially women, rejected the monochrome Fords. One writer 
remarked, “The Model T was a wonderful car, but it certainly did not flatter your pride of 
ownership.” The company lost market share precipitously in the mid-1920s. General Motors, 
meanwhile, had introduced the new DuPont lacquer paint in a bright blue color on its 1924 
Oakland Six. Duco, specially formulated for the automobile industry, dried quickly, was durable 
and scratch-resistant, and only required one coat. Car manufacturers would use it for the next 
thirty years.577    
Faced with shrinking sales, in 1926, Ford prepared for the production of his first new 
passenger car in nearly twenty years. He officially stopped manufacturing Model T’s on May 27, 
1927, closed plants for retooling, idled workers, and watched his market share collapse. The first 
Model A rolled off the River Rouge plant’s assembly line on October 21. Ford gave the fully 
updated vehicle, which came in four standard colors and nine body styles, an extravagant debut, 
 
576 Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, 99, 103; Frederick, Selling 
Mrs. Consumer, 6-7; Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work (Garden City, NY: Garden City 
Publishing, 1922), 71; James Couzens, “What I Learned About Business from Ford,” System 40, no. 3 (September 
1921): 361. The original Model T’s did not come in black at all; touring cars were red, roadsters were gray. In 1914, 
Ford began to use a lacquer-like, baked enamel paint which provided a hard, durable surface. The color black 
happened to dry the fastest, so the choice was practical and economic, not aesthetic; “Model T,”  in Encyclopedia of 
Detroit (Detroit: Detroit Historical Society, ©2020), https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-
detroit/model-t.  
577 “Chevrolet,” Fortune (January 1939): 39-40, quoted in Chandler, 153; William Sherman Dutton, Du 
Pont: One Hundred and Forty Years (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), 295-301. The first Atlanta ad for 
the “True Blue” Oakland Six appeared in 1924; “This One Thing Only,” Atlanta Constitution, February 17, 1924. 
Pyroxylin, Ford’s in-house version of Duco, was introduced on the Model A in 1927, “Pyroxylin Tested For 5-Year 
Period,” Atlanta Constitution, April 22, 1928. 
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spending $2 million on advertising. Branch plants across the country each received one display 
model, to be revealed to the public on December 2. Atlanta’s seven Ford dealers had received 
Model A photos and data for distribution that day, but only the showroom of the Ford factory on 
Ponce de Leon Avenue had an actual vehicle. In less than a week, some 50,000 Atlantans came 
to view the Model A (see photo below), and by late December, Beaudry Motor Company, the 
city’s leading Ford dealership, had its own display model. Deliveries began in the new year.578 
In 1929, a 
marketing academic 
wrote about the growing 
national emphasis on 
style, and held the 
automobile responsible. 
Not only did the industry 
highlight new models 
with splashy publicity campaigns, but the automobile itself, as a transportation vehicle, had 
increased social interactions which made people more conversant with current events. Rural 
dwellers had access to many of the same products as urbanites, and could now (aided by 
federally-funded roadways) travel longer distances “to satisfy their style requirements.” Other 
 
578 Atlanta Constitution: “Ford to Exhibit New Car Dec. 2,” November 25, 1927; “First New Ford to 
Appear Here on Next Friday,” November 29, 1927; “The New Ford Car,” December 2, 1927; “Fifty Thousand,” 
December 7, 1927; Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, 104; Tedlow, New and 
Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America, 163; David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass 
Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 292-93.  
Figure 46. Crowd views the new Ford, Atlanta Constitution, 
December 18, 1927. 
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industries, especially radio, adopted the carmakers’ profitable “new annual model” regimen as 
the national appetite for style over substance grew.579  
Lears labels planned obsolescence as so much “advertising bait,” but underscores its 
success. Manufacturers might make only small, cosmetic changes to a product, but consumers 
found the novelty compelling and rushed to make their next purchase (and still do). The quest for 
happiness and escape from the humdrum of daily living might motivate the culture of 
consumption, but the personal dissatisfaction and promise of freedom were both fabricated 
notions, creations of the ad agencies and their employers, the American manufacturers. Yet, to 
guarantee that customers would act on the feelings and beliefs generated by the ads, sellers 
needed to ensure that prospective buyers had the means to acquire the goods. Automakers in 
particular facilitated credit buying, navigating the final hurdle on their path to greater profits.580    
Mazur explains the rationale for installment purchasing, which came to play such an 
important role in how American businesses did business. 
Obsolescence has been a vital ingredient in American business prosperity. One 
step beyond, however, was still necessary in order to ensure as large a consumer 
demand as American business desired and needed. The consumer was already 
exhausting a good deal of his purchasing power, which was a serious impediment 
to increased sales. It was therefore necessary that increased consumer purchasing 
power should be created. And this was done by the extraordinary extension of 
instalment purchasing, the plan which enables American consumers today to 
satisfy many billions of dollars’ worth of their needs and desires. . . . The purpose 
of the instalment plan is to convert future earning power into present purchasing 
power.581 
 
Most people could not afford to buy a car, except by saving up for a long time, or by 
borrowing money. On an installment plan, they could make a down payment, followed by 
 
579 William J. Reilly, “Methods for the Study of Retail Relationships,” University of Texas Bulletin no. 
2944 (November 22, 1929): 35. 
580 Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture, 126; Lears, Fables 
of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America, 210. 
581 Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 97. Italics added. 
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periodic payments of a set amount (including interest) over a set period of time until the debt was 
discharged. Once considered a chancy maneuver to which only the feckless or the beleaguered 
resorted, “buying on time,” especially for large-ticket items like houses and cars gradually won 
acceptance. By the end of the decade, the Big Three carmakers had established entities to finance 
sales of their own vehicles to both dealers and retail customers. General Motors, naturally, had a 
head start, having in 1919 established the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (G.M.A.C.), 
with an Atlanta office in the prestigious Hurt Building. Not until 1928 did Ford charter his 
Universal Credit Corporation, which had a local office on Marietta Street.582 
For many city dwellers, however, a vehicle was not absolutely critical for daily 
transportation. The great need for an automobile often lay not in its utility as a transportation 
device, but in the status it conferred upon the owner. A profusion of new status-indicators 
abounded in the 1920s, such as an electric refrigerator, a radio (or two), an electric washing 
machine. But these were all indoor items. Besides your house and the neighborhood in which 
you lived, nothing could match the high visibility of the car parked in your driveway or on the 
street in front of your home. That vehicle announced to every neighbor and passerby your fiscal 
status, and consequently your social status. Ownership of a new model from higher up in the 
price brackets indicated greater wealth and conferred higher social standing. 
In 1899, Veblen claimed that to gain and hold the esteem of one’s fellow human beings, 
one had not only to possess power and wealth; one had to display power and wealth. The 
 
582 “How to Sell Automobiles,” Fortune (February 1939); 71-78, 105-09, quoted in Chandler, 166-167; 
Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 102; Flink, The Automobile Age, 189-91; Hounshell, 
From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the 
United States, 293; Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, 104; Scharff, Taking 
the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age, 171. Newspapers mentioned the credit financing businesses: 
Atlanta Constitution: “G.M.A.C. Provides Credit for Dealers,” February 18, 1923; “Mammoth Hurt Building Marks 
Epoch in Business Progress of Dixie Capital,” September 14, 1924; “Ford’s Special Financing Organization Active 
Here,” February 17, 1929. 
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automobile provided the perfect vehicle (no pun intended) for conveying one’s socio-economic 
position to the world. In a consumer-oriented culture, people make assessments based on 
appearances and possessions. A constant calculation ensues, comparing one’s own stuff to that of 
others, and trying to figure out how to rise through the ranks. The popular comic strip, “Keeping 
Up with the Joneses,” ran from 1913 until 1938. It documented the travails of a social-climbing 
family, constantly and unsuccessfully trying to copy their neighbors (the Joneses, who never 
actually appeared in the strip). By the 1920s, the phrase was entrenched in the common idiom, a 
metaphor for the imitative striving of Americans to equal or best each other in the exhibition of 
their possessions. A 1924 op-ed piece in the Constitution deplored people trying so hard to keep 
up with the Joneses, who owned expensive, “high-powered cars.”583    
 
The automobile owned the decade of the 1920s. No other industry grew so rapidly to a #1 
ranking among U.S. products. In ten years, car manufacturing vastly expanded, accompanied by 
its many supporting industries and subsidiary businesses. Even railroad freight car production 
had to be enlarged to meet the shipping demands of automakers—an example of a hidden, 
ancillary branch of motordom, whose tentacles became ever more interwoven into the fabric of 
daily life.584  
The automobile industry expanded and solidified the entrenchment of the consumer 
culture which department stores and others had inaugurated decades earlier. Unprecedented 
manufacturing output, marketing advances, and the quest for an ever-growing number of buyers 
 
583 “Chasing the Joneses,” Atlanta Constitution, July 11, 1924; Thorstein Veblen, Theory of the Leisure 
Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1899), Chap. 3; Mazur, American 
Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 46-47; Allen, Only Yesterday; an Informal History of the Nineteen-
Twenties, 121; Frederick, Selling Mrs. Consumer, 246. 
584 Foster and Catchings, The Road to Plenty, 92. 
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combined to transform not only consumers, but also the culture. Mazur, writing in 1928, 
observes,  
The American consumer has been a product of evolution. The average consumer 
of the middle nineteenth century who struggled for shelter and necessities has 
been left far behind by the great twentieth-century middle class of America riding 
in its seventeen million automobiles, and worrying primarily about its luxuries.585 
 
Commercial stratagems now shaped the daily lives of U.S. citizens with the promise that 
one could achieve happiness through acquisition. By the end of the decade, the culture of 
consumption had become America’s culture. People eagerly assumed debt to purchase a car so 
they could “acquire prestige in the present and pay for it in the future.”586   
Atlanta’s growth coalition had firmly embraced the automobile as its vehicle to fortune, 
and it profited as motordom further entwined itself in American—and Atlantan— government, 
industry, and ethos. The group continued to exercise its collective power during the twenties, 
pushing the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, wider borders, and greater 
wealth. Every member understood that the automobile provided easy and essential access to the 
stores and offices in the central business district. Any disruption to the smooth flow of vehicles 
could have disastrous consequences on city and suburb. Unfortunately, with more cars on the 
roads, traffic congestion frequently gridlocked downtown streets. Large retailers began to 
establish branch stores in the suburbs—an early warning sign of the eventual decentralizing 
exodus. Life at the city’s heart was at risk. By 1929, Atlanta’s business and civic leaders knew 




585 Mazur, American Prosperity: Its Causes and Consequences, 42. 
586 Cohn, The Good Old Days: A History of American Morals and Manners as Seen through the Sears, 
Roebuck Catalogs 1905 to the Present, 531-32. 
316 
8 THE STATE OF THE STREETS 1929 
The 1920s have popularly been called the first “decade of the automobile.” With air 
transport still in its infancy, cars and especially trucks began to threaten the powerful railroad 
companies. Motordom, that complex web of interdependent entities which produces, supports, 
and enables motorized vehicles—grew exponentially, further entwining itself into the fabric of 
American society. Atlanta’s growth coalition of realtors, financiers, publishers, lawyers, 
businessmen, and elected officials embraced it all. They privileged the automobile, their vehicle 
to greater fortune, to such a degree that the public roadways became mere car conduits with all 
other street users restrained or forbidden. An 1899 city dweller would not recognize the smooth-
surfaced, regulated, and dangerous streets of downtown in 1929. The amount of gridlock and 
congestion would stun them; current inhabitants themselves found it pretty intolerable.   
In April 1929, Atlanta undertook another traffic survey, this one guided by experts from 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New York. Few of the actions city leadership had 
taken since 1920 to makeover the streets had achieved the desired effects. The new viaducts and 
traffic regulations had not eliminated congestion; automobile-related fatalities had almost 
doubled over the decade; and the business community remained divided over one-way streets 
and on-street parking. And all the time, more vehicles appeared in the roadways as automakers 
succeeded in expanding America’s consumer culture. Through their sophisticated marketing, 
non-stop advertising, and savvy business strategies, they had made the automobile the number 
one product in the country. City leaders thought perhaps another study of the situation might 
yield definitive answers to the city’s apparently intractable traffic problems. 
 Mayor I. N. Ragsdale’s traffic commission claimed to represent everyone in the city with 
an interest in street traffic. Members came from state and local government, the big newspapers, 
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the major labor group, professional and civic organizations, and numerous business and 
automobile associations. The railroads had only one representative as the viaducts had rendered 
their input less important to traffic discussions. Georgia Power had two representatives; it 
supplied the city’s gas and electric power as well as the streetcar and bus services.587 
Most of the entities taking part in the study had strong automotive interests, so the report 
understandably had a pro-car slant. But the traffic survey deliberately omitted streetcar 
movement from the study. Refusing from the start to investigate the daily transportation of 
thousands of Atlanta citizens through the public streets would, and did, yield a distorted view of 
city traffic patterns. The flagrant omission also unequivocally favored the automobile.  
 The commission’s final report called for the re-routing of pass-through traffic around the 
central business district, and the removal or relocation of numerous trolley stops. It 
recommended that Atlanta adopt the federal Model Municipal Traffic Ordinance, and ensure that 
all traffic control devices conformed to the standards of the American Engineering Council. The 
report called for more men on the police traffic squad, but it most strongly urged the city to 
create a permanent city Traffic Commission.588   
  The 1920s saw the consolidation of the automobile as the defining element on Atlanta’s 
and America’s streets. At the beginning of the century, the principle that all users had equal 
rights to the public roadways prevailed. By the end of 1929, the conquest of the street by motor 
vehicles was nearly complete, with only streetcars providing any sort of competition. But the era 
of trolley supremacy had passed. Laying new track to the outskirts of town was costly and time-
consuming; most of the company’s efforts during the decade consisted of double-tracking the 
busy and more lucrative downtown routes. Instead of extending streetcar lines, the traction 
 
587 Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 2, 8. 
588 Ibid., 9-10. 
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company served the nascent residential suburbs with buses which fed into the street railway 
system. Free use of the roadways by those on foot had disappeared. Instead, regulations corralled 
pedestrians between painted white lines at intersections with traffic lights, and jaywalking 
violators faced fines and a good chance of injury or death. Moving vehicles had the right of way; 
increasingly speedy motor vehicles intimidated pedestrians and most cyclists. The “shared road” 
was not. 
 Over the decade, motor vehicles had acquired new forms and features. In the twenties, 
the earlier tall, boxy, hand-cranked, and open-top cars had given way to low-slung, elongated 
sedans with electric starters and lights, available in an array of colors. They increasingly 
resembled their later twentieth-century counterparts. The paving on downtown streets and 
sidewalks gradually conformed to uniform standards, with asphalt and concrete the preferred 
road surfaces. The apparatus of street regulation and traffic control incrementally matured. Civic 
authorities and citizenry tried to come to terms with streets full of cars which could travel farther 
and faster.589  
The municipal code began to address the adjustments in the physical and psychological 
environments necessary to survive in what was proving to be a dangerous new world. While 
conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles festered, a more significant rivalry grew into the 
unresolved contest of the decade: parked versus moving cars. Whether stationary or in motion, 
however, the car retained top priority in discussions about city street. The 1920s established the 
supremacy of the automobile and the solidification of its position as the sole legitimate consumer 
of road space. 
 
589 McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” 394. 
319 
8.1 Traffic Study Overview 
By 1929, Atlanta’s streets had become more congested than ever before. The automaker’s 
business strategies and the now-dominant consumer culture had combined to put more motor 
vehicles on the roadways. The twin goals of ever-increasing production and acquisition of 
automobiles dictated that the situation would only grow worse, unless city leaders took drastic 
actions to accommodate a future of forever more cars. 
At a 1928 meeting of the Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association, Sam E. Levy spoke 
about the effect of the automobile on the city, especially traffic congestion. Levy had co-founded 
Prior Tire Company, the “Don’t cuss, call us” gas, oil, tire, and accessories company located in 
the Automobile Row section of Spring Street. He recounted the heavy commercial losses 
suffered as a result of the consumer’s dread of braving the downtown traffic tangle. A large rural 
population within a few hours’ ride of city amenities only added to the “general snarl” on the 
streets. Businessmen, Levy prophetically declared, would have to accept rigidly-enforced 
parking laws, or else they would see merchandising “decentralized and scattered in communities 
all over the city,” which was already happening with certain types of small stores. The intelligent 
merchant, he said, would provide parking for customers which would encourage them to come to 
town to patronize his business.590  
Levy’s talk echoed the conclusions of the 1926 “Vehicular Traffic Congestion and Retail 
Business” pamphlet published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The federal study 
identified four factors causing vehicular traffic congestion, in order of most egregious: (1) faulty 
traffic regulations; (2) lack of parking facilities; (3) narrow streets; and (4) the streetcar. At the 
same time, the study contradicted itself by admitting that the vehicle most involved in the 
 
590 “Retail Merchants Told of New Selling Conditions,” Atlanta Constitution, April 20, 1928. Samuel Elias 
Levy (1894-1969), was a Georgia Tech alumnus and real estate investor. He came up with the no-invective slogan. 
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widespread traffic congestion was the automobile, but never suggested that reducing the number 
of cars in city centers might bring some relief. It did warn that, “If merchants do not do 
something to relieve the present traffic situation, within 15 years there will be no down-town 
shopping districts of any importance.” Large cities were decentralizing, and residences had 
already been pushed out of downtown interiors. Business might depend on traffic, but traffic 
could also detract from business.591 
Atlanta was not alone in suffering from gridlocked streets. Every large U.S. city had its 
own tale of traffic woe, and a number had already undertaken studies in search of solutions to the 
widespread predicament. The state of New York in 1926 had authorized the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company [MetLife] to research Albany’s crowded streets. The company’s Safety 
Service division began investigating traffic as an offshoot from its workplace studies to reduce 
accidents and injuries. The insurers developed procedures to systematically scrutinize urban 
traffic conditions, including what areas to study, which organizations to involve, and who should 
lead the effort. A comprehensive, sophisticated report with concrete recommendations resulted. 
Atlanta, always lagging a little behind the streets curve, eventually took advantage of their 
process.592  
McShane describes how engineers provided the expertise to analyze traffic congestion 
and offer mechanisms to control the chaos. The word “survey,” a term borrowed from civil 
engineers, described the quantitative methodology employed by practitioners in the growing field 
of traffic engineering. Numbers and measurements lent factual certainty to their solutions. 
 
591 Inez Katherine Rolph, Vehicular Traffic Congestion and Retail Business (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1926), 1, 3-5. 
592 W. Graham Cole, “A Traffic and Public Safety Demonstration,” American City 35, no. 4 (October 
1926): 470-73; Estelle M. Stewart, Personnel Research Agencies, Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 
518 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1930), 92-93.  
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Drivers and pedestrians, however, did not easily acquiesce to survey proposals, so the 
professionals learned to solicit community input. Motor clubs and transit companies had special 
importance due to their active involvement in city governance. Having an educational 
component in the form of a public hearing proved essential to adoption of the final report.593  
Gudis concisely captures the hows and whys of the universal acceptance of the traffic 
survey during the 1920s this way:   
The traffic survey quickly gained support as a most popular tool for the promotion 
of automotive- and business-friendly urban planning and traffic transportation 
schemes. Businessmen and politicians had come to a full realization that the 
streets of a city are the most important element in its economic usefulness, and 
sought to record how it functioned, and how its traffic flowed or bottled it up. 
Traffic flow studies became a numerical, easily visualized means by which 
coalitions of engineers, planners, and business leaders in metropolitan areas could 
identify and communicate to the public the unfavorable effects of urban growth 
and congestion, and seek support for their solutions that would accommodate the 
frictionless traffic of automobiles.594  
 
Early in 1929, Atlanta’s civic and business leaders realized they had to take action to 
tame the mass of automobiles. Motor vehicle registrations in Fulton County had increased 376% 
over the past ten years: from 12,065 in 1919 to 57,445 in 1929. The vast majority (80%) of those 
vehicles were registered in the City of Atlanta. Few changes could be made to the city’s horse-
era downtown streets to meet the volume of traffic, besides constructing viaducts, and those were 
already finished.595 
City zoning laws accounted for some of the traffic problems. They had concentrated 
business in certain sections, which also increased the number of cars and pedestrians in those 
places. Greater density allowances in commercial and industrial areas meant that a parcel which 
 
593 McShane, “The Origins and Globalization of Traffic Control Signals,” 391-93. 
594 Gudis, Buyways: Billboards, Automobiles, and the American Landscape, 120. 
595 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1933, 224; Atlanta Mayor's 
Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 3. In 1929, 45,788 motor vehicles were registered in 
Atlanta. 
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20 years ago might have held a low-rise building could now hold a skyscraper with thousands of 
occupants during the work week. Residential areas also added to traffic. The new suburban 
neighborhoods had no streetcar lines, and while buses provided transit service, many preferred to 
use their cars to travel to and from work or shopping. Some housing sections also permitted 
multi-family apartments, which only added to the density. Meanwhile, street widths generally 
remained the same, except where sidewalks had been reduced or eliminated. Widening was 
prohibitively expensive, especially in the central business district. Property values there had risen 
astronomically over the decade, making it impossible to acquire more land for public roads or 
walkways. Atlanta would have to find other ways to manage traffic.596 
A local editorial helped prepare the public for the traffic survey contemplated by the 
mayor and council. The writer celebrated the recent opening of the twin viaducts which had 
already brought some congestion relief. He warned, however, that a lasting solution would 
require severe and unpopular measures, especially curtailing on-street parking, a move 
merchants continued to fight. Everyone would have to acquiesce for the greater good.597   
On April 16, 1929, two days before the editorial appeared, Mayor I. N. Ragsdale had 
written to James L. Madden, a vice president of Metropolitan Life, requesting their assistance in 
conducting a fact-finding survey of Atlanta’s street traffic. Not for the first time, the city turned 
to national experts. Within two weeks, Madden confirmed that the Director of Safety Service, W. 
Graham Cole, and his staff would be happy to work with Atlanta. Local leaders were 
 
596 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 3; “Chairmen Named on Traffic Study,” Atlanta Constitution, 
April 24, 1929. 
597 “Traffic Improvement,” Atlanta Constitution, April 18, 1929. 
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enthusiastic, and unrealistic expectations abounded; the survey would relieve congestion, speed 
up traffic through downtown, and eliminate accidents.598 
The mayor appointed a 42-member commission to conduct the survey. It was chaired by 
Charles C. Whitaker, a 
construction engineer and 
vice-chair of the Atlanta 
Safety Council, the local 
motoring club devoted to 
reducing automobile 
collisions. Mayor Ragsdale 
said he had selected commission members from groups “having an interest in traffic matters.” 
That broad descriptor could have applied to every Atlantan. But, despite the mayor’s 
claim that the survey would be conducted “with the best interests of the citizens of Atlanta in 
mind,” many of them, especially African Americans, had no voice on the commission. Its 
members represented white-led state and municipal governments, the city’s largest labor group, 
professional and civic organizations, and numerous businesses and automobile associations (see 
table above). The railroads and the streetcar company each had representatives, as did the daily 
newspapers, but no members of the Black press participated. The all-white makeup of the 
commission effectively proclaimed that Black citizens and their use of the public roadways did 
not matter.599 
 
598 Atlanta Constitution: “Traffic Census Prepared to Aid City Congestion,” September 14, 1921; “Survey 
of Traffic To Start at Once; New Viaduct Voted,” April 16, 1929; Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic 
Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, iii.  
599  Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, ii, 2, 4, 8. Early newspaper accounts reported 46 commission 
members, but the final report lists 42; “Atlanta Traffic Survey to Be Started at Once; Commission Appointed,” 
Atlanta Constitution, April 20, 1929. The mayor served as ex officio chair.    
Categories Count
Businesses and business associations 23
City departments, commissions, committees 6
Professional organizations (architects, engineers, etc.) 5
Civic organizations (Boy Scouts, two civic leagues) 3
Automobile associations 3
Georgia Public Service Commission 1
U.S. Postal Service 1
Total 42
Affiliations of Traffic Commission Members
Table 17. Groups Represented on the Traffic Commission 
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Metropolitan Life supplied engineers who did the design, implementation, and analysis. 
The survey was divided into ten aspects of Atlanta’s traffic problem, with a committee for each. 
Three additional committees provided generalized assistance: Steering guided the group; Review 
assessed the individual studies for inclusion in the final report; and Publicity, with the aid of the 
three daily newspapers, prepared press releases to keep the public informed as the project 
progressed. Prominent white businessmen chaired every committee.600 
The ten study committees furnished information and facilitated access. They did much of 
the groundwork, under the guidance of the engineers, distributing questionnaires and tabulating 
data, assisted by volunteers from 66 local stores and businesses. The Atlanta Police Department 
provided men to the Parking Committee, and automobile dealers donated vehicles and observers 
for making time-study runs over twelve designated routes. Even the Boy Scouts took part, 
counting parked cars, and handling the travel-to-work survey. The commission, however, made 
and approved all recommendations. The seven-month study focused on the traffic problems in 
central business district and on its main thoroughfares.601 
Automotive concerns featured prominently, as one would expect in a traffic study, but the 
interests of other users of the public roadways, such as cyclists and street traders,602 are glaringly 
absent (see Table 17). Streetcar riders, which included thousands of Atlantans, played no part in 
the survey. An early newspaper report had declared, “Every phase of Atlanta vehicular and 
 
600 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 8. The ten committees were: Traffic Flow, Vehicular Routing, 
Parking, Passenger Loading, Physical Conditions, Pedestrian Study, Laws and Ordinances, Enforcement, Signs and 
Signals, and Accident Study; “Organization of Permanent Commission on Traffic to Make Continuous Study of 
Problem Recommended,” Atlanta Constitution, December 1, 1929. 
601 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 4, 6-8. 
602 In 1920s Atlanta, “street traders” included those offering merchandise for sale anywhere outside of a 
building. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, city ordinances imposed new regulations on, or 
banned entirely, the selling of goods or services (e.g., shining shoes) in the streets, on the sidewalks, or in close 
proximity to either; Atlanta, The Charter and Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Code of 1924, Ch. 61, §§ 1831-
1832, 1852-1853, 1858-1859; Ch. 70 Peddlers. The city had opened the Municipal Market on Auburn Avenue as a 
site where farmers from surrounding areas could sell their goods rather than from their wagons parked in the streets. 
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pedestrain [sic] traffic activity will come under the scrutiny and observation of members of the 
commission.” This, unfortunately, did not happen. A disingenuous sentence in the final survey 
report stated, “As the operation of the electric railway system of Atlanta is under the jurisdiction 
of the Georgia Public Service Commission (GPSC), a state body, the Mayor’s Traffic 
Commission, which was appointed by the city administration, did not feel that it was in a 
position to consider the effect of street car operation upon traffic.” The report suggested a 
different study be done for the trolleys.603 
That disclaimer ignored the fact that the GPSC and Georgia Power both had 
representatives on the mayor’s commission. Worse, it completely disregarded the fact that the 
traffic survey actually did evaluate the effect of streetcars on city traffic. In multiple sections of 
the final report, committees faulted streetcars as a major source of low speeds and traffic delays 
on downtown streets. One entire committee (Passenger Loading) concerned itself exclusively 
with streetcar stops in a complete contradiction to the commission’s stated policy. That 
committee took no notice of trucks, buses, taxis, or indeed private autos which also impeded 
traffic flow whenever they stopped to load or discharge passengers or freight. The report stated 
that streetcar riders, once they exited the trolley, “significantly impacted the continuous flow of 
traffic by their disregard of the rights of vehicular traffic.” The committee chose not to 
acknowledge that everyone eventually exited their vehicle and became a pedestrian, even people 
who parked their cars at the curb. 604  
To speed things up, the committee wanted mid-block trolley stops completed removed, 
and a number of other streetcar access points eliminated or relocated. The Peachtree Street stop 
 
603 “Chairmen Named on Traffic Study,” Atlanta Constitution, April 24, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic 
Commission, 4. 
604 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 41. 
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just south of Five Points (immediately past the Marietta-Decatur streets intersection) received 
special condemnation for its “serious interference” with traffic. The committee acknowledged 
that removing access would inconvenience streetcar users, but would greatly facilitate the 
movement of “vehicular” traffic. That one statement made their priorities crystal clear.605  
The commission did not study the streetcar moving; it did study the streetcar stopped, 
when it loaded and unloaded passengers. Only the traffic-impeding aspects of trolley use 
interested the surveyors, not the massive numbers of citizens it moved through the city daily. The 
survey report contained this assertion: “The public streets are provided for the use of the public. 
The suggestions embodied in this report are not offered with a view to curtailing their use but to 
making them more serviceable to those who require them most” [emphasis added].” The 
commission made obvious that, for its members, and by extension the city of Atlanta, those who 
required the public streets most were motor vehicle drivers. It focused on actions to make the 
public streets more serviceable to that group and no one else, and it did so by curtailing street use 
for all others.606  
The entire survey based its counts on the vehicles, not the people using the public streets. 
The city’s 1924 Beeler Report had conclusively demonstrated that a single streetcar carried more 
passengers within a defined amount of road space than multiple automobiles taking up the same 
amount of road space. For the commission, however, only the vehicle counts mattered. It should 
have considered, but never did, what would happen if everyone riding trolleys one day decided 
to drive cars instead. The resulting gridlock would have gained the attention and anger of 
everyone involved.  
 
605 Ibid., 27, 41-44. The use of the term “vehicular” to describe passenger cars and trucks but not streetcars 
was noteworthy sleight-of-hand to re-define trolleys as invalid street users. 
606 Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 34. 
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Such a situation had already occurred once in Atlanta during the 1920 trolley workers 
strike. The Constitution’s automotive reporter, O. J. Willoughby, described the enormous influx 
of cars into downtown, and the (apparently unanticipated) extraordinary congestion they brought 
with them. He admitted that the common belief, that “our streets would take care of the traffic if 
it were not for the streetcars,” was completely untrue. Everyone caught in the rush hour mess 
could confirm it. That a mass transit option actually relieved traffic was knowledge quickly 
forgotten post-strike, and not soon re-acquired.607 
The commission’s anti-trolley omission guaranteed some biased conclusions before the 
survey even began. The one-sentence, don’t-blink-or-you’ll-miss-it dismissal of the daily 
transportation mode for thousands of citizens resulted in a report which did not accurately 
portray city traffic patterns. In so doing, it positioned the automobile as the sole and rightful 
proprietor of Atlanta’s streets.  
8.2 The Parking Committee  
The Traffic Commission concerned itself with more than streetcars. Its Parking 
Committee undertook three types of parking counts in Atlanta: on-street parking spaces within 
the Central Business District (2,665), parking spaces in garages (4,482), and parking spaces on 
surface lots within or adjacent to the business district (6,000). The city had adequate parking. But 
paid spaces, especially on lots, remained empty, while the no-cost, curbside spaces stayed 
continuously occupied throughout the day.608  
With sufficient paid parking available, reducing or eliminating on-street parking on a few 
of the busiest streets would free up entire lanes for moving traffic. Eureka! This was the street-
 
607 O. J. Willoughby, “Motor Pep,” Atlanta Constitution, March 14, 1920; Beeler, Report to the City of 
Atlanta on a Plan for Local Transportation, 39. 
608 Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City of Atlanta, Georgia, 37, 39. 
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widening solution city leaders desired but despaired of, staring them in the face. A glance at 
virtually any contemporary photo of Atlanta’s downtown streets clearly shows how road space 
might double without on-street parking (see photo below609). But curbside parking had two 
inarguable advantages. First, it could often get the driver closer to their destination, assuming 
one found an open space nearby, or cruised around until such a space became available. Data 
confirms that cruising for parking in downtowns was commonplace by the 1920s. Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, on-street parking was free. As Donald Shoup and George Costanza 
demonstrate, free parking is a powerful imperative for most American drivers, one that had 
already entrenched itself by the 1920s.610 
In “The Parking Space,” an episode of the popular 1990s television sitcom, Seinfeld, two 
characters are driving around Manhattan’s Upper West side looking for a place to park. 
Passenger Elaine Benes urges George Costanza, the driver, to just park in a garage. The ensuing 
dialogue describes cruising technique and underscores the mandate for many that parking be 
free.  
 
609 Photo is from Franklin M. Garrett, Yesterday's Atlanta, Seemann's Historic Cities Series, No 8 (Miami, 
Fla.: E. A. Seemann Pub., 1974), 129. 
610 Simpson, “Downtown Storage Garages,” 84; Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking; Tom Cherones, 
“The Parking Space,” in Seinfeld (Columbia Pictures Television, April 22, 1922). This was Episode 39 of Seinfeld 
(Season 3, Episode 22), written by Larry David, Greg Daniels, and Jerry Seinfeld, directed by Tom Cherones, and 
produced by West-Shapiro Productions and Castle Rock Entertainment, 
Figure 47. Forsyth Street, view south from Carnegie Way, 1926. 
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George: Look, I have my system. First I look for the dream spot right in front 
 of the door, then I slowly expand out in concentric circles. 
 Elaine: Oh come on, George, please put it in a garage. I don’t want to spend 
 an hour looking for a space. 
 George: I can’t park in a garage. 
 Elaine: Why? 
 George: I don’t know, I just can’t. Nobody in my family can pay for parking, 
 it’s a sickness. My father never paid for parking; my mother, my brother, 
 nobody. We can’t do it. 
 Elaine: I’ll pay for it. 
 George: You don’t understand. A garage. I can’t even pull in there. It’s 
 like going to a prostitute. Why should I pay, when if I apply myself, maybe I 
 could get it for free?611 
 
Some people will not pay to park, preferring—then and now—to waste time and spew 
carbon into the atmosphere just to get a free even if less convenient parking spot. Proximity to 
the final destination matters somewhat; time spent cruising seems to matter not at all; cost-free is 
the true imperative. “Free parking” of course does not exist, as Shoup has unequivocally proved. 
Everyone pays, just not always at the point of sale. 
The refusal of Atlanta’s leadership to progress beyond the nineteenth century hitching-
post, tie-your-horse-in-front-of-the-saloon practice eludes comprehension. In the 1920s, traffic 
engineers documented the efficiency of mass transit modes, and argued in favor of widening 
streets by eliminating curbside parking—the great usurper. Their data and recommendations 
went unheeded, and many ceased to make the argument at all. More engineers began to work for 
the automobile industry, with Miller McClintock exemplifying the traffic scholar-cum-industry 
spokesman transition. Once in that position, no one would suggest removing any motor vehicles 
from the streets, moving or stationary.612  
The Parking Committee conducted one of the more unusual studies of the entire survey, 
the “how you came to downtown today” count. Boy Scouts handed out “ballots” (see image and 
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table below) to pedestrians entering buildings, instructing them to select one of the six choices to 
describe how they got there: on foot, by car (including where they parked), by bus, or by 
streetcar. Balloting sites included major department and chain stores, drugstores, and a number 
of large commercial firms. Each person was asked to vote just once. The final tally showed that 
only 11% walked, and less than 5% took a bus, while over a third drove. The greatest number of 
respondents, nearly half, arrived in downtown via the streetcar—proof, if any were needed, of 
the streetcar’s importance to a large percentage of Atlanta’s citizens. Based on this survey, which 
counted people not cars, one would conclude that trolley-riders required the public streets 
most.613  
The major disappointment of the Parking Committee’s section of the survey final report 
was their reluctance to offer any solutions to the parking problem. Curbside parking took up 
traffic lanes, but few wanted to surrender personal convenience and/or no-charge parking. 
 
613 With the cooperation of businesses in the central district, ballot boxes were placed at the entrances and 
printed ballots were handed to all patrons with the request that they tear off and deposit in the ballot box the stub 
indicating the method used in coming from their homes; “Traffic Count by Ballot To Be Made in Atlanta Today,” 
Atlanta Constitution, July 9, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 35, 37, 39.   
Method of Arrival Percent
By Street Car 44.9
By Automobile*
   Parking Method
     On Streets 14.8
     In Garages 13.8
     On Parking Lots 9.4
On Foot 11.0
By Motor Bus 4.7
Miscellaneous or Unknown 1.4
*38.0% total.
Figure 48. How You Came To Work form and results; 1929 Traffic Survey, pgs. 37, 
39. 
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Retailers insisted that customers be able to park close to their stores. Police seldom enforced no-
parking restrictions on the few downtown streets where partial bans were in effect. More and 
more cars drove on Atlanta’s streets every year. With congestion out of control, the chief aim of 
the survey was to find remedies. In this, the committee dramatically failed. 
The Traffic Commission’s Parking Committee could not agree on what recommendations 
to make, so Mayor Ragsdale, in mid-October, named a special committee to come up with a set 
of downtown parking regulations to be given directly to the city council. Members of this new, 
special parking committee included Charles Whitaker, consulting engineer and chair of the 
Traffic Commission; and James L. Wells, president of Sloan Paper Company, chairman of the 
city council’s traffic committee and on the Traffic Commission’s steering committee. Other 
members included a real estate agent, a city councilman, two Georgia Power executives, and 
three men representing the Atlanta Retail Merchants’ Association—the owner of a high-end 
women’s clothing boutique, the president of a furniture company, and the manager of a car 
dealership.614 
This special committee was charged with reviewing the report of the Traffic 
Commission’s Parking Committee and making recommendations to council. Because the 
members of the new special committee also could not agree, they produced two separate reports 
containing diametrically-opposed parking recommendations for the city. The Whitaker faction 
favored expanding downtown’s no-parking zones. These zones were not extensive, consisting 
only of sections of North Pryor, James, Fairlie, and Poplar streets, as well as viaducts in the 
central business district. The other group contained the merchants who argued vehemently 
against any additional parking restrictions. That faction actually called for more, not less parking, 
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asserting that “There is such a thing as regulating traffic and trade to death.” Whitaker’s group, 
however, believed “The free movement of traffic and the convenience of the traveling public 
should receive first consideration, as in so doing many times the number of people may be 
served than are accommodated by street parking.”615 
The stubbornness of both sides led the survey’s Parking Committee to adopt the common 
Atlanta leadership approach: suggest further study. The impasse exemplified what happened 
whenever the growth coalition divided against itself—nothing; they chose instead simply to 
maintain the status quo, whatever that happened to be. Traffic would eventually ease when 
congestion forced many stores to move to accessible outlying areas; some already had. 
Decentralization was probably not the solution the downtown merchants envisioned, but by their 
intransigence, they contributed to their own demise. They failed to heed the Commerce 
Department’s prediction, or the prophetic warning of Sam Levy, one of their own.616 
8.3 Pedestrians 
In strong contrast to the parking group, the Pedestrian Study Committee did not hesitate 
in its recommendations to rein in foot travelers in the streets. It lamented unruly pedestrians who 
crossed intersections against traffic lights, exited trolleys at the incorrect curb, or jaywalked. 
They created hazards and seriously interfered with “the free and efficient movement of vehicular 
traffic.” Pedestrians should make brief appearances in the streets, and then only at the direction 
of a police office, a traffic signal, or white lines painted on the roadway. Proper enforcement and 
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a program of continuous public education would better control those who walked and keep them 
from slowing traffic flow.617    
The committee tallied the number of pedestrians at eight major intersections in the central 
business district on normal business days. The counts took place during the periods of heaviest 
traffic, the three rush hours: Morning 7:30–9:00 a.m.; Noon 11:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.; and 
Afternoon 4:30–6:00 p.m. Noon experienced the heaviest foot traffic, when office workers on 
their lunch breaks mingled with shoppers and visitors. To no one’s surprise, Five Points had the 
greatest number of pedestrians, 59,390 in one day, more than double the number at any of the 
other seven intersections surveyed. Remarkably, it also had the fewest number of pedestrian 
violations, which the committee attributed to the savvy of those using the popular, dangerous, 
and intensively-policed crossroads.618 
The committee wanted to facilitate pedestrian movement on city sidewalks, but admitted 
that downtown walkways did not have enough capacity for the volume of foot traffic. Sidewalks 
could not be widened by pushing back building fronts (obviously impossible) or by reducing 
street widths (obviously unthinkable). The opposite had already occurred in Atlanta, as city 
officials ordered some sidewalks trimmed to make roads wider. Aside from recommending the 
removal of sidewalk obstructions, the committee had no remedies to offer pedestrians to ensure 
efficient sidewalk use.619 
The Physical Conditions Committee, which also addressed pedestrian flow on the 
sidewalks, acknowledged that within the central business district, the narrow sidewalks could not 
 
617 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58-59, 65-66. 
618 Atlanta Constitution: “Count of Pedestrians Will Start Today,” May 9, 1929; “Reports Due Soon on 
Traffic Surveys,” July 24, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58-59, 61, 64-66. The  Five Points 
intersection was defined as the crossing of Peachtree and Whitehall streets with Marietta and Decatur streets. The 
Edgewood Avenue intersection with Peachtree to the northeast was not included. 
619 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 58, 65; “Plan Widening of ‘Bottle Neck’ On Marietta St.,” 
Atlanta Constitution, February 18, 1922. 
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be widened. To increase space, it recommended new legislation to prohibit retailers from using 
the sidewalks to display merchandise. The sidewalk area should be retained “entirely for public 
rather than private use.” In keeping with that policy, beggars and vendors of miscellaneous small 
items (e.g., chewing gum, pencils, matches) could be classified as “sidewalk obstructions.” 
These people irritated the public and, as charities existed to help them, the committee felt they 
did not need to beg or sell on the public walkways. It recommended that the city revoke all 
permits for such activities, and issue no new ones.620  
8.4 Traffic 
Vehicle counts accounted for most of the work of the Traffic Flow Committee, and its 
report contained a variety of detailed tables, charts, graphs, and maps. Spring Street, the major 
north-south arterial (which included the city’s longest viaduct over the railroad tracks), carried 
downtown’s heaviest traffic load, followed by Peachtree and Marietta streets. The city’s busiest 
traffic intersection was at Marietta and Spring streets, where 22,347 vehicles crossed in one 11-
hour period (6:30 a.m.-7:30 p.m.).621  
Additional counts revealed the different types of vehicles using the streets and where they 
concentrated. More than three-quarters of all vehicles on the downtown streets were automobiles 
(77%), followed by trucks (15%) and streetcars (less than 5%). Buses, motorcycles, and horse-
drawns of any kind (e.g., carriages, carts, wagons) each accounted for less than 1% of all 
vehicles traveling through the central business district. Peachtree Street carried the most 
streetcars, while the few horse-drawn vehicles mainly travelled mainly the Decatur-Marietta 
corridor.622 
 
620 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 47-48. 
621 Ibid., 18; “1,250,000 Autos Recorded in 4-Day Count of Traffic,” Atlanta Constitution, September 18, 
1929. 
622 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 19, 21, 23.  
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 Despite the large amount of traffic on Spring Street, the most motor vehicle wrecks 
occurred on Peachtree Street, followed by Marietta Street, Fair Street [Memorial Dr.], and 
Piedmont and Ponce de Leon avenues. Although the total area of the business district comprised 
less than 2% of the entire city, more than 16% of all crashes occurred there. The Accident Study 
Committee showed that drivers caused two-thirds of all traffic collisions [emphasis added]; 
pedestrians, the remaining third. As volume of traffic increased, so did the frequency of crashes. 
Failing to signal and speeding accounted for two-thirds of all driver-caused wrecks. Jay-walking 
and crossing at intersections with no traffic signals caused more than 50% of all pedestrian-at-
fault crashes, while playing in the street came in third.623 
The Accident Committee recommended more rigid enforcement of the ordinance 
requiring a correct report of every collision, but made no mention of stricter application of the 
moving vehicle laws or prosecution of violators. It absolutely failed to chastise drivers, suggest 
greater penalties for infractions, or advocate for the adoption of more stringent driver licensing 
requirements. Nowhere in the entire survey report are remedies suggested to correct the unlawful 
behaviors of motorists, despite the fact that drivers caused the majority of “accidents” (twice as 
many as pedestrians), and the majority of the fatalities. Elsewhere, the report’s authors have no 
hesitation in calling out pedestrians for illegal actions like crossing the street incorrectly and 
interfering with the rights of vehicles. Beyond insipid appeals for more education and support for 
safety regulations, the drivers of cars and trucks got a pass.624 
The Enforcement Committee scrutinized the Atlanta Police Department. Of the 
department’s 337 personnel, only 48 were assigned to traffic duty, although additional patrolmen 
 
623 “Street Blocking Hit by Committee,” Atlanta Constitution, August 11, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic 
Commission, 99, 103, 105-108. 
624 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 4, 107, 111. 
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helped direct traffic during rush hours. Twenty-four officers in the traffic squad rode 
motorcycles, too few to adequately enforce speeding and reckless driving ordinances throughout 
the city’s 34.8 square miles of territory. The committee recommended hiring more officers in 
general as well as motorcycle officers in particular. Within the past three years (1927-29), 
Atlanta motor vehicle registrations increased nearly 20%, and motor vehicle wrecks increased 
156%, yet the number of police had remained constant. The National Safety Council 
recommended that a traffic squad should have 3-4 men per 10,000 inhabitants. By this metric, 
Atlanta’s traffic force should have 70 men.625 
During the first six months of 1929, Atlanta police worked 6,410 traffic cases. Parking 
infractions led the list (2,364), with “driving past stop sign” violations second (1,023). The report 
found that the public had a negative attitude toward stop signs, and thought the city had too 
many. The committee actually blamed the “excessive” number of stop signs for the violations 
and collisions at those locations. Removing many of the city’s stop signs would “help 
enforcement and tend to decrease accidents.”626  
The Signs and Signals Committee had a similar opinion of Atlanta’s traffic signals and 
signs in general, saying that the city had an excessive number (see map on next page). The 
effectiveness of traffic control devices depended on the cooperation of drivers, and too many 
signs and signals only bred contempt for the law. The committee studied the American 
Engineering Council (AEC) report on street signs, signals, and markings, and urged that Atlanta 
adopt their standards.627 
 
625 Ibid., 68, 71. 
626 Ibid., 68-69. As a former police officer, this writer is disgusted with the level of ignorance displayed 
here; it is akin to saying that testing fewer people for the novel coronavirus will lead to fewer cases. 
627 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 73-75; American Engineering Council, Manual on Street Traffic 
Signs, Signals and Markings (Washington, DC: National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, 1930). The map 
shows the locations of the 49 traffic signals in Atlanta’s central business district (the light blue area) in 1929; 
adapted from Traffic Survey, pg. 81. 
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 The committee also followed the AEC’s lead by suggesting that Atlanta discontinue the 
use of a yellow light following both red and green lights—a practice which caused numerous 
accidents. The yellow light should show only following the green light. This change could be 
implemented whenever the city adopted the “flexible progressive” type of traffic control system, 
Figure 49. Traffic signal locations in Atlanta's CBD. 
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which had integrated signals, allowing variable timings to meet traffic conditions at each 
intersection.628 
8.5 Survey Recommendations and Impacts 
Chairman Whitaker presented the Traffic Commission’s final report to Mayor Ragsdale  
at the end of November. It was eventually published, with copies distributed to the city council 
and made available to the public. The survey report divided its conclusions into two categories: 
(1) physical changes, and (2) traffic control measures and devices.629    
No large physical changes to Atlanta’s narrow streets could be done, though intersection 
curbs could be cut back to improve turning radii to accommodate trucks and larger automobiles. 
This would obviously reduce sidewalk size, but here as elsewhere in the report, pedestrians needs 
were of little concern. However, providing alternate routes to truckers and pass-through 
motorists had the potential to benefit travelers and relieve congestion in the Central Business and 
Retail District.  
The Vehicle Routing Committee created a map of the entire city indicating proposed 
routes for through traffic. To further ease traffic movement, obstructions in the roadways and on 
the sidewalks should be removed, and streetcar stops re-located to less busy streets. Due to the 
refusal of the Parking Committee to make any concrete recommendations about on-street 
parking, the Commission simply endorsed their suggestion for further study. Apparently no one 
in the business community or municipal government had the fortitude to deal with the parking 
 
628 American Engineering Council, 25-26; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 78-80. 
629 “Organization of Permanent Commission on Traffic to Make Continuous Study of Problem 
Recommended,” Atlanta Constitution, December 1, 1929; Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 9. For an excellent 
summary of the Atlanta survey, its participants, methodologies, and recommendations, see Cole, “How a Fact-
Finding Traffic Survey Was Conducted,” 89-92.  
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dilemma. This leadership failure would consign Atlanta citizens to an ongoing purgatory of 
traffic congestion for decades.630  
For traffic control measures, the Commission recommended that the city adopt a new 
traffic ordinance based on the Model Municipal Traffic Ordinance proposed by the Second 
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety. It urged the city to gradually replace the 
existing traffic control signals to a system meeting the AEC’s standards, and called for a 
reorganization of the Traffic Division of the Atlanta Police Department. Its signature 
recommendation, however, requested that the city create an official body to take charge of traffic 
in Atlanta.631 
The “safe and expeditious handling of traffic” had become one of the city’s major 
problems, affecting both business and social life. The solution to traffic problems had five major 
components: (1) a traffic control plan; (2) the alteration of streets and sidewalks as demanded by 
traffic and permitted by business and financial considerations; (3) a program for the future 
development of roads to handle more traffic; (4) the development of popular support for street 
regulation; and (5) strict and impartial law enforcement. Only an officially designated group, 
with the appropriate authority and engineering staff, could adequately undertake these tasks and 
meet the persistent demands of city traffic. The survey strongly urged that the city council create 
a permanent Traffic Commission to study Atlanta’s traffic and make recommendations.632  
 
630 Atlanta Mayor’s Traffic Commission, 10, 33. 
631 The Second Conference on Street and Highway Safety was held in Washington, DC, March 23-25, 
1926, under the direction of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. Its signature accomplishment was the adoption 
of the uniform code of traffic laws and regulations; Atlanta Constitution: F. C. Chandler, “Safety in Streets Is 
Everybody’s Problem,” March 28, 1926; “Safety Council Receives Report on National Meet,” April 1, 1926.  
632 “Organization of Permanent Commission on Traffic To Make Continuous Study of Problem 
Recommended,” Atlanta Constitution, December 1, 1929; Atlanta Mayor's Traffic Commission, Traffic Survey, City 
of Atlanta, Georgia, 3-4, 9-10. 
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Initially, the survey report received acclaim from leading citizens and the press. Some 
businesses quickly utilized its data in promotions and advertisements. Rich’s department store 
instituted its “Follow the Crowds to Rich’s!” campaign. One of the survey pedestrian counts 
showed that its store at the northeast corner of Alabama and Broad streets was the shopping 
center for 150,385 people every day (so the ad claimed), and urged other shoppers to follow the 
crowd.633  
A Georgia Power ad 
claimed that cars carrying only 
six people took up as much road 
space as a single streetcar 
carrying fifty passengers. It 
included a clever sketch, showing 
what an automobile would look 
like if it were built in proportion 
to the average number of 
customers it carried in downtown 
(see ad at right). Ad copy 
accurately cited the Traffic 
Commission’s finding that cars made up 78% of all street traffic; streetcars, only 4.7%. Yet 
Atlanta’s streetcars carried 275,000 passengers a day, more than the population of the entire city. 
The ad concluded, also accurately, “Obviously street cars don’t cause traffic congestion, they 
reduce it. Without them to do the biggest part of the job in city transportation, traffic conditions 
 
633 “Follow the Crowds to Rich’s!” Atlanta Constitution, July 2, 1930. 
Figure 50. Georgia Power ad; Atlanta Constitution, May 
29, 1930. 
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would be insufferable.” It invited motorists to give the streetcar a try, but most would not until 
the gas rationing during the next world war restricted driving. Americans in general have 
difficulty surrendering personal freedoms for the greater good.634 
The first three months of 1930 passed, and nothing had come of the traffic survey’s 
recommendations. In that year’s annual state-of-the-city speech, Mayor Ragsdale commended 
the survey commission, recommended that all members of council study the report, and urged 
the city council’s traffic committee to create a permanent traffic commission. Although the city 
council formally endorsed the survey, the traffic committee refused to take the requisite initial 
step of creating a permanent traffic commission, which was the most important and most 
strongly urged of all the survey recommendations. After all, establishing a select committee 
devoted to meeting traffic needs would have been an indictment of themselves for not doing their 
job. In truth, council’s traffic committee had continuously failed to deal with the traffic 
congestion which had only grown worse over the last ten years.635 
 In August 1930, the Atlanta Safety Council sent a petition to Mayor Ragsdale, urging the 
city to establish the permanent Traffic Commission. The petition noted that few of the survey 
recommendations “have been either remotely considered or put into effect.” The group had 
received assurances that such a commission would be appointed once the survey was completed. 
The mayor presented the petition to council, but to no effect.636  
Charles Whitaker, the former chair of the traffic survey commission, began making the 
rounds of civic and professional groups, seeking their support for the “traffic improvement 
 
634 “The Traffic Model,” Atlanta Constitution, May 29, 1930. The recent pandemic has served to 
underscore the fact that many Americans choose not to follow medical guidelines (e.g., masking, vaccinating) to 
control disease spread, preferring instead to retain their personal liberties no matter the cost. 
635 “Atlanta Council Reorganized for Year’s Work, Mayor in Annual Message, Urges Strict Economy, 
Atlanta Constitution, January 7, 1930. 
636 “Citizens’ Board Urged to Enforce Traffic Rules,” Atlanta Constitution, April 18, 1930.  
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movement.” Speaking to the Atlanta’s Builder’s Exchange, he discussed the proposals of the 
survey’s voluminous report based on seven months’ of study. No progress had been made in 
implementing any of its recommendations. The intransigence of the city traffic committee 
remained absolute. They failed to follow Herbert Hoover’s operative principle for improving 
traffic conditions: after finding the remedies, you had to apply them.637  
In late March 1931, exactly two years after Mayor Ragsdale had inaugurated his survey, 
Mayor James L. Key named members to another commission to study traffic conditions. He 
charged the group with ascertaining “the best method to solve what is one of our most vexing 
municipal problems.” Though council did act to make the traffic commission “permanent” (it 
wasn’t), Key ignored the earlier study as if it had never taken place. A newspaper editorial 
reported the events, and with more than a little bitterness recalled the 1929 survey.  
Only a few years ago a similar commission, headed by C. C. Whitaker, an 
outstanding expert in traffic control, spent many months in analyzing traffic 
conditions in every part of the city. It filed a report, replete with graphs and 
accompanied by full recommendations. No more intelligent study was ever made 
of a municipal problem. This report was cast aside and the time and energy 
expended by the prominent citizens who composed the commission was effort 
thrown away.638 
 
The writer highlighted the typical modus operandi adopted by Atlanta’s leaders when 
faced with difficult civic dilemmas during the twenties: (1) appoint a committee to undertake a 
fact-finding study; (2) disregard its recommendations; (3) repeat as often as necessary. For proof, 
he cited a just-completed investigation of sewer system difficulties, which council was in the 
process of steadfastly ignoring. The editorial somewhat dejectedly concluded: “It is to be hoped 
 
637 Atlanta Constitution: “Builders’ Aid Voted in Study of Traffic,” August 22, 1930; F. C. Chandler, 
“Safety in Streets Is Everybody’s Problem,” March 28, 1926. 
638 “The Traffic Commission,” Atlanta Constitution, March 26, 1931. 
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the report of the new traffic commission will not meet the fate of its predecessor and that of other 
commissions appointed to study and report on municipal problems.”639 
The editor had uncovered an ongoing pattern of action/inaction adopted by the Atlanta 
city council. Hunter found an identical operational process in place in Atlanta during the late 
1940s-early 1950s. City leaders hired outside specialists to make plans, but put so many 
restrictions on them that most citizens never even knew about their work. He found city files full 
of expert advice on what to do to fix various municipal problems, but on which no measures had 
ever been taken. “Action results when a plan fits the relatively narrow interests of the policy-
makers, but on many issues there is community paralysis and inaction.”640 
Morris Opler, noted American anthropologist, also noted the general phenomenon, 
describing it this way: 
Often it is the social scientist’s presence and prestige, rather than his knowledge, 
that are wanted. There are powerful men of affairs everywhere who give lip 
service to a “scientific age” but who do not propose to alter their habits of mind or 
action one iota in response to it. . . . This type of executive or administrator is 
willing and even eager, in deference to the new age, to have a social scientist in 
the background . . . to have him put the seal of approval on what is proposed.641    
 
Mayor Key, like his predecessors, reacted to the congestion, crashes, and casualties on 
the streets caused primarily by motorists precisely as his predecessors had done, by more data-
gathering. Elected officials as well as influential decisionmakers knew that hiring experts to 
conduct a much-publicized investigation and publish a seldom-read report would satisfy most 
Atlantans that at least something was being done, even if nothing was actually getting done. The 
 
639 Ibid. 
640 Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, 240. 
641 Morris Opler, “Social Science and Democratic Policy,” Applied Anthropology 4, no. 3 (Summer 1945): 
13. 
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ritual had been followed, saving city leaders from having to make difficult decisions to actually 
fix problems.642  
The practical impact of the 1929 traffic survey did not extend beyond the eventual 
establishment of a citizen traffic commission. However, the survey served several valuable 
purposes. It gathered voluminous data about Atlanta’s downtown streets and sidewalks, their 
various users, and the types of traffic control measures and devices employed by the city. In so 
doing, it documented the tremendous impact the automobile had made on the city’s streets and 
the people using them. It recorded the inarguable primacy of motor vehicles over all other forms 
of transportation in the city, and made clear the preferential treatment given by Atlanta’s leaders 
to those vehicles and their drivers. 
The survey’s committee chairs consisted primarily of elites from the city’s pro-growth 
coalition, a group concerned about the effect of traffic congestion on their businesses and 
Atlanta’s reputation as a business-friendly city. However, when the survey ended, they failed to 
implement its proposals. Coalition members passionately disagreed about parking, and the group 
ultimately took no actions to relieve congestion, beyond continuing to restrict non-vehicular 
street users, a task they undertook with enthusiasm. An obvious conclusion is that city leaders 
really did not want to solve congestion, because doing so would require dealing with its primary 
cause, too many cars.   
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, Atlanta’s powerful growth advocates 
had chosen the automobile as their preferred transportation mode. From the successful effort to 
win the national automobile show in 1909, through the auto-centric 1929 traffic survey, the 
group had championed the car, reconfiguring and re-defining city streets to extend its presence. 
 
642 Hunter called the process “a ritualistic panorama,” Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of 
Decision Makers, 240. 
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The survey, in its methodologies and conclusions, discounted the chosen transit option of the 
majority of Atlantans, streetcars. Its recommendations focused on restricting anybody or 
anything which might hinder the free flow of automobiles on the streets, except parked cars. 
Perhaps a more important conclusion to draw from the survey than its preferential 
treatment of the car was the mindset giving rise to that preference. The report’s underlying 
assumption held that the public streets served as traffic channels, and satisfactory service meant 
the optimum movement of vehicles, not persons. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
principle that everyone had equal rights to the public roadways prevailed, but the 1929 traffic 
survey officially finalized the primacy of motor vehicles over all other means of transportation 
on Atlanta’s streets. It highlighted the changed understanding of the roadways. No longer shared 
spaces, the streets had a new and simpler definition: car conduits. 
8.6 State of the Streets – 1929 
Atlanta’s streets had undergone a remarkable transformation in ten years. They were 
much busier, especially in the central business district where close to 186,000 pedestrians a day 
jostled on the sidewalks of major downtown intersections, while nearly 200,000 vehicles of all 
types jammed onto the narrow streets. Thousands of cars now parked along the curbs, effectively 
cutting the size of many downtown streets in half. Three new viaducts, two exclusively for auto 
traffic, tied the north and south sectors of the city together. Over the decade, miles of streets had 
been graded and paved, usually with concrete, and the traction company installed elevated 
platforms in wider streets to provide safe access for streetcar passengers. 
The entire public space from building line to building line was crowded with traffic 
control instruments including signs, lines, and overhead wires holding signal lights. Non-traffic-
related devices included an extensive white way, trash receptacles, postal collection boxes, and 
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more overhead wires for telephones, telegraphs, and trolleys, plus supply lines to newly-
electrified buildings. Service stations had gas pumps, pressurized air dispensers, and water hoses 
on the sidewalks to provide curb service to drivers. By 1930, however, many of these had moved 
out of the congested district to the suburbs where rents were cheaper.     
The buildings lining downtown streets had changed. Churches sold their valuable in-town 
properties and moved farther out, giving way to tall office buildings and department stores. 
Once-fashionable mansions became boarding houses or were demolished to make room for 
hotels, movie palaces, and apartment buildings. Their wealthy former owners sold out at a profit 
and decamped to Buckhead or Druid Hills. A few of the original structures remained, serving as 
the headquarters for local clubs or art and history organizations. The establishments of motordom 
claimed a large swath of territory along Peachtree Street, popularly called Automobile Row, 
which by 1929 spilled onto West Peachtree, 
Spring, and Ivy [Peachtree Center Ave.] 
streets. 
Not only downtown streets had 
changed; residential neighborhoods, especially 
the new suburbs looked different. Cars still 
parked along the street, but beginning in the 
1910s, driveways were added to individual 
homes to provide off-street parking. By the 
1920s, ads for new bungalows mentioned 
asphalt or “cement” (actually concrete) drives (see image above). 
Figure 51. Ad for house with drive and 
garage; Atlanta Constitution, December 10, 
1929. 
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In the early 1900s, the word “garage” applied to a building for motor vehicle storage, or 
the act of storing a vehicle. At that time the garage might be new built, but most often was a 
converted stable as cars gradually replaced horses. By the late twenties, many new home ads 
featured garages (always detached at this time), taking for granted that of course one had an 
automobile to park in it. George Babbitt had a concrete driveway; also a corrugated iron garage 
which he wanted to replace with a framed structure as the old metal one was not up-to-date. The 
automobile, whether moving or stationary, demanded plenty of land, on and off the streets.  
Motor vehicle traffic also changed the nature of policing. In 1921, the city installed its 
first traffic tower holding two officers who worked the hand-operated signal indicators. More 
towers quickly followed in the congested district. But by 1929, the rapid advance of technology 
had replaced these now-dated structures with three-color, electric traffic signals mounted on 
poles or wires. A sophisticated system allowed central timing of the lights to react to changing 
traffic conditions.  
After two short-term experiments, the city council finally authorized a permanent traffic 
squad in 1929. Its cornermen directed traffic and ticketed jaywalkers, while the motorcycle cops 
chased down drunk drivers and speeders. Pistols replaced billy clubs. Bicycles, the great 
innovation of 1897, were eliminated, and most of the horses were gone.643 As the decade ended, 
the department was even asking for small, speedy automobiles to replace motorcycles. Policing 
in Atlanta had entered the modern era, where the majority of a patrol officer’s time is spent 
dealing with motor vehicles while driving in a car from call to call.      
 
643 The Atlanta Police Department never really got rid of all the horses, and today maintains a Mounted 
Patrol Unit which does daily patrol duty and works large events like parades, festivals, and Falcons’ football games. 
The horses are sworn officers and have their own badges; “Atlanta Mounted Patrol,” © 2021 Atlanta Police 
Foundation, https://atlantapolicefoundation.org/programs/community-engagement/mounted-patrol/. In 2018, bicycle 
patrols were re-established throughout the city as part of a community-oriented, anti-crime effort; Atlanta Police 
Department Policy Manual, APD.SOP.4070 Bicycle Patrol, September 15, 2018; 
https://www.atlantapd.org/Home/ShowDocument?id=2166. 
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The laws police enforced had multiplied to meet the vastly changed functioning of city 
streets and sidewalks. Pages and pages of new ordinances defined who could be in the public 
roadways, what they could do while there, how long they could take up some street space, and 
the penalties for any infractions. Rules of the road, rules of the sidewalk, licensing requirements, 
regulations for every moving vehicle—a vast legislative superstructure overlay the city’s public 
spaces, exempting no one.644 Even schoolchildren had to learn about traffic safety and how to 
correctly cross the road.  
As Wiebe notes, a massive administrative bureaucracy at every level of government 
emerged to enforce, manage, and maintain the regulatory environment, and most Americans 
passively accepted the new regime. The multifarious departments, offices, and bureaus were ably 
assisted by local councils and clubs as well as representatives from the national trade groups, 
professional associations, and automobile organizations. The underlying urge for greater 
continuity, regularity, and functionality led to the creation and subsequent universal adoption of 
uniform traffic codes and devices, and a nationwide system of highways.645 
In Georgia, the motor vehicle department, created in 1916 as a division of the Secretary 
of State’s office, had grown so large with expanded responsibilities that by the end of the decade, 
the Secretary begged the legislature to establish it as a separate department. His request was well 
founded. In 1920, Fulton County had 20,363 registered passenger cars; by 1929, that number 
almost tripled to 56,416. Trucks in the state of Georgia saw an even more spectacular increase, 
from 12,000 in 1920 to more than 50,000 in 1929.646 
 
644 Georgia did not have a driver’s license law until 1937, and did not conduct driver’s license examinations 
until 1939; Table DL-230 “Year of First State Driver License Law and First Driver Examination,” U.S. Department 
of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, “Highway Statistics Summary to 1995, Section 2: Motor 
Vehicles,”  http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/. 
645 Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, 294-96. 
646 George H. Carswell, “Annual Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia for the Year 
Ending December 31, 1929,” (Atlanta: Stein, 1930), 3; Secretary of State, Annual Report of the Secretary of State 
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The railroads worried as the trucking industry began to compete for short haul freight just 
like streetcars and automobiles had already purloined short-distance passenger travel. The 
Atlanta and West Point Railroad’s daily suburban trains from downtown to College Park were 
long gone. Concentrating on long-haul freight and passengers would keep the rail lines in good 
financial shape until the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1950s. However, 
during the twenties, the railroads carried an enormous amount of automotive freight into and out 
of the city, benefitting not only themselves, but also their direct competitors. Ironically, the 
railroad industry had a significant role in contributing to the reputation of Atlanta as a leading 
automobile center.  
The business sections of the city directories demonstrate how far Atlanta had come in its 
embrace of the auto industry. The table below compares the number of entries related to the three 
transportation modes: horse; bicycle, and automobile.647 The horse category included items such 
as the makers of wagons and carriages, blacksmiths, stables, wagon yards, repairs. Bicycle 
entries included sales and repair shops. Automobile entries included parts, accessories, repairs, 
gas stations, parking lots, parking garages, dealerships, used cars, cars for rent, tires, and many 
more. The percentages of the totals are 
for the three modes combined. Rail 
travel is not included.   
Bicycle counts remained fairly 
stable, but as a percentage of the totals, 
declined by more than half. The golden 
 
for the State of Georgia (Atlanta: Franklin, 1898-1932); U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway 
Administration, “Highway Statistics Summary to 1995, Section 2: Motor Vehicles.”  
647 Atlanta City Directory (Atlanta: Foote & Davies/Byrd/Atlanta City Directory, 1899-1930). 
Horse Bicycle Automobile Total
1900 147 12 0 159
1920 48 19 303 370
1929 26 12 349 387
1900 92.5% 7.5% 0.0% 100.0%
1920 13.0% 5.1% 81.9% 100.0%
1929 6.7% 3.1% 90.2% 100.0%
Year
Number of City Directory  Entries
Percentage of Total Entries
Table 18. Horses, Bikes, Cars, 1900-1929 
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age of the bicycle as a popular form of adult transportation occurred in the late nineteenth 
century. By 1929, cyclists made up only a small portion of all the vehicles riding the streets; it 
was far too dangerous. The huge swing occurred between the horse and the automobile, which 
basically switched places. In 1900, the only non-rail competitor to horse-drawn vehicles was the 
bicycle, but by the end of the twenties, the automobile had completely replaced the horse, not 
only in numbers on the streets, but also in impact on the local economy. 
Atlanta began 1929 with the Southeastern Automobile Show, which opened on January 
14. A crowd of more than 10,000 attended the show on the first day where eager buyers placed 
25 orders for the latest offerings from Detroit—both record one-day totals (at that time) for any 
auto show in the South. Beautiful women promoted the new cars while an orchestra played. 
Twenty manufacturers, including motordom’s biggest names, exhibited 127 different models 
with new designs, colors, and features. One reporter said the pageant was enough to make a man 
“trade in his old bus for a swanky new speedster,” which, he observed, was why they held this 
event in the first place. The six-day show drew record crowds and sales. Atlantans did love 
Automobile Week.648 
They also loved their cars, as the 1929 Traffic Survey demonstrated. The volume of cars 
on downtown streets far surpassed any other vehicle on the road, even besting the pedestrian 
counts at the busiest intersections. While merchants often griped about the congestion, the 
majority actually welcomed the mass of potential customers who traveled to the business district 
every weekday. 
 
648 Atlanta Constitution: Loyd A. Wilhoit, “Attendance of 10,000 Is First Day’s Record at Automobile 
Show,” January 15, 1929; “Automobile Show Crowds Continue,” January 17, 1929. No vehicles changed hands at 
the auto show; cars could only be ordered. 
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But one Five Points merchant famously disagreed. Countless historians and history buffs 
have referenced or recited the words of Tom Pitts, owner of a cigar store and soda fountain at 
Five Points. In his 1926 interview with Elinor Hillyer, a reporter for the evening daily 
newspaper, the Atlanta Journal, Pitts lamented the automobiles rushing through downtown, not 
stopping to patronize small businesses. But he was not just any shopkeeper. As a Constitution 
reporter observed in 1924, “The story of Tom Pitts is the story of Atlanta.”649 
Thomas H. Pitts (1872-1938) was born in Boston, Georgia, a tiny town in Thomas 
County just north of the Florida border. He never attended school, but at the age of 23, came to 
Atlanta. With very little capital, he managed to open a cigar stand in the prestigious Norcross 
Building, on the southwest corner of Peachtree and Marietta at Five Points. Within four years, 
Pitts had become a prosperous businessman, acquiring a partner and opening a branch in the 
popular Jacob’s Pharmacy (of Coca-Cola fame) at the intersection of Whitehall and Alabama. 
Newspaper accounts from the 1890s praised his stock of cigars and tobacco goods, and claimed 
that everybody in town knew Mr. Pitts, “one of the jolliest, best fellows in town.” More 
newspaper articles early in the new century relieved Tom Pitts of the necessity of advertising—
reporters were his best publicists (possibly his best customers, too). By their accounts, his was 
one of the most elegant cigar stores in Atlanta.650   
When the Norcross Building burned in 1902, Pitts moved across the street into 21 
Peachtree, with a second location around the corner at 3 Decatur Street. He soon opened cigar 
 
649 Elinor Hillyer, “Tom Pitts Tells of Changes at Five Points,” Atlanta Journal Magazine, October 10, 
1926; “City’s Progress Told in the Story of Pitts’ Success,” Atlanta Constitution, October 12, 1924; Garrett and 
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Ethos in the South, 1920-1930, 120. 
650 Atlanta Constitution: “Mr. Thos. H. Pitts,” December 24, 1897; “One of the Boys,” July 31, 1898; 
“What T. H. Pitts Wants,” December 23, 1902; “The Best Cigars,” July 5, 1903. 
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stands in the new skyscrapers, the Fourth National Bank and the Candler Building. His center-
city locations guaranteed him plenty of walk-in traffic.651 
In 1911, Pitts received notice from his landlord that his lease would not be renewed. In a 
daring move, Tom took out a five-year, $100,000 lease on the old Collier Building, located just 
across Decatur Street, at the confluence of Edgewood, Peachtree, and Decatur. The location 
today is the site of a Walgreen’s pharmacy chain store continuously patronized by students at 
Georgia State University. In 1845, George Washington Collier, one of Atlanta’s pioneer citizens, 
built the original wood-frame grocery store on the site. In 1858, Collier replaced the wood store 
with a three-story brick 
structure, which he also had to 
rebuild after it was destroyed 
by Sherman’s troops in 1864 
(see photo at right). Pitts 
undertook a complete 
renovation before taking 
occupancy, installing a  large, 
marble counter as the soda 
fountain side of his business 
was expanding.652 
 
651 “A Real Story About One of Atlanta’s Young Business Men,” Atlanta Constitution, September 19, 
1905. 
652 Atlanta Constitution: “5 Points Corner Leased by Pitts,” July 29, 1911; “Atlanta’s Strides from Day to 
Day,” July 8, 1914; Garrett and Martin, Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events, 1:237-38, 438. 
Figure 52 shows Five Points ca. 1890 looking east, with plenty of foot traffic in the street. Edgewood Avenue is left; 
Decatur Street is right. Thirty-one years later, Tom Pitts’ cigar and soda store would occupy the same building as 
Harry Silverman’s cigar store, the post-Civil War Collier Building; from an undated, anonymous photograph album, 
Special Collections, Atlanta-Fulton County Public Library. 
Figure 52. Future home of Tom Pitts cigar & soda shop, ca. 
1890. 
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The cigar and soda shop at Five Points stood on one of the prime retail properties in the 
city, perfect for a smaller business which depended on foot traffic. It had frontage on Peachtree, 
Edgewood, and Decatur. It became a known gathering place, and Atlantans would often tell their 
friends to “Meet me at Tom Pitts.” His location soon earned the title, “Pitts’ Corner.” In 1920, he 
had a major increase in his annual lease to more than $32,500 a year—a record figure in the 
Atlanta real estate market at that time. In 1923, Pitts gained membership in the esteemed Capital 
City Club.653 
In 1924, the Constitution conducted an in-depth interview with Tom Pitts about his life 
and business acumen. He acknowledged taking advantage of the growing demand for tobacco 
products, transitioning from pipes to cigars and more recently, cigarettes. He started offering ice 
cream sodas as Georgia considered state-wide prohibition, and expanded to soft drinks and 
flavored milks as the national temperance movement gained influence. Pitts told the reporter that 
he had always considered a central location essential for his type of business, which required 
thousands of sales of mostly low-priced items in order to turn a profit. It explained why he paid 
enormous rents to be at Five Points, the business heart of Atlanta.654  
It came as a shock to many when Thomas Pitts closed his famous soda and cigar stores, 
retiring from business at age 54, on October 1, 1926. In his famous, often-quoted interview in the 
Journal, Pitts recounted how downtown had changed; how Five Points, once a gathering place at 
the center, was now a thoroughfare people dashed through on their way to somewhere else. He 
did not hesitate to assign blame.  
I think the real thing that did it was automobiles, and more automobiles. Traffic 
got so congested that the only hope was to keep it going. Hundreds used to stop; 
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now thousands pass. . . . New traffic rules have made it impossible to park an 
automobile within two or three blocks of Five Points, and the traffic signals keep 
everything moving. Street cars do not take on and let off passengers at the old 
junction corners, but rush past to the block beyond. . . . For years and years Five 
Points was the best retail spot in the city. . . . Five Points has become more like a 
Wall Street business section. . . . The place where soda fountain trade is, is where 
automobiles go, and one must have wide spaces for curb service.655 
 
In a complete about-face from his 1924 assertion, he somewhat wistfully added, “A 
central location is no longer a good one for my sort of business” (emphasis added).656 Tom Pitts, 
like a few other keen observers, acted on the evolving decentralization of downtown, for which 
the automobile certainly bore some responsibility. He precisely described the street changes 
instituted during the twenties: traffic signals; on-street parking restrictions; the elimination of 
streetcar stops at congested corners. He presciently perceived that his type of store now needed 
plenty of space where cars could drive up and either get curbside service or drivers had only a 
short walk to shop inside.   
Tom Pitts’ store could be likened to the canary in the coal mine, a signal that changing 
conditions in downtown would no longer sustain a successful business enterprise of a certain 
type. Many would eventually move out to the suburbs, while others simply retired from the fray; 
meanwhile Atlantans arranging a downtown rendezvous would no longer tell each other to 
“Meet me at Tom Pitts.” During the remaining years of the decade after Mr. Pitts’ departure, 
Atlanta’s traffic congestion would only get worse as more cars crammed onto downtown 
streets.657 
Tom Pitts’ abandonment of Five Points presaged Richard Sennett’s discussion of modern 
“dead public space” by fifty years, but the ideas area the same. The intersection called Five 
 
655 Hillyer, “Tom Pitts Tells of Changes at Five Points.”  
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February 24, 1938.  
355 
Points, Atlanta’s closest thing to a town square and once a communal meeting place, had become 
a pass-through space, “an area to move through, not be in.” Sennett asserts that the public square 
had lost its essential nature—a space where a variety of persons intermixed and a diverse array of 
activities took place. It had become a dead space, a space contingent upon motion. City streets, 
and even the spaces around them, like sidewalks, plazas, and squares, have become functions of 
motion. “Their design concept merges with the technology of transportation, losing any 
experiential meaning of their own.” People no longer gather in the street, and seldom stop or 
gather on the sidewalks—the street and the sidewalks have only one valid raison d’être—to be 
spaces where motion is the only acceptable activity. Keep moving or be run down.658 
Throughout the twenties, Atlanta’s power elites continued to exercise their collective 
will, moving the city along the path of expansion, gaining more people, wider borders, and 
substantial wealth. They seized on every chance to extend the city’s regional influence, and 
secure Atlanta’s position as the southeastern locus of finance, transportation, commerce, and 
manufacturing. As early as 1909, they had chosen the automobile as their vehicle to fortune, 
confident it would bring customers to downtown, open up the hinterlands for new homes and 
businesses, and provide economic opportunities not only by making and selling cars, but also 
through the many subsidiary industries of motordom. Local newspapers publicized motor 
vehicles, with special “traffic talks” and “motor pep” columns and detailed stories about car 
races, auto shows, and the latest models. Auto ad sales generated considerable revenue for paper 
and magazine publishers. Realtors benefited from the automobile as an expansion tool, bringing 
new enterprises in and helping residents live further out. The coalition assisted, and profited 
 
658 Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, 12-14. 
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from, the greater involvement of automotive interests in Atlanta’s government, industry, and 
culture.659 
Over the course of the decade, automobiles became incredibly popular and increasingly 
essential, broadening horizons physically and experientially. Members of the pro-growth 
coalition were hardly the only ones privileging cars over streetcars. The rapid and all-
encompassing embrace of the motor vehicle brought many benefits, but also an array of 
unanticipated, unintended, and sometimes horrific consequences. Atlanta’s leaders, like those in 
other cities, failed to address all the problems. During the 1920s, they never developed a 
comprehensive city plan for land use and traffic control, but instead implemented sporadic, 
unsystematic, partial measures. “The result, of course, was that cities, and the life-styles of their 
inhabitants, were increasingly altered to meet the demands and opportunities created by the 
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9 CONCLUSION 
On January 5, 1928, the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission presented a report to the 
mayor and city council entitled The Relation of Individual to Collective Transportation. The 
commission consisted primarily of esteemed engineers in the automobile industry and was 
chaired by the vice president and general manager of Packard Motor Company. The purpose of 
the report was to show the growth in private automobile use (“individual transportation”) and in 
public mass transit (“collective transportation”). It detailed the facilities needed to accommodate 
both along with plans to provide for an efficient and economical future city.661 
The committee’s name, Rapid Transit Commission, might lead one to think their major 
concern was efficient travel by mass transit. Not so. The report’s second paragraph amply 
demonstrated the group’s pro-automobile stance. It asserted the universality of the effects of 
automobility, claiming everyone wanted wide roadways so they could travel by car freely in any 
direction. The economic feasibility of meeting that desire was the only real question confronting 
the city.662 
The Commission acknowledged the right of the individual to occupy the public roads, 
which previously had not presented any real problems. Historically, only a small percentage of 
the population possessed private transportation, and that only over limited distances. In urban 
areas, the more economical approach had been to collect individual rights into a public transit 
option available to the entire community. But “the introduction of the automobile, and its 
corollary, the hard surfaced road” had changed everything, giving to individuals freedom and 
range of movement never seen before. Within the past twenty years, the right of the private 
 
661 Rapid Transit Commission, The Relation of Individual to Collective Transportation, 7, 9. Other 
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individual to use the public road had gained a new significance. Upon that right, the entire 
automobile industry, the U.S.’s number one producer, had been constructed. Any effort to 
remove or abridge that prerogative could not be attempted or even considered; it would result in 
a “social revolution.”663 
The resulting quandary, to which the report would supply multiple solutions, was how to 
affordably accommodate both individual and collective transportation modes. Not surprisingly, 
the Commission’s answers involved building more and bigger roads and highways. They did 
acknowledge that the car had its most economical use and greatest value in low-density, long-
distance travel (i.e., suburbs and hinterlands), while mass transit was the most practical and 
efficient travel mode in areas with high concentrations of people (i.e., cities). The report cited 
statistics similar to Atlanta’s Beeler Report, how trolleys and buses transported 72% of the 
passenger traffic in only 5.4% of the vehicular traffic. It even went so far as to say that, in central 
business districts, mass transit should be given preference over the automobile.664 
However, the rest of the report provided various ways to enlarge and enable greater 
automobile use. It suggested that mass transit for trips from outlying areas into the city center be 
relegated to elevateds or subways, freeing up street space for everyone else. While insisting that 
mass transportation was the only solution to traffic problems in cities, the Commission 
contradicted its own assertion by advocating and providing for even greater use of cars in cities, 
citing the following reasons.  
In spite of the fact that individual transport in automobiles costs nearly twice as 
much per passenger-mile as any form of rail transport, its use has increased until 
it is now more important in point of national expenditure than all other forms of 
passenger transportation put together. Of still greater consequence and social 
significance is the fact that this represents almost entirely new business developed 
in the last two decades. In other words, a new national riding habit has been 
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created which requires for its satisfaction nearly five times the amount of money 
per annum that is spent on all the other elements of passenger transport combined 
(emphasis added).665 
 
In other words, cars cost twice as much as trolleys to operate. Five times the total amount 
of money spent on all other passenger travel modes went into expanding and maintaining the 
requisite infrastructure for motor vehicles. The economics made no sense; but, apparently, the 
Commission found it too hopeless or incomprehensible that any sort of resistance to this 
relatively new phenomenon be mounted. Building public streets to accommodate private cars—
at enormous taxpayer expense—was really the only solution offered in the report. Clearly 
someone somewhere had made and was continuing to make a great deal of money off their 
creation of the “new national riding habit,” the demanding automobile, which cost so much and 
took up so much space. 
Basically the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission gave the roads to the cars, which is what 
happened in Atlanta. The Commission’s report only twice mentioned in tandem the words 
“automobile” and “hard-surfaced road,” but it was clear that they understood the necessity of 
good roads to the car. Without that “essential corollary,” the automobile could not have provided 
the freedom and ease of movement which made it universally popular and indispensable.666 
The importance of a hard-surfaced roadway to the automobile was instantaneously 
apparent to anyone riding in one. The early horseless carriages frequently overturned when 
hitting a bump or dip in the road, and easily became mired in mudholes. Cartoonists found 
fodder in the frequent, usually-harmless mishaps (see image below). Prominent Atlanta 
physician, Dr. Ludwig Amster, complained to a Constitution reporter about the “abominable” 
state of the city’s streets. Utilizing the nomenclature of the day, the doctor said that good roads 
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(out in the country) were fine, but wanted to know why the streets (inside the city) were 
“unpaved, rough, filled with gullies.” A frequent motorist thoroughly familiar with the city map, 
Dr. Amster observed that the Whitehall-Peachtree corridor provided the only good stretch of 
pavement, and once off it, anyone riding in a car could tell the difference. “As long as you walk 
or ride in a street car or even ride in a carriage, the condition of Atlanta’s streets are not so 
noticeable, but once you get into an automobile you will jolt with indignation not only mentally, 
but also physically.”667 
Cars require hard, smooth, durable surfaces on which to travel; without a network of 
paved roads, its range would be limited. The modern first-world motorist can scarcely 
comprehend a time when this was not universal knowledge. During the 1920s, Atlanta regularly 
spent vast sums on paving suitable for automobiles. In the prior two decades, the combined 
business interests, pro-growth advocates, and elected officials of Atlanta promoted automobile 
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use and advocated for motorists rights. In the twenties, they re-legislated and reconfigured the 
city’s streets, but all of it took place before the majority of Atlantans even owned a car. 
“Inequitable” perhaps best summarizes in a word the problem with the growth-machine 
coalition. Other descriptors—hegemonic, unfair, unjust, discriminatory, preferential, non-
inclusive—also apply to the way any urban pro-growth urban alliance functions. The complete 
exclusion of any African American from the dominant white association provides the largest, 
most egregious example of the inequity of the system in the time period of this study. However, 
all working-class and most middle-class whites also had no representation in the city’s most 
powerful decision-making body. As Hunter observes, the ordinary person has no voice in policy 
determination, where the decisions are handed down from above. “These individuals are the 
silent group…. The flow of information is downward in larger volume than it is upward.” 
Despite loud claims about addressing community problems and concerns, only narrow interests 
inform the workings of Atlanta’s “unrepresentative set of power wielders.”668  
The top men had little understanding of the important issues confronting all of the Blacks 
and most of the rest of Atlanta’s citizens. At least some of their blindness resulted from their lack 
of connection to the lives of average folks. One’s operative milieu has great effect on one’s 
views of society, as the following transportation example demonstrates.  
The segregated existence of many of Atlanta’s pro-growth, car-centric individuals left 
them unaware of or unconcerned about the difficulties faced by ordinary people who rode the 
crowded streetcars to work daily. If one never had to take a trolley, one could not comprehend its 
strategic importance to the thousands who did. That lack of awareness made it easier to label 
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trolleys as the enemy of freely-flowing traffic and demand they be curtailed or eliminated, giving 
no thought to the hardships such actions would place on those dependent on mass transit.  
The extreme short-sightedness of the anti-streetcar position, which resulted in hordes of 
new automobiles choking the streets beyond what any number of trolleys ever did, underscores 
the same bias toward the automobile by Atlanta’s power elites demonstrated by Detroit’s Rapid 
Transit Commission. The expense did not really matter; taxpayers would cover that. The slicing 
up of the city by new arterials and later interstates did not really matter; only the poor in the run-
down neighborhoods, invariably the sites of the new roadways, would be discommoded. Even 
traffic congestion did not really matter. Eliminating or reducing cars in downtown might hurt 
business, and, as Brownell notes, many downtown merchants had concluded that traffic 
congestion was preferable to isolating the central business district by limiting cars.669 
The disconnect between the pro-growth policymakers and the masses had the potential to 
create conflicts leading to protests and violence. It did happen in Atlanta, as seen in 1914-15 at 
the Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, where workers struck, unsuccessfully, for better conditions, 
higher wages and the right to unionize. Generally, however, during the time period of this study, 
the overwhelming wealth and power of the top men, greatly assisted by Jim Crow legislation, 
made significant pushback against their authority virtually impossible. 
The city’s growth alliance did nurture relationships with labor leaders. Walter Cobb 
Caraway (1876-1937), a linotype operator for the Atlanta Journal, was also president of the 
Atlanta Federation of Trades and head of the Labor League. He was selected by the mayor to 
serve on the influential Spring Street viaduct commission. Attorney and former tailor, Louie 
Philip Marquardt (1876-1935), had represented workers during the Fulton Bag and Cotton strike, 
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and headed both the Atlanta and Georgia labor federations. He was selected as a member of both 
the city’s planning board and the Forward Atlanta Commission.  
The inclusion of these two into the lower tiers of the coalition, however, did not 
counterbalance the lack of representation of most Atlantans on policy-making bodies. The vast 
majority of the citizenry were not self-governing; they had little to no control over their urban 
environment. Even the city council represented narrow interests, rather than those of the greater 
community. As Hunter remarks, “This situation does not square with the concepts of democracy 
we have been taught to revere.”670   
This is the great problem with the growth-machine alliance. Recent studies underscore 
the anti-democratic nature of the coalition, and demonstrate that, in some places, governments 
are beginning to respond to the demands of ordinary citizens, especially homeowners, regarding 
zoning and land-use regulation. Molotch discusses the environmental and economic costs of 
growth, unequally borne by the non-elites, and the emergence of counter-coalition groups. 
Strategies including historic district overlays, assertion of Native rights, and community benefits 
agreements are resulting in more representative, use value-conscious growth; not just growth 
benefiting the few.671   
The coalition’s policies of continuous growth and non-stop expansion of car-crowded 
roads have had massive environmental impacts and contributed enormously to the existential 
climate crisis humanity now faces. Today, a plethora of efforts are underway to displace the 
single-rider, petroleum-powered motor vehicle, create shared and non-car streets, densify cities, 
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reduce carbon emissions, and keep the earth habitable. Any successful attempt to alter the 
dominant position of the automobile in society must be prefaced by an understanding of how that 
preeminence was established. This means recognizing that the rise of the automobile was 
accomplished through a years-long series of deliberate policy choices made at every level of 
government. Those choices transformed physical and legislative systems, re-organized the city 
itself, and even altered the architecture of its buildings. To comprehend how such policies were 
formulated, one must understand the power structure which conceived and enacted those 
policies. I have attempted to show how this dominance was established in one city, tracing the 
steps of its emplacement by those in power, i.e., the pro-growth coalition. 
 By understanding what happened—and how—in a single place, one can find specific 
ways to counter inequitable and destructive trends that may be applicable regionally and 
nationally. It was not Atlanta’s love affair with the automobile that established the car’s 
supremacy on the roadways, nor was it democracy in action; it was capitalism in action. As 
Cronon observes, “The landscape we have created for them [cars] makes no other options 
available to us. We have no choice but to love them. . . . The scale of our resulting dependence 
on the automobile is so vast that unwinding these dependencies is hard even to imagine.”672   
By demonstrating that deliberate choices and specific policies led to automotive 
supremacy, this study suggests that similar determination, resources, and sustained legislative 
actions will be necessary to alleviate somewhat the catastrophic consequences of Atlanta’s, and 
America’s, massive carbon footprints. Popular grassroots campaigns of good will and good 
intentions will not suffice against a ubiquitous motordom that has been entrenched in American 
life and on the American landscape for more than a century. 
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